tor/doc/TODO
Roger Dingledine 5cce710e2b Some more documentation and specs for CONNECT_DIR and BEGIN_DIR.
Demand that BEGIN_DIR cells have an empty payload.


svn:r9104
2006-12-13 22:42:52 +00:00

458 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext

$Id$
Legend:
SPEC!! - Not specified
SPEC - Spec not finalized
N - nick claims
R - arma claims
P - phobos claims
- Not done
* Top priority
. Partially done
o Done
D Deferred
X Abandoned
. <nickm> "Let's try to find a way to make it run and make the version
match, but if not, let's just make it run."
- <arma> "should we detect if we have a --with-ssl-dir and try the -R
by default, if it works?"
Items for 0.1.2.x, real soon now:
x - When we've been idle a long time, we stop fetching server
descriptors. When we then get a socks request, we build circuits
immediately using whatever descriptors we have, rather than waiting
until we've fetched correct ones.
x - If the client's clock is too far in the past, it will drop (or
just not try to get) descriptors, so it'll never build circuits.
N - Bug 326: make eventdns thrash less.
N - Test guard unreachable logic; make sure that we actually attempt to
connect to guards that we think are unreachable from time to time.
Make sure that we don't freak out when the network is down.
N - Stop recommending exits as guards?
P - Figure out why dll's compiled in mingw don't work right in WinXP.
P - Figure out why openssl 0.9.8d "make test" fails at sha256t test.
Items for 0.1.2.x:
- Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions,
we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If
we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If
we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an internal
circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the last hop, we
reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper.
- enumerate events of important things that occur in tor, so vidalia can
react.
o Backend implementation
R - Actually list all the events (notice and warn log messages are a good
place to look.) Divide messages into categories, perhaps.
R - Specify general event system
R - Specify actual events.
. Have (and document) a BEGIN_DIR relay cell that means "Connect to your
directory port."
o Specify
o Implement
o Use for something, so we can be sure it works.
o Test and debug
- turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
- be able to connect without having a server descriptor, to bootstrap.
- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
- include ORPort in DirServers lines so we can know where to connect.
N - Document .noconnect addresses... but where?
x - We should ship with a list of stable dir mirrors -- they're not
trusted like the authorities, but they'll provide more robustness
and diversity for bootstrapping clients.
N - Simplify authority operation
- Follow weasel's proposal, crossed with mixminion dir config format
- Servers are easy to setup and run: being a relay is about as easy as
being a client.
. Reduce resource load
d - Tolerate clock skew on bridge relays.
o A way to alert controller when router flags change.
o Specify: SETEVENTS NS
o Implement
N - Hunt for places that change networkstatus info that I might have
missed.
d - A way to adjust router flags from the controller
d - a way to pick entries based wholly on extend_info equivalent;
a way to export extend_info equivalent.
R - option to dl directory info via tor
- Make an option like __AllDirActionsPrivate that falls back to
non-Tor DL when not enough info present.
D Count TLS bandwidth more accurately
N - DNS improvements
o Option to deal with broken DNS of the "ggoogle.com? Ah, you meant
ads.me.com!" variety.
o Autodetect whether DNS is broken in this way.
- Additional fix: allow clients to have some addresses that mean,
notfound. Yes, this blacklists IPs for having ever been used by
DNS hijackers.
o Don't ask reject *:* nodes for DNS unless client wants you to.
. Asynchronous DNS
o Document and rename SearchDomains, ResolvConf options
D Make API closer to getaddrinfo()
o Teach evdns about ipv6.
- Make evdns use windows strerror equivalents.
- Teach evdns to be able to listen for requests to be processed.
o Design interface.
o Rename stuff; current names suck.
o Design backend.
. Implement
o Listen for questions
o Parse questions, tell user code
o Let user code tell us the answer
o Generate responses
o Send responses to client
o Queue responses when we see EAGAIN
o Retry responses after a while
o Be efficient about labels.
o Fix the interface for flags and flag handling.
o Generate truncated responses correctly.
- Comment everything.
o Clean up XXXX items
. Test
- Add some kind of general question/response API so libevent can be
flexible here.
d - Add option to use /etc/hosts?
d - Special-case localhost?
- Verify that it works on windows
. Make reverse DNS work.
. Add client-side interface
o SOCKS interface: specify
o SOCKS interface: implement
- Cache answers client-side
o Add to Tor-resolve.py
- Add to tor-resolve
- Check for invalid characters in hostnames before trying to resolve
them. (This will help catch attempts do to mean things to our DNS
server, and bad software that tries to do DNS lookups on whole URLs.)
- address_is_invalid_destination() is the right thing to call here
(and feel free to make that function smarter)
- Performance improvements
x - Better estimates in the directory of whether servers have good uptime
(high expected time to failure) or good guard qualities (high
fractional uptime).
- AKA Track uptime as %-of-time-up, as well as time-since-last-down
- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
x - spec
d - implement
- Critical but minor bugs, backport candidates.
d - Failed rend desc fetches sometimes don't get retried. True/false?
R - support dir 503s better
o clients don't log as loudly when they receive them
- they don't count toward the 3-strikes rule
- should there be some threshold of 503's after which we give up?
- Delay when we get a lot of 503s.
N - split "router is down" from "dirport shouldn't be tried for a while"?
Just a separate bit.
- authorities should *never* 503 a cache, but *should* 503 clients
when they feel like it.
- update dir-spec with what we decided for each of these
- Windows server usability
- Solve the ENOBUFS problem.
- make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets,
so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one.
- make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the
buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c.
- We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some
file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger
asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash.
M - rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow.
- Add overlapped IO
Nd- Have a mode that doesn't write to disk much, so we can run Tor on
flash memory (e.g. Linksys routers or USB keys).
o Add AvoidDiskWrites config option.
- only write state file when it's "changed"
- stop writing identity key / fingerprint / etc every restart
- stop caching directory stuff -- and disable mmap?
- more?
NR. Write path-spec.txt
- Packaging
- Tell people about OSX Uninstaller
- Quietly document NT Service options
- Switch canonical win32 compiler to mingw.
NR - Get some kind of "meta signing key" to be used solely to sign
releases/to certify releases when signed by the right people/
to certify sign the right people's keys? Also use this to cert the SSL
key, etc.
- If we haven't replaced privoxy, lock down its configuration in all
packages, as documented in tor-doc-unix.html
- Docs
- More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list.
- recommend gaim.
- unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug.
- torrc.complete.in needs attention?
- we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date.
Topics to think about during 0.1.2.x development:
* Figure out incentives.
- (How can we make this tolerant of a bad v0?)
* Figure out non-clique.
* Figure out China.
- Figure out partial network knowledge.
- Figure out hidden services.
- Design next-version protocol for directories
- Design next-version protocol for connections
For blocking-resistance scheme:
o allow ordinary-looking ssl for dir connections. need a new dirport
for this, or can we handle both ssl and non-ssl, or should we
entirely switch to ssl in certain cases?
d - need to figure out how to fetch status of a few servers from the BDA
without fetching all statuses. A new URL to fetch I presume?
Deferred from 0.1.2.x:
- Improvements to bandwidth counting
R - look into "uncounting" bytes spent on local connections, so
we can bandwidthrate but still have fast downloads.
R - "bandwidth classes", for incoming vs initiated-here conns,
and to give dir conns lower priority.
. Write limiting; separate token bucket for write
- preemptively give a 503 to some dir requests
- per-conn write buckets
- separate config options for read vs write limiting
- Directory guards
- RAM use in directory authorities.
- Memory use improvements:
- Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
- Save and mmap v1 directories, and networkstatus docs; store them
zipped, not uncompressed.
- Switch cached_router_t to use mmap.
- What to do about reference counts on windows? (On Unix, this is
easy: unlink works fine. (Right?) On Windows, I have doubts. Do we
need to keep multiple files?)
- What do we do about the fact that people can't read zlib-
compressed files manually?
- Add IPv6 support to eventdns.c
- Refactor DNS resolve implementation
- Refactor exit side of resolve: do we need a connection_t?
- Refactor entry side of resolve: do we need a connection_t?
- A more efficient dir protocol.
- Authorities should fetch the network-statuses amongst each
other, consensus them, and advertise a communal network-status.
This is not so much for safety/complexity as it is to reduce
bandwidth requirements for Alice.
- How does this interact with our goal of being able to choose
your own dir authorities? I guess we're now assuming that all
dir authorities know all the other authorities in their "group"?
- Should we also look into a "delta since last network-status
checkpoint" scheme, to reduce overhead further?
- Extend the "r" line in network-status to give a set of buckets (say,
comma-separated) for that router.
- Buckets are deterministic based on IP address.
- Then clients can choose a bucket (or set of buckets) to
download and use.
- Improvements to versioning.
- When we connect to a Tor server, it sends back a cell listing
the IP it believes it is using. Use this to block dvorak's attack.
Also, this is a fine time to say what time you think it is.
o Verify that a new cell type is okay with deployed codebase
. Specify HELLO cells
. Figure out v0 compatibility.
- Implement
Minor items for 0.1.2.x as time permits:
- don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy?
o Some way for the authorities to set BadExit for some nodes manually.
- When we export something from foo.c file for testing purposes only,
make a foo_test.h file for test.c to include.
- "getinfo fingerprint" controller command
- "setevent guards" controller command
- The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting,
to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps
the RPM and other startup scripts should too?
- add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can fix the
https thing in the default configuration:
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort
- even if your torrc lists yourself in your myfamily line, don't list it in
the descriptor.
- Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
- Don't let 'newnym' be triggered more often than every n seconds.
o change log_fn() to log() on notice/warn/err logs where we can.
- the deb now uses --verify-config to distinguish between configuration
errors and other errors. Should the rpm, the ports, etc do this too?
X If we try to publish as a nickname that's already claimed, should
we append a number (or increment the number) and try again? This
way people who read their logs can fix it as before, but people
who don't read their logs will still offer Tor servers.
- Fall back to unnamed; warn user; send controller event.
! - Tor should bind its ports before dropping privs, so users don't
have to do the ipchains dance.
- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
also introduces DoS opportunities.
! - The bw_accounting file should get merged into the state file.
- Streamline how we pick entry nodes.
! - Better installers and build processes.
- Commit edmanm's win32 makefile to tor contrib, or write a new one.
- Christian Grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type
which is used for the first N data cells, and only
extend-data cells can be extend requests.
- Specify, including thought about anonymity implications.
- Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under some
circumstances?
- We need a way for the authorities to declare that nodes are
in a family. Also, it kinda sucks that family declarations use O(N^2)
space in the descriptors.
- If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n,
we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other
people can notice too.
- cpu fixes:
- see if we should make use of truncate to retry
X kill dns workers more slowly
. Directory changes
. Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval
- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
- Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination.
- packaging and ui stuff:
. multiple sample torrc files
. figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
. Document it.
- Vet all pending installer patches
- Win32 installer plus privoxy, sockscap/freecap, etc.
- Vet win32 systray helper code
- Improve controller
- a NEWSTATUS event similar to NEWDESC.
- change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose,
whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become
too dirty for further circuits, etc.
- What do we want here, exactly?
- Specify and implement it.
- Change stream status events analogously.
- What do we want here, exactly?
- Specify and implement it.
- Make other events "better".
- Change stream status events analogously.
- What do we want here, exactly?
- Specify and implement it.
- Make other events "better" analogously
- What do we want here, exactly?
- Specify and implement it.
. Expose more information via getinfo:
- import and export rendezvous descriptors
- Review all static fields for additional candidates
- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
- We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to
download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download.
- It would be nice to request address lookups from the controller
without using SOCKS.
- Make everything work with hidden services
- Directory system improvements
- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond
ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too.
- Parse this.
- Relay this in networkstatus.
Future version:
- Configuration format really wants sections.
- Good RBL substitute.
- Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some URLS
(specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the List Of Things
Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them for results. Exits that
don't give good answers should have the BadExit flag set.
- Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy
is pretty lame; we should get a better one.
. Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach.
- switch to an ascii format, maybe sexpr?
- authdirservers publish blobs of them.
- other authdirservers fetch these blobs.
- hidserv people have the option of not uploading their blobs.
- you can insert a blob via the controller.
- and there's some amount of backwards compatibility.
- teach clients, intro points, and hidservs about auth mechanisms.
- come up with a few more auth mechanisms.
- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
connection requests.
- Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers,
to reduce remote sniping attacks.
- Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
before we approve them.
- Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers
over last N seconds.
- Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what it's for.
- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to
be us as not.
- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman
nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps?
- Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using
those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we recognize
("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not working").
- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.
- Handle full buffers without totally borking
- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
maybe per subnet.
- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
design.
- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
- Specify?
- tor-resolve script should use socks5 to get better error messages.
- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
* figure out what breaks for this, and do it.
- tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses
that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
- Specify; implement.
- let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own
OutboundBindAddress?
- Stop using tor_socketpair to make connection bridges: do an
implementation that uses buffers only.
Blue-sky:
- Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
- Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors.
- The "China problem"
- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
connection (tls session key) rotation.
- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
(Pending a user who needs this)
- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
we've seen in the wild.
(Pending a user who needs this)
Non-Coding:
- Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers
- Mention controller libs someplace.
. more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake
NR- write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
- tor-in-the-media page
- Remove need for HACKING file.
- Figure out licenses for website material.
- Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff
Website:
- and remove home and make the "Tor" picture be the link to home.
- put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
stickers directly, etc.
R - make a page with the hidden service diagrams.
- ask Jan to be the translation coordinator? add to volunteer page.
- add a page for localizing all tor's components.