tor/changes/bug18859
Arthur Edelstein 2bd91dbd34 Don't consider a port "handled" by an isolated circuit.
Previously, circuit_stream_is_being_handled incorrectly reported
that (1) an exit port was "handled" by a circuit regardless of
whether the circuit was already isolated in some way, and
(2) that a stream could be "handled" by a circuit even if their
isolation settings were incompatible.

As a result of (1), in Tor Browser, circuit_get_unhandled_ports was
reporting that all ports were handled even though all non-internal
circuits had already been isolated by a SOCKS username+password.

Therefore, circuit_predict_and_launch_new was declining to launch
new exit circuits. Then, when the user visited a new site in Tor
Browser, a stream with new SOCKS credentials would be initiated,
and the stream would have to wait while a new circuit with those
credentials could be built. That wait was making the
time-to-first-byte longer than it needed to be.

Now, clean, not-yet-isolated circuit(s) will be automatically
launched ahead of time and be ready for use whenever a new stream
with new SOCKS credentials (or other isolation criteria) is
initiated.

Fixes bug 18859. Thanks to Nick Mathewson for improvements.
2017-12-06 14:18:41 -08:00

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o Minor bugfixes (circuit prediction):
- Fix circuit_stream_is_being_handled so it correctly reports on circuits
with isolation settings. Ports must not be said to be "handled" by
already-isolated circuits, and a stream can only be handled by a circuit
if their isolation settings are compatible. Fixes bug 18859.