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Previously, circuit_stream_is_being_handled incorrectly reported that (1) an exit port was "handled" by a circuit regardless of whether the circuit was already isolated in some way, and (2) that a stream could be "handled" by a circuit even if their isolation settings were incompatible. As a result of (1), in Tor Browser, circuit_get_unhandled_ports was reporting that all ports were handled even though all non-internal circuits had already been isolated by a SOCKS username+password. Therefore, circuit_predict_and_launch_new was declining to launch new exit circuits. Then, when the user visited a new site in Tor Browser, a stream with new SOCKS credentials would be initiated, and the stream would have to wait while a new circuit with those credentials could be built. That wait was making the time-to-first-byte longer than it needed to be. Now, clean, not-yet-isolated circuit(s) will be automatically launched ahead of time and be ready for use whenever a new stream with new SOCKS credentials (or other isolation criteria) is initiated. Fixes bug 18859. Thanks to Nick Mathewson for improvements.
6 lines
338 B
Plaintext
6 lines
338 B
Plaintext
o Minor bugfixes (circuit prediction):
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- Fix circuit_stream_is_being_handled so it correctly reports on circuits
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with isolation settings. Ports must not be said to be "handled" by
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already-isolated circuits, and a stream can only be handled by a circuit
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if their isolation settings are compatible. Fixes bug 18859.
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