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tor/src/or/or.h
Nick Mathewson 2ad062ee60 Merge branch 'mikeperry_bug26214-rebased_squashed'
2018-06-21 09:20:03 -04:00

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/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file or.h
* \brief Master header file for Tor-specific functionality.
**/
#ifndef TOR_OR_H
#define TOR_OR_H
#include "orconfig.h"
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
#include <signal.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H
#include <netdb.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
#include <sys/param.h> /* FreeBSD needs this to know what version it is */
#endif
#include "common/torint.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FCNTL_H
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
#include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
#include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
#include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
#include <netinet/in.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H
#include <errno.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
#include <time.h>
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <io.h>
#include <process.h>
#include <direct.h>
#include <windows.h>
#endif /* defined(_WIN32) */
#include "common/crypto.h"
#include "common/crypto_format.h"
#include "common/crypto_dh.h"
#include "common/crypto_hkdf.h"
#include "common/tortls.h"
#include "common/torlog.h"
#include "common/container.h"
#include "common/compress.h"
#include "common/address.h"
#include "common/compat_libevent.h"
#include "ht.h"
#include "common/confline.h"
#include "or/replaycache.h"
#include "common/crypto_curve25519.h"
#include "common/crypto_ed25519.h"
#include "tor_queue.h"
#include "common/token_bucket.h"
#include "common/util_format.h"
#include "or/hs_circuitmap.h"
// These, more than other includes, are for keeping the other struct
// definitions working. We should remove them when we minimize our includes.
#include "or/entry_port_cfg_st.h"
/* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work.
*/
#ifndef SIGHUP
#define SIGHUP 1
#endif
#ifndef SIGINT
#define SIGINT 2
#endif
#ifndef SIGUSR1
#define SIGUSR1 10
#endif
#ifndef SIGUSR2
#define SIGUSR2 12
#endif
#ifndef SIGTERM
#define SIGTERM 15
#endif
/* Controller signals start at a high number so we don't
* conflict with system-defined signals. */
#define SIGNEWNYM 129
#define SIGCLEARDNSCACHE 130
#define SIGHEARTBEAT 131
#if (SIZEOF_CELL_T != 0)
/* On Irix, stdlib.h defines a cell_t type, so we need to make sure
* that our stuff always calls cell_t something different. */
#define cell_t tor_cell_t
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1
#endif
/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */
#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_))
/** Length of longest allowable configured nickname. */
#define MAX_NICKNAME_LEN 19
/** Length of a router identity encoded as a hexadecimal digest, plus
* possible dollar sign. */
#define MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN (HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1)
/** Maximum length of verbose router identifier: dollar sign, hex ID digest,
* equal sign or tilde, nickname. */
#define MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN (1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)
/** Maximum size, in bytes, for resized buffers. */
#define MAX_BUF_SIZE ((1<<24)-1) /* 16MB-1 */
/** Maximum size, in bytes, for any directory object that we've downloaded. */
#define MAX_DIR_DL_SIZE MAX_BUF_SIZE
/** For HTTP parsing: Maximum number of bytes we'll accept in the headers
* of an HTTP request or response. */
#define MAX_HEADERS_SIZE 50000
/** Maximum size, in bytes, for any directory object that we're accepting
* as an upload. */
#define MAX_DIR_UL_SIZE MAX_BUF_SIZE
/** Maximum size, in bytes, of a single router descriptor uploaded to us
* as a directory authority. Caches and clients fetch whatever descriptors
* the authorities tell them to fetch, and don't care about size. */
#define MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE 20000
/** Maximum size of a single extrainfo document, as above. */
#define MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE 50000
/** Minimum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
#define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (1)
/** Maximum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
#define MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (90)
/** Default lifetime for an onion key in days. */
#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (28)
/** Minimum grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days.
* The maximum value is defined in proposal #274 as being the current network
* consensus parameter for "onion-key-rotation-days". */
#define MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (1)
/** Default grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days. */
#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (7)
/** How often we should check the network consensus if it is time to rotate or
* expire onion keys. */
#define ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL (60*60)
/** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */
#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL (2*60*60)
/** How old do we allow a router to get before removing it
* from the router list? In seconds. */
#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE (60*60*48)
/** How old can a router get before we (as a server) will no longer
* consider it live? In seconds. */
#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH (60*60*24)
/** How old do we let a saved descriptor get before force-removing it? */
#define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5)
/** Possible rules for generating circuit IDs on an OR connection. */
typedef enum {
CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER=0, /**< Pick from 0..1<<15-1. */
CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER=1, /**< Pick from 1<<15..1<<16-1. */
/** The other side of a connection is an OP: never create circuits to it,
* and let it use any circuit ID it wants. */
CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER=2
} circ_id_type_t;
#define circ_id_type_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(circ_id_type_t)
#define CONN_TYPE_MIN_ 3
/** Type for sockets listening for OR connections. */
#define CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER 3
/** A bidirectional TLS connection transmitting a sequence of cells.
* May be from an OR to an OR, or from an OP to an OR. */
#define CONN_TYPE_OR 4
/** A TCP connection from an onion router to a stream's destination. */
#define CONN_TYPE_EXIT 5
/** Type for sockets listening for SOCKS connections. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER 6
/** A SOCKS proxy connection from the user application to the onion
* proxy. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP 7
/** Type for sockets listening for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
#define CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER 8
/** Type for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
#define CONN_TYPE_DIR 9
/* Type 10 is unused. */
/** Type for listening for connections from user interface process. */
#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER 11
/** Type for connections from user interface process. */
#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL 12
/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by pf or
* netfilter. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER 13
/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by
* natd. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER 14
/** Type for sockets listening for DNS requests. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER 15
/** Type for connections from the Extended ORPort. */
#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR 16
/** Type for sockets listening for Extended ORPort connections. */
#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER 17
/** Type for sockets listening for HTTP CONNECT tunnel connections. */
#define CONN_TYPE_AP_HTTP_CONNECT_LISTENER 18
#define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 19
/* !!!! If _CONN_TYPE_MAX is ever over 31, we must grow the type field in
* connection_t. */
/* Proxy client types */
#define PROXY_NONE 0
#define PROXY_CONNECT 1
#define PROXY_SOCKS4 2
#define PROXY_SOCKS5 3
/* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 3, we must grow the proxy_type
* field in or_connection_t */
/* Pluggable transport proxy type. Don't use this in or_connection_t,
* instead use the actual underlying proxy type (see above). */
#define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 4
/* Proxy client handshake states */
/* We use a proxy but we haven't even connected to it yet. */
#define PROXY_INFANT 1
/* We use an HTTP proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
#define PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK 2
/* We use a SOCKS4 proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
#define PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK 3
/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate without
any authentication . */
#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE 4
/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate with
Username/Password authentication . */
#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929 5
/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our credentials. */
#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK 6
/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our CONNECT command. */
#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK 7
/* We use a proxy and we CONNECTed successfully!. */
#define PROXY_CONNECTED 8
/** True iff <b>x</b> is an edge connection. */
#define CONN_IS_EDGE(x) \
((x)->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT || (x)->type == CONN_TYPE_AP)
/** State for any listener connection. */
#define LISTENER_STATE_READY 0
#define OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for connect() to finish. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1
/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for proxy handshake to complete */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING 2
/** State for an OR connection client: SSL is handshaking, not done
* yet. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING 3
/** State for a connection to an OR: We're doing a second SSL handshake for
* renegotiation purposes. (V2 handshake only.) */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING 4
/** State for a connection at an OR: We're waiting for the client to
* renegotiate (to indicate a v2 handshake) or send a versions cell (to
* indicate a v3 handshake) */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING 5
/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, we've done
* renegotiation, but we haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions and
* sent a netinfo cell. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 6
/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, but we
* haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions, done a V3 handshake, and
* sent a netinfo cell. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3 7
/** State for an OR connection: Ready to send/receive cells. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8
#define OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 8
/** States of the Extended ORPort protocol. Be careful before changing
* the numbers: they matter. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the authentication
* type selected by the client. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE 1
/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client nonce. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE 2
/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client hash. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH 3
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_MAX 3
/** Authentication finished and the Extended ORPort is now accepting
* traffic. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 4
/** Extended ORPort is flushing its last messages and preparing to
* start accepting OR connections. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING 5
#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 5
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
/** State for an exit connection: waiting for response from DNS farm. */
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING 1
/** State for an exit connection: waiting for connect() to finish. */
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 2
/** State for an exit connection: open and ready to transmit data. */
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN 3
/** State for an exit connection: waiting to be removed. */
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED 4
#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 4
/* The AP state values must be disjoint from the EXIT state values. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 5
/** State for a SOCKS connection: waiting for SOCKS request. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT 5
/** State for a SOCKS connection: got a y.onion URL; waiting to receive
* rendezvous descriptor. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT 6
/** The controller will attach this connection to a circuit; it isn't our
* job to do so. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT 7
/** State for a SOCKS connection: waiting for a completed circuit. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT 8
/** State for a SOCKS connection: sent BEGIN, waiting for CONNECTED. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT 9
/** State for a SOCKS connection: sent RESOLVE, waiting for RESOLVED. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT 10
/** State for a SOCKS connection: ready to send and receive. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN 11
/** State for a transparent natd connection: waiting for original
* destination. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT 12
/** State for an HTTP tunnel: waiting for an HTTP CONNECT command. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_HTTP_CONNECT_WAIT 13
#define AP_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 13
/** True iff the AP_CONN_STATE_* value <b>s</b> means that the corresponding
* edge connection is not attached to any circuit. */
#define AP_CONN_STATE_IS_UNATTACHED(s) \
((s) <= AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT || (s) == AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT)
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
/** State for connection to directory server: waiting for connect(). */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1
/** State for connection to directory server: sending HTTP request. */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING 2
/** State for connection to directory server: reading HTTP response. */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_READING 3
/** State for connection to directory server: happy and finished. */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_FINISHED 4
/** State for connection at directory server: waiting for HTTP request. */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT 5
/** State for connection at directory server: sending HTTP response. */
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING 6
#define DIR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 6
/** True iff the purpose of <b>conn</b> means that it's a server-side
* directory connection. */
#define DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn) ((conn)->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER)
#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
/** State for a control connection: Authenticated and accepting v1 commands. */
#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN 1
/** State for a control connection: Waiting for authentication; speaking
* protocol v1. */
#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_NEEDAUTH 2
#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 2
#define DIR_PURPOSE_MIN_ 4
/** A connection to a directory server: set after a v2 rendezvous
* descriptor is downloaded. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC_V2 4
/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more server
* descriptors. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC 6
/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more extra-info
* documents. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_EXTRAINFO 7
/** A connection to a directory server: upload a server descriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR 8
/** A connection to a directory server: upload a v3 networkstatus vote. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_VOTE 10
/** A connection to a directory server: upload a v3 consensus signature */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_SIGNATURES 11
/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more v3 networkstatus
* votes. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_STATUS_VOTE 12
/** A connection to a directory server: download a v3 detached signatures
* object for a consensus. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_DETACHED_SIGNATURES 13
/** A connection to a directory server: download a v3 networkstatus
* consensus. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS 14
/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more directory
* authority certificates. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE 15
/** Purpose for connection at a directory server. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER 16
/** A connection to a hidden service directory server: upload a v2 rendezvous
* descriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2 17
/** A connection to a hidden service directory server: download a v2 rendezvous
* descriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2 18
/** A connection to a directory server: download a microdescriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC 19
/** A connection to a hidden service directory: upload a v3 descriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC 20
/** A connection to a hidden service directory: fetch a v3 descriptor. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC 21
/** A connection to a directory server: set after a hidden service descriptor
* is downloaded. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_HSDESC 22
#define DIR_PURPOSE_MAX_ 22
/** True iff <b>p</b> is a purpose corresponding to uploading
* data to a directory server. */
#define DIR_PURPOSE_IS_UPLOAD(p) \
((p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR || \
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_VOTE || \
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_SIGNATURES || \
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2 || \
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC)
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
/** This exit stream wants to do an ordinary connect. */
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT 1
/** This exit stream wants to do a resolve (either normal or reverse). */
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE 2
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 2
/* !!!! If any connection purpose is ever over 31, we must grow the type
* field in connection_t. */
/** Circuit state: I'm the origin, still haven't done all my handshakes. */
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING 0
/** Circuit state: Waiting to process the onionskin. */
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING 1
/** Circuit state: I'd like to deliver a create, but my n_chan is still
* connecting. */
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT 2
/** Circuit state: the circuit is open but we don't want to actually use it
* until we find out if a better guard will be available.
*/
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT 3
/** Circuit state: onionskin(s) processed, ready to send/receive cells. */
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN 4
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
/* these circuits were initiated elsewhere */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1
/** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from
* clients. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service.
*/
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ 4
/* these circuits originate at this node */
/* here's how circ client-side purposes work:
* normal circuits are C_GENERAL.
* circuits that are c_introducing are either on their way to
* becoming open, or they are open and waiting for a
* suitable rendcirc before they send the intro.
* circuits that are c_introduce_ack_wait have sent the intro,
* but haven't gotten a response yet.
* circuits that are c_establish_rend are either on their way
* to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the
* establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack.
* circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a
* rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet. if they have a
* buildstate->pending_final_cpath then they're expecting a
* cell from the service, else they're not.
* circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and
* some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack.
* circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from
* the service, and are talking to it.
*/
/** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ 6
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
* waiting for ACK/NAK. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing.
*/
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service,
* INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12
/** This circuit is used for getting hsdirs */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET 13
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_ 13
/** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 14
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 14
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ 15
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for
* introductions. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 15
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully
* established intro. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 16
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend
* point. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 17
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous
* established. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 18
/** This circuit is used for uploading hsdirs */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST 19
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_ 19
/** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 20
/** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not use it. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 21
/** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 22
/** This circuit is used for vanguards/restricted paths.
*
* This type of circuit is *only* created preemptively and never
* on-demand. When an HS operation needs to take place (e.g. connect to an
* intro point), these circuits are then cannibalized and repurposed to the
* actual needed HS purpose. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS 23
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 23
/** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect
* to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that
* originated at this node. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(p) ((p)>CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_)
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that originated
* here to serve as a client. (Hidden services don't count here.) */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(p) \
((p)> CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ && \
(p)<=CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_)
/** True iff the circuit_t <b>c</b> is actually an origin_circuit_t. */
#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c) (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN((c)->purpose))
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for an established rendezvous
* circuit. */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ESTABLISHED_REND(p) \
((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED || \
(p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)
/** True iff the circuit_t c is actually an or_circuit_t */
#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC(c) (((circuit_t *)(c))->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC)
/** True iff this circuit purpose should count towards the global
* pending rate limit (set by MaxClientCircuitsPending). We count all
* general purpose circuits, as well as the first step of client onion
* service connections (HSDir gets). */
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_COUNTS_TOWARDS_MAXPENDING(p) \
((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || \
(p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET)
/** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle
* a given stream? */
#define MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM 2
/* These RELAY_COMMAND constants define values for relay cell commands, and
* must match those defined in tor-spec.txt. */
#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN 1
#define RELAY_COMMAND_DATA 2
#define RELAY_COMMAND_END 3
#define RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED 4
#define RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME 5
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND 6
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED 7
#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE 8
#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED 9
#define RELAY_COMMAND_DROP 10
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE 11
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED 12
#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR 13
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2 14
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2 15
#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO 32
#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS 33
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 34
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 35
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 36
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2 37
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED 38
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED 39
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK 40
/* Reasons why an OR connection is closed. */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_DONE 1
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_REFUSED 2 /* connection refused */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 3
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_CONNRESET 4 /* connection reset by peer */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_TIMEOUT 5
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_NO_ROUTE 6 /* no route to host/net */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_IO_ERROR 7 /* read/write error */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_RESOURCE_LIMIT 8 /* sockets, buffers, etc */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING 9 /* PT failed or not available */
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC 10
/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a stream. See tor-spec.txt for
* documentation of these. The values must match. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_MISC 1
#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED 2
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED 3
#define END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY 4
#define END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY 5
#define END_STREAM_REASON_DONE 6
#define END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT 7
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE 8
#define END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING 9
#define END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL 10
#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 11
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET 12
#define END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 13
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY 14
#define END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY 15
/* These high-numbered end reasons are not part of the official spec,
* and are not intended to be put in relay end cells. They are here
* to be more informative when sending back socks replies to the
* application. */
/* XXXX 256 is no longer used; feel free to reuse it. */
/** We were unable to attach the connection to any circuit at all. */
/* XXXX the ways we use this one don't make a lot of sense. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH 257
/** We can't connect to any directories at all, so we killed our streams
* before they can time out. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NET_UNREACHABLE 258
/** This is a SOCKS connection, and the client used (or misused) the SOCKS
* protocol in a way we couldn't handle. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL 259
/** This is a transparent proxy connection, but we can't extract the original
* target address:port. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST 260
/** This is a connection on the NATD port, and the destination IP:Port was
* either ill-formed or out-of-range. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST 261
/** The target address is in a private network (like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1);
* you don't want to do that over a randomly chosen exit */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR 262
/** This is an HTTP tunnel connection and the client used or misused HTTP in a
* way we can't handle.
*/
#define END_STREAM_REASON_HTTPPROTOCOL 263
/** Bitwise-and this value with endreason to mask out all flags. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_MASK 511
/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
* to indicate that the reason came from an END cell. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
* to indicate that we already sent a CLOSED stream event. */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED 1024
/** Bitwise-or this with endreason to indicate that we already sent
* a socks reply, and no further reply needs to be sent from
* connection_mark_unattached_ap(). */
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED 2048
/** Reason for remapping an AP connection's address: we have a cached
* answer. */
#define REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE 1
/** Reason for remapping an AP connection's address: the exit node told us an
* answer. */
#define REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_EXIT 2
/* 'type' values to use in RESOLVED cells. Specified in tor-spec.txt. */
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME 0
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 4
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 6
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT 0xF0
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR 0xF1
/* Negative reasons are internal: we never send them in a DESTROY or TRUNCATE
* call; they only go to the controller for tracking */
/* Closing introduction point that were opened in parallel. */
#define END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT -4
/** Our post-timeout circuit time measurement period expired.
* We must give up now */
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED -3
/** We couldn't build a path for this circuit. */
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH -2
/** Catch-all "other" reason for closing origin circuits. */
#define END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN -1
/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a circuit. See tor-spec.txt
* section 5.4 for documentation of these. */
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MIN_ 0
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NONE 0
#define END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 1
#define END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL 2
#define END_CIRC_REASON_REQUESTED 3
#define END_CIRC_REASON_HIBERNATING 4
#define END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 5
#define END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED 6
#define END_CIRC_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 7
#define END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED 8
#define END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED 9
#define END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT 10
#define END_CIRC_REASON_DESTROYED 11
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE 12
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MAX_ 12
/** Bitwise-OR this with the argument to circuit_mark_for_close() or
* control_event_circuit_status() to indicate that the reason was
* passed through from a destroy or truncate cell. */
#define END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
/** Length of 'y' portion of 'y.onion' URL. */
#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 16
/** Length of 'y.onion' including '.onion' URL. */
#define REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN (16+1+5)
/** Length of a binary-encoded rendezvous service ID. */
#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN 10
/** Time period for which a v2 descriptor will be valid. */
#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY (24*60*60)
/** Time period within which two sets of v2 descriptors will be uploaded in
* parallel. */
#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS (60*60)
/** Number of non-consecutive replicas (i.e. distributed somewhere
* in the ring) for a descriptor. */
#define REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 2
/** Number of consecutive replicas for a descriptor. */
#define REND_NUMBER_OF_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 3
/** Length of v2 descriptor ID (32 base32 chars = 160 bits). */
#define REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
/** Length of the base32-encoded secret ID part of versioned hidden service
* descriptors. */
#define REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
/** Length of the base32-encoded hash of an introduction point's
* identity key. */
#define REND_INTRO_POINT_ID_LEN_BASE32 BASE32_DIGEST_LEN
/** Length of the descriptor cookie that is used for client authorization
* to hidden services. */
#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN 16
/** Length of the base64-encoded descriptor cookie that is used for
* exchanging client authorization between hidden service and client. */
#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64 22
/** Length of client identifier in encrypted introduction points for hidden
* service authorization type 'basic'. */
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN 4
/** Multiple of the number of clients to which the real number of clients
* is padded with fake clients for hidden service authorization type
* 'basic'. */
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE 16
/** Length of client entry consisting of client identifier and encrypted
* session key for hidden service authorization type 'basic'. */
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN (REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN \
+ CIPHER_KEY_LEN)
/** Maximum size of v2 hidden service descriptors. */
#define REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE (20 * 1024)
/** Legal characters for use in authorized client names for a hidden
* service. */
#define REND_LEGAL_CLIENTNAME_CHARACTERS \
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+-_"
/** Maximum length of authorized client names for a hidden service. */
#define REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN 16
/** Length of the rendezvous cookie that is used to connect circuits at the
* rendezvous point. */
#define REND_COOKIE_LEN DIGEST_LEN
/** Client authorization type that a hidden service performs. */
typedef enum rend_auth_type_t {
REND_NO_AUTH = 0,
REND_BASIC_AUTH = 1,
REND_STEALTH_AUTH = 2,
} rend_auth_type_t;
/** Client-side configuration of authorization for a hidden service. */
typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t {
uint8_t descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN+1];
rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
} rend_service_authorization_t;
/** Client- and server-side data that is used for hidden service connection
* establishment. Not all fields contain data depending on where this struct
* is used. */
typedef struct rend_data_t {
/* Hidden service protocol version of this base object. */
uint32_t version;
/** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. This
* contains binary identity digest of the directory of size DIGEST_LEN. */
smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp;
/** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */
char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
/** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */
int nr_streams;
} rend_data_t;
typedef struct rend_data_v2_t {
/* Rendezvous base data. */
rend_data_t base_;
/** Onion address (without the .onion part) that a client requests. */
char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
/** Descriptor ID for each replicas computed from the onion address. If
* the onion address is empty, this array MUST be empty. We keep them so
* we know when to purge our entry in the last hsdir request table. */
char descriptor_id[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS][DIGEST_LEN];
/** (Optional) descriptor cookie that is used by a client. */
char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
/** Authorization type for accessing a service used by a client. */
rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
/** Descriptor ID for a client request. The control port command HSFETCH
* uses this. It's set if the descriptor query should only use this
* descriptor ID. */
char desc_id_fetch[DIGEST_LEN];
/** Hash of the hidden service's PK used by a service. */
char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
} rend_data_v2_t;
/* From a base rend_data_t object <b>d</d>, return the v2 object. */
static inline
rend_data_v2_t *TO_REND_DATA_V2(const rend_data_t *d)
{
tor_assert(d);
tor_assert(d->version == 2);
return DOWNCAST(rend_data_v2_t, d);
}
/* Stub because we can't include hs_ident.h. */
struct hs_ident_edge_conn_t;
struct hs_ident_dir_conn_t;
struct hs_ident_circuit_t;
typedef struct hsdir_index_t hsdir_index_t;
/** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in
* INTRODUCE2 cells. Used only to avoid launching multiple
* simultaneous attempts to connect to the same rendezvous point. */
#define REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL (5 * 60)
/** Used to indicate which way a cell is going on a circuit. */
typedef enum {
CELL_DIRECTION_IN=1, /**< The cell is moving towards the origin. */
CELL_DIRECTION_OUT=2, /**< The cell is moving away from the origin. */
} cell_direction_t;
/** Initial value for both sides of a circuit transmission window when the
* circuit is initialized. Measured in cells. */
#define CIRCWINDOW_START 1000
#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MIN 100
#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX 1000
/** Amount to increment a circuit window when we get a circuit SENDME. */
#define CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT 100
/** Initial value on both sides of a stream transmission window when the
* stream is initialized. Measured in cells. */
#define STREAMWINDOW_START 500
#define STREAMWINDOW_START_MAX 500
/** Amount to increment a stream window when we get a stream SENDME. */
#define STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT 50
/** Maximum number of queued cells on a circuit for which we are the
* midpoint before we give up and kill it. This must be >= circwindow
* to avoid killing innocent circuits, and >= circwindow*2 to give
* leaky-pipe a chance of working someday. The ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH
* ratio controls the margin of error between emitting a warning and
* killing the circuit.
*/
#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX*2)
/** Ratio of hard (circuit kill) to soft (warning) thresholds for the
* ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS tests.
*/
#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH (1.1f)
/* Cell commands. These values are defined in tor-spec.txt. */
#define CELL_PADDING 0
#define CELL_CREATE 1
#define CELL_CREATED 2
#define CELL_RELAY 3
#define CELL_DESTROY 4
#define CELL_CREATE_FAST 5
#define CELL_CREATED_FAST 6
#define CELL_VERSIONS 7
#define CELL_NETINFO 8
#define CELL_RELAY_EARLY 9
#define CELL_CREATE2 10
#define CELL_CREATED2 11
#define CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE 12
#define CELL_VPADDING 128
#define CELL_CERTS 129
#define CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE 130
#define CELL_AUTHENTICATE 131
#define CELL_AUTHORIZE 132
#define CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ 132
/** How long to test reachability before complaining to the user. */
#define TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT (20*60)
/** Legal characters in a nickname. */
#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
/** Name to use in client TLS certificates if no nickname is given. Once
* Tor 0.1.2.x is obsolete, we can remove this. */
#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_NICKNAME "client"
/** Name chosen by routers that don't configure nicknames */
#define UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME "Unnamed"
/** Number of bytes in a SOCKS4 header. */
#define SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN 8
/*
* Relay payload:
* Relay command [1 byte]
* Recognized [2 bytes]
* Stream ID [2 bytes]
* Partial SHA-1 [4 bytes]
* Length [2 bytes]
* Relay payload [498 bytes]
*/
/** Number of bytes in a cell, minus cell header. */
#define CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE 509
/** Number of bytes in a cell transmitted over the network, in the longest
* form */
#define CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE 514
/** Maximum length of a header on a variable-length cell. */
#define VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE 7
static int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids);
static inline int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids)
{
return wide_circ_ids ? CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE : CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE - 2;
}
static int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids);
static inline int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids)
{
return wide_circ_ids ? VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE :
VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
}
static int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids);
static inline int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids)
{
return wide_circ_ids ? 4 : 2;
}
/** Number of bytes in a relay cell's header (not including general cell
* header). */
#define RELAY_HEADER_SIZE (1+2+2+4+2)
/** Largest number of bytes that can fit in a relay cell payload. */
#define RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE (CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE-RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)
/** Identifies a circuit on an or_connection */
typedef uint32_t circid_t;
/** Identifies a stream on a circuit */
typedef uint16_t streamid_t;
/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */
typedef struct channel_s channel_t;
/* channel_listener_t typedef; struct channel_listener_s is in channel.h */
typedef struct channel_listener_s channel_listener_t;
/* channel states for channel_t */
typedef enum {
/*
* Closed state - channel is inactive
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
/*
* Opening state - channel is trying to connect
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING,
/*
* Open state - channel is active and ready for use
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN,
/*
* Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific
* maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation.
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
/*
* Closing state - channel is shutting down
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED,
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING,
/*
* Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
* Permitted transitions to:
* - None
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR,
/*
* Placeholder for maximum state value
*/
CHANNEL_STATE_LAST
} channel_state_t;
/* channel listener states for channel_listener_t */
typedef enum {
/*
* Closed state - channel listener is inactive
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
*/
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
/*
* Listening state - channel listener is listening for incoming
* connections
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING,
/*
* Closing state - channel listener is shutting down
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED,
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
*/
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING,
/*
* Error state - channel listener has experienced a permanent error
*
* Permitted transitions from:
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
* Permitted transitions to:
* - None
*/
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR,
/*
* Placeholder for maximum state value
*/
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LAST
} channel_listener_state_t;
/* TLS channel stuff */
typedef struct channel_tls_s channel_tls_t;
/* circuitmux_t typedef; struct circuitmux_s is in circuitmux.h */
typedef struct circuitmux_s circuitmux_t;
typedef struct cell_t cell_t;
typedef struct var_cell_t var_cell_t;
typedef struct packed_cell_t packed_cell_t;
typedef struct cell_queue_t cell_queue_t;
typedef struct destroy_cell_t destroy_cell_t;
typedef struct destroy_cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue_t;
/** A parsed Extended ORPort message. */
typedef struct ext_or_cmd_t {
uint16_t cmd; /** Command type */
uint16_t len; /** Body length */
char body[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; /** Message body */
} ext_or_cmd_t;
/** Beginning of a RELAY cell payload. */
typedef struct {
uint8_t command; /**< The end-to-end relay command. */
uint16_t recognized; /**< Used to tell whether cell is for us. */
streamid_t stream_id; /**< Which stream is this cell associated with? */
char integrity[4]; /**< Used to tell whether cell is corrupted. */
uint16_t length; /**< How long is the payload body? */
} relay_header_t;
typedef struct socks_request_t socks_request_t;
typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t entry_port_cfg_t;
typedef struct server_port_cfg_t server_port_cfg_t;
/* Values for connection_t.magic: used to make sure that downcasts (casts from
* connection_t to foo_connection_t) are safe. */
#define BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x7C3C304Eu
#define OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x7D31FF03u
#define EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0xF0374013u
#define ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0xbb4a5703
#define DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x9988ffeeu
#define CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x8abc765du
#define LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x1a1ac741u
/** Minimum length of the random part of an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. */
#define OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN 32
/**
* @name Certificate types for CERTS cells.
*
* These values are defined by the protocol, and affect how an X509
* certificate in a CERTS cell is interpreted and used.
*
* @{ */
/** A certificate that authenticates a TLS link key. The subject key
* must match the key used in the TLS handshake; it must be signed by
* the identity key. */
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK 1
/** A self-signed identity certificate. The subject key must be a
* 1024-bit RSA key. */
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 2
/** A certificate that authenticates a key used in an AUTHENTICATE cell
* in the v3 handshake. The subject key must be a 1024-bit RSA key; it
* must be signed by the identity key */
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 3
/* DOCDOC */
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT 7
/**@}*/
/** The first supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
* a bunch of structures signed with an RSA1024 key. The signed
* structures include a HMAC using negotiated TLS secrets, and a digest
* of all cells sent or received before the AUTHENTICATE cell (including
* the random server-generated AUTH_CHALLENGE cell).
*/
#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, but instead of using the
* negotiated TLS secrets, uses exported keying material from the TLS
* session as described in RFC 5705.
*
* Not used by today's tors, since everything that supports this
* also supports ED25519_SHA256_5705, which is better.
**/
#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705 2
/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705, but uses an Ed25519 identity key to
* authenticate. */
#define AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 3
/*
* NOTE: authchallenge_type_is_better() relies on these AUTHTYPE codes
* being sorted in order of preference. If we someday add one with
* a higher numerical value that we don't like as much, we should revise
* authchallenge_type_is_better().
*/
/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client and
* server can generate independently (when using RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET). It
* contains everything except the client's timestamp, the client's randomly
* generated nonce, and the signature. */
#define V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN (8+(32*6))
/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client
* signs. */
#define V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN (V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN + 8 + 16)
typedef struct or_handshake_certs_t or_handshake_certs_t;
typedef struct or_handshake_state_t or_handshake_state_t;
/** Length of Extended ORPort connection identifier. */
#define EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN DIGEST_LEN /* 20 */
/*
* OR_CONN_HIGHWATER and OR_CONN_LOWWATER moved from connection_or.c so
* channeltls.c can see them too.
*/
/** When adding cells to an OR connection's outbuf, keep adding until the
* outbuf is at least this long, or we run out of cells. */
#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER (32*1024)
/** Add cells to an OR connection's outbuf whenever the outbuf's data length
* drops below this size. */
#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER (16*1024)
typedef struct connection_t connection_t;
typedef struct control_connection_t control_connection_t;
typedef struct dir_connection_t dir_connection_t;
typedef struct edge_connection_t edge_connection_t;
typedef struct entry_connection_t entry_connection_t;
typedef struct listener_connection_t listener_connection_t;
typedef struct or_connection_t or_connection_t;
/** Cast a connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
#define TO_CONN(c) (&(((c)->base_)))
/** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
#define ENTRY_TO_CONN(c) (TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c)))
/** What action type does an address policy indicate: accept or reject? */
typedef enum {
ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT=1,
ADDR_POLICY_REJECT=2,
} addr_policy_action_t;
#define addr_policy_action_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addr_policy_action_t)
/** A reference-counted address policy rule. */
typedef struct addr_policy_t {
int refcnt; /**< Reference count */
/** What to do when the policy matches.*/
addr_policy_action_bitfield_t policy_type:2;
unsigned int is_private:1; /**< True iff this is the pseudo-address,
* "private". */
unsigned int is_canonical:1; /**< True iff this policy is the canonical
* copy (stored in a hash table to avoid
* duplication of common policies) */
maskbits_t maskbits; /**< Accept/reject all addresses <b>a</b> such that the
* first <b>maskbits</b> bits of <b>a</b> match
* <b>addr</b>. */
/** Base address to accept or reject.
*
* Note that wildcards are treated
* differntly depending on address family. An AF_UNSPEC address means
* "All addresses, IPv4 or IPv6." An AF_INET address with maskbits==0 means
* "All IPv4 addresses" and an AF_INET6 address with maskbits == 0 means
* "All IPv6 addresses".
**/
tor_addr_t addr;
uint16_t prt_min; /**< Lowest port number to accept/reject. */
uint16_t prt_max; /**< Highest port number to accept/reject. */
} addr_policy_t;
typedef struct cached_dir_t cached_dir_t;
/** Enum used to remember where a signed_descriptor_t is stored and how to
* manage the memory for signed_descriptor_body. */
typedef enum {
/** The descriptor isn't stored on disk at all: the copy in memory is
* canonical; the saved_offset field is meaningless. */
SAVED_NOWHERE=0,
/** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers file: the
* signed_descriptor_body is meaningless; the signed_descriptor_len and
* saved_offset are used to index into the mmaped cache file. */
SAVED_IN_CACHE,
/** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers.new file: the
* signed_descriptor_body and saved_offset fields are both set. */
/* FFFF (We could also mmap the file and grow the mmap as needed, or
* lazy-load the descriptor text by using seek and read. We don't, for
* now.)
*/
SAVED_IN_JOURNAL
} saved_location_t;
#define saved_location_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(saved_location_t)
/** Enumeration: what directory object is being downloaded?
* This determines which schedule is selected to perform the download. */
typedef enum {
DL_SCHED_GENERIC = 0,
DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS = 1,
DL_SCHED_BRIDGE = 2,
} download_schedule_t;
#define download_schedule_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(download_schedule_t)
/** Enumeration: is the download schedule for downloading from an authority,
* or from any available directory mirror?
* During bootstrap, "any" means a fallback (or an authority, if there
* are no fallbacks).
* When we have a valid consensus, "any" means any directory server. */
typedef enum {
DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER = 0,
DL_WANT_AUTHORITY = 1,
} download_want_authority_t;
#define download_want_authority_bitfield_t \
ENUM_BF(download_want_authority_t)
/** Enumeration: do we want to increment the schedule position each time a
* connection is attempted (these attempts can be concurrent), or do we want
* to increment the schedule position after a connection fails? */
typedef enum {
DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_FAILURE = 0,
DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_ATTEMPT = 1,
} download_schedule_increment_t;
#define download_schedule_increment_bitfield_t \
ENUM_BF(download_schedule_increment_t)
typedef struct download_status_t download_status_t;
/** If n_download_failures is this high, the download can never happen. */
#define IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD 255
/** The max size we expect router descriptor annotations we create to
* be. We'll accept larger ones if we see them on disk, but we won't
* create any that are larger than this. */
#define ROUTER_ANNOTATION_BUF_LEN 256
typedef struct signed_descriptor_t signed_descriptor_t;
/** A signed integer representing a country code. */
typedef int16_t country_t;
/** Flags used to summarize the declared protocol versions of a relay,
* so we don't need to parse them again and again. */
typedef struct protover_summary_flags_t {
/** True iff we have a proto line for this router, or a versions line
* from which we could infer the protocols. */
unsigned int protocols_known:1;
/** True iff this router has a version or protocol list that allows it to
* accept EXTEND2 cells. This requires Relay=2. */
unsigned int supports_extend2_cells:1;
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to negotiate
* ed25519 identity keys on a link handshake with us. This
* requires LinkAuth=3. */
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_compat:1;
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to negotiate
* ed25519 identity keys on a link handshake, at all. This requires some
* LinkAuth=X for X >= 3. */
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any:1;
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an
* introduction point supporting ed25519 authentication key which is part of
* the v3 protocol detailed in proposal 224. This requires HSIntro=4. */
unsigned int supports_ed25519_hs_intro : 1;
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden
* service directory supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224. This
* requires HSDir=2. */
unsigned int supports_v3_hsdir : 1;
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden
* service rendezvous point supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224.
* This requires HSRend=2. */
unsigned int supports_v3_rendezvous_point: 1;
} protover_summary_flags_t;
typedef struct routerinfo_t routerinfo_t;
typedef struct extrainfo_t extrainfo_t;
typedef struct routerstatus_t routerstatus_t;
/** A single entry in a parsed policy summary, describing a range of ports. */
typedef struct short_policy_entry_t {
uint16_t min_port, max_port;
} short_policy_entry_t;
/** A short_poliy_t is the parsed version of a policy summary. */
typedef struct short_policy_t {
/** True if the members of 'entries' are port ranges to accept; false if
* they are port ranges to reject */
unsigned int is_accept : 1;
/** The actual number of values in 'entries'. */
unsigned int n_entries : 31;
/** An array of 0 or more short_policy_entry_t values, each describing a
* range of ports that this policy accepts or rejects (depending on the
* value of is_accept).
*/
short_policy_entry_t entries[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
} short_policy_t;
typedef struct microdesc_t microdesc_t;
typedef struct node_t node_t;
typedef struct vote_microdesc_hash_t vote_microdesc_hash_t;
typedef struct vote_routerstatus_t vote_routerstatus_t;
typedef struct document_signature_t document_signature_t;
typedef struct networkstatus_voter_info_t networkstatus_voter_info_t;
typedef struct networkstatus_sr_info_t networkstatus_sr_info_t;
/** Enumerates the possible seriousness values of a networkstatus document. */
typedef enum {
NS_TYPE_VOTE,
NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS,
NS_TYPE_OPINION,
} networkstatus_type_t;
/** Enumerates recognized flavors of a consensus networkstatus document. All
* flavors of a consensus are generated from the same set of votes, but they
* present different types information to different versions of Tor. */
typedef enum {
FLAV_NS = 0,
FLAV_MICRODESC = 1,
} consensus_flavor_t;
/** How many different consensus flavors are there? */
#define N_CONSENSUS_FLAVORS ((int)(FLAV_MICRODESC)+1)
typedef struct networkstatus_t networkstatus_t;
typedef struct ns_detached_signatures_t ns_detached_signatures_t;
/** Allowable types of desc_store_t. */
typedef enum store_type_t {
ROUTER_STORE = 0,
EXTRAINFO_STORE = 1
} store_type_t;
typedef struct desc_store_t desc_store_t;
typedef struct routerlist_t routerlist_t;
typedef struct extend_info_t extend_info_t;
typedef struct authority_cert_t authority_cert_t;
/** Bitfield enum type listing types of information that directory authorities
* can be authoritative about, and that directory caches may or may not cache.
*
* Note that the granularity here is based on authority granularity and on
* cache capabilities. Thus, one particular bit may correspond in practice to
* a few types of directory info, so long as every authority that pronounces
* officially about one of the types prounounces officially about all of them,
* and so long as every cache that caches one of them caches all of them.
*/
typedef enum {
NO_DIRINFO = 0,
/** Serves/signs v3 directory information: votes, consensuses, certs */
V3_DIRINFO = 1 << 2,
/** Serves bridge descriptors. */
BRIDGE_DIRINFO = 1 << 4,
/** Serves extrainfo documents. */
EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO=1 << 5,
/** Serves microdescriptors. */
MICRODESC_DIRINFO=1 << 6,
} dirinfo_type_t;
#define ALL_DIRINFO ((dirinfo_type_t)((1<<7)-1))
#define CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC 0x70127012u
struct fast_handshake_state_t;
struct ntor_handshake_state_t;
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST 0x0001
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR 0x0002
#define MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE 0x0002
typedef struct {
uint16_t tag;
union {
struct fast_handshake_state_t *fast;
crypto_dh_t *tap;
struct ntor_handshake_state_t *ntor;
} u;
} onion_handshake_state_t;
typedef struct relay_crypto_t relay_crypto_t;
typedef struct crypt_path_t crypt_path_t;
typedef struct crypt_path_reference_t crypt_path_reference_t;
#define CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN (20*2+16*2)
#define DH_KEY_LEN DH_BYTES
typedef struct cpath_build_state_t cpath_build_state_t;
/** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */
#define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x35315243u
/** "magic" value for an or_circuit_t */
#define OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x98ABC04Fu
/** "magic" value for a circuit that would have been freed by circuit_free,
* but which we're keeping around until a cpuworker reply arrives. See
* circuit_free() for more documentation. */
#define DEAD_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0xdeadc14c
struct create_cell_t;
/** Entry in the cell stats list of a circuit; used only if CELL_STATS
* events are enabled. */
typedef struct testing_cell_stats_entry_t {
uint8_t command; /**< cell command number. */
/** Waiting time in centiseconds if this event is for a removed cell,
* or 0 if this event is for adding a cell to the queue. 22 bits can
* store more than 11 hours, enough to assume that a circuit with this
* delay would long have been closed. */
unsigned int waiting_time:22;
unsigned int removed:1; /**< 0 for added to, 1 for removed from queue. */
unsigned int exitward:1; /**< 0 for app-ward, 1 for exit-ward. */
} testing_cell_stats_entry_t;
typedef struct circuit_t circuit_t;
typedef struct origin_circuit_t origin_circuit_t;
typedef struct or_circuit_t or_circuit_t;
/** Largest number of relay_early cells that we can send on a given
* circuit. */
#define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8
/**
* Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based
* on the path bias accounting state for a circuit.
*
* NOTE: These state values are enumerated in the order for which we
* expect circuits to transition through them. If you add states,
* you need to preserve this overall ordering. The various pathbias
* state transition and accounting functions (pathbias_mark_* and
* pathbias_count_*) contain ordinal comparisons to enforce proper
* state transitions for corrections.
*
* This state machine and the associated logic was created to prevent
* miscounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See also tickets
* #6475 and #7802.
*/
typedef enum {
/** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop
* or been counted by the path bias code. */
PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0,
/** This circuit has completed one/two hops, and has been counted by
* the path bias logic. */
PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED = 1,
/** This circuit has been completely built */
PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED = 2,
/** Did we try to attach any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions to
* this circuit?
*
* Note: If we ever implement end-to-end stream timing through test
* stream probes (#5707), we must *not* set this for those probes
* (or any other automatic streams) because the adversary could
* just tag at a later point.
*/
PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED = 3,
/** Did any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions actually succeed on
* this circuit?
*
* If any streams detatch/fail from this circuit, the code transitions
* the circuit back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED to ensure we probe. See
* pathbias_mark_use_rollback() for that.
*/
PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 4,
/**
* This is a special state to indicate that we got a corrupted
* relay cell on a circuit and we don't intend to probe it.
*/
PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED = 5,
/**
* This is a special state to indicate that we already counted
* the circuit. Used to guard against potential state machine
* violations.
*/
PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED = 6,
} path_state_t;
#define path_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(path_state_t)
#if REND_COOKIE_LEN != DIGEST_LEN
#error "The REND_TOKEN_LEN macro assumes REND_COOKIE_LEN == DIGEST_LEN"
#endif
#define REND_TOKEN_LEN DIGEST_LEN
/** Convert a circuit subtype to a circuit_t. */
#define TO_CIRCUIT(x) (&((x)->base_))
/* limits for TCP send and recv buffer size used for constrained sockets */
#define MIN_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 2048
#define MAX_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 262144 /* 256k */
/** @name Isolation flags
Ways to isolate client streams
@{
*/
/** Isolate based on destination port */
#define ISO_DESTPORT (1u<<0)
/** Isolate based on destination address */
#define ISO_DESTADDR (1u<<1)
/** Isolate based on SOCKS authentication */
#define ISO_SOCKSAUTH (1u<<2)
/** Isolate based on client protocol choice */
#define ISO_CLIENTPROTO (1u<<3)
/** Isolate based on client address */
#define ISO_CLIENTADDR (1u<<4)
/** Isolate based on session group (always on). */
#define ISO_SESSIONGRP (1u<<5)
/** Isolate based on newnym epoch (always on). */
#define ISO_NYM_EPOCH (1u<<6)
/** Isolate all streams (Internal only). */
#define ISO_STREAM (1u<<7)
/**@}*/
/** Default isolation level for ports. */
#define ISO_DEFAULT (ISO_CLIENTADDR|ISO_SOCKSAUTH|ISO_SESSIONGRP|ISO_NYM_EPOCH)
/** Indicates that we haven't yet set a session group on a port_cfg_t. */
#define SESSION_GROUP_UNSET -1
/** Session group reserved for directory connections */
#define SESSION_GROUP_DIRCONN -2
/** Session group reserved for resolve requests launched by a controller */
#define SESSION_GROUP_CONTROL_RESOLVE -3
/** First automatically allocated session group number */
#define SESSION_GROUP_FIRST_AUTO -4
typedef struct port_cfg_t port_cfg_t;
typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t;
/** A magic value for the (Socks|OR|...)Port options below, telling Tor
* to pick its own port. */
#define CFG_AUTO_PORT 0xc4005e
/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types:
* Exit-only, OR-only, or both */
typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR,
OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR,
OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t;
/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */
typedef struct {
uint32_t magic_;
/** What should the tor process actually do? */
enum {
CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD,
CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG,
CMD_KEYGEN,
CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION,
} command;
char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */
config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines
* for logs */
int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */
int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which
* each log message occurs? */
int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file
before we start writing? */
char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */
char *AndroidIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for Android logging. */
char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */
char *DataDirectory_option; /**< Where to store long-term data, as
* configured by the user. */
char *DataDirectory; /**< Where to store long-term data, as modified. */
int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */
char *KeyDirectory_option; /**< Where to store keys, as
* configured by the user. */
char *KeyDirectory; /**< Where to store keys data, as modified. */
int KeyDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the KeyDirectory g+r? */
char *CacheDirectory_option; /**< Where to store cached data, as
* configured by the user. */
char *CacheDirectory; /**< Where to store cached data, as modified. */
int CacheDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CacheDirectory g+r? */
char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */
char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */
char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */
routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
* consider as exits. */
routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
* consider as entry points. */
int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes
* are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes,
* do we just fail instead? */
routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs
* not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes
* above. */
routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
* country codes and IP address patterns of
* ORs not to consider as exits. */
/** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */
routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our
* process for all current and future memory. */
config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */
int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private
* addresses, and our own published addresses?
*/
int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local
* interface addresses?
* Includes OutboundBindAddresses and
* configured ports. */
int ReducedExitPolicy; /**<Should we use the Reduced Exit Policy? */
config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */
config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */
/** Local address to bind outbound sockets */
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress;
/** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR;
/** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit;
/** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines.
* [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6
*/
tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2];
/** Directory server only: which versions of
* Tor should we tell users to run? */
config_line_t *RecommendedVersions;
config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions;
config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions;
config_line_t *RecommendedPackages;
/** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */
int DirAllowPrivateAddresses;
/** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */
int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses;
char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */
config_line_t *ORPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
/** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */
config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines;
/** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
config_line_t *SocksPort_lines;
/** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */
config_line_t *TransPort_lines;
char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy
* implementation are we using? */
/** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */
enum {
TPT_DEFAULT,
TPT_PF_DIVERT,
TPT_IPFW,
TPT_TPROXY,
} TransProxyType_parsed;
config_line_t *NATDPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for transparent natd
* connections. */
/** Ports to listen on for HTTP Tunnel connections. */
config_line_t *HTTPTunnelPort_lines;
config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control
* connections. */
config_line_t *ControlSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on
* for control connections. */
int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */
int UnixSocksGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS Unix sockets g+rw? */
/** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */
config_line_t *DirPort_lines;
config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */
/* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be
* MaxMemInQueues. */
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw;
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated
* for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */
/** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold;
/** @name port booleans
*
* Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a
* non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type
* configured in one of the _lines options above.
* For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured.
* If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use:
* SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set ||
* HTTPTunnelPort_set
* rather than SocksPort_set.
*
* @{
*/
unsigned int ORPort_set : 1;
unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1;
unsigned int TransPort_set : 1;
unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1;
unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1;
unsigned int DirPort_set : 1;
unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1;
unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1;
unsigned int HTTPTunnelPort_set : 1;
/**@}*/
int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */
int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */
int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
* for version 3 directories? */
int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative
* directory that's willing to recommend
* versions? */
int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
* that aggregates bridge descriptors? */
/** If set on a bridge relay, it will include this value on a new
* "bridge-distribution-request" line in its bridge descriptor. */
char *BridgeDistribution;
/** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport
* for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */
char *BridgePassword;
/** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http
* authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */
char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_;
int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */
config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */
config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
transport plugins. */
config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
transport plugins. */
/** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */
config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr;
/** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */
config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions;
int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make
* this explicit so we can change how we behave in the
* future. */
/** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new
* descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */
int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk?
* Not used yet. */
int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */
int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections
open shorter and pad them less against
connection-level traffic analysis? */
/** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client
* and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still
* pad to the server regardless of server support. */
int ConnectionPadding;
/** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are
* "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */
smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor;
/** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */
dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_;
/** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */
int PublishHidServDescriptors;
int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */
int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */
int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden
* service directories after what time? */
int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */
int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent
* through a Tor circuit? */
/** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden
* services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related
* circuits.) */
int Tor2webMode;
/** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */
routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints;
/** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS
* circuits. */
routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes;
/** A routerset that should be used when picking third-hop nodes for HS
* circuits. */
routerset_t *HSLayer3Nodes;
/** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct)
* circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and
* rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using
* 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.)
* This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by
* this tor instance a Single Onion Service.
* HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be
* set to 1.
* Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or
* rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly.
*/
int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode;
/* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor
* instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables
* non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol.
* Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option
* directly.
*/
int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode;
int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */
int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */
int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we
* have this many. */
int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket
* exhaustion. */
int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */
int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */
smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows
* (strings). */
config_line_t *ReachableAddresses; /**< IP:ports our firewall allows. */
config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */
config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */
int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */
uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */
/** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are
* relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do
* what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says
* nothing). */
int RefuseUnknownExits;
/** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient
* uptime. */
smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts;
/** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and
* unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the
* user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an
* observer somewhere on the Internet. */
smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts;
/** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option
* controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status
* event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */
smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts;
/** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */
smartlist_t *TrackHostExits;
int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an
* addressmap */
config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */
int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a
* hostname ending with one of the suffixes in
* <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a
* virtual address. */
/** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value
* "." means "match everything." */
smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes;
int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service
* descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */
int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep
* connections alive? */
int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait
* unattached before we fail it? */
int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value
* for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout
* history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled()
* rather than checking this value directly. */
int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at
* least this many seconds ago. Used until
* adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */
int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at
least this long after last activity */
int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits
* and try a new circuit if the stream has been
* waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use
* our default internal timeout schedule. */
int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */
int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building
* a new one? */
int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than
this interval ago. */
uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing
* to use in a second? */
uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
* to use in a second? */
uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
* tell other nodes we have? */
uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
* willing to use for all relayed conns? */
uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
* use in a second for all relayed conns? */
uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */
uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */
int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */
config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines
* for rendezvous services. */
config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for client-side
* authorizations for hidden services */
char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */
int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds
* have passed. */
int MainloopStats; /**< Log main loop statistics as part of the
* heartbeat messages. */
char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */
tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */
uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */
char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */
tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */
uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */
char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */
tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */
tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */
uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */
char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
/** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities.
* If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time,
* use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */
config_line_t *DirAuthorities;
/** List of fallback directory servers */
config_line_t *FallbackDir;
/** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */
int UseDefaultFallbackDirs;
/** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them
* along with fallbackdirs */
double DirAuthorityFallbackRate;
/** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and
* not the default ones. */
config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority;
/** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */
config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority;
config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */
config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR, normalized */
config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for
* node families */
smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets; /**< List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */
config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
* mark as bad exits. */
config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
* reject. */
config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
* never mark as valid. */
/** @name AuthDir...CC
*
* Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to
* reject entirely.
*
* @{
*/
smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs;
smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs;
smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs;
/**@}*/
int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits,
* and vote for all other exits as good. */
int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this
* number of servers per IP address. */
int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */
int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */
/** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising
* this amount of capacity or more. */
uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee;
/** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient
* to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */
uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee;
char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when
* does it start? */
uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting
* interval before hibernation? 0 for "never
* hibernate." */
/** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached?
* "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax
* "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax
* "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax
* "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */
char *AccountingRule_option;
enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule;
/** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */
config_line_t *HashedControlPassword;
/** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */
config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword;
int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for
* the control system? */
char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort
* authentication cookie. */
char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended
* ORPort authentication cookie. */
int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */
int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the
* ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */
int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to
* circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller
* to cope? (1) */
int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively
* make circuits in the background (0),
* or not (1)? */
/** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor
* instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */
char *OwningControllerProcess;
/** FD specifier for a controller that owns this Tor instance. */
int OwningControllerFD;
int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how
* long do we wait before exiting? */
char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */
/* Derived from SafeLogging */
enum {
SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE
} SafeLogging_;
int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */
int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application
* connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */
int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor
* protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */
int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly
* log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */
int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware
* acceleration where available? */
/** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */
int TokenBucketRefillInterval;
char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */
char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */
/** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number
* of fixed nodes? */
int UseEntryGuards_option;
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
* UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
* Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
* UseEntryGuards_option. */
int UseEntryGuards;
int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */
/** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the
* consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter
* decide. */
int UseGuardFraction;
int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish?
* If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */
int NumPrimaryGuards; /**< How many primary guards do we want? */
int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */
/** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which
* means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */
int FetchDirInfoEarly;
/** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */
int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly;
int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via
* tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default);
* If 0, disabled. */
char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
* MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */
char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
* MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */
int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit
* addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in
* the local domains. */
int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure
* hijacking. */
int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent
* DNS poisoning attacks. */
char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal
* resolver from the file here rather than from
* /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */
char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html
disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show
that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server
will know this without any specialized knowledge. */
int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to
disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */
/** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing
* or broken. */
int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig;
/** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get
* rate-limited. */
int CountPrivateBandwidth;
smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses; /**< A list of addresses that definitely
* should be resolvable. Used for
* testing our DNS server. */
int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the
* same network zone in the same circuit. */
int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames
* with weird characters. */
/** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */
int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames;
/** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them,
* if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
int DownloadExtraInfo;
/** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients
* requesting network statuses from us as directory. */
int DirReqStatistics_option;
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
* DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */
int DirReqStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */
int ExitPortStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */
int ConnDirectionStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */
int CellStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */
int PaddingStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */
int EntryStatistics;
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service
* directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */
int HiddenServiceStatistics_option;
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
* HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server,
* else no. */
int HiddenServiceStatistics;
/** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */
int ExtraInfoStatistics;
/** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
* to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
* Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
/** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses
* over randomly chosen exits. */
int ClientRejectInternalAddresses;
/** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid
* connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */
int ClientUseIPv4;
/** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid
* connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections.
* Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value
* directly. */
int ClientUseIPv6;
/** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node
* connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients
* prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value
* directly. */
int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort;
/** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct
* directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other
* clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of
* accessing this value directly. */
int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort;
/** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */
int V3AuthVotingInterval;
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */
int V3AuthVoteDelay;
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */
int V3AuthDistDelay;
/** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */
int V3AuthNIntervalsValid;
/** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key
* migration purposes? */
int V3AuthUseLegacyKey;
/** Location of bandwidth measurement file */
char *V3BandwidthsFile;
/** Location of guardfraction file */
char *GuardfractionFile;
/** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus
* consensus vote on the 'params' line. */
char *ConsensusParams;
/** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see
* before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */
int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
/** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh.
* Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval;
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes.
* Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay;
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial
* signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/
int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay;
/** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus
voting. Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset;
/** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it
* does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only
* altered on testing networks. */
int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability;
/** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will
* probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing
* networks. */
int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime;
/** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only
* altered on testing networks. */
int TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only
* altered on testing networks. */
int TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered
* on testing networks. */
int TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered
* on testing networks. */
int TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
* if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
* live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
* directory mirrors.
*
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
* directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
* usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
* list of fallback directory mirrors.
*
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
int ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
* if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
* live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
* from a list of fallback directory mirrors.
*
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only
* altered on testing networks. */
int TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay;
/** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors when they
* have no running bridges. Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay;
/** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they
* batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has
* passed. Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest;
/** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring
* it? Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall;
/** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying
* to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or
* error out? Only altered on testing networks. */
int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries;
/** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a
* couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values
* of certain configuration options. */
int TestingTorNetwork;
/** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */
uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold;
/** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */
uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold;
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit
* regardless of exit policy. */
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit;
int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict;
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard
* regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard;
int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict;
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir
* regardless of uptime and DirPort. */
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir;
int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict;
/** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingEnableConnBwEvent;
/** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */
int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent;
/** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country
* count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help
* the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */
int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry;
/** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */
char *GeoIPFile;
char *GeoIPv6File;
/** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular
* country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in
* ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */
int GeoIPExcludeUnknown;
/** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want
* to make this false. */
int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP;
/* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection.
*
* If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection,
* we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest.
* Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent
* 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as
* much.
*
* If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm.
*
* If this value is negative, we're using the default approach
* according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus.
*/
double CircuitPriorityHalflife;
/** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set.
* This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that
* the defaults have changed. */
int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_;
/** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't.
* If -1, Tor decides. */
int UseMicrodescriptors;
/** File where we should write the ControlPort. */
char *ControlPortWriteToFile;
/** Should that file be group-readable? */
int ControlPortFileGroupReadable;
#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024
/** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at
* once. */
int MaxClientCircuitsPending;
/** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we
* never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */
int OptimisticData;
/** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on
* control ports. */
int DisableNetwork;
/**
* Parameters for path-bias detection.
* @{
* These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
* experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
* misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
* fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built.
*
* The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to
* build through a guard before we make these checks. The
* PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options
* control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we
* won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits
* succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that
* guard.
*
* When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a
* guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so
* that new observations don't get swamped by old ones.
*
* By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
* Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
* If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
* .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
*/
int PathBiasCircThreshold;
double PathBiasNoticeRate;
double PathBiasWarnRate;
double PathBiasExtremeRate;
int PathBiasDropGuards;
int PathBiasScaleThreshold;
/** @} */
/**
* Parameters for path-bias use detection
* @{
* Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
* of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm.
*
* Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
* building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
* only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not
* counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
* successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
* well-formed responses to RELAY cells.
*
* By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
* Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
* If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
* .60, and 100, respectively.
*/
int PathBiasUseThreshold;
double PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
double PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
/** @} */
int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */
/** Fraction: */
double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits;
/** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we
* should guess a suitable value. */
int SSLKeyLifetime;
/** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */
int GuardLifetime;
/** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use
* the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy
* is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user."
*
* XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
int ExitRelay;
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */
int SigningKeyLifetime;
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */
int TestingAuthKeyLifetime;
/** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
int TestingSigningKeySlop;
/** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
int TestingLinkKeySlop;
/** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
int TestingAuthKeySlop;
/** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master
* ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */
int OfflineMasterKey;
enum {
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0,
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON,
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF
} keygen_force_passphrase;
int use_keygen_passphrase_fd;
int keygen_passphrase_fd;
int change_key_passphrase;
char *master_key_fname;
/** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */
int KeepBindCapabilities;
/** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the
* lifetime of this Tor process.
*/
uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog;
/** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only
* relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't
* participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the
* vote indicating participation. */
int AuthDirSharedRandomness;
/** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */
int DisableOOSCheck;
/** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
* If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
int ExtendByEd25519ID;
/** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
* do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
/* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
/** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */
int IncludeUsed;
/** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old
* consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0,
* use the default. */
int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs;
/** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program.
*/
int NoExec;
/** Have the KIST scheduler run every X milliseconds. If less than zero, do
* not use the KIST scheduler but use the old vanilla scheduler instead. If
* zero, do what the consensus says and fall back to using KIST as if this is
* set to "10 msec" if the consensus doesn't say anything. */
int KISTSchedRunInterval;
/** A multiplier for the KIST per-socket limit calculation. */
double KISTSockBufSizeFactor;
/** The list of scheduler type string ordered by priority that is first one
* has to be tried first. Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla */
smartlist_t *Schedulers;
/* An ordered list of scheduler_types mapped from Schedulers. */
smartlist_t *SchedulerTypes_;
/** List of files that were opened by %include in torrc and torrc-defaults */
smartlist_t *FilesOpenedByIncludes;
/** If true, Tor shouldn't install any posix signal handlers, since it is
* running embedded inside another process.
*/
int DisableSignalHandlers;
/** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */
int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled;
/** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any
* defense is used. */
int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections;
/** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */
int DoSCircuitCreationRate;
/** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is
* detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */
int DoSCircuitCreationBurst;
/** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used
* against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */
int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType;
/** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious
* address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address
* which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */
int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod;
/** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */
int DoSConnectionEnabled;
/** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */
int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount;
/** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be
* used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */
int DoSConnectionDefenseType;
/** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */
int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous;
} or_options_t;
#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level())
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */
typedef struct {
uint32_t magic_;
/** The time at which we next plan to write the state to the disk. Equal to
* TIME_MAX if there are no savable changes, 0 if there are changes that
* should be saved right away. */
time_t next_write;
/** When was the state last written to disk? */
time_t LastWritten;
/** Fields for accounting bandwidth use. */
time_t AccountingIntervalStart;
uint64_t AccountingBytesReadInInterval;
uint64_t AccountingBytesWrittenInInterval;
int AccountingSecondsActive;
int AccountingSecondsToReachSoftLimit;
time_t AccountingSoftLimitHitAt;
uint64_t AccountingBytesAtSoftLimit;
uint64_t AccountingExpectedUsage;
/** A list of Entry Guard-related configuration lines. (pre-prop271) */
config_line_t *EntryGuards;
/** A list of guard-related configuration lines. (post-prop271) */
config_line_t *Guard;
config_line_t *TransportProxies;
/** Cached revision counters for active hidden services on this host */
config_line_t *HidServRevCounter;
/** These fields hold information on the history of bandwidth usage for
* servers. The "Ends" fields hold the time when we last updated the
* bandwidth usage. The "Interval" fields hold the granularity, in seconds,
* of the entries of Values. The "Values" lists hold decimal string
* representations of the number of bytes read or written in each
* interval. The "Maxima" list holds decimal strings describing the highest
* rate achieved during the interval.
*/
time_t BWHistoryReadEnds;
int BWHistoryReadInterval;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadValues;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadMaxima;
time_t BWHistoryWriteEnds;
int BWHistoryWriteInterval;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteValues;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteMaxima;
time_t BWHistoryDirReadEnds;
int BWHistoryDirReadInterval;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadValues;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadMaxima;
time_t BWHistoryDirWriteEnds;
int BWHistoryDirWriteInterval;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteValues;
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteMaxima;
/** Build time histogram */
config_line_t * BuildtimeHistogram;
int TotalBuildTimes;
int CircuitBuildAbandonedCount;
/** What version of Tor wrote this state file? */
char *TorVersion;
/** Holds any unrecognized values we found in the state file, in the order
* in which we found them. */
config_line_t *ExtraLines;
/** When did we last rotate our onion key? "0" for 'no idea'. */
time_t LastRotatedOnionKey;
} or_state_t;
#define MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN 1024
#define MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN 256
#define SOCKS_NO_AUTH 0x00
#define SOCKS_USER_PASS 0x02
/** Please open a TCP connection to this addr:port. */
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT 0x01
/** Please turn this FQDN into an IP address, privately. */
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE 0xF0
/** Please turn this IP address into an FQDN, privately. */
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR 0xF1
/* || 0 is for -Wparentheses-equality (-Wall?) appeasement under clang */
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(c) (((c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) || 0)
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(c) ((c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE || \
(c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR)
/********************************* circuitbuild.c **********************/
/** How many hops does a general-purpose circuit have by default? */
#define DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN 3
/* Circuit Build Timeout "public" structures. */
/** Precision multiplier for the Bw weights */
#define BW_WEIGHT_SCALE 10000
#define BW_MIN_WEIGHT_SCALE 1
#define BW_MAX_WEIGHT_SCALE INT32_MAX
/** Total size of the circuit timeout history to accumulate.
* 1000 is approx 2.5 days worth of continual-use circuits. */
#define CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 1000
/** Width of the histogram bins in milliseconds */
#define CBT_BIN_WIDTH ((build_time_t)50)
/** Number of modes to use in the weighted-avg computation of Xm */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_NUM_XM_MODES 3
#define CBT_MIN_NUM_XM_MODES 1
#define CBT_MAX_NUM_XM_MODES 20
/** A build_time_t is milliseconds */
typedef uint32_t build_time_t;
/**
* CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED is our flag value to represent a force-closed
* circuit (Aka a 'right-censored' pareto value).
*/
#define CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED ((build_time_t)(INT32_MAX-1))
#define CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX ((build_time_t)(INT32_MAX))
/** Save state every 10 circuits */
#define CBT_SAVE_STATE_EVERY 10
/* Circuit build times consensus parameters */
/**
* How long to wait before actually closing circuits that take too long to
* build in terms of CDF quantile.
*/
#define CBT_DEFAULT_CLOSE_QUANTILE 95
#define CBT_MIN_CLOSE_QUANTILE CBT_MIN_QUANTILE_CUTOFF
#define CBT_MAX_CLOSE_QUANTILE CBT_MAX_QUANTILE_CUTOFF
/**
* How many circuits count as recent when considering if the
* connection has gone gimpy or changed.
*/
#define CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS 20
#define CBT_MIN_RECENT_CIRCUITS 3
#define CBT_MAX_RECENT_CIRCUITS 1000
/**
* Maximum count of timeouts that finish the first hop in the past
* RECENT_CIRCUITS before calculating a new timeout.
*
* This tells us whether to abandon timeout history and set
* the timeout back to whatever circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()
* gives us.
*/
#define CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT (CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS*9/10)
#define CBT_MIN_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT 3
#define CBT_MAX_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT 10000
/** Minimum circuits before estimating a timeout */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 100
#define CBT_MIN_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 1
#define CBT_MAX_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 10000
/** Cutoff percentile on the CDF for our timeout estimation. */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 80
#define CBT_MIN_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 10
#define CBT_MAX_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 99
double circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void);
/** How often in seconds should we build a test circuit */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TEST_FREQUENCY 10
#define CBT_MIN_TEST_FREQUENCY 1
#define CBT_MAX_TEST_FREQUENCY INT32_MAX
/** Lowest allowable value for CircuitBuildTimeout in milliseconds */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE (1500)
#define CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE 500
#define CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE INT32_MAX
/** Initial circuit build timeout in milliseconds */
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE (60*1000)
#define CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE
#define CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE INT32_MAX
int32_t circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void);
#if CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT < CBT_MIN_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT
#error "RECENT_CIRCUITS is set too low."
#endif
typedef struct circuit_build_times_s circuit_build_times_t;
/********************************* config.c ***************************/
/** An error from options_trial_assign() or options_init_from_string(). */
typedef enum setopt_err_t {
SETOPT_OK = 0,
SETOPT_ERR_MISC = -1,
SETOPT_ERR_PARSE = -2,
SETOPT_ERR_TRANSITION = -3,
SETOPT_ERR_SETTING = -4,
} setopt_err_t;
/********************************* connection_edge.c *************************/
/** Enumerates possible origins of a client-side address mapping. */
typedef enum {
/** We're remapping this address because the controller told us to. */
ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER,
/** We're remapping this address because of an AutomapHostsOnResolve
* configuration. */
ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP,
/** We're remapping this address because our configuration (via torrc, the
* command line, or a SETCONF command) told us to. */
ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC,
/** We're remapping this address because we have TrackHostExit configured,
* and we want to remember to use the same exit next time. */
ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT,
/** We're remapping this address because we got a DNS resolution from a
* Tor server that told us what its value was. */
ADDRMAPSRC_DNS,
/** No remapping has occurred. This isn't a possible value for an
* addrmap_entry_t; it's used as a null value when we need to answer "Why
* did this remapping happen." */
ADDRMAPSRC_NONE
} addressmap_entry_source_t;
#define addressmap_entry_source_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addressmap_entry_source_t)
/********************************* control.c ***************************/
/** Used to indicate the type of a circuit event passed to the controller.
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
typedef enum circuit_status_event_t {
CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0,
CIRC_EVENT_BUILT = 1,
CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED = 2,
CIRC_EVENT_FAILED = 3,
CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED = 4,
} circuit_status_event_t;
/** Used to indicate the type of a CIRC_MINOR event passed to the controller.
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt . */
typedef enum circuit_status_minor_event_t {
CIRC_MINOR_EVENT_PURPOSE_CHANGED,
CIRC_MINOR_EVENT_CANNIBALIZED,
} circuit_status_minor_event_t;
/** Used to indicate the type of a stream event passed to the controller.
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
typedef enum stream_status_event_t {
STREAM_EVENT_SENT_CONNECT = 0,
STREAM_EVENT_SENT_RESOLVE = 1,
STREAM_EVENT_SUCCEEDED = 2,
STREAM_EVENT_FAILED = 3,
STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED = 4,
STREAM_EVENT_NEW = 5,
STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE = 6,
STREAM_EVENT_FAILED_RETRIABLE = 7,
STREAM_EVENT_REMAP = 8
} stream_status_event_t;
/** Used to indicate the type of an OR connection event passed to the
* controller. The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
typedef enum or_conn_status_event_t {
OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0,
OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED = 1,
OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED = 2,
OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED = 3,
OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW = 4,
} or_conn_status_event_t;
/** Used to indicate the type of a buildtime event */
typedef enum buildtimeout_set_event_t {
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED = 0,
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET = 1,
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_SUSPENDED = 2,
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_DISCARD = 3,
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESUME = 4
} buildtimeout_set_event_t;
/** Execute the statement <b>stmt</b>, which may log events concerning the
* connection <b>conn</b>. To prevent infinite loops, disable log messages
* being sent to controllers if <b>conn</b> is a control connection.
*
* Stmt must not contain any return or goto statements.
*/
#define CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, stmt) \
STMT_BEGIN \
int _log_conn_is_control; \
tor_assert(conn); \
_log_conn_is_control = (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); \
if (_log_conn_is_control) \
disable_control_logging(); \
STMT_BEGIN stmt; STMT_END; \
if (_log_conn_is_control) \
enable_control_logging(); \
STMT_END
/** Enum describing various stages of bootstrapping, for use with controller
* bootstrap status events. The values range from 0 to 100. */
typedef enum {
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_UNDEF=-1,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_STARTING=0,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR=5,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE=-2,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE_DIR=10,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE=15,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS=20,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_STATUS=25,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_KEYS=40,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_DESCRIPTORS=45,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS=50,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_OR=80,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE_OR=85,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE=90,
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE=100
} bootstrap_status_t;
/********************************* dirserv.c ***************************/
/** An enum to describe what format we're generating a routerstatus line in.
*/
typedef enum {
/** For use in a v2 opinion */
NS_V2,
/** For use in a consensus networkstatus document (ns flavor) */
NS_V3_CONSENSUS,
/** For use in a vote networkstatus document */
NS_V3_VOTE,
/** For passing to the controlport in response to a GETINFO request */
NS_CONTROL_PORT,
/** For use in a consensus networkstatus document (microdesc flavor) */
NS_V3_CONSENSUS_MICRODESC
} routerstatus_format_type_t;
/********************************* dirvote.c ************************/
typedef struct vote_timing_t vote_timing_t;
/********************************* geoip.c **************************/
/** Indicates an action that we might be noting geoip statistics on.
* Note that if we're noticing CONNECT, we're a bridge, and if we're noticing
* the others, we're not.
*/
typedef enum {
/** We've noticed a connection as a bridge relay or entry guard. */
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT = 0,
/** We've served a networkstatus consensus as a directory server. */
GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS = 1,
} geoip_client_action_t;
/** Indicates either a positive reply or a reason for rejectng a network
* status request that will be included in geoip statistics. */
typedef enum {
/** Request is answered successfully. */
GEOIP_SUCCESS = 0,
/** V3 network status is not signed by a sufficient number of requested
* authorities. */
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_ENOUGH_SIGS = 1,
/** Requested network status object is unavailable. */
GEOIP_REJECT_UNAVAILABLE = 2,
/** Requested network status not found. */
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_FOUND = 3,
/** Network status has not been modified since If-Modified-Since time. */
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_MODIFIED = 4,
/** Directory is busy. */
GEOIP_REJECT_BUSY = 5,
} geoip_ns_response_t;
#define GEOIP_NS_RESPONSE_NUM 6
/** Directory requests that we are measuring can be either direct or
* tunneled. */
typedef enum {
DIRREQ_DIRECT = 0,
DIRREQ_TUNNELED = 1,
} dirreq_type_t;
/** Possible states for either direct or tunneled directory requests that
* are relevant for determining network status download times. */
typedef enum {
/** Found that the client requests a network status; applies to both
* direct and tunneled requests; initial state of a request that we are
* measuring. */
DIRREQ_IS_FOR_NETWORK_STATUS = 0,
/** Finished writing a network status to the directory connection;
* applies to both direct and tunneled requests; completes a direct
* request. */
DIRREQ_FLUSHING_DIR_CONN_FINISHED = 1,
/** END cell sent to circuit that initiated a tunneled request. */
DIRREQ_END_CELL_SENT = 2,
/** Flushed last cell from queue of the circuit that initiated a
* tunneled request to the outbuf of the OR connection. */
DIRREQ_CIRC_QUEUE_FLUSHED = 3,
/** Flushed last byte from buffer of the channel belonging to the
* circuit that initiated a tunneled request; completes a tunneled
* request. */
DIRREQ_CHANNEL_BUFFER_FLUSHED = 4
} dirreq_state_t;
#define WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL (24*60*60)
/********************************* microdesc.c *************************/
typedef struct microdesc_cache_t microdesc_cache_t;
/********************************* networkstatus.c *********************/
/** Possible statuses of a version of Tor, given opinions from the directory
* servers. */
typedef enum version_status_t {
VS_RECOMMENDED=0, /**< This version is listed as recommended. */
VS_OLD=1, /**< This version is older than any recommended version. */
VS_NEW=2, /**< This version is newer than any recommended version. */
VS_NEW_IN_SERIES=3, /**< This version is newer than any recommended version
* in its series, but later recommended versions exist.
*/
VS_UNRECOMMENDED=4, /**< This version is not recommended (general case). */
VS_EMPTY=5, /**< The version list was empty; no agreed-on versions. */
VS_UNKNOWN, /**< We have no idea. */
} version_status_t;
/********************************* policies.c ************************/
/** Outcome of applying an address policy to an address. */
typedef enum {
/** The address was accepted */
ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED=0,
/** The address was rejected */
ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED=-1,
/** Part of the address was unknown, but as far as we can tell, it was
* accepted. */
ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED=1,
/** Part of the address was unknown, but as far as we can tell, it was
* rejected. */
ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED=2,
} addr_policy_result_t;
/********************************* rephist.c ***************************/
/** Possible public/private key operations in Tor: used to keep track of where
* we're spending our time. */
typedef enum {
SIGN_DIR, SIGN_RTR,
VERIFY_DIR, VERIFY_RTR,
ENC_ONIONSKIN, DEC_ONIONSKIN,
TLS_HANDSHAKE_C, TLS_HANDSHAKE_S,
REND_CLIENT, REND_MID, REND_SERVER,
} pk_op_t;
/********************************* rendcommon.c ***************************/
typedef struct rend_authorized_client_t rend_authorized_client_t;
typedef struct rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t;
/** The maximum number of non-circuit-build-timeout failures a hidden
* service client will tolerate while trying to build a circuit to an
* introduction point. See also rend_intro_point_t.unreachable_count. */
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES 5
/** The minimum and maximum number of distinct INTRODUCE2 cells which a
* hidden service's introduction point will receive before it begins to
* expire. */
#define INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS 16384
/* Double the minimum value so the interval is [min, min * 2]. */
#define INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS \
(INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS * 2)
/** The minimum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
* before expiring due to old age. (If it receives
* INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS INTRODUCE2 cells, it may expire
* sooner.)
*
* XXX Should this be configurable? */
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS (18*60*60)
/** The maximum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
* before expiring due to old age.
*
* XXX Should this be configurable? */
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS (24*60*60)
/** The maximum number of circuit creation retry we do to an intro point
* before giving up. We try to reuse intro point that fails during their
* lifetime so this is a hard limit on the amount of time we do that. */
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES 3
typedef struct rend_intro_point_t rend_intro_point_t;
typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t rend_service_descriptor_t;
/********************************* routerlist.c ***************************/
typedef struct dir_server_t dir_server_t;
#define RELAY_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (75*1024)
#define BRIDGE_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (50*1024)
#define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX
/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */
/** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use
* ourself to answer a directory request.
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
#define PDS_ALLOW_SELF (1<<0)
/** Flag to indicate that if no servers seem to be up, we should mark all
* directory servers as up and try again.
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
#define PDS_RETRY_IF_NO_SERVERS (1<<1)
/** Flag to indicate that we should not exclude directory servers that
* our ReachableAddress settings would exclude. This usually means that
* we're going to connect to the server over Tor, and so we don't need to
* worry about our firewall telling us we can't.
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
#define PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL (1<<2)
/** Flag to indicate that we should not use any directory authority to which
* we have an existing directory connection for downloading server descriptors
* or extrainfo documents.
*
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al)
*/
#define PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH (1<<3)
/** Flag to indicate that we should not use any directory authority to which
* we have an existing directory connection for downloading microdescs.
*
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al)
*/
#define PDS_NO_EXISTING_MICRODESC_FETCH (1<<4)
/** Possible ways to weight routers when choosing one randomly. See
* routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth() for more information.*/
typedef enum bandwidth_weight_rule_t {
NO_WEIGHTING, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT, WEIGHT_FOR_MID, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD,
WEIGHT_FOR_DIR
} bandwidth_weight_rule_t;
/** Flags to be passed to control router_choose_random_node() to indicate what
* kind of nodes to pick according to what algorithm. */
typedef enum {
CRN_NEED_UPTIME = 1<<0,
CRN_NEED_CAPACITY = 1<<1,
CRN_NEED_GUARD = 1<<2,
/* XXXX not used, apparently. */
CRN_WEIGHT_AS_EXIT = 1<<5,
CRN_NEED_DESC = 1<<6,
/* On clients, only provide nodes that satisfy ClientPreferIPv6OR */
CRN_PREF_ADDR = 1<<7,
/* On clients, only provide nodes that we can connect to directly, based on
* our firewall rules */
CRN_DIRECT_CONN = 1<<8,
/* On clients, only provide nodes with HSRend >= 2 protocol version which
* is required for hidden service version >= 3. */
CRN_RENDEZVOUS_V3 = 1<<9,
} router_crn_flags_t;
/** Return value for router_add_to_routerlist() and dirserv_add_descriptor() */
typedef enum was_router_added_t {
/* Router was added successfully. */
ROUTER_ADDED_SUCCESSFULLY = 1,
/* Extrainfo document was rejected because no corresponding router
* descriptor was found OR router descriptor was rejected because
* it was incompatible with its extrainfo document. */
ROUTER_BAD_EI = -1,
/* Router descriptor was rejected because it is already known. */
ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN = -2,
/* General purpose router was rejected, because it was not listed
* in consensus. */
ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS = -3,
/* Router was neither in directory consensus nor in any of
* networkstatus documents. Caching it to access later.
* (Applies to fetched descriptors only.) */
ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS = -4,
/* Router was rejected by directory authority. */
ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS = -5,
/* Bridge descriptor was rejected because such bridge was not one
* of the bridges we have listed in our configuration. */
ROUTER_WAS_NOT_WANTED = -6,
/* Router descriptor was rejected because it was older than
* OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE. */
ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD = -7, /* note contrast with 'NOT_NEW' */
/* DOCDOC */
ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED = -8
} was_router_added_t;
typedef struct tor_version_t tor_version_t;
#endif /* !defined(TOR_OR_H) */
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