mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-13 14:43:46 +01:00
07b3028db7
In a nutshell, since a circuit can not exit at its entry point, it's very easy for an attacker to find the hidden service guard if only one EntryNodes is specified since for that guard, the HS will refuse to build a rendezvous circuit to it. For now, the best solution is to stop tor to allow a single EntryNodes for an hidden service. Fixes #14917 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
85 lines
3.5 KiB
C
85 lines
3.5 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2015, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file routerlist.h
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* \brief Header file for routerset.c
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**/
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#ifndef TOR_ROUTERSET_H
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#define TOR_ROUTERSET_H
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routerset_t *routerset_new(void);
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void routerset_refresh_countries(routerset_t *rs);
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int routerset_parse(routerset_t *target, const char *s,
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const char *description);
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void routerset_union(routerset_t *target, const routerset_t *source);
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int routerset_is_list(const routerset_t *set);
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int routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set);
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int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set);
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int routerset_contains_router(const routerset_t *set, const routerinfo_t *ri,
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country_t country);
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int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set,
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const routerstatus_t *rs,
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country_t country);
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int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set,
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const extend_info_t *ei);
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int routerset_contains_node(const routerset_t *set, const node_t *node);
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void routerset_get_all_nodes(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset,
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const routerset_t *excludeset,
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int running_only);
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int routerset_add_unknown_ccs(routerset_t **setp, int only_if_some_cc_set);
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void routerset_subtract_nodes(smartlist_t *out,
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const routerset_t *routerset);
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char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset);
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int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new);
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void routerset_free(routerset_t *routerset);
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int routerset_len(const routerset_t *set);
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#ifdef ROUTERSET_PRIVATE
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STATIC char * routerset_get_countryname(const char *c);
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STATIC int routerset_contains(const routerset_t *set, const tor_addr_t *addr,
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uint16_t orport,
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const char *nickname, const char *id_digest,
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country_t country);
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/** A routerset specifies constraints on a set of possible routerinfos, based
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* on their names, identities, or addresses. It is optimized for determining
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* whether a router is a member or not, in O(1+P) time, where P is the number
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* of address policy constraints. */
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struct routerset_t {
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/** A list of strings for the elements of the policy. Each string is either
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* a nickname, a hexadecimal identity fingerprint, or an address policy. A
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* router belongs to the set if its nickname OR its identity OR its address
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* matches an entry here. */
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smartlist_t *list;
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/** A map from lowercase nicknames of routers in the set to (void*)1 */
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strmap_t *names;
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/** A map from identity digests routers in the set to (void*)1 */
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digestmap_t *digests;
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/** An address policy for routers in the set. For implementation reasons,
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* a router belongs to the set if it is _rejected_ by this policy. */
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smartlist_t *policies;
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/** A human-readable description of what this routerset is for. Used in
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* log messages. */
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char *description;
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/** A list of the country codes in this set. */
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smartlist_t *country_names;
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/** Total number of countries we knew about when we built <b>countries</b>.*/
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int n_countries;
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/** Bit array mapping the return value of geoip_get_country() to 1 iff the
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* country is a member of this routerset. Note that we MUST call
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* routerset_refresh_countries() whenever the geoip country list is
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* reloaded. */
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bitarray_t *countries;
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};
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#endif
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#endif
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