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95 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
95 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: 139-conditional-consensus-download.txt
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Title: Download consensus documents only when it will be trusted
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Author: Peter Palfrader
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Created: 2008-04-13
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Status: Closed
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Implemented-In: 0.2.1.x
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Overview:
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Servers only provide consensus documents to clients when it is known that
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the client will trust it.
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Motivation:
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When clients[1] want a new network status consensus they request it
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from a Tor server using the URL path /tor/status-vote/current/consensus.
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Then after downloading the client checks if this consensus can be
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trusted. Whether the client trusts the consensus depends on the
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authorities that the client trusts and how many of those
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authorities signed the consensus document.
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If the client cannot trust the consensus document it is disregarded
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and a new download is tried at a later time. Several hundred
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kilobytes of server bandwidth were wasted by this single client's
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request.
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With hundreds of thousands of clients this will have undesirable
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consequences when the list of authorities has changed so much that a
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large number of established clients no longer can trust any consensus
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document formed.
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Objective:
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The objective of this proposal is to make clients not download
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consensuses they will not trust.
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Proposal:
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The list of authorities that are trusted by a client are encoded in
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the URL they send to the directory server when requesting a consensus
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document.
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The directory server then only sends back the consensus when more than
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half of the authorities listed in the request have signed the
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consensus. If it is known that the consensus will not be trusted
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a 404 error code is sent back to the client.
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This proposal does not require directory caches to keep more than one
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consensus document. This proposal also does not require authorities
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to verify the signature on the consensus document of authorities they
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do not recognize.
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The new URL scheme to download a consensus is
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/tor/status-vote/current/consensus/<F> where F is a list of
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fingerprints, sorted in ascending order, and concatenated using a +
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sign.
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Fingerprints are uppercase hexadecimal encodings of the authority
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identity key's digest. Servers should also accept requests that
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use lower case or mixed case hexadecimal encodings.
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A .z URL for compressed versions of the consensus will be provided
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similarly to existing resources and is the URL that usually should
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be used by clients.
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Migration:
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The old location of the consensus should continue to work
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indefinitely. Not only is it used by old clients, but it is a useful
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resource for automated tools that do not particularly care which
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authorities have signed the consensus.
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Authorities that are known to the client a priori by being shipped
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with the Tor code are assumed to handle this format.
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When downloading a consensus document from caches that do not support this
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new format they fall back to the old download location.
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Caches support the new format starting with Tor version 0.2.1.1-alpha.
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Anonymity Implications:
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By supplying the list of authorities a client trusts to the directory
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server we leak information (like likely version of Tor client) to the
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directory server. In the current system we also leak that we are
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very old - by re-downloading the consensus over and over again, but
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only when we are so old that we no longer can trust the consensus.
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Footnotes:
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1. For the purpose of this proposal a client can be any Tor instance
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that downloads a consensus document. This includes relays,
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directory caches as well as end users.
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