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3008 lines
110 KiB
C
3008 lines
110 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file connection_edge.c
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* \brief Handle edge streams.
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**/
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#define CONNECTION_EDGE_PRIVATE
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#include "or.h"
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#include "addressmap.h"
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#include "buffers.h"
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#include "channel.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "connection_edge.h"
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#include "connection_or.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "dns.h"
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#include "dnsserv.h"
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#include "dirserv.h"
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#include "hibernate.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "policies.h"
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#include "reasons.h"
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#include "relay.h"
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#include "rendclient.h"
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#include "rendcommon.h"
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#include "rendservice.h"
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#include "rephist.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "routerlist.h"
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#include "routerset.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_TYPES_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETFILTER_IPV4_H
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#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
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#define TRANS_NETFILTER
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#endif
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#if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H)
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/pfvar.h>
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#define TRANS_PF
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#endif
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#define SOCKS4_GRANTED 90
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#define SOCKS4_REJECT 91
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static int connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(entry_connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn);
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static int consider_plaintext_ports(entry_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port);
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static int connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(const entry_connection_t *);
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/** An AP stream has failed/finished. If it hasn't already sent back
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* a socks reply, send one now (based on endreason). Also set
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* has_sent_end to 1, and mark the conn.
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*/
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void
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connection_mark_unattached_ap_(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason,
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int line, const char *file)
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{
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connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
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edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
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tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
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ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */
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/* If this is a rendezvous stream and it is failing without ever
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* being attached to a circuit, assume that an attempt to connect to
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* the destination hidden service has just ended.
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*
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* XXXX This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing
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* without ever being attached. That sloppiness should be harmless,
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* but we should fix it someday anyway. */
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if ((edge_conn->on_circuit != NULL || edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) &&
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connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
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rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(
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edge_conn->rend_data->onion_address);
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}
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if (base_conn->marked_for_close) {
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/* This call will warn as appropriate. */
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connection_mark_for_close_(base_conn, line, file);
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return;
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}
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if (!conn->socks_request->has_finished) {
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if (endreason & END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED)
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log_warn(LD_BUG,
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"stream (marked at %s:%d) sending two socks replies?",
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file, line);
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if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(conn->socks_request->command))
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connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, NULL, 0, endreason);
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else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command))
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connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
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RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT,
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0, NULL, -1, -1);
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else /* unknown or no handshake at all. send no response. */
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conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
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}
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connection_mark_and_flush_(base_conn, line, file);
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ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->end_reason = endreason;
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}
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/** There was an EOF. Send an end and mark the connection for close.
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_reached_eof(edge_connection_t *conn)
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{
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if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)) &&
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connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) {
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/* it still has stuff to process. don't let it die yet. */
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return 0;
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}
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log_info(LD_EDGE,"conn (fd %d) reached eof. Closing.", conn->base_.s);
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if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
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/* only mark it if not already marked. it's possible to
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* get the 'end' right around when the client hangs up on us. */
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connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DONE);
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if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
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/* eof, so don't send a socks reply back */
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if (EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request)
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EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
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}
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Handle new bytes on conn->inbuf based on state:
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* - If it's waiting for socks info, try to read another step of the
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* socks handshake out of conn->inbuf.
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* - If it's waiting for the original destination, fetch it.
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* - If it's open, then package more relay cells from the stream.
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* - Else, leave the bytes on inbuf alone for now.
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*
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* Mark and return -1 if there was an unexpected error with the conn,
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* else return 0.
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *conn, int package_partial)
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{
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tor_assert(conn);
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switch (conn->base_.state) {
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case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT:
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if (connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) <0) {
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/* already marked */
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT:
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if (connection_ap_process_natd(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)) < 0) {
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/* already marked */
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL) < 0) {
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/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT:
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if (connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn))) {
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log_info(LD_EDGE,
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"data from edge while in '%s' state. Sending it anyway. "
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"package_partial=%d, buflen=%ld",
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conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state),
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package_partial,
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(long)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)));
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if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, package_partial, NULL)<0) {
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/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Fall through if the connection is on a circuit without optimistic
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* data support. */
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case EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT:
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log_info(LD_EDGE,
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"data from edge while in '%s' state. Leaving it on buffer.",
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conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
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return 0;
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}
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log_warn(LD_BUG,"Got unexpected state %d. Closing.",conn->base_.state);
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tor_fragile_assert();
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connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
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connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
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return -1;
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}
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/** This edge needs to be closed, because its circuit has closed.
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* Mark it for close and return 0.
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_destroy(circid_t circ_id, edge_connection_t *conn)
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{
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if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
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log_info(LD_EDGE,
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"CircID %d: At an edge. Marking connection for close.", circ_id);
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if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
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entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
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connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
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control_event_stream_bandwidth(conn);
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control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED,
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END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
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conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
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} else {
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/* closing the circuit, nothing to send an END to */
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conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
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conn->end_reason = END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY;
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conn->end_reason |= END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED;
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connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn));
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}
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}
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conn->cpath_layer = NULL;
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conn->on_circuit = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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/** Send a raw end cell to the stream with ID <b>stream_id</b> out over the
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* <b>circ</b> towards the hop identified with <b>cpath_layer</b>. If this
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* is not a client connection, set the relay end cell's reason for closing
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* as <b>reason</b> */
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static int
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relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ,
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uint8_t reason, crypt_path_t *cpath_layer)
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{
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char payload[1];
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if (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(circ->purpose)) {
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/* Never send the server an informative reason code; it doesn't need to
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* know why the client stream is failing. */
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reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
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}
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payload[0] = (char) reason;
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return relay_send_command_from_edge(stream_id, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_END,
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payload, 1, cpath_layer);
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}
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/** Send a relay end cell from stream <b>conn</b> down conn's circuit, and
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* remember that we've done so. If this is not a client connection, set the
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* relay end cell's reason for closing as <b>reason</b>.
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*
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* Return -1 if this function has already been called on this conn,
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* else return 0.
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_end(edge_connection_t *conn, uint8_t reason)
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{
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char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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size_t payload_len=1;
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circuit_t *circ;
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uint8_t control_reason = reason;
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if (conn->edge_has_sent_end) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG,"(Harmless.) Calling connection_edge_end (reason %d) "
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"on an already ended stream?", reason);
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tor_fragile_assert();
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return -1;
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}
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if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG,
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"called on conn that's already marked for close at %s:%d.",
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conn->base_.marked_for_close_file, conn->base_.marked_for_close);
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return 0;
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}
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circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
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if (circ && CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(circ->purpose)) {
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/* If this is a client circuit, don't send the server an informative
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* reason code; it doesn't need to know why the client stream is
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* failing. */
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reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
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}
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payload[0] = (char)reason;
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if (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY &&
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!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) {
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int addrlen;
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if (tor_addr_family(&conn->base_.addr) == AF_INET) {
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set_uint32(payload+1, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->base_.addr));
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addrlen = 4;
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} else {
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memcpy(payload+1, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(&conn->base_.addr), 16);
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addrlen = 16;
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}
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set_uint32(payload+1+addrlen, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(conn->address_ttl)));
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payload_len += 4+addrlen;
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}
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if (circ && !circ->marked_for_close) {
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log_debug(LD_EDGE,"Sending end on conn (fd %d).",conn->base_.s);
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connection_edge_send_command(conn, RELAY_COMMAND_END,
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payload, payload_len);
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} else {
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log_debug(LD_EDGE,"No circ to send end on conn (fd %d).",
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conn->base_.s);
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}
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conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
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conn->end_reason = control_reason;
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return 0;
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}
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/** An error has just occurred on an operation on an edge connection
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* <b>conn</b>. Extract the errno; convert it to an end reason, and send an
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* appropriate relay end cell to the other end of the connection's circuit.
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**/
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int
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connection_edge_end_errno(edge_connection_t *conn)
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{
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uint8_t reason;
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tor_assert(conn);
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reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(tor_socket_errno(conn->base_.s));
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return connection_edge_end(conn, reason);
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}
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/** We just wrote some data to <b>conn</b>; act appropriately.
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*
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* (That is, if it's open, consider sending a stream-level sendme cell if we
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* have just flushed enough.)
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_flushed_some(edge_connection_t *conn)
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{
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switch (conn->base_.state) {
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case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
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* its outbuf.
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*
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* If it's in state 'open', stop writing, consider responding with a
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* sendme, and return.
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* Otherwise, stop writing and return.
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*
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* If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
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* return 0.
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*/
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int
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connection_edge_finished_flushing(edge_connection_t *conn)
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{
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tor_assert(conn);
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switch (conn->base_.state) {
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case AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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case EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
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connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
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return 0;
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case AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT:
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case AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT:
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return 0;
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default:
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called in unexpected state %d.",conn->base_.state);
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tor_fragile_assert();
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Longest size for the relay payload of a RELAY_CONNECTED cell that we're
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* able to generate. */
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/* 4 zero bytes; 1 type byte; 16 byte IPv6 address; 4 byte TTL. */
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#define MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN 25
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/** Set the buffer at <b>payload_out</b> -- which must have at least
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* MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN bytes available -- to the body of a
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* RELAY_CONNECTED cell indicating that we have connected to <b>addr</b>, and
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* that the name resolution that led us to <b>addr</b> will be valid for
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* <b>ttl</b> seconds. Return -1 on error, or the number of bytes used on
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* success. */
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/* private */int
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connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out,
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const tor_addr_t *addr,
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uint32_t ttl)
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{
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const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
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int connected_payload_len;
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/* should be needless */
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memset(payload_out, 0, MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
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if (family == AF_INET) {
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set_uint32(payload_out, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(addr));
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connected_payload_len = 4;
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} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
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set_uint32(payload_out, 0);
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set_uint8(payload_out + 4, 6);
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memcpy(payload_out + 5, tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(addr), 16);
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connected_payload_len = 21;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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set_uint32(payload_out + connected_payload_len, htonl(dns_clip_ttl(ttl)));
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connected_payload_len += 4;
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tor_assert(connected_payload_len <= MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN);
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return connected_payload_len;
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}
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/** Connected handler for exit connections: start writing pending
|
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* data, deliver 'CONNECTED' relay cells as appropriate, and check
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* any pending data that may have been received. */
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int
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connection_edge_finished_connecting(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
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{
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connection_t *conn;
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tor_assert(edge_conn);
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tor_assert(edge_conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT);
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conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
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tor_assert(conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
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log_info(LD_EXIT,"Exit connection to %s:%u (%s) established.",
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escaped_safe_str(conn->address), conn->port,
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safe_str(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&conn->addr)));
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rep_hist_note_exit_stream_opened(conn->port);
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conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
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IF_HAS_NO_BUFFEREVENT(conn)
|
|
connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT); /* stop writing, keep reading */
|
|
if (connection_get_outbuf_len(conn)) /* in case there are any queued relay
|
|
* cells */
|
|
connection_start_writing(conn);
|
|
/* deliver a 'connected' relay cell back through the circuit. */
|
|
if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED, NULL, 0) < 0)
|
|
return 0; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
|
|
} else {
|
|
uint8_t connected_payload[MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN];
|
|
int connected_payload_len =
|
|
connected_cell_format_payload(connected_payload, &conn->addr,
|
|
edge_conn->address_ttl);
|
|
if (connected_payload_len < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
|
|
(char*)connected_payload, connected_payload_len) < 0)
|
|
return 0; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(edge_conn->package_window > 0);
|
|
/* in case the server has written anything */
|
|
return connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_conn, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Common code to connection_(ap|exit)_about_to_close. */
|
|
static void
|
|
connection_edge_about_to_close(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) {
|
|
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "(Harmless.) Edge connection (marked at %s:%d) "
|
|
"hasn't sent end yet?",
|
|
conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an AP (client)
|
|
* connection: perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_about_to_close(entry_connection_t *entry_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
|
|
connection_t *conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(entry_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished == 0) {
|
|
/* since conn gets removed right after this function finishes,
|
|
* there's no point trying to send back a reply at this point. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without sending"
|
|
" back a socks reply.",
|
|
conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!edge_conn->end_reason) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without having"
|
|
" set end_reason.",
|
|
conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry_conn->dns_server_request) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Closing stream (marked at %s:%d) without having"
|
|
" replied to DNS request.",
|
|
conn->marked_for_close_file, conn->marked_for_close);
|
|
dnsserv_reject_request(entry_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
control_event_stream_bandwidth(edge_conn);
|
|
control_event_stream_status(entry_conn, STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED,
|
|
edge_conn->end_reason);
|
|
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn);
|
|
if (circ)
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circ, edge_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an exit
|
|
* connection: perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_exit_about_to_close(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
|
|
|
|
connection_edge_about_to_close(edge_conn);
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn);
|
|
if (circ)
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circ, edge_conn);
|
|
if (conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) {
|
|
connection_dns_remove(edge_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Define a schedule for how long to wait between retrying
|
|
* application connections. Rather than waiting a fixed amount of
|
|
* time between each retry, we wait 10 seconds each for the first
|
|
* two tries, and 15 seconds for each retry after
|
|
* that. Hopefully this will improve the expected user experience. */
|
|
static int
|
|
compute_retry_timeout(entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
int timeout = get_options()->CircuitStreamTimeout;
|
|
if (timeout) /* if our config options override the default, use them */
|
|
return timeout;
|
|
if (conn->num_socks_retries < 2) /* try 0 and try 1 */
|
|
return 10;
|
|
return 15;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Find all general-purpose AP streams waiting for a response that sent their
|
|
* begin/resolve cell too long ago. Detach from their current circuit, and
|
|
* mark their current circuit as unsuitable for new streams. Then call
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit() to attach to a new circuit (if
|
|
* available) or launch a new one.
|
|
*
|
|
* For rendezvous streams, simply give up after SocksTimeout seconds (with no
|
|
* retry attempt).
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_expire_beginning(void)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *conn;
|
|
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int severity;
|
|
int cutoff;
|
|
int seconds_idle, seconds_since_born;
|
|
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, base_conn) {
|
|
if (base_conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP || base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
continue;
|
|
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(base_conn);
|
|
conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(entry_conn);
|
|
/* if it's an internal linked connection, don't yell its status. */
|
|
severity = (tor_addr_is_null(&base_conn->addr) && !base_conn->port)
|
|
? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
seconds_idle = (int)( now - base_conn->timestamp_lastread );
|
|
seconds_since_born = (int)( now - base_conn->timestamp_created );
|
|
|
|
if (base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* We already consider SocksTimeout in
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(), but we need to consider
|
|
* it here too because controllers that put streams in controller_wait
|
|
* state never ask Tor to attach the circuit. */
|
|
if (AP_CONN_STATE_IS_UNATTACHED(base_conn->state)) {
|
|
if (seconds_since_born >= options->SocksTimeout) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP,
|
|
"Tried for %d seconds to get a connection to %s:%d. "
|
|
"Giving up. (%s)",
|
|
seconds_since_born,
|
|
safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
entry_conn->socks_request->port,
|
|
conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_AP, base_conn->state));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We're in state connect_wait or resolve_wait now -- waiting for a
|
|
* reply to our relay cell. See if we want to retry/give up. */
|
|
|
|
cutoff = compute_retry_timeout(entry_conn);
|
|
if (seconds_idle < cutoff)
|
|
continue;
|
|
circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(conn);
|
|
if (!circ) { /* it's vanished? */
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,"Conn is waiting (address %s), but lost its circ.",
|
|
safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
|
|
if (seconds_idle >= options->SocksTimeout) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_REND,
|
|
"Rend stream is %d seconds late. Giving up on address"
|
|
" '%s.onion'.",
|
|
seconds_idle,
|
|
safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
|
|
connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
|
log_fn(cutoff < 15 ? LOG_INFO : severity, LD_APP,
|
|
"We tried for %d seconds to connect to '%s' using exit %s."
|
|
" Retrying on a new circuit.",
|
|
seconds_idle,
|
|
safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
conn->cpath_layer ?
|
|
extend_info_describe(conn->cpath_layer->extend_info):
|
|
"*unnamed*");
|
|
/* send an end down the circuit */
|
|
connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
/* un-mark it as ending, since we're going to reuse it */
|
|
conn->edge_has_sent_end = 0;
|
|
conn->end_reason = 0;
|
|
/* kludge to make us not try this circuit again, yet to allow
|
|
* current streams on it to survive if they can: make it
|
|
* unattractive to use for new streams */
|
|
/* XXXX024 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
|
|
tor_assert(circ->timestamp_dirty);
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
|
|
/* give our stream another 'cutoff' seconds to try */
|
|
conn->base_.timestamp_lastread += cutoff;
|
|
if (entry_conn->num_socks_retries < 250) /* avoid overflow */
|
|
entry_conn->num_socks_retries++;
|
|
/* move it back into 'pending' state, and try to attach. */
|
|
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(entry_conn, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT)<0) {
|
|
if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Tell any AP streams that are waiting for a new circuit to try again,
|
|
* either attaching to an available circ or launching a new one.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending(void)
|
|
{
|
|
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
|
|
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
if (conn->marked_for_close ||
|
|
conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
|
|
conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
|
|
continue;
|
|
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_conn) < 0) {
|
|
if (!conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Tell any AP streams that are waiting for a one-hop tunnel to
|
|
* <b>failed_digest</b> that they are going to fail. */
|
|
/* XXX024 We should get rid of this function, and instead attach
|
|
* one-hop streams to circ->p_streams so they get marked in
|
|
* circuit_mark_for_close like normal p_streams. */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state)
|
|
{
|
|
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
if (conn->marked_for_close ||
|
|
conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
|
|
conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
|
|
continue;
|
|
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
if (!entry_conn->want_onehop)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (hexdigest_to_digest(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name, digest) < 0 ||
|
|
tor_memneq(digest, failed_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) {
|
|
/* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
if (!build_state || !build_state->chosen_exit ||
|
|
!entry_conn->socks_request || !entry_conn->socks_request->address)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, entry_conn->socks_request->address)<0 ||
|
|
!tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) ||
|
|
build_state->chosen_exit->port != entry_conn->socks_request->port)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Closing one-hop stream to '%s/%s' because the OR conn "
|
|
"just failed.", entry_conn->chosen_exit_name,
|
|
entry_conn->socks_request->address);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A circuit failed to finish on its last hop <b>info</b>. If there
|
|
* are any streams waiting with this exit node in mind, but they
|
|
* don't absolutely require it, make them give up on it.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
{
|
|
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
|
|
const node_t *r1, *r2;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
if (conn->marked_for_close ||
|
|
conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
|
|
conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
|
|
continue;
|
|
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
if (!entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional &&
|
|
!entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries)
|
|
continue;
|
|
r1 = node_get_by_nickname(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
|
|
r2 = node_get_by_id(info->identity_digest);
|
|
if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2)
|
|
continue;
|
|
tor_assert(entry_conn->socks_request);
|
|
if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional) {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Giving up on enclave exit '%s' for destination %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name),
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(entry_conn->socks_request->address));
|
|
entry_conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
|
tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
|
|
/* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
|
|
* think it'll be using an enclave. */
|
|
consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries) {
|
|
if (--entry_conn->chosen_exit_retries == 0) { /* give up! */
|
|
clear_trackexithost_mappings(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
tor_free(entry_conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
|
|
/* if this port is dangerous, warn or reject it now that we don't
|
|
* think it'll be using an enclave. */
|
|
consider_plaintext_ports(entry_conn, entry_conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The AP connection <b>conn</b> has just failed while attaching or
|
|
* sending a BEGIN or resolving on <b>circ</b>, but another circuit
|
|
* might work. Detach the circuit, and either reattach it, launch a
|
|
* new circuit, tell the controller, or give up as a appropriate.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns -1 on err, 1 on success, 0 on not-yet-sure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_detach_retriable(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
int reason)
|
|
{
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_FAILED_RETRIABLE, reason);
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->timestamp_lastread = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->pending_optimistic_data) {
|
|
generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&conn->sending_optimistic_data,
|
|
conn->pending_optimistic_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!get_options()->LeaveStreamsUnattached || conn->use_begindir) {
|
|
/* If we're attaching streams ourself, or if this connection is
|
|
* a tunneled directory connection, then just attach it. */
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
|
|
return connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT;
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check if <b>conn</b> is using a dangerous port. Then warn and/or
|
|
* reject depending on our config options. */
|
|
static int
|
|
consider_plaintext_ports(entry_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int reject = smartlist_string_num_isin(options->RejectPlaintextPorts, port);
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_string_num_isin(options->WarnPlaintextPorts, port)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "Application request to port %d: this port is "
|
|
"commonly used for unencrypted protocols. Please make sure "
|
|
"you don't send anything you would mind the rest of the "
|
|
"Internet reading!%s", port, reject ? " Closing." : "");
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "DANGEROUS_PORT PORT=%d RESULT=%s",
|
|
port, reject ? "REJECT" : "WARN");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reject) {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Port %d listed in RejectPlaintextPorts. Closing.", port);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How many times do we try connecting with an exit configured via
|
|
* TrackHostExits before concluding that it won't work any more and trying a
|
|
* different one? */
|
|
#define TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES 5
|
|
|
|
/** Call connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach() unless a controller
|
|
* asked us to leave streams unattached. Return 0 in that case.
|
|
*
|
|
* See connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach()'s
|
|
* documentation for arguments and return value.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
if (options->LeaveStreamsUnattached) {
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, circ, cpath);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Connection <b>conn</b> just finished its socks handshake, or the
|
|
* controller asked us to take care of it. If <b>circ</b> is defined,
|
|
* then that's where we'll want to attach it. Otherwise we have to
|
|
* figure it out ourselves.
|
|
*
|
|
* First, parse whether it's a .exit address, remap it, and so on. Then
|
|
* if it's for a general circuit, try to attach it to a circuit (or launch
|
|
* one as needed), else if it's for a rendezvous circuit, fetch a
|
|
* rendezvous descriptor first (or attach/launch a circuit if the
|
|
* rendezvous descriptor is already here and fresh enough).
|
|
*
|
|
* The stream will exit from the hop
|
|
* indicated by <b>cpath</b>, or from the last hop in circ's cpath if
|
|
* <b>cpath</b> is NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
{
|
|
socks_request_t *socks = conn->socks_request;
|
|
hostname_type_t addresstype;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
struct in_addr addr_tmp;
|
|
/* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically
|
|
* remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */
|
|
int automap = 0;
|
|
char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN];
|
|
time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
addressmap_entry_source_t exit_source = ADDRMAPSRC_NONE;
|
|
|
|
tor_strlower(socks->address); /* normalize it */
|
|
strlcpy(orig_address, socks->address, sizeof(orig_address));
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,"Client asked for %s:%d",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address),
|
|
socks->port);
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmpend(socks->address, ".exit") && !options->AllowDotExit) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "The \".exit\" notation is disabled in Tor due to "
|
|
"security risks. Set AllowDotExit in your torrc to enable "
|
|
"it (at your own risk).");
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (! conn->original_dest_address)
|
|
conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
|
|
|
|
if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE &&
|
|
!tor_inet_aton(socks->address, &addr_tmp) &&
|
|
options->AutomapHostsOnResolve && options->AutomapHostsSuffixes) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->AutomapHostsSuffixes, const char *, cp,
|
|
if (!strcasecmpend(socks->address, cp)) {
|
|
automap = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
});
|
|
if (automap) {
|
|
const char *new_addr;
|
|
new_addr = addressmap_register_virtual_address(
|
|
RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4, tor_strdup(socks->address));
|
|
if (! new_addr) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "Unable to automap address %s",
|
|
escaped_safe_str(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Automapping %s to %s",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(socks->address),
|
|
safe_str_client(new_addr));
|
|
strlcpy(socks->address, new_addr, sizeof(socks->address));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
|
|
if (addressmap_rewrite_reverse(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
|
|
&map_expires)) {
|
|
char *result = tor_strdup(socks->address);
|
|
/* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */
|
|
tor_snprintf(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address), "REVERSE[%s]",
|
|
orig_address);
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
|
|
strlen(result), (uint8_t*)result,
|
|
-1,
|
|
map_expires);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
|
|
/* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
int ok;
|
|
ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(
|
|
&addr, socks->address, AF_UNSPEC, 1);
|
|
if (ok == 1 && tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
|
|
0, NULL, -1, TIME_MAX);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!automap) {
|
|
/* For address map controls, remap the address. */
|
|
if (addressmap_rewrite(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address),
|
|
&map_expires, &exit_source)) {
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_REMAP,
|
|
REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!automap && address_is_in_virtual_range(socks->address)) {
|
|
/* This address was probably handed out by client_dns_get_unmapped_address,
|
|
* but the mapping was discarded for some reason. We *don't* want to send
|
|
* the address through Tor; that's likely to fail, and may leak
|
|
* information.
|
|
*/
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"Missing mapping for virtual address '%s'. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the address provided by SOCKS. Modify it in-place if it
|
|
* specifies a hidden-service (.onion) or particular exit node (.exit).
|
|
*/
|
|
addresstype = parse_extended_hostname(socks->address);
|
|
|
|
if (addresstype == BAD_HOSTNAME) {
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addresstype == EXIT_HOSTNAME) {
|
|
/* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit
|
|
* node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */
|
|
char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.');
|
|
|
|
/* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */
|
|
routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ?
|
|
options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ : options->ExcludeExitNodes;
|
|
const node_t *node;
|
|
|
|
if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP && !options->AllowDotExit) {
|
|
/* Whoops; this one is stale. It must have gotten added earlier,
|
|
* when AllowDotExit was on. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"Stale automapped address for '%s.exit', with "
|
|
"AllowDotExit disabled. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_DNS ||
|
|
(exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_NONE && !options->AllowDotExit)) {
|
|
/* It shouldn't be possible to get a .exit address from any of these
|
|
* sources. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Address '%s.exit', with impossible source for the "
|
|
".exit part. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!automap);
|
|
if (s) {
|
|
/* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */
|
|
if (s[1] != '\0') {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1);
|
|
node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (exit_source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT) {
|
|
/* We 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES;
|
|
}
|
|
*s = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address);
|
|
node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
if (node) {
|
|
*socks->address = 0;
|
|
node_get_address_string(node, socks->address, sizeof(socks->address));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,
|
|
"Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */
|
|
if (routerset_contains_node(excludeset, node)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,
|
|
"Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* XXXX024-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and
|
|
Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch
|
|
implies no. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {
|
|
/* not a hidden-service request (i.e. normal or .exit) */
|
|
if (address_is_invalid_destination(socks->address, 1)) {
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
|
|
escaped(socks->address));
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,
|
|
"Destination '%s' seems to be an invalid hostname. Failing.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (options->Tor2webMode) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname %s "
|
|
"because tor2web mode is enabled.",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
|
|
uint32_t answer;
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
/* Reply to resolves immediately if we can. */
|
|
if (tor_inet_aton(socks->address, &in)) { /* see if it's an IP already */
|
|
/* leave it in network order */
|
|
answer = in.s_addr;
|
|
/* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */
|
|
strlcpy(socks->address, orig_address, sizeof(socks->address));
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,4,
|
|
(uint8_t*)&answer,
|
|
-1,map_expires);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(!automap);
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
|
|
} else if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
|
|
tor_assert(!automap);
|
|
if (socks->port == 0) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_APP,"Application asked to connect to port 0. Refusing.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->ClientRejectInternalAddresses &&
|
|
!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
if (tor_addr_hostname_is_local(socks->address) ||
|
|
(tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0 &&
|
|
tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0))) {
|
|
/* If this is an explicit private address with no chosen exit node,
|
|
* then we really don't want to try to connect to it. That's
|
|
* probably an error. */
|
|
if (conn->is_transparent_ap) {
|
|
#define WARN_INTRVL_LOOP 300
|
|
static ratelim_t loop_warn_limit = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_INTRVL_LOOP);
|
|
char *m;
|
|
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&loop_warn_limit, approx_time()))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET,
|
|
"Rejecting request for anonymous connection to private "
|
|
"address %s on a TransPort or NATDPort. Possible loop "
|
|
"in your NAT rules?%s", safe_str_client(socks->address),
|
|
m);
|
|
tor_free(m);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
#define WARN_INTRVL_PRIV 300
|
|
static ratelim_t priv_warn_limit = RATELIM_INIT(WARN_INTRVL_PRIV);
|
|
char *m;
|
|
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&priv_warn_limit, approx_time()))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET,
|
|
"Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous connection to "
|
|
"private address %s.%s",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address),m);
|
|
tor_free(m);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
/* XXX Duplicate call to tor_addr_parse. */
|
|
if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, socks->address) >= 0) {
|
|
sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(&addr);
|
|
if ((family == AF_INET && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) ||
|
|
(family == AF_INET6 && ! conn->ipv4_traffic_ok)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS request for an IP address "
|
|
"family that this listener does not support.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (family == AF_INET6 && socks->socks_version == 4) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request for an IPv6 address.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (socks->socks_version == 4 && !conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "Rejecting SOCKS4 request on a listener with "
|
|
"no IPv4 traffic supported.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
conn->ipv4_traffic_ok = 0;
|
|
} else if (family == AF_INET) {
|
|
conn->ipv6_traffic_ok = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (socks->socks_version == 4)
|
|
conn->ipv6_traffic_ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ) {
|
|
/* see if we can find a suitable enclave exit */
|
|
const node_t *r =
|
|
router_find_exact_exit_enclave(socks->address, socks->port);
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,
|
|
"Redirecting address %s to exit at enclave router %s",
|
|
safe_str_client(socks->address), node_describe(r));
|
|
/* use the hex digest, not nickname, in case there are two
|
|
routers with this nickname */
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name =
|
|
tor_strdup(hex_str(r->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* warn or reject if it's using a dangerous port */
|
|
if (!conn->use_begindir && !conn->chosen_exit_name && !circ)
|
|
if (consider_plaintext_ports(conn, socks->port) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!conn->use_begindir) {
|
|
/* help predict this next time */
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_port(now, socks->port);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (socks->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_resolve(now); /* help predict this next time */
|
|
/* no extra processing needed */
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
}
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
if ((circ && connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(
|
|
conn, circ, cpath) < 0) ||
|
|
(!circ &&
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0)) {
|
|
if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* it's a hidden-service request */
|
|
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
|
|
int r;
|
|
rend_service_authorization_t *client_auth;
|
|
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
|
tor_assert(!automap);
|
|
if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(socks->command)) {
|
|
/* if it's a resolve request, fail it right now, rather than
|
|
* building all the circuits and then realizing it won't work. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,
|
|
"Resolve requests to hidden services not allowed. Failing.");
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,
|
|
0,NULL,-1,TIME_MAX);
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONTROL, "Attachstream to a circuit is not "
|
|
"supported for .onion addresses currently. Failing.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data = rend_data =
|
|
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
|
|
strlcpy(rend_data->onion_address, socks->address,
|
|
sizeof(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
/* see if we already have it cached */
|
|
r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_data->onion_address, -1, &entry);
|
|
if (r<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'",
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Help predict this next time. We're not sure if it will need
|
|
* a stable circuit yet, but we know we'll need *something*. */
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, 0, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Look up if we have client authorization for it. */
|
|
client_auth = rend_client_lookup_service_authorization(
|
|
rend_data->onion_address);
|
|
if (client_auth) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Using previously configured client authorization "
|
|
"for hidden service request.");
|
|
memcpy(rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
|
|
client_auth->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
rend_data->auth_type = client_auth->auth_type;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r==0) {
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown descriptor %s. Fetching.",
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data);
|
|
} else { /* r > 0 */
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor is here. Great.");
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0) {
|
|
if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0; /* unreached but keeps the compiler happy */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TRANS_PF
|
|
static int pf_socket = -1;
|
|
int
|
|
get_pf_socket(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int pf;
|
|
/* This should be opened before dropping privileges. */
|
|
if (pf_socket >= 0)
|
|
return pf_socket;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENBSD
|
|
/* only works on OpenBSD */
|
|
pf = tor_open_cloexec("/dev/pf", O_RDONLY, 0);
|
|
#else
|
|
/* works on NetBSD and FreeBSD */
|
|
pf = tor_open_cloexec("/dev/pf", O_RDWR, 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (pf < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "open(\"/dev/pf\") failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pf_socket = pf;
|
|
return pf_socket;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** Fetch the original destination address and port from a
|
|
* system-specific interface and put them into a
|
|
* socks_request_t as if they came from a socks request.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if an error prevents fetching the destination,
|
|
* else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_ap_get_original_destination(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
socks_request_t *req)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef TRANS_NETFILTER
|
|
/* Linux 2.4+ */
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage orig_dst;
|
|
socklen_t orig_dst_len = sizeof(orig_dst);
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
|
|
if (getsockopt(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, SOL_IP, SO_ORIGINAL_DST,
|
|
(struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst, &orig_dst_len) < 0) {
|
|
int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockopt() failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&addr, (struct sockaddr*)&orig_dst, &req->port);
|
|
tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &addr, sizeof(req->address), 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#elif defined(TRANS_PF)
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage proxy_addr;
|
|
socklen_t proxy_addr_len = sizeof(proxy_addr);
|
|
struct sockaddr *proxy_sa = (struct sockaddr*) &proxy_addr;
|
|
struct pfioc_natlook pnl;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
int pf = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (getsockname(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s, (struct sockaddr*)&proxy_addr,
|
|
&proxy_addr_len) < 0) {
|
|
int e = tor_socket_errno(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->s);
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() to determine transocks destination "
|
|
"failed: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&pnl, 0, sizeof(pnl));
|
|
pnl.proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
|
|
pnl.direction = PF_OUT;
|
|
if (proxy_sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)proxy_sa;
|
|
pnl.af = AF_INET;
|
|
pnl.saddr.v4.s_addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr);
|
|
pnl.sport = htons(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->port);
|
|
pnl.daddr.v4.s_addr = sin->sin_addr.s_addr;
|
|
pnl.dport = sin->sin_port;
|
|
} else if (proxy_sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)proxy_sa;
|
|
pnl.af = AF_INET6;
|
|
memcpy(&pnl.saddr.v6, tor_addr_to_in6(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr),
|
|
sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
pnl.sport = htons(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->port);
|
|
memcpy(&pnl.daddr.v6, &sin6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
|
|
pnl.dport = sin6->sin6_port;
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "getsockname() gave an unexpected address family (%d)",
|
|
(int)proxy_sa->sa_family);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pf = get_pf_socket();
|
|
if (pf<0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (ioctl(pf, DIOCNATLOOK, &pnl) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_NET, "ioctl(DIOCNATLOOK) failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pnl.af == AF_INET) {
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&addr, pnl.rdaddr.v4.s_addr);
|
|
} else if (pnl.af == AF_INET6) {
|
|
tor_addr_from_in6(&addr, &pnl.rdaddr.v6);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_addr_to_str(req->address, &addr, sizeof(req->address), 1);
|
|
req->port = ntohs(pnl.rdport);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
(void)conn;
|
|
(void)req;
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called connection_ap_get_original_destination, but no "
|
|
"transparent proxy method was configured.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** connection_edge_process_inbuf() found a conn in state
|
|
* socks_wait. See if conn->inbuf has the right bytes to proceed with
|
|
* the socks handshake.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the handshake is complete, send it to
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn occurs (and mark it for close),
|
|
* else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_process_socks(entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
socks_request_t *socks;
|
|
int sockshere;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int had_reply = 0;
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
socks = conn->socks_request;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
|
|
|
|
IF_HAS_BUFFEREVENT(base_conn, {
|
|
struct evbuffer *input = bufferevent_get_input(base_conn->bufev);
|
|
sockshere = fetch_from_evbuffer_socks(input, socks,
|
|
options->TestSocks, options->SafeSocks);
|
|
}) ELSE_IF_NO_BUFFEREVENT {
|
|
sockshere = fetch_from_buf_socks(base_conn->inbuf, socks,
|
|
options->TestSocks, options->SafeSocks);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (socks->replylen) {
|
|
had_reply = 1;
|
|
connection_write_to_buf((const char*)socks->reply, socks->replylen,
|
|
base_conn);
|
|
socks->replylen = 0;
|
|
if (sockshere == -1) {
|
|
/* An invalid request just got a reply, no additional
|
|
* one is necessary. */
|
|
socks->has_finished = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sockshere == 0) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,"socks handshake not all here yet.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (sockshere == -1) {
|
|
if (!had_reply) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.");
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, NULL, 0,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL);
|
|
}
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL |
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} /* else socks handshake is done, continue processing */
|
|
|
|
if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(socks->command))
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE, 0);
|
|
|
|
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** connection_init_accepted_conn() found a new trans AP conn.
|
|
* Get the original destination and send it to
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn (and it should be marked
|
|
* for close), else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_process_transparent(entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
socks_request_t *socks;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
socks = conn->socks_request;
|
|
|
|
/* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
|
|
* send a socks reply down a transparent conn */
|
|
socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
|
|
socks->has_finished = 1;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
|
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_get_original_destination(conn, socks) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"Fetching original destination failed. Closing.");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* we have the original destination */
|
|
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
|
|
|
|
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** connection_edge_process_inbuf() found a conn in state natd_wait. See if
|
|
* conn-\>inbuf has the right bytes to proceed. See FreeBSD's libalias(3) and
|
|
* ProxyEncodeTcpStream() in src/lib/libalias/alias_proxy.c for the encoding
|
|
* form of the original destination.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the original destination is complete, send it to
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if an unexpected error with conn (and it should be marked
|
|
* for close), else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
char tmp_buf[36], *tbuf, *daddr;
|
|
size_t tlen = 30;
|
|
int err, port_ok;
|
|
socks_request_t *socks;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
socks = conn->socks_request;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
|
|
|
|
/* look for LF-terminated "[DEST ip_addr port]"
|
|
* where ip_addr is a dotted-quad and port is in string form */
|
|
err = connection_fetch_from_buf_line(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn), tmp_buf, &tlen);
|
|
if (err == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (err < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed (DEST too long). Closing");
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmpstart(tmp_buf, "[DEST ")) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
|
|
"said: %s",
|
|
escaped(tmp_buf));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
daddr = tbuf = &tmp_buf[0] + 6; /* after end of "[DEST " */
|
|
if (!(tbuf = strchr(tbuf, ' '))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
|
|
"said: %s",
|
|
escaped(tmp_buf));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*tbuf++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
|
|
* send a socks reply down a natd conn */
|
|
strlcpy(socks->address, daddr, sizeof(socks->address));
|
|
socks->port = (uint16_t)
|
|
tor_parse_long(tbuf, 10, 1, 65535, &port_ok, &daddr);
|
|
if (!port_ok) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed; port %s is ill-formed or out "
|
|
"of range.", escaped(tbuf));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
|
|
socks->has_finished = 1;
|
|
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
|
|
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Iterate over the two bytes of stream_id until we get one that is not
|
|
* already in use; return it. Return 0 if can't get a unique stream_id.
|
|
*/
|
|
static streamid_t
|
|
get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *tmpconn;
|
|
streamid_t test_stream_id;
|
|
uint32_t attempts=0;
|
|
|
|
again:
|
|
test_stream_id = circ->next_stream_id++;
|
|
if (++attempts > 1<<16) {
|
|
/* Make sure we don't loop forever if all stream_id's are used. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP,"No unused stream IDs. Failing.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (test_stream_id == 0)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
for (tmpconn = circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
|
|
if (tmpconn->stream_id == test_stream_id)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
return test_stream_id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> is linked to a circuit and configured to use
|
|
* an exit that supports optimistic data. */
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(const entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
|
|
/* We can only send optimistic data if we're connected to an open
|
|
general circuit. */
|
|
if (edge_conn->on_circuit == NULL ||
|
|
edge_conn->on_circuit->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
|
|
edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return conn->may_use_optimistic_data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a bitmask of BEGIN_FLAG_* flags that we should transmit in the
|
|
* RELAY_BEGIN cell for <b>ap_conn</b>. */
|
|
static uint32_t
|
|
connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
|
|
const node_t *exitnode = NULL;
|
|
const crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = edge_conn->cpath_layer;
|
|
uint32_t flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* No flags for begindir */
|
|
if (ap_conn->use_begindir)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* No flags for hidden services. */
|
|
if (edge_conn->on_circuit->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If only IPv4 is supported, no flags */
|
|
if (ap_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok && !ap_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (! cpath_layer ||
|
|
! cpath_layer->extend_info)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ap_conn->ipv4_traffic_ok)
|
|
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK;
|
|
|
|
exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath_layer->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
|
if (ap_conn->ipv6_traffic_ok && exitnode) {
|
|
tor_addr_t a;
|
|
tor_addr_make_null(&a, AF_INET6);
|
|
if (compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(&a, ap_conn->socks_request->port,
|
|
exitnode)
|
|
!= ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED) {
|
|
/* Only say "IPv6 OK" if the exit node supports IPv6. Otherwise there's
|
|
* no point. */
|
|
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_OK) {
|
|
/* When IPv4 and IPv6 are both allowed, consider whether to say we
|
|
* prefer IPv6. Otherwise there's no point in declaring a preference */
|
|
if (ap_conn->prefer_ipv6_traffic)
|
|
flags |= BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flags == BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Hey; I'm about to ask a node for a connection that I "
|
|
"am telling it to fulfil with neither IPv4 nor IPv6. That's "
|
|
"probably not going to work.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Write a relay begin cell, using destaddr and destport from ap_conn's
|
|
* socks_request field, and send it down circ.
|
|
*
|
|
* If ap_conn is broken, mark it for close and return -1. Else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
int payload_len;
|
|
int begin_type;
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
|
|
tor_assert(edge_conn->on_circuit);
|
|
circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(edge_conn->on_circuit);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(ap_conn->socks_request);
|
|
tor_assert(SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(ap_conn->socks_request->command));
|
|
|
|
edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
|
|
if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
|
|
/* XXXX024 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
|
|
* retried on another circuit. */
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
|
|
/* XXXX024 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
|
|
tor_assert(circ->base_.timestamp_dirty);
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set up begin cell flags. */
|
|
edge_conn->begincell_flags = connection_ap_get_begincell_flags(ap_conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:%d",
|
|
(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) ?
|
|
ap_conn->socks_request->address : "",
|
|
ap_conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1;
|
|
if (payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4 && edge_conn->begincell_flags) {
|
|
set_uint32(payload + payload_len, htonl(edge_conn->begincell_flags));
|
|
payload_len += 4;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,
|
|
"Sending relay cell %d to begin stream %d.",
|
|
(int)ap_conn->use_begindir,
|
|
edge_conn->stream_id);
|
|
|
|
begin_type = ap_conn->use_begindir ?
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR : RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN;
|
|
if (begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
|
|
#ifndef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED
|
|
tor_assert(circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel == 0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn, begin_type,
|
|
begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload : NULL,
|
|
begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload_len : 0) < 0)
|
|
return -1; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
|
|
|
|
edge_conn->package_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
|
|
edge_conn->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT;
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,"Address/port sent, ap socket %d, n_circ_id %d",
|
|
base_conn->s, circ->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
control_event_stream_status(ap_conn, STREAM_EVENT_SENT_CONNECT, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* If there's queued-up data, send it now */
|
|
if ((connection_get_inbuf_len(base_conn) ||
|
|
ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data) &&
|
|
connection_ap_supports_optimistic_data(ap_conn)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Sending up to %ld + %ld bytes of queued-up data",
|
|
(long)connection_get_inbuf_len(base_conn),
|
|
ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data ?
|
|
(long)generic_buffer_len(ap_conn->sending_optimistic_data) : 0);
|
|
if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(edge_conn, 1, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(base_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Write a relay resolve cell, using destaddr and destport from ap_conn's
|
|
* socks_request field, and send it down circ.
|
|
*
|
|
* If ap_conn is broken, mark it for close and return -1. Else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
int payload_len, command;
|
|
const char *string_addr;
|
|
char inaddr_buf[REVERSE_LOOKUP_NAME_BUF_LEN];
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ap_conn);
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
|
|
tor_assert(edge_conn->on_circuit);
|
|
circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(edge_conn->on_circuit);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(ap_conn->socks_request);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
|
|
|
command = ap_conn->socks_request->command;
|
|
tor_assert(SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(command));
|
|
|
|
edge_conn->stream_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(circ);
|
|
if (edge_conn->stream_id==0) {
|
|
/* XXXX024 Instead of closing this stream, we should make it get
|
|
* retried on another circuit. */
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
|
|
/* XXXX024 this is a kludgy way to do this. */
|
|
tor_assert(circ->base_.timestamp_dirty);
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty -= get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
|
|
string_addr = ap_conn->socks_request->address;
|
|
payload_len = (int)strlen(string_addr)+1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR */
|
|
const char *a = ap_conn->socks_request->address;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/* We're doing a reverse lookup. The input could be an IP address, or
|
|
* could be an .in-addr.arpa or .ip6.arpa address */
|
|
r = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&addr, a, AF_UNSPEC, 1);
|
|
if (r <= 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "Rejecting ill-formed reverse lookup of %s",
|
|
safe_str_client(a));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = tor_addr_to_PTR_name(inaddr_buf, sizeof(inaddr_buf), &addr);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate reverse lookup hostname of %s",
|
|
safe_str_client(a));
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(ap_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
string_addr = inaddr_buf;
|
|
payload_len = (int)strlen(inaddr_buf)+1;
|
|
tor_assert(payload_len <= (int)sizeof(inaddr_buf));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP,
|
|
"Sending relay cell to begin stream %d.", edge_conn->stream_id);
|
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE,
|
|
string_addr, payload_len) < 0)
|
|
return -1; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
|
|
|
|
tor_free(base_conn->address); /* Maybe already set by dnsserv. */
|
|
base_conn->address = tor_strdup("(Tor_internal)");
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT;
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,"Address sent for resolve, ap socket %d, n_circ_id %d",
|
|
base_conn->s, circ->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
control_event_stream_status(ap_conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
|
|
control_event_stream_status(ap_conn, STREAM_EVENT_SENT_RESOLVE, 0);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Make an AP connection_t linked to the connection_t <b>partner</b>. make a
|
|
* new linked connection pair, and attach one side to the conn, connection_add
|
|
* it, initialize it to circuit_wait, and call
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) on it.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return the newly created end of the linked connection pair, or -1 if error.
|
|
*/
|
|
entry_connection_t *
|
|
connection_ap_make_link(connection_t *partner,
|
|
char *address, uint16_t port,
|
|
const char *digest,
|
|
int session_group, int isolation_flags,
|
|
int use_begindir, int want_onehop)
|
|
{
|
|
entry_connection_t *conn;
|
|
connection_t *base_conn;
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,"Making internal %s tunnel to %s:%d ...",
|
|
want_onehop ? "direct" : "anonymized",
|
|
safe_str_client(address), port);
|
|
|
|
conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, tor_addr_family(&partner->addr));
|
|
base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
base_conn->linked = 1; /* so that we can add it safely below. */
|
|
|
|
/* populate conn->socks_request */
|
|
|
|
/* leave version at zero, so the socks_reply is empty */
|
|
conn->socks_request->socks_version = 0;
|
|
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 0; /* waiting for 'connected' */
|
|
strlcpy(conn->socks_request->address, address,
|
|
sizeof(conn->socks_request->address));
|
|
conn->socks_request->port = port;
|
|
conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
|
|
conn->want_onehop = want_onehop;
|
|
conn->use_begindir = use_begindir;
|
|
if (use_begindir) {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name[0] = '$';
|
|
tor_assert(digest);
|
|
base16_encode(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Populate isolation fields. */
|
|
conn->socks_request->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER;
|
|
conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(address);
|
|
conn->session_group = session_group;
|
|
conn->isolation_flags = isolation_flags;
|
|
|
|
base_conn->address = tor_strdup("(Tor_internal)");
|
|
tor_addr_make_unspec(&base_conn->addr);
|
|
base_conn->port = 0;
|
|
|
|
connection_link_connections(partner, base_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (connection_add(base_conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */
|
|
connection_free(base_conn);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* attaching to a dirty circuit is fine */
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(conn) < 0) {
|
|
if (!base_conn->marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,"... application connection created and linked.");
|
|
return conn;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Notify any interested controller connections about a new hostname resolve
|
|
* or resolve error. Takes the same arguments as does
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(). */
|
|
static void
|
|
tell_controller_about_resolved_result(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
int answer_type,
|
|
size_t answer_len,
|
|
const char *answer,
|
|
int ttl,
|
|
time_t expires)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ttl >= 0 && (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 ||
|
|
answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME)) {
|
|
return; /* we already told the controller. */
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len >= 4) {
|
|
char *cp = tor_dup_ip(ntohl(get_uint32(answer)));
|
|
control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
cp, expires, NULL);
|
|
tor_free(cp);
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
|
|
char *cp = tor_strndup(answer, answer_len);
|
|
control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
cp, expires, NULL);
|
|
tor_free(cp);
|
|
} else {
|
|
control_event_address_mapped(conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
"<error>",
|
|
time(NULL)+ttl,
|
|
"error=yes");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send an answer to an AP connection that has requested a DNS lookup via
|
|
* SOCKS. The type should be one of RESOLVED_TYPE_(IPV4|IPV6|HOSTNAME) or -1
|
|
* for unreachable; the answer should be in the format specified in the socks
|
|
* extensions document. <b>ttl</b> is the ttl for the answer, or -1 on
|
|
* certain errors or for values that didn't come via DNS. <b>expires</b> is
|
|
* a time when the answer expires, or -1 or TIME_MAX if there's a good TTL.
|
|
**/
|
|
/* XXXX the use of the ttl and expires fields is nutty. Let's make this
|
|
* interface and those that use it less ugly. */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
int answer_type,
|
|
size_t answer_len,
|
|
const uint8_t *answer,
|
|
int ttl,
|
|
time_t expires)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[384];
|
|
size_t replylen;
|
|
|
|
if (ttl >= 0) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = NULL;
|
|
circuit_t *circ = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit;
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) /* should always be true */
|
|
origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
|
|
tor_addr_t a;
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&a, get_uint32(answer));
|
|
if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
|
|
client_dns_set_addressmap(origin_circ,
|
|
conn->socks_request->address, &a,
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
|
|
tor_addr_t a;
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&a, (char*)answer);
|
|
if (! tor_addr_is_null(&a)) {
|
|
client_dns_set_addressmap(origin_circ,
|
|
conn->socks_request->address, &a,
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
|
|
char *cp = tor_strndup((char*)answer, answer_len);
|
|
client_dns_set_reverse_addressmap(origin_circ,
|
|
conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
cp,
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
|
|
tor_free(cp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->is_dns_request) {
|
|
if (conn->dns_server_request) {
|
|
/* We had a request on our DNS port: answer it. */
|
|
dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, (char*)answer, ttl);
|
|
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* This must be a request from the controller. We already sent
|
|
* a mapaddress if there's a ttl. */
|
|
tell_controller_about_resolved_result(conn, answer_type, answer_len,
|
|
(char*)answer, ttl, expires);
|
|
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* We shouldn't need to free conn here; it gets marked by the caller. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 4) {
|
|
buf[0] = 0x00; /* version */
|
|
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS4_GRANTED;
|
|
set_uint16(buf+2, 0);
|
|
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
|
|
replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
|
|
} else { /* "error" */
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS4_REJECT;
|
|
memset(buf+2, 0, 6);
|
|
replylen = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) {
|
|
/* SOCKS5 */
|
|
buf[0] = 0x05; /* version */
|
|
if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && answer_len == 4) {
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
|
|
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
|
|
buf[3] = 0x01; /* IPv4 address type */
|
|
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 4); /* address */
|
|
set_uint16(buf+8, 0); /* port == 0. */
|
|
replylen = 10;
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 && answer_len == 16) {
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
|
|
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
|
|
buf[3] = 0x04; /* IPv6 address type */
|
|
memcpy(buf+4, answer, 16); /* address */
|
|
set_uint16(buf+20, 0); /* port == 0. */
|
|
replylen = 22;
|
|
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED;
|
|
buf[2] = 0; /* reserved */
|
|
buf[3] = 0x03; /* Domainname address type */
|
|
buf[4] = (char)answer_len;
|
|
memcpy(buf+5, answer, answer_len); /* address */
|
|
set_uint16(buf+5+answer_len, 0); /* port == 0. */
|
|
replylen = 5+answer_len+2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
buf[1] = SOCKS5_HOST_UNREACHABLE;
|
|
memset(buf+2, 0, 8);
|
|
replylen = 10;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* no socks version info; don't send anything back */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(conn, buf, replylen,
|
|
(answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 ||
|
|
answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 ||
|
|
answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME) ?
|
|
0 : END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send a socks reply to stream <b>conn</b>, using the appropriate
|
|
* socks version, etc, and mark <b>conn</b> as completed with SOCKS
|
|
* handshaking.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>reply</b> is defined, then write <b>replylen</b> bytes of it to conn
|
|
* and return, else reply based on <b>endreason</b> (one of
|
|
* END_STREAM_REASON_*). If <b>reply</b> is undefined, <b>endreason</b> can't
|
|
* be 0 or REASON_DONE. Send endreason to the controller, if appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
|
|
size_t replylen, int endreason)
|
|
{
|
|
char buf[256];
|
|
socks5_reply_status_t status =
|
|
stream_end_reason_to_socks5_response(endreason);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request); /* make sure it's an AP stream */
|
|
|
|
control_event_stream_status(conn,
|
|
status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ? STREAM_EVENT_SUCCEEDED : STREAM_EVENT_FAILED,
|
|
endreason);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->has_finished) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "(Harmless.) duplicate calls to "
|
|
"connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (replylen) { /* we already have a reply in mind */
|
|
connection_write_to_buf(reply, replylen, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 4) {
|
|
memset(buf,0,SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN);
|
|
buf[1] = (status==SOCKS5_SUCCEEDED ? SOCKS4_GRANTED : SOCKS4_REJECT);
|
|
/* leave version, destport, destip zero */
|
|
connection_write_to_buf(buf, SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN, ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
} else if (conn->socks_request->socks_version == 5) {
|
|
buf[0] = 5; /* version 5 */
|
|
buf[1] = (char)status;
|
|
buf[2] = 0;
|
|
buf[3] = 1; /* ipv4 addr */
|
|
memset(buf+4,0,6); /* Set external addr/port to 0.
|
|
The spec doesn't seem to say what to do here. -RD */
|
|
connection_write_to_buf(buf,10,ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
}
|
|
/* If socks_version isn't 4 or 5, don't send anything.
|
|
* This can happen in the case of AP bridges. */
|
|
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Read a RELAY_BEGIN or RELAY_BEGINDIR cell from <b>cell</b>, decode it, and
|
|
* place the result in <b>bcell</b>. On success return 0; on failure return
|
|
* <0 and set *<b>end_reason_out</b> to the end reason we should send back to
|
|
* the client. */
|
|
/* static */ int
|
|
begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell,
|
|
uint8_t *end_reason_out)
|
|
{
|
|
relay_header_t rh;
|
|
const uint8_t *body, *nul;
|
|
|
|
memset(bcell, 0, sizeof(*bcell));
|
|
*end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
|
|
|
|
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
|
|
return -2; /*XXXX why not TORPROTOL? */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcell->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
|
|
|
|
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
|
|
bcell->is_begindir = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (rh.command != RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got an unexpected command %d", (int)rh.command);
|
|
*end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
body = cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE;
|
|
nul = memchr(body, 0, rh.length);
|
|
if (! nul) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Relay begin cell has no \\0. Closing.");
|
|
*end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tor_addr_port_split(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
|
|
(char*)(body),
|
|
&bcell->address,&bcell->port)<0) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Unable to parse addr:port in relay begin cell. Closing.");
|
|
*end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (bcell->port == 0) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Missing port in relay begin cell. Closing.");
|
|
tor_free(bcell->address);
|
|
*end_reason_out = END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (body + rh.length >= nul + 4)
|
|
bcell->flags = ntohl(get_uint32(nul+1));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A relay 'begin' or 'begin_dir' cell has arrived, and either we are
|
|
* an exit hop for the circuit, or we are the origin and it is a
|
|
* rendezvous begin.
|
|
*
|
|
* Launch a new exit connection and initialize things appropriately.
|
|
*
|
|
* If it's a rendezvous stream, call connection_exit_connect() on
|
|
* it.
|
|
*
|
|
* For general streams, call dns_resolve() on it first, and only call
|
|
* connection_exit_connect() if the dns answer is already known.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that we don't call connection_add() on the new stream! We wait
|
|
* for connection_exit_connect() to do that.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -(some circuit end reason) if we want to tear down <b>circ</b>.
|
|
* Else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *n_stream;
|
|
relay_header_t rh;
|
|
char *address = NULL;
|
|
uint16_t port = 0;
|
|
or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
begin_cell_t bcell;
|
|
int r;
|
|
uint8_t end_reason=0;
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
|
|
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* Note: we have to use relay_send_command_from_edge here, not
|
|
* connection_edge_end or connection_edge_send_command, since those require
|
|
* that we have a stream connected to a circuit, and we don't connect to a
|
|
* circuit until we have a pending/successful resolve. */
|
|
|
|
if (!server_mode(options) &&
|
|
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Relay begin cell at non-server. Closing.");
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, NULL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = begin_cell_parse(cell, &bcell, &end_reason);
|
|
if (r < -1) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (r == -1) {
|
|
tor_free(bcell.address);
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ, end_reason, NULL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (! bcell.is_begindir) {
|
|
/* Steal reference */
|
|
address = bcell.address;
|
|
port = bcell.port;
|
|
|
|
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) {
|
|
if (!options->AllowSingleHopExits &&
|
|
(or_circ->is_first_hop ||
|
|
(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
|
|
or_circ->p_chan->identity_digest) &&
|
|
should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
|
|
/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
|
|
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
|
|
* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
|
|
*/
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
|
|
safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)),
|
|
or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
|
|
"from unknown relay");
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
or_circ->is_first_hop ?
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
tor_free(address);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
|
|
if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) ||
|
|
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY, NULL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure to get the 'real' address of the previous hop: the
|
|
* caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and
|
|
* we might already have corrected base_.addr[ess] for the relay's
|
|
* canonical IP address. */
|
|
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
|
|
address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_address(or_circ->p_chan));
|
|
else
|
|
address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
|
|
port = 1; /* XXXX This value is never actually used anywhere, and there
|
|
* isn't "really" a connection here. But we
|
|
* need to set it to something nonzero. */
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got an unexpected command %d", (int)rh.command);
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL, NULL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (! options->IPv6Exit) {
|
|
/* I don't care if you prefer IPv6; I can't give you any. */
|
|
bcell.flags &= ~BEGIN_FLAG_IPV6_PREFERRED;
|
|
/* If you don't want IPv4, I can't help. */
|
|
if (bcell.flags & BEGIN_FLAG_IPV4_NOT_OK) {
|
|
tor_free(address);
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"Creating new exit connection.");
|
|
n_stream = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);/*XXXX IPv6*/
|
|
|
|
/* Remember the tunneled request ID in the new edge connection, so that
|
|
* we can measure download times. */
|
|
n_stream->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id;
|
|
|
|
n_stream->base_.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT;
|
|
n_stream->begincell_flags = bcell.flags;
|
|
n_stream->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
|
|
n_stream->base_.port = port;
|
|
/* leave n_stream->s at -1, because it's not yet valid */
|
|
n_stream->package_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
|
|
n_stream->deliver_window = STREAMWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"begin is for rendezvous. configuring stream.");
|
|
n_stream->base_.address = tor_strdup("(rendezvous)");
|
|
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
|
|
n_stream->rend_data = rend_data_dup(origin_circ->rend_data);
|
|
tor_assert(connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(n_stream));
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
if (rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(n_stream, origin_circ) < 0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Didn't find rendezvous service (port %d)",
|
|
n_stream->base_.port);
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY,
|
|
origin_circ->cpath->prev);
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
|
|
tor_free(address);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND,"Finished assigning addr/port");
|
|
n_stream->cpath_layer = origin_circ->cpath->prev; /* link it */
|
|
|
|
/* add it into the linked list of p_streams on this circuit */
|
|
n_stream->next_stream = origin_circ->p_streams;
|
|
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
|
|
origin_circ->p_streams = n_stream;
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
|
|
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
|
|
tor_free(address);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_strlower(address);
|
|
n_stream->base_.address = address;
|
|
n_stream->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
|
|
/* default to failed, change in dns_resolve if it turns out not to fail */
|
|
|
|
if (we_are_hibernating()) {
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING, NULL);
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(n_stream));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n_stream->on_circuit = circ;
|
|
|
|
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
|
|
tor_addr_t tmp_addr;
|
|
tor_assert(or_circ);
|
|
if (or_circ->p_chan &&
|
|
channel_get_addr_if_possible(or_circ->p_chan, &tmp_addr)) {
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&n_stream->base_.addr, &tmp_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to start the dns_resolve().");
|
|
|
|
/* send it off to the gethostbyname farm */
|
|
switch (dns_resolve(n_stream)) {
|
|
case 1: /* resolve worked; now n_stream is attached to circ. */
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to call connection_exit_connect().");
|
|
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case -1: /* resolve failed */
|
|
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
|
|
END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED, NULL);
|
|
/* n_stream got freed. don't touch it. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case 0: /* resolve added to pending list */
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Called when we receive a RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE cell 'cell' along the
|
|
* circuit <b>circ</b>;
|
|
* begin resolving the hostname, and (eventually) reply with a RESOLVED cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *dummy_conn;
|
|
relay_header_t rh;
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
|
|
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* This 'dummy_conn' only exists to remember the stream ID
|
|
* associated with the resolve request; and to make the
|
|
* implementation of dns.c more uniform. (We really only need to
|
|
* remember the circuit, the stream ID, and the hostname to be
|
|
* resolved; but if we didn't store them in a connection like this,
|
|
* the housekeeping in dns.c would get way more complicated.)
|
|
*/
|
|
dummy_conn = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
|
|
dummy_conn->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
|
|
dummy_conn->base_.address = tor_strndup(
|
|
(char*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
|
|
rh.length);
|
|
dummy_conn->base_.port = 0;
|
|
dummy_conn->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
|
|
dummy_conn->base_.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
|
|
|
|
dummy_conn->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
|
|
/* send it off to the gethostbyname farm */
|
|
switch (dns_resolve(dummy_conn)) {
|
|
case -1: /* Impossible to resolve; a resolved cell was sent. */
|
|
/* Connection freed; don't touch it. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case 1: /* The result was cached; a resolved cell was sent. */
|
|
if (!dummy_conn->base_.marked_for_close)
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(dummy_conn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case 0: /* resolve added to pending list */
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Connect to conn's specified addr and port. If it worked, conn
|
|
* has now been added to the connection_array.
|
|
*
|
|
* Send back a connected cell. Include the resolved IP of the destination
|
|
* address, but <em>only</em> if it's a general exit stream. (Rendezvous
|
|
* streams must not reveal what IP they connected to.)
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *edge_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
const tor_addr_t *addr;
|
|
uint16_t port;
|
|
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
|
|
int socket_error = 0;
|
|
|
|
if ( (!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn) &&
|
|
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(&edge_conn->base_.addr,
|
|
edge_conn->base_.port)) ||
|
|
(tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) == AF_INET6 &&
|
|
! get_options()->IPv6Exit)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_EXIT,"%s:%d failed exit policy. Closing.",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(conn->address), conn->port);
|
|
connection_edge_end(edge_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY);
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
|
|
connection_free(conn);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr = &conn->addr;
|
|
port = conn->port;
|
|
|
|
if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)
|
|
conn->socket_family = AF_INET6;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_EXIT,"about to try connecting");
|
|
switch (connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port, &socket_error)) {
|
|
case -1: {
|
|
int reason = errno_to_stream_end_reason(socket_error);
|
|
connection_edge_end(edge_conn, reason);
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
|
|
connection_free(conn);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
case 0:
|
|
conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
|
|
|
|
connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT | WRITE_EVENT);
|
|
/* writable indicates finish;
|
|
* readable/error indicates broken link in windows-land. */
|
|
return;
|
|
/* case 1: fall through */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
if (connection_get_outbuf_len(conn)) {
|
|
/* in case there are any queued data cells */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"newly connected conn had data waiting!");
|
|
// connection_start_writing(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
IF_HAS_NO_BUFFEREVENT(conn)
|
|
connection_watch_events(conn, READ_EVENT);
|
|
|
|
/* also, deliver a 'connected' cell back through the circuit. */
|
|
if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
|
|
/* rendezvous stream */
|
|
/* don't send an address back! */
|
|
connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
} else { /* normal stream */
|
|
uint8_t connected_payload[MAX_CONNECTED_CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN];
|
|
int connected_payload_len =
|
|
connected_cell_format_payload(connected_payload, &conn->addr,
|
|
edge_conn->address_ttl);
|
|
if (connected_payload_len < 0) {
|
|
connection_edge_end(edge_conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL);
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn), edge_conn);
|
|
connection_free(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_edge_send_command(edge_conn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED,
|
|
(char*)connected_payload,
|
|
connected_payload_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given an exit conn that should attach to us as a directory server, open a
|
|
* bridge connection with a linked connection pair, create a new directory
|
|
* conn, and join them together. Return 0 on success (or if there was an
|
|
* error we could send back an end cell for). Return -(some circuit end
|
|
* reason) if the circuit needs to be torn down. Either connects
|
|
* <b>exitconn</b>, frees it, or marks it, as appropriate.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_exit_connect_dir(edge_connection_t *exitconn)
|
|
{
|
|
dir_connection_t *dirconn = NULL;
|
|
or_circuit_t *circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(exitconn->on_circuit);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_EXIT, "Opening local connection for anonymized directory exit");
|
|
|
|
exitconn->base_.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
dirconn = dir_connection_new(tor_addr_family(&exitconn->base_.addr));
|
|
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&dirconn->base_.addr, &exitconn->base_.addr);
|
|
dirconn->base_.port = 0;
|
|
dirconn->base_.address = tor_strdup(exitconn->base_.address);
|
|
dirconn->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_DIR;
|
|
dirconn->base_.purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER;
|
|
dirconn->base_.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
/* Note that the new dir conn belongs to the same tunneled request as
|
|
* the edge conn, so that we can measure download times. */
|
|
dirconn->dirreq_id = exitconn->dirreq_id;
|
|
|
|
connection_link_connections(TO_CONN(dirconn), TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
|
|
if (connection_add(TO_CONN(exitconn))<0) {
|
|
connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(dirconn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* link exitconn to circ, now that we know we can use it. */
|
|
exitconn->next_stream = circ->n_streams;
|
|
circ->n_streams = exitconn;
|
|
|
|
if (connection_add(TO_CONN(dirconn))<0) {
|
|
connection_edge_end(exitconn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
|
connection_close_immediate(TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
connection_free(TO_CONN(dirconn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(dirconn));
|
|
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(exitconn,
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED, NULL, 0) < 0) {
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(exitconn));
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(dirconn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if <b>conn</b> is a rendezvous stream, or 0 if
|
|
* it is a general stream.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
if (conn->rend_data)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if router <b>exit</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
|
|
* to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it.
|
|
* (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been
|
|
* resolved.)
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
tor_assert(exit);
|
|
|
|
/* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
|
|
* make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
const node_t *chosen_exit =
|
|
node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
|
|
exit->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
/* doesn't match */
|
|
// log_debug(LD_APP,"Requested node '%s', considering node '%s'. No.",
|
|
// conn->chosen_exit_name, exit->nickname);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn->use_begindir) {
|
|
/* Internal directory fetches do not count as exiting. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
|
|
tor_addr_t addr, *addrp = NULL;
|
|
addr_policy_result_t r;
|
|
if (0 == tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address)) {
|
|
addrp = &addr;
|
|
} else if (!conn->ipv4_traffic_ok && conn->ipv6_traffic_ok) {
|
|
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET6);
|
|
addrp = &addr;
|
|
} else if (conn->ipv4_traffic_ok && !conn->ipv6_traffic_ok) {
|
|
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
|
|
addrp = &addr;
|
|
}
|
|
r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,exit);
|
|
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
|
|
return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
|
|
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
|
|
return 0; /* We don't know the addr, but the exit policy rejects most
|
|
* addresses with this port. Since the user didn't ask for
|
|
* this node, err on the side of caution. */
|
|
} else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
|
|
/* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
|
|
if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit)) {
|
|
/* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If address is of the form "y.onion" with a well-formed handle y:
|
|
* Put a NUL after y, lower-case it, and return ONION_HOSTNAME.
|
|
*
|
|
* If address is of the form "y.onion" with a badly-formed handle y:
|
|
* Return BAD_HOSTNAME and log a message.
|
|
*
|
|
* If address is of the form "y.exit":
|
|
* Put a NUL after y and return EXIT_HOSTNAME.
|
|
*
|
|
* Otherwise:
|
|
* Return NORMAL_HOSTNAME and change nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
hostname_type_t
|
|
parse_extended_hostname(char *address)
|
|
{
|
|
char *s;
|
|
char query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
|
|
s = strrchr(address,'.');
|
|
if (!s)
|
|
return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* no dot, thus normal */
|
|
if (!strcmp(s+1,"exit")) {
|
|
*s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */
|
|
return EXIT_HOSTNAME; /* .exit */
|
|
}
|
|
if (strcmp(s+1,"onion"))
|
|
return NORMAL_HOSTNAME; /* neither .exit nor .onion, thus normal */
|
|
|
|
/* so it is .onion */
|
|
*s = 0; /* NUL-terminate it */
|
|
if (strlcpy(query, address, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1) >=
|
|
REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1)
|
|
goto failed;
|
|
if (rend_valid_service_id(query)) {
|
|
return ONION_HOSTNAME; /* success */
|
|
}
|
|
failed:
|
|
/* otherwise, return to previous state and return 0 */
|
|
*s = '.';
|
|
log_warn(LD_APP, "Invalid onion hostname %s; rejecting",
|
|
safe_str_client(address));
|
|
return BAD_HOSTNAME;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff the (possibly NULL) <b>alen</b>-byte chunk of memory at
|
|
* <b>a</b> is equal to the (possibly NULL) <b>blen</b>-byte chunk of memory
|
|
* at <b>b</b>. */
|
|
static int
|
|
memeq_opt(const char *a, size_t alen, const char *b, size_t blen)
|
|
{
|
|
if (a == NULL) {
|
|
return (b == NULL);
|
|
} else if (b == NULL) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else if (alen != blen) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return tor_memeq(a, b, alen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Return true iff none of the isolation flags and fields in <b>conn</b>
|
|
* should prevent it from being attached to <b>circ</b>.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
const uint8_t iso = conn->isolation_flags;
|
|
const socks_request_t *sr = conn->socks_request;
|
|
|
|
/* If circ has never been used for an isolated connection, we can
|
|
* totally use it for this one. */
|
|
if (!circ->isolation_values_set)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* If circ has been used for connections having more than one value
|
|
* for some field f, it will have the corresponding bit set in
|
|
* isolation_flags_mixed. If isolation_flags_mixed has any bits
|
|
* in common with iso, then conn must be isolated from at least
|
|
* one stream that has been attached to circ. */
|
|
if ((iso & circ->isolation_flags_mixed) != 0) {
|
|
/* For at least one field where conn is isolated, the circuit
|
|
* already has mixed streams. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Reached connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit without "
|
|
"having set conn->original_dest_address");
|
|
((entry_connection_t*)conn)->original_dest_address =
|
|
tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_STREAM) &&
|
|
(circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id !=
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_DESTPORT) && conn->socks_request->port != circ->dest_port)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_DESTADDR) &&
|
|
strcasecmp(conn->original_dest_address, circ->dest_address))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_SOCKSAUTH) &&
|
|
(! memeq_opt(sr->username, sr->usernamelen,
|
|
circ->socks_username, circ->socks_username_len) ||
|
|
! memeq_opt(sr->password, sr->passwordlen,
|
|
circ->socks_password, circ->socks_password_len)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_CLIENTPROTO) &&
|
|
(conn->socks_request->listener_type != circ->client_proto_type ||
|
|
conn->socks_request->socks_version != circ->client_proto_socksver))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_CLIENTADDR) &&
|
|
!tor_addr_eq(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &circ->client_addr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_SESSIONGRP) && conn->session_group != circ->session_group)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if ((iso & ISO_NYM_EPOCH) && conn->nym_epoch != circ->nym_epoch)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* If <b>dry_run</b> is false, update <b>circ</b>'s isolation flags and fields
|
|
* to reflect having had <b>conn</b> attached to it, and return 0. Otherwise,
|
|
* if <b>dry_run</b> is true, then make no changes to <b>circ</b>, and return
|
|
* a bitfield of isolation flags that we would have to set in
|
|
* isolation_flags_mixed to add <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, or -1 if
|
|
* <b>circ</b> has had no streams attached to it.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(const entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
int dry_run)
|
|
{
|
|
const socks_request_t *sr = conn->socks_request;
|
|
if (! conn->original_dest_address) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Reached connection_update_circuit_isolation without "
|
|
"having set conn->original_dest_address");
|
|
((entry_connection_t*)conn)->original_dest_address =
|
|
tor_strdup(conn->socks_request->address);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!circ->isolation_values_set) {
|
|
if (dry_run)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id =
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier;
|
|
circ->dest_port = conn->socks_request->port;
|
|
circ->dest_address = tor_strdup(conn->original_dest_address);
|
|
circ->client_proto_type = conn->socks_request->listener_type;
|
|
circ->client_proto_socksver = conn->socks_request->socks_version;
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&circ->client_addr, &ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr);
|
|
circ->session_group = conn->session_group;
|
|
circ->nym_epoch = conn->nym_epoch;
|
|
circ->socks_username = sr->username ?
|
|
tor_memdup(sr->username, sr->usernamelen) : NULL;
|
|
circ->socks_password = sr->password ?
|
|
tor_memdup(sr->password, sr->passwordlen) : NULL;
|
|
circ->socks_username_len = sr->usernamelen;
|
|
circ->socks_password_len = sr->passwordlen;
|
|
|
|
circ->isolation_values_set = 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
uint8_t mixed = 0;
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->port != circ->dest_port)
|
|
mixed |= ISO_DESTPORT;
|
|
if (strcasecmp(conn->original_dest_address, circ->dest_address))
|
|
mixed |= ISO_DESTADDR;
|
|
if (!memeq_opt(sr->username, sr->usernamelen,
|
|
circ->socks_username, circ->socks_username_len) ||
|
|
!memeq_opt(sr->password, sr->passwordlen,
|
|
circ->socks_password, circ->socks_password_len))
|
|
mixed |= ISO_SOCKSAUTH;
|
|
if ((conn->socks_request->listener_type != circ->client_proto_type ||
|
|
conn->socks_request->socks_version != circ->client_proto_socksver))
|
|
mixed |= ISO_CLIENTPROTO;
|
|
if (!tor_addr_eq(&ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->addr, &circ->client_addr))
|
|
mixed |= ISO_CLIENTADDR;
|
|
if (conn->session_group != circ->session_group)
|
|
mixed |= ISO_SESSIONGRP;
|
|
if (conn->nym_epoch != circ->nym_epoch)
|
|
mixed |= ISO_NYM_EPOCH;
|
|
|
|
if (dry_run)
|
|
return mixed;
|
|
|
|
if ((mixed & conn->isolation_flags) != 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Updating a circuit with seemingly incompatible "
|
|
"isolation flags.");
|
|
}
|
|
circ->isolation_flags_mixed |= mixed;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Clear the isolation settings on <b>circ</b>.
|
|
*
|
|
* This only works on an open circuit that has never had a stream attached to
|
|
* it, and whose isolation settings are hypothetical. (We set hypothetical
|
|
* isolation settings on circuits as we're launching them, so that we
|
|
* know whether they can handle more streams or whether we need to launch
|
|
* even more circuits. Once the circuit is open, if it turns out that
|
|
* we no longer have any streams to attach to it, we clear the isolation flags
|
|
* and data so that other streams can have a chance.)
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_clear_isolation(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
if (circ->isolation_any_streams_attached) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear the isolation status of a dirty circuit");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to clear the isolation status of a non-open "
|
|
"circuit");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circ->isolation_values_set = 0;
|
|
circ->isolation_flags_mixed = 0;
|
|
circ->associated_isolated_stream_global_id = 0;
|
|
circ->client_proto_type = 0;
|
|
circ->client_proto_socksver = 0;
|
|
circ->dest_port = 0;
|
|
tor_addr_make_unspec(&circ->client_addr);
|
|
tor_free(circ->dest_address);
|
|
circ->session_group = -1;
|
|
circ->nym_epoch = 0;
|
|
if (circ->socks_username) {
|
|
memwipe(circ->socks_username, 0x11, circ->socks_username_len);
|
|
tor_free(circ->socks_username);
|
|
}
|
|
if (circ->socks_password) {
|
|
memwipe(circ->socks_password, 0x05, circ->socks_password_len);
|
|
tor_free(circ->socks_password);
|
|
}
|
|
circ->socks_username_len = circ->socks_password_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|