mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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bb0c98daa8
svn:r5303
313 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
313 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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NICK - nick claims
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ARMA - arma claims
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PHOBOS - phobos claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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Non-Coding, Soon:
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N - Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers
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N - Clean up dir spec.
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N . contact umass folks
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N - Mention controller libs someplace.
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D FAQ entry: why gnutls is bad/not good for tor
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P - flesh out the rest of the section 6 of the faq
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P - gather pointers to livecd distros that include tor
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- put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
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stickers directly, etc.
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- more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake, i want to
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talk about hidden services.
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* clean up the places where our docs are redundant (or worse, obsolete in
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one file and correct elsewhere). agl has a start on a global
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list-of-tor-docs.
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P - update windows docs to clarify which versions of windows, and why a
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DOS window, how it's used, for the less technical users
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NR- write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
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- tor-in-the-media page
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- Ask schanzle@cas.homelinux.org about a patch for rpm spec fixes against
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tor-0.1.0.7.rc
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- Remove need for HACKING file.
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for 0.1.1.x:
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N - if they're trying to be a tor server and they're running
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win 98 or win me, don't let them be a server.
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R - are dirservers auto-verifying duplicate nicknames?
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o tor should auto-sort the recommended-versions strings
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(with the new smartlist sort stuff maybe)
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o setconf SocksBindAddress kills tor if it fails to bind
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o controller libs should support resetconf command.
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N . Additional controller features
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o Find a way to make event info more extensible
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- change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose,
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whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become
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too dirty for further circuits, etc.
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R - What do we want here, exactly?
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N - Specify and implement it.
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- Change stream status events analogously.
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R - What do we want here, exactly?
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N - Specify and implement it.
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- Make other events "better".
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- Change stream status events analogously.
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R - What do we want here, exactly?
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N - Specify and implement it.
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- Make other events "better" analogously
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R - What do we want here, exactly?
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N - Specify and implement it.
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. Expose more information via getinfo:
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- import and export rendezvous descriptors
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- Review all static fields for additional candidates
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- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
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- We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to
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download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download.
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- It would be nice to request address lookups from the controller
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without using SOCKS.
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. Helper nodes
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. More testing and debugging
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o On sighup, if usehelpernodes changed to 1, use new circuits?
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- If your helper nodes are unavailable, don't abandon them unless
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other nodes *are* reachable.
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R - If you think an OR conn is open but you can never establish a circuit
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to it, reconsider whether it's actually open.
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- Miscellaneous cleanups
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- switch accountingmax to count total in+out, not either in or
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out. it's easy to move in this direction (not risky), but hard to
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back, out if we decide we prefer it the way it already is. hm.
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. Come up with a coherent strategy for bandwidth buckets and TLS. (The
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logic for reading from TLS sockets is likely to overrun the bandwidth
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buckets under heavy load. (Really, the logic was never right in the
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first place.) Also, we should audit all users of get_pending_bytes().)
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- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
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sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
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R o remove the warnings from rendezvous stuff that shouldn't be warnings.
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. Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach.
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- switch to an ascii format.
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- authdirservers publish blobs of them.
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- other authdirservers fetch these blobs.
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- hidserv people have the option of not uploading their blobs.
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- you can insert a blob via the controller.
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- and there's some amount of backwards compatibility.
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- teach clients, intro points, and hidservs about auth mechanisms.
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- come up with a few more auth mechanisms.
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- Christian Grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
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the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type
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which is used for the first N data cells, and only
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extend-data cells can be extend requests.
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- Specify, including thought about
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- Implement
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N - Destroy and truncated cells should have reasons.
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N - Add private:* alias in exit policies to make it easier to ban all the
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fiddly little 192.168.foo addresses.
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(AGL had a patch; consider applying it.)
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N - warn if listening for SOCKS on public IP.
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- cpu fixes:
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- see if we should make use of truncate to retry
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o hardware accelerator support (configure engines.)
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o hardware accelerator support (use instead of aes.c when reasonable)
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- Benchmark this somehow to see whether using EVP_foo is slower in the
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non-engine case than AES_foo. If so, check for AES engine and fall
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back to AES_foo when it's not found.
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R - kill dns workers more slowly
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. Directory changes
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o recommended-versions for client / server ?
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. Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval
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o dirservers have blacklist of IPs and keys they hate
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- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
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- have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
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before we approve them
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- other?
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R . Dirservers verify reachability claims
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o basic reachability testing, influencing network-status list.
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X rate-limiting the reporting of trouble servers
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R - check reachability as soon as you hear about a new server
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- Decentralization
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- Figure out what to do about hidden service descriptors.
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- find 10 dirservers.
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- (what are criteria to be a dirserver?)
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o Dirservers publish compressed network-status objects.
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o Support retrieving several-at-once
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o Everyone downloads network-status objects
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o Clients: from all directories, round-robin
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o Basic implementation: disable until 0.1.1.x is out.
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o On failure, mark trusted_dir_server as having failed
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o Retry, up to a point.
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- Launch retry immediately on failure.
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o Parse them
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o Cache them, reload on restart
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o Serve cached directories
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o Directories expose individual descriptors
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X By 'if-newer-than' (Does the spec require this??)
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o Support compression.
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o Alice acts on network-status objects
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o Alice downloads descriptors as needed.
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o Figure out what's needed
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o Store it
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o Implement store
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o Implement reload-from-store
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o Store downloaded descriptors
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o Download it
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o As-needed if we have 2 network-status objs.
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o Download "all" if we have less than 2 network-status objs.
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(This has vulnerabilities if we're not careful)
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o Call directory_has_arrived as needed; rename it.
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o Set has_fetched_directory properly.
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o Retry descriptors on failure
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o Give up after a while.
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- But try again after a long while (???)
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o Check software versions according to some sane plan.
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- Warn again after 24 hours.
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o Alice sets descriptor status from network-status
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o Implement
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o Use
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N . Routerdesc download changes
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o Refactor combined-status to be its own type.
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o Change rule from "do not launch new connections when one exists" to
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"do not request any fingerprint that we're currently requesting."
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o Launch connections every minute, or whenever a download fails
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o Retry failed routerdescs after 0, 1, 5, 10 minutes.
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o Mirrors retry harder and more often. (0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 5, and 15)
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o Reset failure count every 60 minutes
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o Drop fallback to download-all. Also, always split download.
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- Only use a routerdesc if you recognize its hash.
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- (Must defer till dirservers are upgraded to latest code, which
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actually generates these hashes.)
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- Of course, authdirservers must not do this.
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- Should directory mirrors do something else entirely?
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- Use has_fetched_directory sanely, whatever that means.
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- What *does* that mean?
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o If we have a routerdesc for Bob, and he says, "I'm 0.1.0.x", don't
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fetch a new one if it was published in the last 2 hours.
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- How does this interact with the 'recognized hash' rule?
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. Downgrade new directory events from notice to info
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- Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from directory
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connections over last N seconds.
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o Call dirport_is_reachable from somewhere else.
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o Networkstatus should list who's an authority.
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o Add nickname element to dirserver line. Log this along with IP:Port.
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o Warn when using non-default directory servers.
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o When giving up on a non-finished dir request, log how many bytes
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dropped, to see whether it's worthwhile to use partial info.
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- Security
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- Alices avoid duplicate class C nodes.
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- Analyze how bad the partitioning is or isn't.
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- Flags
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- Clients use Stable and Fast instead of uptime and bandwidth to
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pick which servers are stable/fast.
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- Make authorities rate-limit logging their complaints about given
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servers?
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N . Naming and validation:
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o Separate naming from validation in authdirs.
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o Authdirs need to be able to decline to validate based on
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IP range and key
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o Authdirs need to be able to decline to include baased on
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IP range and key.
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o Not all authdirs name.
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o Change naming rule: N->K iff any naming authdir says N->K,
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and none says N->K' or N'->K.
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o Clients choose names based on network-status options.
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o Names are remembered in client state (?)
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- Okay to have two valid servers with same nickname, but not
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two named servers with same nickname. Update logic.
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- packaging and ui stuff:
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. multiple sample torrc files
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- uninstallers
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. for os x
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. something, anything, for sys tray on Windows.
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. figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
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. Document it.
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. Add version number to directory.
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N - Vet all pending installer patches
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- Win32 installer plus privoxy, sockscap/freecap, etc.
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- Vet win32 systray helper code
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o openssl patch to check for degenerate keys in DH handshake
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o accepted and put into openssl
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Reach (deferrable) items for 0.1.1.x:
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- Start using create-fast cells as clients
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o Let more config options (e.g. ORPort) change dynamically.
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- start handling server descriptors without a socksport?
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o Add TTLs to DNS-related replies, and use them (when present) to adjust
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addressmap values.
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. Research memory use on Linux: what's happening?
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- Is it threading? (Maybe, maybe not)
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- Is it the buf_shrink bug? (Quite possibly)
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- Instrument the 0.1.1 code to figure out where our memory is going;
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apply the results. (all platforms?)
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- Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what it's for.
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For 0.1.1.x, if we can figure out how:
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- rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow.
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o enclaves (at least preliminary)
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- Write limiting; separate token bucket for write
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- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to
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be us as not.
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- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman
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nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps?
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Future version:
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- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.
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- Handle full buffers without totally borking
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- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
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maybe per subnet.
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- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
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design.
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- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
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- Specify?
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- tor-resolve script should use socks5 to get better error messages.
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- make min uptime a function of the available choices (say, choose 60th
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percentile, not 1 day.)
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- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond ORPort/DirPort
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- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
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* figure out what breaks for this, and do it.
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- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
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connection requests.
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- Relax clique assumptions.
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- tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses
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that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
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Blue-sky:
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- Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
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- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
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- Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors.
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- The "China problem"
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- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
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- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
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circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
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connection (tls session key) rotation.
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- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
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- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
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link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
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- Conn key rotation.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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we've seen in the wild.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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