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I don't personally agree that this is likely to be easy to exploit, and some initial experimention I've done suggests that cache-miss times are just plain too fast to get useful info out of when they're mixed up with the rest of Tor's timing noise. Nevertheless, I'm leaving Robert's initial changelog entry in the git history so that he can be the voice of reason if I'm wrong. :)
15 lines
801 B
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15 lines
801 B
Plaintext
o Security fixes:
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- Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
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would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
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soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
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when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
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can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
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proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
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grained information about which relays a client was picking
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(middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
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exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
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(see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
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take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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