mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-11 21:53:48 +01:00
948dd2c79e
This patch adds a new node_has_preferred_descriptor() function, and
replaces most users of node_has_descriptor() with it. That's an
important change, since as of d1874b4339 (our fix for #25213),
we are willing to say that a node has _some_ descriptor, but not the
_right_ descriptor for a particular use case.
Part of a fix for 25691 and 25692.
4414 lines
152 KiB
C
4414 lines
152 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
|
|
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* \file rendservice.c
|
|
* \brief The hidden-service side of rendezvous functionality.
|
|
**/
|
|
|
|
#define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE
|
|
|
|
#include "or.h"
|
|
#include "circpathbias.h"
|
|
#include "circuitbuild.h"
|
|
#include "circuitlist.h"
|
|
#include "circuituse.h"
|
|
#include "config.h"
|
|
#include "control.h"
|
|
#include "directory.h"
|
|
#include "hs_common.h"
|
|
#include "hs_config.h"
|
|
#include "main.h"
|
|
#include "networkstatus.h"
|
|
#include "nodelist.h"
|
|
#include "policies.h"
|
|
#include "rendclient.h"
|
|
#include "rendcommon.h"
|
|
#include "rendservice.h"
|
|
#include "router.h"
|
|
#include "relay.h"
|
|
#include "rephist.h"
|
|
#include "replaycache.h"
|
|
#include "routerlist.h"
|
|
#include "routerparse.h"
|
|
#include "routerset.h"
|
|
|
|
struct rend_service_t;
|
|
static origin_circuit_t *find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
|
|
const char *pk_digest);
|
|
static rend_intro_point_t *find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ);
|
|
static rend_intro_point_t *find_expiring_intro_point(
|
|
struct rend_service_t *service, origin_circuit_t *circ);
|
|
|
|
static extend_info_t *find_rp_for_intro(
|
|
const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
char **err_msg_out);
|
|
|
|
static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro);
|
|
static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
|
|
time_t now);
|
|
static int rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s);
|
|
static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s);
|
|
static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s,
|
|
const char *hfname);
|
|
static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
|
|
const char* digest);
|
|
static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id);
|
|
static const char *rend_service_escaped_dir(
|
|
const struct rend_service_t *s);
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out);
|
|
static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out);
|
|
static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out);
|
|
|
|
static int rend_service_check_private_dir(const or_options_t *options,
|
|
const rend_service_t *s,
|
|
int create);
|
|
static const smartlist_t* rend_get_service_list(
|
|
const smartlist_t* substitute_service_list);
|
|
static smartlist_t* rend_get_service_list_mutable(
|
|
smartlist_t* substitute_service_list);
|
|
static int rend_max_intro_circs_per_period(unsigned int n_intro_points_wanted);
|
|
|
|
/* Hidden service directory file names:
|
|
* new file names should be added to rend_service_add_filenames_to_list()
|
|
* for sandboxing purposes. */
|
|
static const char *private_key_fname = "private_key";
|
|
static const char *hostname_fname = "hostname";
|
|
static const char *client_keys_fname = "client_keys";
|
|
static const char *sos_poison_fname = "onion_service_non_anonymous";
|
|
|
|
/** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP. */
|
|
static smartlist_t *rend_service_list = NULL;
|
|
/** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP which is used as a
|
|
* staging area before they are put in the main list in order to prune dying
|
|
* service on config reload. */
|
|
static smartlist_t *rend_service_staging_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Like rend_get_service_list_mutable, but returns a read-only list. */
|
|
static const smartlist_t*
|
|
rend_get_service_list(const smartlist_t* substitute_service_list)
|
|
{
|
|
/* It is safe to cast away the const here, because
|
|
* rend_get_service_list_mutable does not actually modify the list */
|
|
return rend_get_service_list_mutable((smartlist_t*)substitute_service_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return a mutable list of hidden services.
|
|
* If substitute_service_list is not NULL, return it.
|
|
* Otherwise, check if the global rend_service_list is non-NULL, and if so,
|
|
* return it.
|
|
* Otherwise, log a BUG message and return NULL.
|
|
* */
|
|
static smartlist_t*
|
|
rend_get_service_list_mutable(smartlist_t* substitute_service_list)
|
|
{
|
|
if (substitute_service_list) {
|
|
return substitute_service_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If no special service list is provided, then just use the global one. */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!rend_service_list)) {
|
|
/* No global HS list, which is a programmer error. */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rend_service_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Tells if onion service <b>s</b> is ephemeral.
|
|
*/
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
rend_service_is_ephemeral(const struct rend_service_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return (s->directory == NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>.
|
|
*/
|
|
static const char *
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(const struct rend_service_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return rend_service_is_ephemeral(s) ? "[EPHEMERAL]" : escaped(s->directory);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of rendezvous services we have configured. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_num_services(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!rend_service_list)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return smartlist_len(rend_service_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Helper: free storage held by a single service authorized client entry. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_authorized_client_free_(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!client)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (client->client_key)
|
|
crypto_pk_free(client->client_key);
|
|
if (client->client_name)
|
|
memwipe(client->client_name, 0, strlen(client->client_name));
|
|
tor_free(client->client_name);
|
|
memwipe(client->descriptor_cookie, 0, sizeof(client->descriptor_cookie));
|
|
tor_free(client);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Helper for strmap_free. */
|
|
static void
|
|
rend_authorized_client_free_void(void *authorized_client)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_authorized_client_free_(authorized_client);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release the storage held by <b>service</b>.
|
|
*/
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
rend_service_free_(rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!service)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(service->directory);
|
|
if (service->ports) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t*, p,
|
|
rend_service_port_config_free(p));
|
|
smartlist_free(service->ports);
|
|
}
|
|
if (service->private_key)
|
|
crypto_pk_free(service->private_key);
|
|
if (service->intro_nodes) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro,
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro););
|
|
smartlist_free(service->intro_nodes);
|
|
}
|
|
if (service->expiring_nodes) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->expiring_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro,
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro););
|
|
smartlist_free(service->expiring_nodes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
|
|
if (service->clients) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, c,
|
|
rend_authorized_client_free(c););
|
|
smartlist_free(service->clients);
|
|
}
|
|
if (service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) {
|
|
replaycache_free(service->accepted_intro_dh_parts);
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(service);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Release all the storage held in rend_service_staging_list. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_free_staging_list(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rend_service_staging_list) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_staging_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
|
|
rend_service_free(ptr));
|
|
smartlist_free(rend_service_staging_list);
|
|
rend_service_staging_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release all the storage held in both rend_service_list and
|
|
* rend_service_staging_list. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_free_all(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rend_service_list) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
|
|
rend_service_free(ptr));
|
|
smartlist_free(rend_service_list);
|
|
rend_service_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
rend_service_free_staging_list();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the subsystem. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(!rend_service_list);
|
|
tor_assert(!rend_service_staging_list);
|
|
|
|
rend_service_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
rend_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate a <b>service</b>. Use the <b>service_list</b> to make sure there
|
|
* is no duplicate entry for the given service object. Return 0 if valid else
|
|
* -1 if not.*/
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_validate_service(const smartlist_t *service_list,
|
|
const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(service_list);
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
if (service->max_streams_per_circuit < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with negative max "
|
|
"streams per circuit.",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
goto invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (service->max_streams_close_circuit < 0 ||
|
|
service->max_streams_close_circuit > 1) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) configured with invalid "
|
|
"max streams handling.",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
goto invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
|
|
(!service->clients || smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but "
|
|
"no clients.",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
goto invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!service->ports || !smartlist_len(service->ports)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with no ports configured.",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
goto invalid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Valid. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
invalid:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add it to <b>service_list</b>, or to the global rend_service_list if
|
|
* <b>service_list</b> is NULL. Return 0 on success. On failure, free
|
|
* <b>service</b> and return -1. Takes ownership of <b>service</b>. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_add_service(smartlist_t *service_list, rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
rend_service_port_config_t *p;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *s_list = rend_get_service_list_mutable(service_list);
|
|
/* We must have a service list, even if it's a temporary one, so we can
|
|
* check for duplicate services */
|
|
if (BUG(!s_list)) {
|
|
rend_service_free(service);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
service->expiring_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory %s",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->ports); ++i) {
|
|
p = smartlist_get(service->ports, i);
|
|
if (!(p->is_unix_addr)) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND,
|
|
"Service maps port %d to %s",
|
|
p->virtual_port,
|
|
fmt_addrport(&p->real_addr, p->real_port));
|
|
} else {
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND,
|
|
"Service maps port %d to socket at \"%s\"",
|
|
p->virtual_port, p->unix_addr);
|
|
#else
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
"Service maps port %d to an AF_UNIX socket, but we "
|
|
"have no AF_UNIX support on this platform. This is "
|
|
"probably a bug.",
|
|
p->virtual_port);
|
|
rend_service_free(service);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* The service passed all the checks */
|
|
tor_assert(s_list);
|
|
smartlist_add(s_list, service);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a new rend_service_port_config_t with its path set to
|
|
* <b>socket_path</b> or empty if <b>socket_path</b> is NULL */
|
|
static rend_service_port_config_t *
|
|
rend_service_port_config_new(const char *socket_path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!socket_path)
|
|
return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_port_config_t) + 1);
|
|
|
|
const size_t pathlen = strlen(socket_path) + 1;
|
|
rend_service_port_config_t *conf =
|
|
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_port_config_t) + pathlen);
|
|
memcpy(conf->unix_addr, socket_path, pathlen);
|
|
conf->is_unix_addr = 1;
|
|
return conf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parses a virtual-port to real-port/socket mapping separated by
|
|
* the provided separator and returns a new rend_service_port_config_t,
|
|
* or NULL and an optional error string on failure.
|
|
*
|
|
* The format is: VirtualPort SEP (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort|'socket':path)?
|
|
*
|
|
* IP defaults to 127.0.0.1; RealPort defaults to VirtualPort.
|
|
*/
|
|
rend_service_port_config_t *
|
|
rend_service_parse_port_config(const char *string, const char *sep,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_t *sl;
|
|
int virtport;
|
|
int realport = 0;
|
|
uint16_t p;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
rend_service_port_config_t *result = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int is_unix_addr = 0;
|
|
const char *socket_path = NULL;
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
char *addrport = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sl = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_split_string(sl, string, sep,
|
|
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 2);
|
|
if (smartlist_len(sl) < 1 || BUG(smartlist_len(sl) > 2)) {
|
|
err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
virtport = (int)tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(sl,0), 10, 1, 65535, NULL,NULL);
|
|
if (!virtport) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service "
|
|
"port configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0)));
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (smartlist_len(sl) == 1) {
|
|
/* No addr:port part; use default. */
|
|
realport = virtport;
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, 0x7F000001u); /* 127.0.0.1 */
|
|
} else {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
const char *addrport_element = smartlist_get(sl,1);
|
|
const char *rest = NULL;
|
|
int is_unix;
|
|
ret = port_cfg_line_extract_addrport(addrport_element, &addrport,
|
|
&is_unix, &rest);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Couldn't process address <%s> from hidden "
|
|
"service configuration", addrport_element);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_unix) {
|
|
socket_path = addrport;
|
|
is_unix_addr = 1;
|
|
} else if (strchr(addrport, ':') || strchr(addrport, '.')) {
|
|
/* else try it as an IP:port pair if it has a : or . in it */
|
|
if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &p)<0) {
|
|
err_msg = tor_strdup("Unparseable address in hidden service port "
|
|
"configuration.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
realport = p?p:virtport;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* No addr:port, no addr -- must be port. */
|
|
realport = (int)tor_parse_long(addrport, 10, 1, 65535, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (!realport) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in "
|
|
"hidden service port configuration.",
|
|
escaped(addrport));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, 0x7F000001u); /* Default to 127.0.0.1 */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allow room for unix_addr */
|
|
result = rend_service_port_config_new(socket_path);
|
|
result->virtual_port = virtport;
|
|
result->is_unix_addr = is_unix_addr;
|
|
if (!is_unix_addr) {
|
|
result->real_port = realport;
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&result->real_addr, &addr);
|
|
result->unix_addr[0] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
tor_free(addrport);
|
|
if (err_msg_out != NULL) {
|
|
*err_msg_out = err_msg;
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release all storage held in a rend_service_port_config_t. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_port_config_free_(rend_service_port_config_t *p)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_free(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy relevant data from service src to dst while pruning the service lists.
|
|
* This should only be called during the pruning process which takes existing
|
|
* services and copy their data to the newly configured services. The src
|
|
* service replaycache will be set to NULL after this call. */
|
|
static void
|
|
copy_service_on_prunning(rend_service_t *dst, rend_service_t *src)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(dst);
|
|
tor_assert(src);
|
|
|
|
/* Keep the timestamps for when the content changed and the next upload
|
|
* time so we can properly upload the descriptor if needed for the new
|
|
* service object. */
|
|
dst->desc_is_dirty = src->desc_is_dirty;
|
|
dst->next_upload_time = src->next_upload_time;
|
|
/* Move the replaycache to the new object. */
|
|
dst->accepted_intro_dh_parts = src->accepted_intro_dh_parts;
|
|
src->accepted_intro_dh_parts = NULL;
|
|
/* Copy intro point information to destination service. */
|
|
dst->intro_period_started = src->intro_period_started;
|
|
dst->n_intro_circuits_launched = src->n_intro_circuits_launched;
|
|
dst->n_intro_points_wanted = src->n_intro_points_wanted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Helper: Actual implementation of the pruning on reload which we've
|
|
* decoupled in order to make the unit test workeable without ugly hacks.
|
|
* Furthermore, this function does NOT free any memory but will nullify the
|
|
* temporary list pointer whatever happens. */
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
rend_service_prune_list_impl_(void)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
|
|
smartlist_t *surviving_services, *old_service_list, *new_service_list;
|
|
|
|
/* When pruning our current service list, we must have a staging list that
|
|
* contains what we want to check else it's a code flow error. */
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_staging_list);
|
|
|
|
/* We are about to prune the current list of its dead service so set the
|
|
* semantic for that list to be the "old" one. */
|
|
old_service_list = rend_service_list;
|
|
/* The staging list is now the "new" list so set this semantic. */
|
|
new_service_list = rend_service_staging_list;
|
|
/* After this, whatever happens, we'll use our new list. */
|
|
rend_service_list = new_service_list;
|
|
/* Finally, nullify the staging list pointer as we don't need it anymore
|
|
* and it needs to be NULL before the next reload. */
|
|
rend_service_staging_list = NULL;
|
|
/* Nothing to prune if we have no service list so stop right away. */
|
|
if (!old_service_list) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This contains all _existing_ services that survives the relaod that is
|
|
* that haven't been removed from the configuration. The difference between
|
|
* this list and the new service list is that the new list can possibly
|
|
* contain newly configured service that have no introduction points opened
|
|
* yet nor key material loaded or generated. */
|
|
surviving_services = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
/* Preserve the existing ephemeral services.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is the ephemeral service equivalent of the "Copy introduction
|
|
* points to new services" block, except there's no copy required since
|
|
* the service structure isn't regenerated.
|
|
*
|
|
* After this is done, all ephemeral services will be:
|
|
* * Removed from old_service_list, so the equivalent non-ephemeral code
|
|
* will not attempt to preserve them.
|
|
* * Added to the new_service_list (that previously only had the
|
|
* services listed in the configuration).
|
|
* * Added to surviving_services, which is the list of services that
|
|
* will NOT have their intro point closed.
|
|
*/
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old) {
|
|
if (rend_service_is_ephemeral(old)) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_service_list, old);
|
|
smartlist_add(surviving_services, old);
|
|
smartlist_add(new_service_list, old);
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(old);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy introduction points to new services. This is O(n^2), but it's only
|
|
* called on reconfigure, so it's ok performance wise. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(new_service_list, rend_service_t *, new) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old) {
|
|
/* Skip ephemeral services as we only want to copy introduction points
|
|
* from current services to newly configured one that already exists.
|
|
* The same directory means it's the same service. */
|
|
if (rend_service_is_ephemeral(new) || rend_service_is_ephemeral(old) ||
|
|
strcmp(old->directory, new->directory)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_add_all(new->intro_nodes, old->intro_nodes);
|
|
smartlist_clear(old->intro_nodes);
|
|
smartlist_add_all(new->expiring_nodes, old->expiring_nodes);
|
|
smartlist_clear(old->expiring_nodes);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy needed information from old to new. */
|
|
copy_service_on_prunning(new, old);
|
|
|
|
/* This regular service will survive the closing IPs step after. */
|
|
smartlist_add(surviving_services, old);
|
|
break;
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(old);
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(new);
|
|
|
|
/* For every service introduction circuit we can find, see if we have a
|
|
* matching surviving configured service. If not, close the circuit. */
|
|
while ((ocirc = circuit_get_next_service_intro_circ(ocirc))) {
|
|
int keep_it = 0;
|
|
if (ocirc->rend_data == NULL) {
|
|
/* This is a v3 circuit, ignore it. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(surviving_services, const rend_service_t *, s) {
|
|
if (rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(ocirc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) {
|
|
/* Keep this circuit as we have a matching configured service. */
|
|
keep_it = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
|
|
if (keep_it) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
|
|
ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(ocirc->rend_data)));
|
|
/* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
|
|
* circuit is considered old/uneeded. */
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_free(surviving_services);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try to prune our main service list using the temporary one that we just
|
|
* loaded and parsed successfully. The pruning process decides which onion
|
|
* services to keep and which to discard after a reload. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_prune_list(void)
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_t *old_service_list = rend_service_list;
|
|
/* Don't try to prune anything if we have no staging list. */
|
|
if (!rend_service_staging_list) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
rend_service_prune_list_impl_();
|
|
if (old_service_list) {
|
|
/* Every remaining service in the old list have been removed from the
|
|
* configuration so clean them up safely. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, s,
|
|
rend_service_free(s));
|
|
smartlist_free(old_service_list);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy all the relevant data that the hs_service object contains over to the
|
|
* rend_service_t object. The reason to do so is because when configuring a
|
|
* service, we go through a generic handler that creates an hs_service_t
|
|
* object which so we have to copy the parsed values to a rend service object
|
|
* which is version 2 specific. */
|
|
static void
|
|
service_config_shadow_copy(rend_service_t *service,
|
|
hs_service_config_t *config)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
tor_assert(config);
|
|
|
|
service->directory = tor_strdup(config->directory_path);
|
|
service->dir_group_readable = config->dir_group_readable;
|
|
service->allow_unknown_ports = config->allow_unknown_ports;
|
|
/* This value can't go above HS_CONFIG_MAX_STREAMS_PER_RDV_CIRCUIT (65535)
|
|
* if the code flow is right so this cast is safe. But just in case, we'll
|
|
* check it. */
|
|
service->max_streams_per_circuit = (int) config->max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
|
|
if (BUG(config->max_streams_per_rdv_circuit >
|
|
HS_CONFIG_MAX_STREAMS_PER_RDV_CIRCUIT)) {
|
|
service->max_streams_per_circuit = HS_CONFIG_MAX_STREAMS_PER_RDV_CIRCUIT;
|
|
}
|
|
service->max_streams_close_circuit = config->max_streams_close_circuit;
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted = config->num_intro_points;
|
|
/* Switching ownership of the ports to the rend service object. */
|
|
smartlist_add_all(service->ports, config->ports);
|
|
smartlist_free(config->ports);
|
|
config->ports = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the hidden service configuration starting at <b>line_</b> using the
|
|
* already configured generic service configuration in <b>config</b>. This
|
|
* function will translate the config object to a rend_service_t and add it to
|
|
* the temporary list if valid. If <b>validate_only</b> is set, parse, warn
|
|
* and return as normal but don't actually add the service to the list. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_config_service(const config_line_t *line_,
|
|
const or_options_t *options,
|
|
hs_service_config_t *config)
|
|
{
|
|
const config_line_t *line;
|
|
rend_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* line_ can be NULL which would mean that the service configuration only
|
|
* have one line that is the directory directive. */
|
|
tor_assert(options);
|
|
tor_assert(config);
|
|
|
|
/* Use the staging service list so that we can check then do the pruning
|
|
* process using the main list at the end. */
|
|
if (rend_service_staging_list == NULL) {
|
|
rend_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize service. */
|
|
service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
|
|
service->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
|
|
service->ports = smartlist_new();
|
|
/* From the hs_service object which has been used to load the generic
|
|
* options, we'll copy over the useful data to the rend_service_t object. */
|
|
service_config_shadow_copy(service, config);
|
|
|
|
for (line = line_; line; line = line->next) {
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceDir")) {
|
|
/* We just hit the next hidden service, stop right now. */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Number of introduction points. */
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints")) {
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
/* Those are specific defaults for version 2. */
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted =
|
|
(unsigned int) tor_parse_long(line->value, 10,
|
|
0, NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, &ok, NULL);
|
|
if (!ok) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
|
|
"HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints "
|
|
"should be between %d and %d, not %s",
|
|
0, NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX, line->value);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints=%d for %s",
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted, escaped(service->directory));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient")) {
|
|
/* Parse auth type and comma-separated list of client names and add a
|
|
* rend_authorized_client_t for each client to the service's list
|
|
* of authorized clients. */
|
|
smartlist_t *type_names_split, *clients;
|
|
const char *authname;
|
|
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Got multiple HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient "
|
|
"lines for a single service.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
type_names_split = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_split_string(type_names_split, line->value, " ", 0, 2);
|
|
if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 1) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient has no value. This "
|
|
"should have been prevented when parsing the "
|
|
"configuration.");
|
|
smartlist_free(type_names_split);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
authname = smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0);
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(authname, "basic")) {
|
|
service->auth_type = REND_BASIC_AUTH;
|
|
} else if (!strcasecmp(authname, "stealth")) {
|
|
service->auth_type = REND_STEALTH_AUTH;
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
|
|
"unrecognized auth-type '%s'. Only 'basic' or 'stealth' "
|
|
"are recognized.",
|
|
(char *) smartlist_get(type_names_split, 0));
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(type_names_split);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
service->clients = smartlist_new();
|
|
if (smartlist_len(type_names_split) < 2) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains "
|
|
"auth-type '%s', but no client names.",
|
|
service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(type_names_split);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
clients = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_split_string(clients, smartlist_get(type_names_split, 1),
|
|
",", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(type_names_split, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(type_names_split);
|
|
/* Remove duplicate client names. */
|
|
{
|
|
int num_clients = smartlist_len(clients);
|
|
smartlist_sort_strings(clients);
|
|
smartlist_uniq_strings(clients);
|
|
if (smartlist_len(clients) < num_clients) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains %d "
|
|
"duplicate client name(s); removing.",
|
|
num_clients - smartlist_len(clients));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(clients, const char *, client_name)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_authorized_client_t *client;
|
|
if (!rend_valid_client_name(client_name)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains an "
|
|
"illegal client name: '%s'. Names must be "
|
|
"between 1 and %d characters and contain "
|
|
"only [A-Za-z0-9+_-].",
|
|
client_name, REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(clients, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(clients);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_authorized_client_t));
|
|
client->client_name = tor_strdup(client_name);
|
|
smartlist_add(service->clients, client);
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND, "Adding client name '%s'", client_name);
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client_name);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(clients, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(clients);
|
|
/* Ensure maximum number of clients. */
|
|
if ((service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH &&
|
|
smartlist_len(service->clients) > 512) ||
|
|
(service->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH &&
|
|
smartlist_len(service->clients) > 16)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains %d "
|
|
"client authorization entries, but only a "
|
|
"maximum of %d entries is allowed for "
|
|
"authorization type '%s'.",
|
|
smartlist_len(service->clients),
|
|
service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? 512 : 16,
|
|
service->auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ? "basic" : "stealth");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Validate the service just parsed. */
|
|
if (rend_validate_service(rend_service_staging_list, service) < 0) {
|
|
/* Service is in the staging list so don't try to free it. */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add it to the temporary list which we will use to prune our current
|
|
* list if any after configuring all services. */
|
|
if (rend_add_service(rend_service_staging_list, service) < 0) {
|
|
/* The object has been freed on error already. */
|
|
service = NULL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
err:
|
|
rend_service_free(service);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible, using
|
|
* client authorization <b>auth_type</b> and an optional list of
|
|
* rend_authorized_client_t in <b>auth_clients</b>, with
|
|
* <b>max_streams_per_circuit</b> streams allowed per rendezvous circuit,
|
|
* and circuit closure on max streams being exceeded set by
|
|
* <b>max_streams_close_circuit</b>.
|
|
*
|
|
* Ownership of pk, ports, and auth_clients is passed to this routine.
|
|
* Regardless of success/failure, callers should not touch these values
|
|
* after calling this routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has
|
|
* been done on failure.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return an appropriate hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t.
|
|
*/
|
|
hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
|
|
rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk,
|
|
smartlist_t *ports,
|
|
int max_streams_per_circuit,
|
|
int max_streams_close_circuit,
|
|
rend_auth_type_t auth_type,
|
|
smartlist_t *auth_clients,
|
|
char **service_id_out)
|
|
{
|
|
*service_id_out = NULL;
|
|
/* Allocate the service structure, and initialize the key, and key derived
|
|
* parameters.
|
|
*/
|
|
rend_service_t *s = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
|
|
s->directory = NULL; /* This indicates the service is ephemeral. */
|
|
s->private_key = pk;
|
|
s->auth_type = auth_type;
|
|
s->clients = auth_clients;
|
|
s->ports = ports;
|
|
s->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
|
|
s->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
|
|
s->max_streams_per_circuit = max_streams_per_circuit;
|
|
s->max_streams_close_circuit = max_streams_close_circuit;
|
|
if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) {
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
return RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->ports || smartlist_len(s->ports) == 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified.");
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
return RSAE_BADVIRTPORT;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
|
|
(!s->clients || smartlist_len(s->clients) == 0)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one authorized client must be specified.");
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
return RSAE_BADAUTH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Enforcing pk/id uniqueness should be done by rend_service_load_keys(), but
|
|
* it's not, see #14828.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(s->pk_digest)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an "
|
|
"existing service.");
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
return RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rend_service_get_by_service_id(s->service_id)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service id collides with an existing service.");
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
return RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the service. */
|
|
if (rend_add_service(NULL, s)) {
|
|
return RSAE_INTERNAL;
|
|
}
|
|
*service_id_out = tor_strdup(s->service_id);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral Onion Service: %s", s->service_id);
|
|
return RSAE_OKAY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Remove the ephemeral service <b>service_id</b> if possible. Returns 0 on
|
|
* success, and -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *s;
|
|
if (!rend_valid_v2_service_id(service_id)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for "
|
|
"removal.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(s)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from
|
|
* the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction
|
|
* would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code.
|
|
*/
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
|
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
if (oc->rend_data == NULL ||
|
|
!rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) s->pk_digest)) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(
|
|
oc->build_state->chosen_exit)),
|
|
rend_data_get_address(oc->rend_data));
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s);
|
|
rend_service_free(s);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* There can be 1 second's delay due to second_elapsed_callback, and perhaps
|
|
* another few seconds due to blocking calls. */
|
|
#define INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD_SLOP 10
|
|
|
|
/** Log information about the intro point creation rate and current intro
|
|
* points for service, upgrading the log level from min_severity to warn if
|
|
* we have stopped launching new intro point circuits. */
|
|
static void
|
|
rend_log_intro_limit(const rend_service_t *service, int min_severity)
|
|
{
|
|
int exceeded_limit = (service->n_intro_circuits_launched >=
|
|
rend_max_intro_circs_per_period(
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted));
|
|
int severity = min_severity;
|
|
/* We stopped creating circuits */
|
|
if (exceeded_limit) {
|
|
severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
}
|
|
time_t intro_period_elapsed = time(NULL) - service->intro_period_started;
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(intro_period_elapsed >= 0);
|
|
{
|
|
char *msg;
|
|
static ratelim_t rlimit = RATELIM_INIT(INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD);
|
|
if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&rlimit, approx_time()))) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_REND,
|
|
"Hidden service %s %s %d intro points in the last %d seconds. "
|
|
"Intro circuit launches are limited to %d per %d seconds.%s",
|
|
service->service_id,
|
|
exceeded_limit ? "exceeded launch limit with" : "launched",
|
|
service->n_intro_circuits_launched,
|
|
(int)intro_period_elapsed,
|
|
rend_max_intro_circs_per_period(service->n_intro_points_wanted),
|
|
INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD, msg);
|
|
rend_service_dump_stats(severity);
|
|
tor_free(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Replace the old value of <b>service</b>-\>desc with one that reflects
|
|
* the other fields in service.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_descriptor_t *d;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
|
|
service->desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
d = service->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
|
|
d->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(service->private_key);
|
|
d->timestamp = time(NULL);
|
|
d->timestamp -= d->timestamp % 3600; /* Round down to nearest hour */
|
|
d->intro_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
/* Support intro protocols 2 and 3. */
|
|
d->protocols = (1 << 2) + (1 << 3);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++i) {
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro_svc = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i);
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro_desc;
|
|
|
|
/* This intro point won't be listed in the descriptor... */
|
|
intro_svc->listed_in_last_desc = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* circuit_established is set in rend_service_intro_established(), and
|
|
* checked every second in rend_consider_services_intro_points(), so it's
|
|
* safe to use it here */
|
|
if (!intro_svc->circuit_established) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ...unless this intro point is listed in the descriptor. */
|
|
intro_svc->listed_in_last_desc = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* We have an entirely established intro circuit. Publish it in
|
|
* our descriptor. */
|
|
intro_desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
|
|
intro_desc->extend_info = extend_info_dup(intro_svc->extend_info);
|
|
if (intro_svc->intro_key)
|
|
intro_desc->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro_svc->intro_key);
|
|
smartlist_add(d->intro_nodes, intro_desc);
|
|
|
|
if (intro_svc->time_published == -1) {
|
|
/* We are publishing this intro point in a descriptor for the
|
|
* first time -- note the current time in the service's copy of
|
|
* the intro point. */
|
|
intro_svc->time_published = time(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have the right number of intro points */
|
|
unsigned int have_intro = (unsigned int)smartlist_len(d->intro_nodes);
|
|
if (have_intro != service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
|
|
int severity;
|
|
/* Getting less than we wanted or more than we're allowed is serious */
|
|
if (have_intro < service->n_intro_points_wanted ||
|
|
have_intro > NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX) {
|
|
severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Getting more than we wanted is weird, but less of a problem */
|
|
severity = LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
}
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_REND, "Hidden service %s wanted %d intro points, but "
|
|
"descriptor was updated with %d instead.",
|
|
service->service_id,
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted, have_intro);
|
|
/* Now log an informative message about how we might have got here. */
|
|
rend_log_intro_limit(service, severity);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate and return a string containing the path to file_name in
|
|
* service->directory. Asserts that service has a directory.
|
|
* This function will never return NULL.
|
|
* The caller must free this path. */
|
|
static char *
|
|
rend_service_path(const rend_service_t *service, const char *file_name)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(service->directory);
|
|
return hs_path_from_filename(service->directory, file_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate and return a string containing the path to the single onion
|
|
* service poison file in service->directory. Asserts that service has a
|
|
* directory.
|
|
* The caller must free this path. */
|
|
STATIC char *
|
|
rend_service_sos_poison_path(const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
return rend_service_path(service, sos_poison_fname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return True if hidden services <b>service</b> has been poisoned by single
|
|
* onion mode. */
|
|
static int
|
|
service_is_single_onion_poisoned(const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
char *poison_fname = NULL;
|
|
file_status_t fstatus;
|
|
|
|
/* Passing a NULL service is a bug */
|
|
if (BUG(!service)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_is_ephemeral(service)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
poison_fname = rend_service_sos_poison_path(service);
|
|
|
|
fstatus = file_status(poison_fname);
|
|
tor_free(poison_fname);
|
|
|
|
/* If this fname is occupied, the hidden service has been poisoned.
|
|
* fstatus can be FN_ERROR if the service directory does not exist, in that
|
|
* case, there is obviously no private key. */
|
|
if (fstatus == FN_FILE || fstatus == FN_EMPTY) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return 1 if the private key file for service exists and has a non-zero size,
|
|
* and 0 otherwise. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_private_key_exists(const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
char *private_key_path = rend_service_path(service, private_key_fname);
|
|
const file_status_t private_key_status = file_status(private_key_path);
|
|
tor_free(private_key_path);
|
|
/* Only non-empty regular private key files could have been used before.
|
|
* fstatus can be FN_ERROR if the service directory does not exist, in that
|
|
* case, there is obviously no private key. */
|
|
return private_key_status == FN_FILE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check the single onion service poison state of the directory for s:
|
|
* - If the service is poisoned, and we are in Single Onion Mode,
|
|
* return 0,
|
|
* - If the service is not poisoned, and we are not in Single Onion Mode,
|
|
* return 0,
|
|
* - Otherwise, the poison state is invalid: the service was created in one
|
|
* mode, and is being used in the other, return -1.
|
|
* Hidden service directories without keys are always considered consistent.
|
|
* They will be poisoned after their directory is created (if needed). */
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
rend_service_verify_single_onion_poison(const rend_service_t* s,
|
|
const or_options_t* options)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Passing a NULL service is a bug */
|
|
if (BUG(!s)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ephemeral services are checked at ADD_ONION time */
|
|
if (BUG(rend_service_is_ephemeral(s))) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Service is expected to have a directory */
|
|
if (BUG(!s->directory)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Services without keys are always ok - their keys will only ever be used
|
|
* in the current mode */
|
|
if (!rend_service_private_key_exists(s)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The key has been used before in a different mode */
|
|
if (service_is_single_onion_poisoned(s) !=
|
|
rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The key exists and is consistent with the current mode */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*** Helper for rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dir(). Add a file to
|
|
* the hidden service directory for s that marks it as a single onion service.
|
|
* Tor must be in single onion mode before calling this function, and the
|
|
* service directory must already have been created.
|
|
* Returns 0 when a directory is successfully poisoned, or if it is already
|
|
* poisoned. Returns -1 on a failure to read the directory or write the poison
|
|
* file, or if there is an existing private key file in the directory. (The
|
|
* service should have been poisoned when the key was created.) */
|
|
static int
|
|
poison_new_single_onion_hidden_service_dir_impl(const rend_service_t *service,
|
|
const or_options_t* options)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Passing a NULL service is a bug */
|
|
if (BUG(!service)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We must only poison directories if we're in Single Onion mode */
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options));
|
|
|
|
int fd;
|
|
int retval = -1;
|
|
char *poison_fname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_is_ephemeral(service)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Ephemeral HS started in non-anonymous mode.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we're only poisoning new hidden service directories */
|
|
if (rend_service_private_key_exists(service)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to single onion poison a service directory after "
|
|
"the private key was created.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the directory was created before calling this function. */
|
|
if (BUG(hs_check_service_private_dir(options->User, service->directory,
|
|
service->dir_group_readable, 0) < 0))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
poison_fname = rend_service_sos_poison_path(service);
|
|
|
|
switch (file_status(poison_fname)) {
|
|
case FN_DIR:
|
|
case FN_ERROR:
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS, "Can't read single onion poison file \"%s\"",
|
|
poison_fname);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
case FN_FILE: /* single onion poison file already exists. NOP. */
|
|
case FN_EMPTY: /* single onion poison file already exists. NOP. */
|
|
log_debug(LD_FS, "Tried to re-poison a single onion poisoned file \"%s\"",
|
|
poison_fname);
|
|
break;
|
|
case FN_NOENT:
|
|
fd = tor_open_cloexec(poison_fname, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0600);
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not create single onion poison file %s",
|
|
poison_fname);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(poison_fname);
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We just got launched in Single Onion Mode. That's a non-anonymous mode for
|
|
* hidden services. If s is new, we should mark its hidden service
|
|
* directory appropriately so that it is never launched as a location-private
|
|
* hidden service. (New directories don't have private key files.)
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 on fail. */
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dir(const rend_service_t *s,
|
|
const or_options_t* options)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Passing a NULL service is a bug */
|
|
if (BUG(!s)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We must only poison directories if we're in Single Onion mode */
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options));
|
|
|
|
/* Ephemeral services aren't allowed in non-anonymous mode */
|
|
if (BUG(rend_service_is_ephemeral(s))) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Service is expected to have a directory */
|
|
if (BUG(!s->directory)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rend_service_private_key_exists(s)) {
|
|
if (poison_new_single_onion_hidden_service_dir_impl(s, options)
|
|
< 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly
|
|
* including keys for client authorization.
|
|
* If a <b>service_list</b> is provided, treat it as the list of hidden
|
|
* services (used in unittests). Otherwise, require that rend_service_list is
|
|
* not NULL.
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_load_all_keys(const smartlist_t *service_list)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Use service_list for unit tests */
|
|
const smartlist_t *s_list = rend_get_service_list(service_list);
|
|
if (BUG(!s_list)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s_list, rend_service_t *, s) {
|
|
if (s->private_key)
|
|
continue;
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Loading hidden-service keys from %s",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(s));
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_load_keys(s) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add to <b>lst</b> every filename used by <b>s</b>. */
|
|
static void
|
|
rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(smartlist_t *lst, const rend_service_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(lst);
|
|
tor_assert(s);
|
|
tor_assert(s->directory);
|
|
smartlist_add(lst, rend_service_path(s, private_key_fname));
|
|
smartlist_add(lst, rend_service_path(s, hostname_fname));
|
|
smartlist_add(lst, rend_service_path(s, client_keys_fname));
|
|
smartlist_add(lst, rend_service_sos_poison_path(s));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add to <b>open_lst</b> every filename used by a configured hidden service,
|
|
* and to <b>stat_lst</b> every directory used by a configured hidden
|
|
* service */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst,
|
|
smartlist_t *stat_lst)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!rend_service_list)
|
|
return;
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s) {
|
|
if (!rend_service_is_ephemeral(s)) {
|
|
rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(open_lst, s);
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(stat_lst, s->directory);
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Derive all rend_service_t internal material based on the service's key.
|
|
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Make sure that the directory for <b>s</b> is private, using the config in
|
|
* <b>options</b>.
|
|
* If <b>create</b> is true:
|
|
* - if the directory exists, change permissions if needed,
|
|
* - if the directory does not exist, create it with the correct permissions.
|
|
* If <b>create</b> is false:
|
|
* - if the directory exists, check permissions,
|
|
* - if the directory does not exist, check if we think we can create it.
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_check_private_dir(const or_options_t *options,
|
|
const rend_service_t *s,
|
|
int create)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Passing a NULL service is a bug */
|
|
if (BUG(!s)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check/create directory */
|
|
if (hs_check_service_private_dir(options->User, s->directory,
|
|
s->dir_group_readable, create) < 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the hidden service key exists, and was created in a different
|
|
* single onion service mode, and refuse to launch if it has.
|
|
* This is safe to call even when create is false, as it ignores missing
|
|
* keys and directories: they are always valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rend_service_verify_single_onion_poison(s, options) < 0) {
|
|
/* We can't use s->service_id here, as the key may not have been loaded */
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We are configured with "
|
|
"HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode %d, but the hidden "
|
|
"service key in directory %s was created in %s mode. "
|
|
"This is not allowed.",
|
|
rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) ? 1 : 0,
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(s),
|
|
rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) ?
|
|
"an anonymous" : "a non-anonymous"
|
|
);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Poison new single onion directories immediately after they are created,
|
|
* so that we never accidentally launch non-anonymous hidden services
|
|
* thinking they are anonymous. Any keys created later will end up with the
|
|
* correct poisoning state.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (create && rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)) {
|
|
static int logged_warning = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dir(s, options) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to mark new hidden services as non-anonymous"
|
|
".");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!logged_warning) {
|
|
/* The keys for these services are linked to the server IP address */
|
|
log_notice(LD_REND, "The configured onion service directories have been "
|
|
"used in single onion mode. They can not be used for "
|
|
"anonymous hidden services.");
|
|
logged_warning = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Load and/or generate private keys for the hidden service <b>s</b>,
|
|
* possibly including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1
|
|
* on failure. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
char *fname = NULL;
|
|
char buf[128];
|
|
|
|
/* Create the directory if needed which will also poison it in case of
|
|
* single onion service. */
|
|
if (rend_service_check_private_dir(get_options(), s, 1) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Load key */
|
|
fname = rend_service_path(s, private_key_fname);
|
|
s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!s->private_key)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
|
/* Create service file */
|
|
fname = rend_service_path(s, hostname_fname);
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),"%s.onion\n", s->service_id);
|
|
if (write_str_to_file(fname,buf,0)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not write onion address to hostname file.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
if (s->dir_group_readable) {
|
|
/* Also verify hostname file created with group read. */
|
|
if (chmod(fname, 0640))
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make hidden hostname file %s group-readable.",
|
|
fname);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !defined(_WIN32) */
|
|
|
|
/* If client authorization is configured, load or generate keys. */
|
|
if (s->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
|
|
if (rend_service_load_auth_keys(s, fname) < 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
err:
|
|
r = -1;
|
|
done:
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Load and/or generate client authorization keys for the hidden service
|
|
* <b>s</b>, which stores its hostname in <b>hfname</b>. Return 0 on success,
|
|
* -1 on failure. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_load_auth_keys(rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname)
|
|
{
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
char *cfname = NULL;
|
|
char *client_keys_str = NULL;
|
|
strmap_t *parsed_clients = strmap_new();
|
|
FILE *cfile, *hfile;
|
|
open_file_t *open_cfile = NULL, *open_hfile = NULL;
|
|
char desc_cook_out[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1];
|
|
char service_id[16+1];
|
|
char buf[1500];
|
|
|
|
/* Load client keys and descriptor cookies, if available. */
|
|
cfname = rend_service_path(s, client_keys_fname);
|
|
client_keys_str = read_file_to_str(cfname, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
|
|
if (client_keys_str) {
|
|
if (rend_parse_client_keys(parsed_clients, client_keys_str) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Previously stored client_keys file could not "
|
|
"be parsed.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Parsed %d previously stored client entries.",
|
|
strmap_size(parsed_clients));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare client_keys and hostname files. */
|
|
if (!(cfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(cfname,
|
|
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
|
0600, &open_cfile))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open client_keys file %s",
|
|
escaped(cfname));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(hfile = start_writing_to_stdio_file(hfname,
|
|
OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE | O_TEXT,
|
|
0600, &open_hfile))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Could not open hostname file %s", escaped(hfname));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Either use loaded keys for configured clients or generate new
|
|
* ones if a client is new. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(s->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client) {
|
|
rend_authorized_client_t *parsed =
|
|
strmap_get(parsed_clients, client->client_name);
|
|
int written;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
/* Copy descriptor cookie from parsed entry or create new one. */
|
|
if (parsed) {
|
|
memcpy(client->descriptor_cookie, parsed->descriptor_cookie,
|
|
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
crypto_rand((char *) client->descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
/* For compatibility with older tor clients, this does not
|
|
* truncate the padding characters, unlike rend_auth_encode_cookie. */
|
|
if (base64_encode(desc_cook_out, 3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+1,
|
|
(char *) client->descriptor_cookie,
|
|
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Copy client key from parsed entry or create new one if required. */
|
|
if (parsed && parsed->client_key) {
|
|
client->client_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(parsed->client_key);
|
|
} else if (s->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
|
|
/* Create private key for client. */
|
|
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
|
|
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error constructing client key");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error generating client key");
|
|
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Generated client key seems invalid");
|
|
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
client->client_key = prkey;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add entry to client_keys file. */
|
|
written = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
|
|
"client-name %s\ndescriptor-cookie %s\n",
|
|
client->client_name, desc_cook_out);
|
|
if (written < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (client->client_key) {
|
|
char *client_key_out = NULL;
|
|
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(client->client_key,
|
|
&client_key_out, &len) != 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: "
|
|
"crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() failed.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rend_get_service_id(client->client_key, service_id)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID.");
|
|
/*
|
|
* len is string length, not buffer length, but last byte is NUL
|
|
* anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
memwipe(client_key_out, 0, len);
|
|
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
written = tor_snprintf(buf + written, sizeof(buf) - written,
|
|
"client-key\n%s", client_key_out);
|
|
memwipe(client_key_out, 0, len);
|
|
tor_free(client_key_out);
|
|
if (written < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not write client entry.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(service_id, s->service_id, sizeof(service_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fputs(buf, cfile) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append client entry to file: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add line to hostname file. This is not the same encoding as in
|
|
* client_keys. */
|
|
char *encoded_cookie = rend_auth_encode_cookie(client->descriptor_cookie,
|
|
s->auth_type);
|
|
if (!encoded_cookie) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not base64-encode descriptor cookie.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.onion %s # client: %s\n",
|
|
service_id, encoded_cookie, client->client_name);
|
|
memwipe(encoded_cookie, 0, strlen(encoded_cookie));
|
|
tor_free(encoded_cookie);
|
|
|
|
if (fputs(buf, hfile)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS, "Could not append host entry to file: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
|
|
|
|
finish_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
|
finish_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
err:
|
|
r = -1;
|
|
if (open_cfile)
|
|
abort_writing_to_file(open_cfile);
|
|
if (open_hfile)
|
|
abort_writing_to_file(open_hfile);
|
|
done:
|
|
if (client_keys_str) {
|
|
memwipe(client_keys_str, 0, strlen(client_keys_str));
|
|
tor_free(client_keys_str);
|
|
}
|
|
strmap_free(parsed_clients, rend_authorized_client_free_void);
|
|
|
|
if (cfname) {
|
|
memwipe(cfname, 0, strlen(cfname));
|
|
tor_free(cfname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Clear stack buffers that held key-derived material. */
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
memwipe(desc_cook_out, 0, sizeof(desc_cook_out));
|
|
memwipe(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id));
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the service whose public key has a digest of <b>digest</b>, or
|
|
* NULL if no such service exists.
|
|
*/
|
|
static rend_service_t *
|
|
rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(const char* digest)
|
|
{
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s,
|
|
if (tor_memeq(s->pk_digest,digest,DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
return s);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the service whose service id is <b>id</b>, or NULL if no such
|
|
* service exists.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct rend_service_t *
|
|
rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(strlen(id) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s, {
|
|
if (tor_memeq(s->service_id, id, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32))
|
|
return s;
|
|
});
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check client authorization of a given <b>descriptor_cookie</b> of
|
|
* length <b>cookie_len</b> for <b>service</b>. Return 1 for success
|
|
* and 0 for failure. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
|
|
const char *descriptor_cookie,
|
|
size_t cookie_len)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL;
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
tor_assert(descriptor_cookie);
|
|
if (!service->clients) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't check authorization for a service that has no "
|
|
"authorized clients configured.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected "
|
|
"%lu bytes. Dropping cell.",
|
|
(unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, {
|
|
if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie,
|
|
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN)) {
|
|
auth_client = client;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
if (!auth_client) {
|
|
char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
|
|
base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64),
|
|
descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0);
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "No authorization found for descriptor cookie '%s'! "
|
|
"Dropping cell!",
|
|
descriptor_cookie_base64);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allow the request. */
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Client %s authorized for service %s.",
|
|
auth_client->client_name, service->service_id);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Can this service make a direct connection to ei?
|
|
* It must be a single onion service, and the firewall rules must allow ei. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_use_direct_connection(const or_options_t* options,
|
|
const extend_info_t* ei)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We'll connect directly all reachable addresses, whether preferred or not.
|
|
* The prefer_ipv6 argument to fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr is
|
|
* ignored, because pref_only is 0. */
|
|
return (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
|
|
fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr(&ei->addr, ei->port,
|
|
FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0, 0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Like rend_service_use_direct_connection, but to a node. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_use_direct_connection_node(const or_options_t* options,
|
|
const node_t* node)
|
|
{
|
|
/* We'll connect directly all reachable addresses, whether preferred or not.
|
|
*/
|
|
return (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
|
|
fascist_firewall_allows_node(node, FIREWALL_OR_CONNECTION, 0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/******
|
|
* Handle cells
|
|
******/
|
|
|
|
/** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen
|
|
* rendezvous point.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
|
|
const uint8_t *request,
|
|
size_t request_len)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Global status stuff */
|
|
int status = 0, result;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
int err_msg_severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
const char *stage_descr = NULL, *rend_pk_digest;
|
|
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
/* Service/circuit/key stuff we can learn before parsing */
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
rend_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro_point = NULL;
|
|
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
|
|
/* Parsed cell */
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *parsed_req = NULL;
|
|
/* Rendezvous point */
|
|
extend_info_t *rp = NULL;
|
|
/* XXX not handled yet */
|
|
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */
|
|
int i;
|
|
crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
|
|
origin_circuit_t *launched = NULL;
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL;
|
|
char hexcookie[9];
|
|
int circ_needs_uptime;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
time_t elapsed;
|
|
int replay;
|
|
ssize_t keylen;
|
|
|
|
/* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
|
|
if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Got an INTRODUCE2 over a non-introduction circuit %u.",
|
|
(unsigned) circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, options);
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
|
|
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */
|
|
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* We'll use this in a bazillion log messages */
|
|
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
|
|
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
|
|
if (!service) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
"Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro "
|
|
"circ for an unrecognized service %s.",
|
|
escaped(serviceid));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
intro_point = find_intro_point(circuit);
|
|
if (intro_point == NULL) {
|
|
intro_point = find_expiring_intro_point(service, circuit);
|
|
if (intro_point == NULL) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
"Internal error: Got an INTRODUCE2 cell on an "
|
|
"intro circ (for service %s) with no corresponding "
|
|
"rend_intro_point_t.",
|
|
escaped(serviceid));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Received INTRODUCE2 cell for service %s on circ %u.",
|
|
escaped(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
/* use intro key instead of service key. */
|
|
intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
stage_descr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
stage_descr = "early parsing";
|
|
/* Early parsing pass (get pk, ciphertext); type 2 is INTRODUCE2 */
|
|
parsed_req =
|
|
rend_service_begin_parse_intro(request, request_len, 2, &err_msg);
|
|
if (!parsed_req) {
|
|
goto log_error;
|
|
} else if (err_msg) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* make sure service replay caches are present */
|
|
if (!service->accepted_intro_dh_parts) {
|
|
service->accepted_intro_dh_parts =
|
|
replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL,
|
|
REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts) {
|
|
intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts = replaycache_new(0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */
|
|
keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
|
|
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
|
|
intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts,
|
|
parsed_req->ciphertext, MIN(parsed_req->ciphertext_len, keylen),
|
|
&elapsed);
|
|
|
|
if (replay) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND,
|
|
"Possible replay detected! We received an "
|
|
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d "
|
|
"seconds ago. Dropping cell.",
|
|
(int)elapsed);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stage_descr = "decryption";
|
|
/* Now try to decrypt it */
|
|
result = rend_service_decrypt_intro(parsed_req, intro_key, &err_msg);
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
goto log_error;
|
|
} else if (err_msg) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stage_descr = "late parsing";
|
|
/* Parse the plaintext */
|
|
result = rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(parsed_req, &err_msg);
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
goto log_error;
|
|
} else if (err_msg) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stage_descr = "late validation";
|
|
/* Validate the parsed plaintext parts */
|
|
result = rend_service_validate_intro_late(parsed_req, &err_msg);
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
goto log_error;
|
|
} else if (err_msg) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "%s on circ %u.", err_msg,
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
}
|
|
stage_descr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Increment INTRODUCE2 counter */
|
|
++(intro_point->accepted_introduce2_count);
|
|
|
|
/* Find the rendezvous point */
|
|
rp = find_rp_for_intro(parsed_req, &err_msg);
|
|
if (!rp) {
|
|
err_msg_severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
|
|
goto log_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */
|
|
if (options->StrictNodes &&
|
|
routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, rp)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we "
|
|
"exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(hexcookie, 9, (const char *)(parsed_req->rc), 4);
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether there is a past request with the same Diffie-Hellman,
|
|
* part 1. */
|
|
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
|
|
service->accepted_intro_dh_parts,
|
|
parsed_req->dh, DH_KEY_LEN,
|
|
&elapsed);
|
|
|
|
if (replay) {
|
|
/* A Tor client will send a new INTRODUCE1 cell with the same rend
|
|
* cookie and DH public key as its previous one if its intro circ
|
|
* times out while in state CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT .
|
|
* If we received the first INTRODUCE1 cell (the intro-point relay
|
|
* converts it into an INTRODUCE2 cell), we are already trying to
|
|
* connect to that rend point (and may have already succeeded);
|
|
* drop this cell. */
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "We received an "
|
|
"INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of "
|
|
"Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping "
|
|
"cell.",
|
|
(int) elapsed);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the service performs client authorization, check included auth data. */
|
|
if (service->clients) {
|
|
if (parsed_req->version == 3 && parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
|
|
if (rend_check_authorization(service,
|
|
(const char*)parsed_req->u.v3.auth_data,
|
|
parsed_req->u.v3.auth_len)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Authorization data in INTRODUCE2 cell are valid.");
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "The authorization data that are contained in "
|
|
"the INTRODUCE2 cell are invalid. Dropping cell.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell does not contain authentication "
|
|
"data, but we require client authorization. Dropping cell.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try DH handshake... */
|
|
dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND);
|
|
if (!dh || crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: couldn't build DH state "
|
|
"or generate public key.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh,
|
|
(char *)(parsed_req->dh),
|
|
DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circ_needs_uptime = hs_service_requires_uptime_circ(service->ports);
|
|
|
|
/* help predict this next time */
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_needs_uptime, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Launch a circuit to the client's chosen rendezvous point.
|
|
*/
|
|
int max_rend_failures=hs_get_service_max_rend_failures();
|
|
for (i=0;i<max_rend_failures;i++) {
|
|
int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
if (circ_needs_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
/* A Single Onion Service only uses a direct connection if its
|
|
* firewall rules permit direct connections to the address. */
|
|
if (rend_service_use_direct_connection(options, rp)) {
|
|
flags = flags | CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
|
|
}
|
|
launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, rp, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (launched)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!launched) { /* give up */
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous "
|
|
"point %s for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)),
|
|
serviceid);
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Accepted intro; launching circuit to %s "
|
|
"(cookie %s) for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(rp)),
|
|
hexcookie, serviceid);
|
|
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
|
|
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
|
|
|
|
launched->rend_data =
|
|
rend_data_service_create(service->service_id, rend_pk_digest,
|
|
parsed_req->rc, service->auth_type);
|
|
|
|
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref =
|
|
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_reference_t));
|
|
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->refcount = 1;
|
|
|
|
launched->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath = cpath =
|
|
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
launched->build_state->expiry_time = now + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = dh;
|
|
dh = NULL;
|
|
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,
|
|
keys+DIGEST_LEN, sizeof(keys)-DIGEST_LEN,
|
|
1, 0)<0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
memcpy(cpath->rend_circ_nonce, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
log_error:
|
|
if (!err_msg) {
|
|
if (stage_descr) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"unknown %s error for INTRODUCE2", stage_descr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
err_msg = tor_strdup("unknown error for INTRODUCE2");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(err_msg_severity, LD_REND, "%s on circ %u", err_msg,
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
err:
|
|
status = -1;
|
|
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
|
|
if (launched) {
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason);
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
|
memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
|
|
|
|
/* Free the parsed cell */
|
|
rend_service_free_intro(parsed_req);
|
|
|
|
/* Free rp */
|
|
extend_info_free(rp);
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given a parsed and decrypted INTRODUCE2, find the rendezvous point or
|
|
* return NULL and an error string if we can't. Return a newly allocated
|
|
* extend_info_t* for the rendezvous point. */
|
|
static extend_info_t *
|
|
find_rp_for_intro(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
extend_info_t *rp = NULL;
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
const char *rp_nickname = NULL;
|
|
const node_t *node = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!intro) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad parameters to find_rp_for_intro()");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (intro->version == 0 || intro->version == 1) {
|
|
rp_nickname = (const char *)(intro->u.v0_v1.rp);
|
|
|
|
node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, NNF_NO_WARN_UNNAMED);
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"Couldn't find router %s named in INTRODUCE2 cell",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Are we in single onion mode? */
|
|
const int allow_direct = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
|
|
get_options());
|
|
rp = extend_info_from_node(node, allow_direct);
|
|
if (!rp) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"Couldn't build extend_info_t for router %s named "
|
|
"in INTRODUCE2 cell",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (intro->version == 2) {
|
|
rp = extend_info_dup(intro->u.v2.extend_info);
|
|
} else if (intro->version == 3) {
|
|
rp = extend_info_dup(intro->u.v3.extend_info);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"Unknown version %d in INTRODUCE2 cell",
|
|
(int)(intro->version));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* rp is always set here: extend_info_dup guarantees a non-NULL result, and
|
|
* the other cases goto err. */
|
|
tor_assert(rp);
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the RP we are being asked to connect to is _not_ a private
|
|
* address unless it's allowed. Let's avoid to build a circuit to our
|
|
* second middle node and fail right after when extending to the RP. */
|
|
if (!extend_info_addr_is_allowed(&rp->addr)) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"Relay IP in INTRODUCE2 cell is private address.");
|
|
}
|
|
extend_info_free(rp);
|
|
rp = NULL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
*err_msg_out = err_msg;
|
|
else
|
|
tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
return rp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Free a parsed INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell that was allocated by
|
|
* rend_service_parse_intro().
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_free_intro_(rend_intro_cell_t *request)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!request) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Free ciphertext */
|
|
tor_free(request->ciphertext);
|
|
request->ciphertext_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Have plaintext? */
|
|
if (request->plaintext) {
|
|
/* Zero it out just to be safe */
|
|
memwipe(request->plaintext, 0, request->plaintext_len);
|
|
tor_free(request->plaintext);
|
|
request->plaintext_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Have parsed plaintext? */
|
|
if (request->parsed) {
|
|
switch (request->version) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
case 1:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Nothing more to do; these formats have no further pointers
|
|
* in them.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
extend_info_free(request->u.v2.extend_info);
|
|
request->u.v2.extend_info = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 3:
|
|
if (request->u.v3.auth_data) {
|
|
memwipe(request->u.v3.auth_data, 0, request->u.v3.auth_len);
|
|
tor_free(request->u.v3.auth_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(request->u.v3.extend_info);
|
|
request->u.v3.extend_info = NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
"rend_service_free_intro() saw unknown protocol "
|
|
"version %d.",
|
|
request->version);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Zero it out to make sure sensitive stuff doesn't hang around in memory */
|
|
memwipe(request, 0, sizeof(*request));
|
|
|
|
tor_free(request);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell into a newly allocated
|
|
* rend_intro_cell_t structure. Free it with rend_service_free_intro()
|
|
* when finished. The type parameter should be 1 or 2 to indicate whether
|
|
* this is INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2. This parses only the non-encrypted
|
|
* parts; after this, call rend_service_decrypt_intro() with a key, then
|
|
* rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() to finish parsing. The optional
|
|
* err_msg_out parameter is set to a string suitable for log output
|
|
* if parsing fails. This function does some validation, but only
|
|
* that which depends solely on the contents of the cell and the
|
|
* key; it can be unit-tested. Further validation is done in
|
|
* rend_service_validate_intro().
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *
|
|
rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request,
|
|
size_t request_len,
|
|
uint8_t type,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *rv = NULL;
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!request || request_len <= 0) goto err;
|
|
if (!(type == 1 || type == 2)) goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* First, check that the cell is long enough to be a sensible INTRODUCE */
|
|
|
|
/* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */
|
|
if (request_len <
|
|
(DIGEST_LEN + REND_COOKIE_LEN + (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1) +
|
|
DH_KEY_LEN + 42)) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"got a truncated INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
(int)type);
|
|
}
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a new parsed cell structure */
|
|
rv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rv));
|
|
|
|
/* Set the type */
|
|
rv->type = type;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy in the ID */
|
|
memcpy(rv->pk, request, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* Copy in the ciphertext */
|
|
rv->ciphertext = tor_malloc(request_len - DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(rv->ciphertext, request + DIGEST_LEN, request_len - DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
rv->ciphertext_len = request_len - DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
rend_service_free_intro(rv);
|
|
rv = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"unknown INTRODUCE%d error",
|
|
(int)type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg;
|
|
else tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v0 or v1 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2
|
|
* cell
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *rp_nickname, *endptr;
|
|
size_t nickname_field_len, ver_specific_len;
|
|
|
|
if (intro->version == 1) {
|
|
ver_specific_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 2;
|
|
rp_nickname = ((const char *)buf) + 1;
|
|
nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
|
|
} else if (intro->version == 0) {
|
|
ver_specific_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
|
|
rp_nickname = (const char *)buf;
|
|
nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1() called with "
|
|
"bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext_len < ver_specific_len) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"short plaintext of encrypted part in v1 INTRODUCE%d "
|
|
"cell (%lu bytes, needed %lu)",
|
|
(int)(intro->type),
|
|
(unsigned long)plaintext_len,
|
|
(unsigned long)ver_specific_len);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
endptr = memchr(rp_nickname, 0, nickname_field_len);
|
|
if (!endptr || endptr == rp_nickname) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in "
|
|
"INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((intro->version == 0 &&
|
|
!is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
|
|
(intro->version == 1 &&
|
|
!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"bad nickname in INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(intro->u.v0_v1.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1);
|
|
|
|
return ver_specific_len;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v2 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int klen;
|
|
extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t ver_specific_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We accept version 3 too so that the v3 parser can call this with
|
|
* an adjusted buffer for the latter part of a v3 cell, which is
|
|
* identical to a v2 cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(intro->version == 2 ||
|
|
intro->version == 3)) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2() called with "
|
|
"bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */
|
|
if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
|
|
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&extend_info->addr, get_uint32(buf + 1));
|
|
extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 5));
|
|
memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf + 7, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
extend_info->nickname[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(extend_info->nickname + 1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname) - 1,
|
|
extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
|
/* 7 == version, IP and port, DIGEST_LEN == id, 2 == key length */
|
|
if (plaintext_len < 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2 + klen) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
|
|
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info->onion_key =
|
|
crypto_pk_asn1_decode((const char *)(buf + 7 + DIGEST_LEN + 2), klen);
|
|
if (!extend_info->onion_key) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"error decoding onion key in version %d "
|
|
"INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (128 != crypto_pk_keysize(extend_info->onion_key)) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"invalid onion key size in version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ver_specific_len = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
|
|
|
|
if (intro->version == 2) intro->u.v2.extend_info = extend_info;
|
|
else intro->u.v3.extend_info = extend_info;
|
|
|
|
return ver_specific_len;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
extend_info_free(extend_info);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse the version-specific parts of a v3 INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
const uint8_t *buf,
|
|
size_t plaintext_len,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
ssize_t adjust, v2_ver_specific_len, ts_offset;
|
|
|
|
/* This should only be called on v3 cells */
|
|
if (intro->version != 3) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3() called with "
|
|
"bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check that we have at least enough to get auth_len:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1 octet for version, 1 for auth_type, 2 for auth_len
|
|
*/
|
|
if (plaintext_len < 4) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
|
|
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The rend_client_send_introduction() function over in rendclient.c is
|
|
* broken (i.e., fails to match the spec) in such a way that we can't
|
|
* change it without breaking the protocol. Specifically, it doesn't
|
|
* emit auth_len when auth-type is REND_NO_AUTH, so everything is off
|
|
* by two bytes after that. Calculate ts_offset and do everything from
|
|
* the timestamp on relative to that to handle this dain bramage.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_type = buf[1];
|
|
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH) {
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_len = ntohs(get_uint16(buf + 2));
|
|
ts_offset = 4 + intro->u.v3.auth_len;
|
|
} else {
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_len = 0;
|
|
ts_offset = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that auth len makes sense for this auth type */
|
|
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ||
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH) {
|
|
if (intro->u.v3.auth_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"wrong auth data size %d for INTRODUCE%d cell, "
|
|
"should be %d",
|
|
(int)(intro->u.v3.auth_len),
|
|
(int)(intro->type),
|
|
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we actually have everything up through the timestamp */
|
|
if (plaintext_len < (size_t)(ts_offset)+4) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"truncated plaintext of encrypted parted of "
|
|
"version %d INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
intro->version,
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (intro->u.v3.auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_len > 0) {
|
|
/* Okay, we can go ahead and copy auth_data */
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_data = tor_malloc(intro->u.v3.auth_len);
|
|
/*
|
|
* We know we had an auth_len field in this case, so 4 is
|
|
* always right.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(intro->u.v3.auth_data, buf + 4, intro->u.v3.auth_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* From here on, the format is as in v2, so we call the v2 parser with
|
|
* adjusted buffer and length. We are 4 + ts_offset octets in, but the
|
|
* v2 parser expects to skip over a version byte at the start, so we
|
|
* adjust by 3 + ts_offset.
|
|
*/
|
|
adjust = 3 + ts_offset;
|
|
|
|
v2_ver_specific_len =
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2(intro,
|
|
buf + adjust, plaintext_len - adjust,
|
|
err_msg_out);
|
|
|
|
/* Success in v2 parser */
|
|
if (v2_ver_specific_len >= 0) return v2_ver_specific_len + adjust;
|
|
/* Failure in v2 parser; it will have provided an err_msg */
|
|
else return v2_ver_specific_len;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Table of parser functions for version-specific parts of an INTRODUCE2
|
|
* cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
(*intro_version_handlers[])(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *,
|
|
const uint8_t *,
|
|
size_t,
|
|
char **) =
|
|
{ rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1,
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1,
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v2,
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3 };
|
|
|
|
/** Decrypt the encrypted part of an INTRODUCE1 or INTRODUCE2 cell,
|
|
* return 0 if successful, or < 0 and write an error message to
|
|
* *err_msg_out if provided.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_decrypt_intro(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
crypto_pk_t *key,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
ssize_t key_len;
|
|
uint8_t buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
int result, status = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!intro || !key) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
err_msg =
|
|
tor_strdup("rend_service_decrypt_intro() called with bad "
|
|
"parameters");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = -2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we have ciphertext */
|
|
if (!(intro->ciphertext) || intro->ciphertext_len <= 0) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"rend_intro_cell_t was missing ciphertext for "
|
|
"INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
status = -3;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that this cell actually matches this service key */
|
|
|
|
/* first DIGEST_LEN bytes of request is intro or service pk digest */
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(key, (char *)key_digest) < 0) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
*err_msg_out = tor_strdup("Couldn't compute RSA digest.");
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute key digest.");
|
|
status = -7;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tor_memneq(key_digest, intro->pk, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
base32_encode(service_id, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1,
|
|
(char*)(intro->pk), REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"got an INTRODUCE%d cell for the wrong service (%s)",
|
|
(int)(intro->type),
|
|
escaped(service_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = -4;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the encrypted part is long enough to decrypt */
|
|
|
|
key_len = crypto_pk_keysize(key);
|
|
if (intro->ciphertext_len < key_len) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"got an INTRODUCE%d cell with a truncated PK-encrypted "
|
|
"part",
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = -5;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt the encrypted part */
|
|
result =
|
|
crypto_pk_obsolete_private_hybrid_decrypt(
|
|
key, (char *)buf, sizeof(buf),
|
|
(const char *)(intro->ciphertext), intro->ciphertext_len,
|
|
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1);
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE%d cell",
|
|
(int)(intro->type));
|
|
}
|
|
status = -6;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
intro->plaintext_len = result;
|
|
intro->plaintext = tor_malloc(intro->plaintext_len);
|
|
memcpy(intro->plaintext, buf, intro->plaintext_len);
|
|
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"unknown INTRODUCE%d error decrypting encrypted part",
|
|
intro ? (int)(intro->type) : -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg;
|
|
else tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
|
|
/* clean up potentially sensitive material */
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
memwipe(key_digest, 0, sizeof(key_digest));
|
|
memwipe(service_id, 0, sizeof(service_id));
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse the plaintext of the encrypted part of an INTRODUCE1 or
|
|
* INTRODUCE2 cell, return 0 if successful, or < 0 and write an error
|
|
* message to *err_msg_out if provided.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(
|
|
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
char *err_msg = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t ver_specific_len, ver_invariant_len;
|
|
uint8_t version;
|
|
int status = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!intro) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
err_msg =
|
|
tor_strdup("rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() called with NULL "
|
|
"rend_intro_cell_t");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status = -2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have plaintext */
|
|
if (!(intro->plaintext) || intro->plaintext_len <= 0) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out) {
|
|
err_msg = tor_strdup("rend_intro_cell_t was missing plaintext");
|
|
}
|
|
status = -3;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* In all formats except v0, the first byte is a version number */
|
|
version = intro->plaintext[0];
|
|
|
|
/* v0 has no version byte (stupid...), so handle it as a fallback */
|
|
if (version > 3) version = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the version into the parsed cell structure */
|
|
intro->version = version;
|
|
|
|
/* Call the version-specific parser from the table */
|
|
ver_specific_len =
|
|
intro_version_handlers[version](intro,
|
|
intro->plaintext, intro->plaintext_len,
|
|
&err_msg);
|
|
if (ver_specific_len < 0) {
|
|
status = -4;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The rendezvous cookie and Diffie-Hellman stuff are version-invariant
|
|
* and at the end of the plaintext of the encrypted part of the cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ver_invariant_len = intro->plaintext_len - ver_specific_len;
|
|
if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was truncated (%ld bytes)",
|
|
(int)(intro->type),
|
|
(long)(intro->plaintext_len));
|
|
status = -5;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was too long (%ld bytes)",
|
|
(int)(intro->type),
|
|
(long)(intro->plaintext_len));
|
|
status = -6;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(intro->rc,
|
|
intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len,
|
|
REND_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(intro->dh,
|
|
intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len + REND_COOKIE_LEN,
|
|
DH_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Flag it as being fully parsed */
|
|
intro->parsed = 1;
|
|
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (err_msg_out && !err_msg) {
|
|
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
|
|
"unknown INTRODUCE%d error parsing encrypted part",
|
|
intro ? (int)(intro->type) : -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg;
|
|
else tor_free(err_msg);
|
|
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Do validity checks on a parsed intro cell after decryption; some of
|
|
* these are not done in rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext() itself because
|
|
* they depend on a lot of other state and would make it hard to unit test.
|
|
* Returns >= 0 if successful or < 0 if the intro cell is invalid, and
|
|
* optionally writes out an error message for logging. If an err_msg
|
|
* pointer is provided, it is the caller's responsibility to free any
|
|
* provided message.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_validate_intro_late(const rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
|
|
char **err_msg_out)
|
|
{
|
|
int status = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!intro) {
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
*err_msg_out =
|
|
tor_strdup("NULL intro cell passed to "
|
|
"rend_service_validate_intro_late()");
|
|
|
|
status = -1;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (intro->version == 3 && intro->parsed) {
|
|
if (!(intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ||
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_BASIC_AUTH ||
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH)) {
|
|
/* This is an informative message, not an error, as in the old code */
|
|
if (err_msg_out)
|
|
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
|
|
"unknown authorization type %d",
|
|
intro->u.v3.auth_type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we fail building a rendezvous circuit at some point other
|
|
* than the last hop: launches a new circuit to the same rendezvous point.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *newcirc;
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *newstate, *oldstate;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(oldcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
|
|
oldstate = oldcirc->build_state;
|
|
tor_assert(oldstate);
|
|
|
|
if (oldstate->service_pending_final_cpath_ref == NULL) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Skipping relaunch of circ that failed on its first hop. "
|
|
"Initiator will retry.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Reattempting rendezvous circuit to '%s'",
|
|
safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldstate->chosen_exit)));
|
|
|
|
/* You'd think Single Onion Services would want to retry the rendezvous
|
|
* using a direct connection. But if it's blocked by a firewall, or the
|
|
* service is IPv6-only, or the rend point avoiding becoming a one-hop
|
|
* proxy, we need a 3-hop connection. */
|
|
newcirc = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND,
|
|
oldstate->chosen_exit,
|
|
CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
|
|
|
|
if (!newcirc) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND,"Couldn't relaunch rendezvous circuit to '%s'.",
|
|
safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldstate->chosen_exit)));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
newstate = newcirc->build_state;
|
|
tor_assert(newstate);
|
|
newstate->failure_count = oldstate->failure_count+1;
|
|
newstate->expiry_time = oldstate->expiry_time;
|
|
newstate->service_pending_final_cpath_ref =
|
|
oldstate->service_pending_final_cpath_ref;
|
|
++(newstate->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->refcount);
|
|
|
|
newcirc->rend_data = rend_data_dup(oldcirc->rend_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a circuit to serve as an introduction point for the service
|
|
* <b>service</b> at the introduction point <b>nickname</b>
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_launch_establish_intro(rend_service_t *service,
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *launched;
|
|
int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
extend_info_t *launch_ei = intro->extend_info;
|
|
extend_info_t *direct_ei = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Are we in single onion mode? */
|
|
if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)) {
|
|
/* Do we have a descriptor for the node?
|
|
* We've either just chosen it from the consensus, or we've just reviewed
|
|
* our intro points to see which ones are still valid, and deleted the ones
|
|
* that aren't in the consensus any more. */
|
|
const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(launch_ei->identity_digest);
|
|
if (BUG(!node)) {
|
|
/* The service has kept an intro point after it went missing from the
|
|
* consensus. If we did anything else here, it would be a consensus
|
|
* distinguisher. Which are less of an issue for single onion services,
|
|
* but still a bug. */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Can we connect to the node directly? If so, replace launch_ei
|
|
* (a multi-hop extend_info) with one suitable for direct connection. */
|
|
if (rend_service_use_direct_connection_node(options, node)) {
|
|
direct_ei = extend_info_from_node(node, 1);
|
|
if (BUG(!direct_ei)) {
|
|
/* rend_service_use_direct_connection_node and extend_info_from_node
|
|
* disagree about which addresses on this node are permitted. This
|
|
* should never happen. Avoiding the connection is a safe response. */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
flags = flags | CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
|
|
launch_ei = direct_ei;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* launch_ei is either intro->extend_info, or has been replaced with a valid
|
|
* extend_info for single onion service direct connection. */
|
|
tor_assert(launch_ei);
|
|
/* We must have the same intro when making a direct connection. */
|
|
tor_assert(tor_memeq(intro->extend_info->identity_digest,
|
|
launch_ei->identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Launching circuit to introduction point %s%s%s for service %s",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
direct_ei ? " via direct address " : "",
|
|
direct_ei ? safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(direct_ei)) : "",
|
|
service->service_id);
|
|
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), 1, 0);
|
|
|
|
++service->n_intro_circuits_launched;
|
|
launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
|
|
launch_ei, flags);
|
|
|
|
if (!launched) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Can't launch circuit to establish introduction at %s%s%s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
direct_ei ? " via direct address " : "",
|
|
direct_ei ? safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(direct_ei)) : ""
|
|
);
|
|
extend_info_free(direct_ei);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* We must have the same exit node even if cannibalized or direct connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
tor_assert(tor_memeq(intro->extend_info->identity_digest,
|
|
launched->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
|
launched->rend_data = rend_data_service_create(service->service_id,
|
|
service->pk_digest, NULL,
|
|
service->auth_type);
|
|
launched->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro->intro_key);
|
|
if (launched->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(launched);
|
|
extend_info_free(direct_ei);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of introduction points that are established for the
|
|
* given service. */
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
count_established_intro_points(const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int num = 0;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro,
|
|
num += intro->circuit_established
|
|
);
|
|
return num;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of introduction points that are or are being
|
|
* established for the given service. This function iterates over all
|
|
* circuit and count those that are linked to the service and are waiting
|
|
* for the intro point to respond. */
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
count_intro_point_circuits(const rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int num_ipos = 0;
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
|
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
if (oc->rend_data &&
|
|
rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, (uint8_t *) service->pk_digest)) {
|
|
num_ipos++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
return num_ipos;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Given a buffer of at least RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE bytes in <b>cell_body_out</b>,
|
|
write the body of a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell in it. Use <b>intro_key</b>
|
|
as the intro point auth key, and <b>rend_circ_nonce</b> as the circuit
|
|
crypto material. On success, fill <b>cell_body_out</b> and return the number
|
|
of bytes written. On fail, return -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssize_t
|
|
rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell(char *cell_body_out,
|
|
size_t cell_body_out_len,
|
|
crypto_pk_t *intro_key,
|
|
const char *rend_circ_nonce)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval = -1;
|
|
int r;
|
|
int len = 0;
|
|
char auth[DIGEST_LEN + 9];
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(intro_key);
|
|
tor_assert(rend_circ_nonce);
|
|
|
|
/* Build the payload for a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */
|
|
r = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(intro_key, cell_body_out+2,
|
|
RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-2);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error; failed to establish intro point.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
len = r;
|
|
set_uint16(cell_body_out, htons((uint16_t)len));
|
|
len += 2;
|
|
memcpy(auth, rend_circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(auth+DIGEST_LEN, "INTRODUCE", 9);
|
|
if (crypto_digest(cell_body_out+len, auth, DIGEST_LEN+9))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
len += 20;
|
|
r = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(intro_key, cell_body_out+len,
|
|
cell_body_out_len - len,
|
|
cell_body_out, len);
|
|
if (r<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't sign introduction request.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
len += r;
|
|
|
|
retval = len;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
memwipe(auth, 0, sizeof(auth));
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we're done building a circuit to an introduction point:
|
|
* sends a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
unsigned int expiring_nodes_len, num_ip_circuits, valid_ip_circuits = 0;
|
|
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
const char *rend_pk_digest;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
|
|
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
|
|
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only on supported). */
|
|
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
|
|
|
|
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
|
|
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
|
|
if (!service) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %u.",
|
|
safe_str_client(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Take the current amount of expiring nodes and the current amount of IP
|
|
* circuits and compute how many valid IP circuits we have. */
|
|
expiring_nodes_len = (unsigned int) smartlist_len(service->expiring_nodes);
|
|
num_ip_circuits = count_intro_point_circuits(service);
|
|
/* Let's avoid an underflow. The valid_ip_circuits is initialized to 0 in
|
|
* case this condition turns out false because it means that all circuits
|
|
* are expiring so we need to keep this circuit. */
|
|
if (num_ip_circuits > expiring_nodes_len) {
|
|
valid_ip_circuits = num_ip_circuits - expiring_nodes_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
|
|
* redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending.
|
|
* Subtract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
|
|
* still opened. */
|
|
if (valid_ip_circuits > service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
/* Remove the intro point associated with this circuit, it's being
|
|
* repurposed or closed thus cleanup memory. */
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro = find_intro_point(circuit);
|
|
if (intro != NULL) {
|
|
smartlist_remove(service->intro_nodes, intro);
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
|
|
/* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is
|
|
allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now,
|
|
this case, we might as well close the thing. */
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
|
|
"circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
|
|
"circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to "
|
|
"general; leaving as internal.");
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_should_use_vanguards(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose)) {
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit),
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS);
|
|
} else {
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
rend_data_free(circuit->rend_data);
|
|
circuit->rend_data = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
|
|
circuit->intro_key = NULL;
|
|
crypto_pk_free(intro_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circuit_has_opened(circuit);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Established circuit %u as introduction point for service %s",
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
|
|
|
|
/* Send the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */
|
|
{
|
|
ssize_t len;
|
|
len = rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell(buf, sizeof(buf),
|
|
circuit->intro_key,
|
|
circuit->cpath->prev->rend_circ_nonce);
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circuit),
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
|
|
buf, len, circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Couldn't send introduction request for service %s on circuit %u",
|
|
serviceid, (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We've attempted to use this circuit */
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
|
|
done:
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
|
|
* live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is
|
|
* now out-of-date. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
|
|
const uint8_t *request,
|
|
size_t request_len)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
(void) request;
|
|
(void) request_len;
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
|
|
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only supported one for now). */
|
|
const char *rend_pk_digest =
|
|
(char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on non-intro circuit.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
|
|
if (!service) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %u.",
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 + 1,
|
|
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
/* We've just successfully established a intro circuit to one of our
|
|
* introduction point, account for it. */
|
|
intro = find_intro_point(circuit);
|
|
if (intro == NULL) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND,
|
|
"Introduction circuit established without a rend_intro_point_t "
|
|
"object for service %s on circuit %u",
|
|
safe_str_client(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
intro->circuit_established = 1;
|
|
/* We might not have every introduction point ready but at this point we
|
|
* know that the descriptor needs to be uploaded. */
|
|
service->desc_is_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit %u for service %s",
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
|
|
|
|
/* Getting a valid INTRODUCE_ESTABLISHED means we've successfully
|
|
* used the circ */
|
|
pathbias_mark_use_success(circuit);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
err:
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called once a circuit to a rendezvous point is established: sends a
|
|
* RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
char hexcookie[9];
|
|
int reason;
|
|
const char *rend_cookie, *rend_pk_digest;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
|
|
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
|
|
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only one supported). */
|
|
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
rend_cookie = circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie;
|
|
|
|
/* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias. We set the
|
|
* timestamp regardless of its content because that circuit could have been
|
|
* cannibalized so in any cases, we are about to use that circuit more. */
|
|
circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* This may be redundant */
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
|
|
|
|
hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath;
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(hexcookie,9, rend_cookie,4);
|
|
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
|
|
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Done building circuit %u to rendezvous with "
|
|
"cookie %s for service %s",
|
|
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
|
|
|
|
/* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for
|
|
* consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has
|
|
* no effect on Tor's behaviour. */
|
|
circuit->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If hop is NULL, another rend circ has already connected to this
|
|
* rend point. Close this circ. */
|
|
if (hop == NULL) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Another rend circ has already reached this rend point; "
|
|
"closing this rend circ.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove our final cpath element from the reference, so that no
|
|
* other circuit will try to use it. Store it in
|
|
* pending_final_cpath for now to ensure that it will be freed if
|
|
* our rendezvous attempt fails. */
|
|
circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = hop;
|
|
circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath = NULL;
|
|
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
|
|
if (!service) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on "
|
|
"rendezvous circuit.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
|
|
memcpy(buf, rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
|
|
if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
|
|
buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
|
|
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* Send the cell */
|
|
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circuit),
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1,
|
|
buf, HS_LEGACY_RENDEZVOUS_CELL_SIZE,
|
|
circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't send RENDEZVOUS1 cell.");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_dh_free(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
|
|
hop->rend_dh_handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Append the cpath entry. */
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
/* set the windows to default. these are the windows
|
|
* that the service thinks the client has.
|
|
*/
|
|
hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
|
|
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
onion_append_to_cpath(&circuit->cpath, hop);
|
|
circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL; /* prevent double-free */
|
|
|
|
/* Change the circuit purpose. */
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
|
|
done:
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
|
|
memwipe(hexcookie, 0, sizeof(hexcookie));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Manage introduction points
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/** Return the (possibly non-open) introduction circuit ending at
|
|
* <b>intro</b> for the service whose public key is <b>pk_digest</b>.
|
|
* (<b>desc_version</b> is ignored). Return NULL if no such service is
|
|
* found.
|
|
*/
|
|
static origin_circuit_t *
|
|
find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(intro);
|
|
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,
|
|
(uint8_t *) pk_digest, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) {
|
|
if (tor_memeq(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
|
|
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
|
|
circ->rend_data) {
|
|
return circ;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circ = NULL;
|
|
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,
|
|
(uint8_t *) pk_digest,
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) {
|
|
if (tor_memeq(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
|
|
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
|
|
circ->rend_data) {
|
|
return circ;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the corresponding introdution point using the circuit <b>circ</b>
|
|
* found in the <b>service</b>. NULL is returned if not found. */
|
|
static rend_intro_point_t *
|
|
find_expiring_intro_point(rend_service_t *service, origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->expiring_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
|
|
intro_point,
|
|
if (crypto_pk_eq_keys(intro_point->intro_key, circ->intro_key)) {
|
|
return intro_point;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a pointer to the rend_intro_point_t corresponding to the
|
|
* service-side introduction circuit <b>circ</b>. */
|
|
static rend_intro_point_t *
|
|
find_intro_point(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *serviceid;
|
|
rend_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
|
|
serviceid = rend_data_get_address(circ->rend_data);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s,
|
|
if (tor_memeq(s->service_id, serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)) {
|
|
service = s;
|
|
break;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro_point,
|
|
if (crypto_pk_eq_keys(intro_point->intro_key, circ->intro_key)) {
|
|
return intro_point;
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Upload the rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t's in <b>descs</b>
|
|
* associated with the rend_service_descriptor_t <b>renddesc</b> to
|
|
* the responsible hidden service directories OR the hidden service
|
|
* directories specified by <b>hs_dirs</b>; <b>service_id</b> and
|
|
* <b>seconds_valid</b> are only passed for logging purposes.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
|
|
smartlist_t *descs, smartlist_t *hs_dirs,
|
|
const char *service_id, int seconds_valid)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, j, failed_upload = 0;
|
|
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_t *successful_uploads = smartlist_new();
|
|
routerstatus_t *hs_dir;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++) {
|
|
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc = smartlist_get(descs, i);
|
|
/** If any HSDirs are specified, they should be used instead of
|
|
* the responsible directories */
|
|
if (hs_dirs && smartlist_len(hs_dirs) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add_all(responsible_dirs, hs_dirs);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Determine responsible dirs. */
|
|
if (hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs,
|
|
desc->desc_id) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not determine the responsible hidden service "
|
|
"directories to post descriptors to.");
|
|
control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
|
|
"UNKNOWN",
|
|
"UNKNOWN", NULL);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (j = 0; j < smartlist_len(responsible_dirs); j++) {
|
|
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
|
|
char *hs_dir_ip;
|
|
const node_t *node;
|
|
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
|
hs_dir = smartlist_get(responsible_dirs, j);
|
|
if (smartlist_contains_digest(renddesc->successful_uploads,
|
|
hs_dir->identity_digest))
|
|
/* Don't upload descriptor if we succeeded in doing so last time. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
node = node_get_by_id(hs_dir->identity_digest);
|
|
if (!node || !node_has_preferred_descriptor(node,0)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Not launching upload for for v2 descriptor to "
|
|
"hidden service directory %s; we don't have its "
|
|
"router descriptor. Queuing for later upload.",
|
|
safe_str_client(routerstatus_describe(hs_dir)));
|
|
failed_upload = -1;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Send publish request. */
|
|
|
|
/* We need the service ID to identify which service did the upload
|
|
* request. Lookup is made in rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(). */
|
|
rend_data = rend_data_client_create(service_id, desc->desc_id, NULL,
|
|
REND_NO_AUTH);
|
|
directory_request_t *req =
|
|
directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2);
|
|
directory_request_set_routerstatus(req, hs_dir);
|
|
directory_request_set_indirection(req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
|
|
directory_request_set_payload(req,
|
|
desc->desc_str, strlen(desc->desc_str));
|
|
directory_request_set_rend_query(req, rend_data);
|
|
directory_initiate_request(req);
|
|
directory_request_free(req);
|
|
|
|
rend_data_free(rend_data);
|
|
base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32),
|
|
desc->desc_id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
hs_dir_ip = tor_dup_ip(hs_dir->addr);
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Launching upload for v2 descriptor for "
|
|
"service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s' with validity "
|
|
"of %d seconds to hidden service directory '%s' on "
|
|
"%s:%d.",
|
|
safe_str_client(service_id),
|
|
safe_str_client(desc_id_base32),
|
|
seconds_valid,
|
|
hs_dir->nickname,
|
|
hs_dir_ip,
|
|
hs_dir->or_port);
|
|
control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
|
|
hs_dir->identity_digest,
|
|
desc_id_base32, NULL);
|
|
tor_free(hs_dir_ip);
|
|
/* Remember successful upload to this router for next time. */
|
|
if (!smartlist_contains_digest(successful_uploads,
|
|
hs_dir->identity_digest))
|
|
smartlist_add(successful_uploads, hs_dir->identity_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_clear(responsible_dirs);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!failed_upload) {
|
|
if (renddesc->successful_uploads) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(renddesc->successful_uploads, char *, c, tor_free(c););
|
|
smartlist_free(renddesc->successful_uploads);
|
|
renddesc->successful_uploads = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
renddesc->all_uploads_performed = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Remember which routers worked this time, so that we don't upload the
|
|
* descriptor to them again. */
|
|
if (!renddesc->successful_uploads)
|
|
renddesc->successful_uploads = smartlist_new();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(successful_uploads, const char *, c, {
|
|
if (!smartlist_contains_digest(renddesc->successful_uploads, c)) {
|
|
char *hsdir_id = tor_memdup(c, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
smartlist_add(renddesc->successful_uploads, hsdir_id);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
done:
|
|
smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
|
|
smartlist_free(successful_uploads);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Encode and sign an up-to-date service descriptor for <b>service</b>,
|
|
* and upload it/them to the responsible hidden service directories.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
int rendpostperiod;
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
int uploaded = 0;
|
|
|
|
rendpostperiod = get_options()->RendPostPeriod;
|
|
|
|
networkstatus_t *c = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus();
|
|
if (c && smartlist_len(c->routerstatus_list) > 0) {
|
|
int seconds_valid, i, j, num_descs;
|
|
smartlist_t *descs = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_t *client_cookies = smartlist_new();
|
|
/* Either upload a single descriptor (including replicas) or one
|
|
* descriptor for each authorized client in case of authorization
|
|
* type 'stealth'. */
|
|
num_descs = service->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ?
|
|
smartlist_len(service->clients) : 1;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < num_descs; j++) {
|
|
crypto_pk_t *client_key = NULL;
|
|
rend_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
|
|
smartlist_clear(client_cookies);
|
|
switch (service->auth_type) {
|
|
case REND_NO_AUTH:
|
|
/* Do nothing here. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case REND_BASIC_AUTH:
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *,
|
|
cl, smartlist_add(client_cookies, cl->descriptor_cookie));
|
|
break;
|
|
case REND_STEALTH_AUTH:
|
|
client = smartlist_get(service->clients, j);
|
|
client_key = client->client_key;
|
|
smartlist_add(client_cookies, client->descriptor_cookie);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Encode the current descriptor. */
|
|
seconds_valid = rend_encode_v2_descriptors(descs, service->desc,
|
|
now, 0,
|
|
service->auth_type,
|
|
client_key,
|
|
client_cookies);
|
|
if (seconds_valid < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service "
|
|
"descriptor; not uploading.");
|
|
smartlist_free(descs);
|
|
smartlist_free(client_cookies);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
rend_get_service_id(service->desc->pk, serviceid);
|
|
if (get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
|
|
/* Post the current descriptors to the hidden service directories. */
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Launching upload for hidden service %s",
|
|
serviceid);
|
|
directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, NULL, serviceid,
|
|
seconds_valid);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Free memory for descriptors. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++)
|
|
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_free_(smartlist_get(descs, i));
|
|
smartlist_clear(descs);
|
|
/* Update next upload time. */
|
|
if (seconds_valid - REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS
|
|
> rendpostperiod)
|
|
service->next_upload_time = now + rendpostperiod;
|
|
else if (seconds_valid < REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS)
|
|
service->next_upload_time = now + seconds_valid + 1;
|
|
else
|
|
service->next_upload_time = now + seconds_valid -
|
|
REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS + 1;
|
|
/* Post also the next descriptors, if necessary. */
|
|
if (seconds_valid < REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS) {
|
|
seconds_valid = rend_encode_v2_descriptors(descs, service->desc,
|
|
now, 1,
|
|
service->auth_type,
|
|
client_key,
|
|
client_cookies);
|
|
if (seconds_valid < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service "
|
|
"descriptor; not uploading.");
|
|
smartlist_free(descs);
|
|
smartlist_free(client_cookies);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
|
|
directory_post_to_hs_dir(service->desc, descs, NULL, serviceid,
|
|
seconds_valid);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Free memory for descriptors. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++)
|
|
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_free_(smartlist_get(descs, i));
|
|
smartlist_clear(descs);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_free(descs);
|
|
smartlist_free(client_cookies);
|
|
uploaded = 1;
|
|
if (get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully uploaded v2 rend descriptors!");
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully stored created v2 rend descriptors!");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If not uploaded, try again in one minute. */
|
|
if (!uploaded)
|
|
service->next_upload_time = now + 60;
|
|
|
|
/* Unmark dirty flag of this service. */
|
|
service->desc_is_dirty = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of INTRODUCE2 cells this hidden service has received
|
|
* from this intro point. */
|
|
static int
|
|
intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro)
|
|
{
|
|
return intro->accepted_introduce2_count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return non-zero iff <b>intro</b> should 'expire' now (i.e. we
|
|
* should stop publishing it in new descriptors and eventually close
|
|
* it). */
|
|
static int
|
|
intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
|
|
time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(intro != NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (intro->time_published == -1) {
|
|
/* Don't expire an intro point if we haven't even published it yet. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (intro_point_accepted_intro_count(intro) >=
|
|
intro->max_introductions) {
|
|
/* This intro point has been used too many times. Expire it now. */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (intro->time_to_expire == -1) {
|
|
/* This intro point has been published, but we haven't picked an
|
|
* expiration time for it. Pick one now. */
|
|
int intro_point_lifetime_seconds =
|
|
crypto_rand_int_range(INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
|
|
INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS);
|
|
|
|
/* Start the expiration timer now, rather than when the intro
|
|
* point was first published. There shouldn't be much of a time
|
|
* difference. */
|
|
intro->time_to_expire = now + intro_point_lifetime_seconds;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This intro point has a time to expire set already. Use it. */
|
|
return (now >= intro->time_to_expire);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Iterate over intro points in the given service and remove the invalid
|
|
* ones. For an intro point object to be considered invalid, the circuit
|
|
* _and_ node need to have disappeared.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the intro point should expire, it's placed into the expiring_nodes
|
|
* list of the service and removed from the active intro nodes list.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>exclude_nodes</b> is not NULL, add the valid nodes to it.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>retry_nodes</b> is not NULL, add the valid node to it if the
|
|
* circuit disappeared but the node is still in the consensus. */
|
|
static void
|
|
remove_invalid_intro_points(rend_service_t *service,
|
|
smartlist_t *exclude_nodes,
|
|
smartlist_t *retry_nodes, time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
/* Remove any expired nodes that doesn't have a circuit. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->expiring_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
|
|
intro) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *intro_circ =
|
|
find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
|
|
if (intro_circ) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
/* No more circuit, cleanup the into point object. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
|
|
intro) {
|
|
/* Find the introduction point node object. */
|
|
const node_t *node =
|
|
node_get_by_id(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
/* Find the intro circuit, this might be NULL. */
|
|
origin_circuit_t *intro_circ =
|
|
find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
|
|
|
|
/* Add the valid node to the exclusion list so we don't try to establish
|
|
* an introduction point to it again. */
|
|
if (node && exclude_nodes) {
|
|
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*) node);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First, make sure we still have a valid circuit for this intro point.
|
|
* If we dont, we'll give up on it and make a new one. */
|
|
if (intro_circ == NULL) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Attempting to retry on %s as intro point for %s"
|
|
" (circuit disappeared).",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
/* We've lost the circuit for this intro point, flag it so it can be
|
|
* accounted for when considiring uploading a descriptor. */
|
|
intro->circuit_established = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Node is gone or we've reached our maximum circuit creationg retry
|
|
* count, clean up everything, we'll find a new one. */
|
|
if (node == NULL ||
|
|
intro->circuit_retries >= MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro);
|
|
/* We've just killed the intro point, nothing left to do. */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The intro point is still alive so let's try to use it again because
|
|
* we have a published descriptor containing it. Keep the intro point
|
|
* in the intro_nodes list because it's still valid, we are rebuilding
|
|
* a circuit to it. */
|
|
if (retry_nodes) {
|
|
smartlist_add(retry_nodes, intro);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else, the circuit is valid so in both cases, node being alive or not,
|
|
* we leave the circuit and intro point object as is. Closing the
|
|
* circuit here would leak new consensus timing and freeing the intro
|
|
* point object would make the intro circuit unusable. */
|
|
|
|
/* Now, check if intro point should expire. If it does, queue it so
|
|
* it can be cleaned up once it has been replaced properly. */
|
|
if (intro_point_should_expire_now(intro, now)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Expiring %s as intro point for %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
/* We might have put it in the retry list if so, undo. */
|
|
if (retry_nodes) {
|
|
smartlist_remove(retry_nodes, intro);
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_add(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->intro_nodes, intro);
|
|
/* Intro point is expired, we need a new one thus don't consider it
|
|
* anymore has a valid established intro point. */
|
|
intro->circuit_established = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A new descriptor has been successfully uploaded for the given
|
|
* <b>rend_data</b>. Remove and free the expiring nodes from the associated
|
|
* service. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(const rend_data_t *rend_data)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
const char *onion_address;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(rend_data);
|
|
|
|
onion_address = rend_data_get_address(rend_data);
|
|
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_service_id(onion_address);
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(service->expiring_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
|
|
intro) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *intro_circ =
|
|
find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
|
|
if (intro_circ != NULL) {
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
|
|
END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(service->expiring_nodes, intro);
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Don't try to build more than this many circuits before giving up
|
|
* for a while. Dynamically calculated based on the configured number of
|
|
* introduction points for the service, n_intro_points_wanted. */
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_max_intro_circs_per_period(unsigned int n_intro_points_wanted)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Allow all but one of the initial connections to fail and be
|
|
* retried. (If all fail, we *want* to wait, because something is broken.) */
|
|
tor_assert(n_intro_points_wanted <= NUM_INTRO_POINTS_MAX);
|
|
|
|
/* For the normal use case, 3 intro points plus 2 extra for performance and
|
|
* allow that twice because once every 24h or so, we can do it twice for two
|
|
* descriptors that is the current one and the next one. So (3 + 2) * 2 ==
|
|
* 12 allowed attempts for one period. */
|
|
return ((n_intro_points_wanted + NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA) * 2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** For every service, check how many intro points it currently has, and:
|
|
* - Invalidate introdution points based on specific criteria, see
|
|
* remove_invalid_intro_points comments.
|
|
* - Pick new intro points as necessary.
|
|
* - Launch circuits to any new intro points.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is called once a second by the main loop.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_consider_services_intro_points(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
/* Are we in single onion mode? */
|
|
const int allow_direct = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(
|
|
get_options());
|
|
/* List of nodes we need to _exclude_ when choosing a new node to
|
|
* establish an intro point to. */
|
|
smartlist_t *exclude_nodes;
|
|
/* List of nodes we need to retry to build a circuit on them because the
|
|
* node is valid but circuit died. */
|
|
smartlist_t *retry_nodes;
|
|
|
|
if (!have_completed_a_circuit())
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
exclude_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
retry_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, service) {
|
|
int r;
|
|
/* Number of intro points we want to open and add to the intro nodes
|
|
* list of the service. */
|
|
unsigned int n_intro_points_to_open;
|
|
/* Have an unsigned len so we can use it to compare values else gcc is
|
|
* not happy with unmatching signed comparaison. */
|
|
unsigned int intro_nodes_len;
|
|
/* Different service are allowed to have the same introduction point as
|
|
* long as they are on different circuit thus why we clear this list. */
|
|
smartlist_clear(exclude_nodes);
|
|
smartlist_clear(retry_nodes);
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup the invalid intro points and save the node objects, if any,
|
|
* in the exclude_nodes and retry_nodes lists. */
|
|
remove_invalid_intro_points(service, exclude_nodes, retry_nodes, now);
|
|
|
|
/* This retry period is important here so we don't stress circuit
|
|
* creation. */
|
|
|
|
if (now > service->intro_period_started + INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD) {
|
|
/* One period has elapsed:
|
|
* - if we stopped, we can try building circuits again,
|
|
* - if we haven't, we reset the circuit creation counts. */
|
|
rend_log_intro_limit(service, LOG_INFO);
|
|
service->intro_period_started = now;
|
|
service->n_intro_circuits_launched = 0;
|
|
} else if (service->n_intro_circuits_launched >=
|
|
rend_max_intro_circs_per_period(
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted)) {
|
|
/* We have failed too many times in this period; wait for the next
|
|
* one before we try to initiate any more connections. */
|
|
rend_log_intro_limit(service, LOG_WARN);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's try to rebuild circuit on the nodes we want to retry on. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(retry_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, intro) {
|
|
r = rend_service_launch_establish_intro(service, intro);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error launching circuit to node %s for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
/* Unable to launch a circuit to that intro point, remove it from
|
|
* the valid list so we can create a new one. */
|
|
smartlist_remove(service->intro_nodes, intro);
|
|
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
intro->circuit_retries++;
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(intro);
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid mismatched signed comparaison below. */
|
|
intro_nodes_len = (unsigned int) smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes);
|
|
|
|
/* Quiescent state, we have more or the equal amount of wanted node for
|
|
* this service. Proceed to the next service. We can have more nodes
|
|
* because we launch extra preemptive circuits if our intro nodes list was
|
|
* originally empty for performance reasons. */
|
|
if (intro_nodes_len >= service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Number of intro points we want to open which is the wanted amount minus
|
|
* the current amount of valid nodes. We know that this won't underflow
|
|
* because of the check above. */
|
|
n_intro_points_to_open = service->n_intro_points_wanted - intro_nodes_len;
|
|
if (intro_nodes_len == 0) {
|
|
/* We want to end up with n_intro_points_wanted intro points, but if
|
|
* we have no intro points at all (chances are they all cycled or we
|
|
* are starting up), we launch NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA extra circuits
|
|
* and use the first n_intro_points_wanted that complete. See proposal
|
|
* #155, section 4 for the rationale of this which is purely for
|
|
* performance.
|
|
*
|
|
* The ones after the first n_intro_points_to_open will be converted
|
|
* to 'general' internal circuits in rend_service_intro_has_opened(),
|
|
* and then we'll drop them from the list of intro points. */
|
|
n_intro_points_to_open += NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (int) n_intro_points_to_open; i++) {
|
|
const node_t *node;
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
|
|
router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME|CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags;
|
|
direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR;
|
|
direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
|
|
|
|
node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes,
|
|
options->ExcludeNodes,
|
|
allow_direct ? direct_flags : flags);
|
|
/* If we are in single onion mode, retry node selection for a 3-hop
|
|
* path */
|
|
if (allow_direct && !node) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Unable to find an intro point that we can connect to "
|
|
"directly for %s, falling back to a 3-hop path.",
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes,
|
|
options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND,
|
|
"We only have %d introduction points established for %s; "
|
|
"wanted %u.",
|
|
smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id),
|
|
n_intro_points_to_open);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add the chosen node to the exclusion list in order to avoid picking
|
|
* it again in the next iteration. */
|
|
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)node);
|
|
intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
|
|
/* extend_info is for clients, so we want the multi-hop primary ORPort,
|
|
* even if we are a single onion service and intend to connect to it
|
|
* directly ourselves. */
|
|
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
|
|
if (BUG(intro->extend_info == NULL)) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
intro->intro_key = crypto_pk_new();
|
|
const int fail = crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key);
|
|
tor_assert(!fail);
|
|
intro->time_published = -1;
|
|
intro->time_to_expire = -1;
|
|
intro->max_introductions =
|
|
crypto_rand_int_range(INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
|
|
INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS);
|
|
smartlist_add(service->intro_nodes, intro);
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked router %s as an intro point for %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(node_describe(node)),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
/* Establish new introduction circuit to our chosen intro point. */
|
|
r = rend_service_launch_establish_intro(service, intro);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error launching circuit to node %s for service %s.",
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)),
|
|
safe_str_client(service->service_id));
|
|
/* This funcion will be called again by the main loop so this intro
|
|
* point without a intro circuit will be retried on or removed after
|
|
* a maximum number of attempts. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(service);
|
|
smartlist_free(exclude_nodes);
|
|
smartlist_free(retry_nodes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY (30)
|
|
#define MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY_TESTING (5)
|
|
|
|
/** Regenerate and upload rendezvous service descriptors for all
|
|
* services, if necessary. If the descriptor has been dirty enough
|
|
* for long enough, definitely upload; else only upload when the
|
|
* periodic timeout has expired.
|
|
*
|
|
* For the first upload, pick a random time between now and two periods
|
|
* from now, and pick it independently for each service.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int rendpostperiod = options->RendPostPeriod;
|
|
int rendinitialpostdelay = (options->TestingTorNetwork ?
|
|
MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY_TESTING :
|
|
MIN_REND_INITIAL_POST_DELAY);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
|
|
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
|
|
if (!service->next_upload_time) { /* never been uploaded yet */
|
|
/* The fixed lower bound of rendinitialpostdelay seconds ensures that
|
|
* the descriptor is stable before being published. See comment below. */
|
|
service->next_upload_time =
|
|
now + rendinitialpostdelay + crypto_rand_int(2*rendpostperiod);
|
|
/* Single Onion Services prioritise availability over hiding their
|
|
* startup time, as their IP address is publicly discoverable anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rend_service_reveal_startup_time(options)) {
|
|
service->next_upload_time = now + rendinitialpostdelay;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Does every introduction points have been established? */
|
|
unsigned int intro_points_ready =
|
|
count_established_intro_points(service) >=
|
|
service->n_intro_points_wanted;
|
|
if (intro_points_ready &&
|
|
(service->next_upload_time < now ||
|
|
(service->desc_is_dirty &&
|
|
service->desc_is_dirty < now-rendinitialpostdelay))) {
|
|
/* if it's time, or if the directory servers have a wrong service
|
|
* descriptor and ours has been stable for rendinitialpostdelay seconds,
|
|
* upload a new one of each format. */
|
|
rend_service_update_descriptor(service);
|
|
upload_service_descriptor(service);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** True if the list of available router descriptors might have changed so
|
|
* that we should have a look whether we can republish previously failed
|
|
* rendezvous service descriptors. */
|
|
static int consider_republishing_rend_descriptors = 1;
|
|
|
|
/** Called when our internal view of the directory has changed, so that we
|
|
* might have router descriptors of hidden service directories available that
|
|
* we did not have before. */
|
|
void
|
|
rend_hsdir_routers_changed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
consider_republishing_rend_descriptors = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Consider republication of v2 rendezvous service descriptors that failed
|
|
* previously, but without regenerating descriptor contents.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_consider_descriptor_republication(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
|
|
if (!consider_republishing_rend_descriptors)
|
|
return;
|
|
consider_republishing_rend_descriptors = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
|
|
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
|
|
if (service->desc && !service->desc->all_uploads_performed) {
|
|
/* If we failed in uploading a descriptor last time, try again *without*
|
|
* updating the descriptor's contents. */
|
|
upload_service_descriptor(service);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Log the status of introduction points for all rendezvous services
|
|
* at log severity <b>severity</b>.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
rend_service_dump_stats(int severity)
|
|
{
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
|
|
const char *safe_name;
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
|
|
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
|
|
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Service configured in %s:",
|
|
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
|
|
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
|
|
safe_name = safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname);
|
|
|
|
circ = find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
|
|
if (!circ) {
|
|
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: no circuit",
|
|
j, safe_name);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: circuit is %s",
|
|
j, safe_name, circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given <b>conn</b>, a rendezvous exit stream, look up the hidden service for
|
|
* <b>circ</b>, and look up the port and address based on conn-\>port.
|
|
* Assign the actual conn-\>addr and conn-\>port. Return -2 on failure
|
|
* for which the circuit should be closed, -1 on other failure,
|
|
* or 0 for success.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_t *service;
|
|
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
|
const char *rend_pk_digest;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND,"beginning to hunt for addr/port");
|
|
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circ->rend_data, NULL);
|
|
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
|
|
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
|
|
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
|
|
if (!service) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't find any service associated with pk %s on "
|
|
"rendezvous circuit %u; closing.",
|
|
serviceid, (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (service->max_streams_per_circuit > 0) {
|
|
/* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a
|
|
* mapping if this circuit will exceed the limit. */
|
|
#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
|
|
static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
|
|
RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
|
|
if (circ->rend_data->nr_streams >= service->max_streams_per_circuit) {
|
|
log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
|
|
"Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on rendezvous "
|
|
"circuit %u; %s. Circuit has %d out of %d streams.",
|
|
(unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
|
|
service->max_streams_close_circuit ?
|
|
"closing circuit" :
|
|
"ignoring open stream request",
|
|
circ->rend_data->nr_streams,
|
|
service->max_streams_per_circuit);
|
|
return service->max_streams_close_circuit ? -2 : -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->ports, conn) == 0) {
|
|
/* Successfully set the port to the connection. We are done. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"No virtual port mapping exists for port %d on service %s",
|
|
conn->base_.port, serviceid);
|
|
|
|
if (service->allow_unknown_ports)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
else
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Are HiddenServiceSingleHopMode and HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode consistent?
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_consistent(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
/* !! is used to make these options boolean */
|
|
return (!! options->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode ==
|
|
!! options->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do the options allow onion services to make direct (non-anonymous)
|
|
* connections to introduction or rendezvous points?
|
|
* Must only be called after options_validate_single_onion() has successfully
|
|
* checked onion service option consistency.
|
|
* Returns true if tor is in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_consistent(options));
|
|
return options->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do the options allow us to reveal the exact startup time of the onion
|
|
* service?
|
|
* Single Onion Services prioritise availability over hiding their
|
|
* startup time, as their IP address is publicly discoverable anyway.
|
|
* Must only be called after options_validate_single_onion() has successfully
|
|
* checked onion service option consistency.
|
|
* Returns true if tor is in non-anonymous hidden service mode. */
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_reveal_startup_time(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_consistent(options));
|
|
return rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Is non-anonymous mode enabled using the HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode
|
|
* config option?
|
|
* Must only be called after options_validate_single_onion() has successfully
|
|
* checked onion service option consistency.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_consistent(options));
|
|
return options->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
|
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
set_rend_service_list(smartlist_t *new_list)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_list = new_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
set_rend_rend_service_staging_list(smartlist_t *new_list)
|
|
{
|
|
rend_service_staging_list = new_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
|
|
|