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99 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
99 lines
3.5 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: 157-specific-cert-download.txt
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Title: Make certificate downloads specific
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Version: $Revision$
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Last-Modified: $Date$
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Author: Nick Mathewson
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Created: 2-Dec-2008
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Status: Open
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Target: 0.2.1.x
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History:
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2008 Dec 2, 22:34
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Changed name of cross certification field to match the other authority
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certificate fields.
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Overview:
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Tor's directory specification gives two ways to download a certificate:
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by its identity fingerprint, or by the digest of its signing key. Both
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are error-prone. We propose a new download mechanism to make sure that
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clients get the certificates they want.
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Motivation:
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When a client wants a certificate to verify a consensus, it has two choices
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currently:
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- Download by identity key fingerprint. In this case, the client risks
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getting a certificate for the same authority, but with a different
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signing key than the one used to sign the consensus.
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- Download by signing key fingerprint. In this case, the client risks
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getting a forged certificate that contains the right signing key
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signed with the wrong identity key. (Since caches are willing to
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cache certs from authorities they do not themselves recognize, the
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attacker wouldn't need to compromise an authority's key to do this.)
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Current solution:
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Clients fetch by identity keys, and re-fetch with backoff if they don't get
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certs with the signing key they want.
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Proposed solution:
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Phase 1: Add a URL type for clients to download certs by identity _and_
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signing key fingerprint. Unless both fields match, the client doesn't
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accept the certificate(s). Clients begin using this method when their
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randomly chosen directory cache supports it.
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Phase 1A: Simultaneously, add a cross-certification element to
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certificates.
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Phase 2: Once many directory caches support phase 1, clients should prefer
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to fetch certificates using that protocol when available.
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Phase 2A: Once all authorities are generating cross-certified certificates
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as in phase 1A, require cross-certification.
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Specification additions:
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The key certificate whose identity key fingerprint is <F> and whose signing
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key fingerprint is <S> should be available at:
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http://<hostname>/tor/keys/fp-sk/<F>-<S>.z
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As usual, clients may request multiple certificates using:
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http://<hostname>/tor/keys/fp-sk/<F1>-<S1>+<F2>-<S2>.z
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Clients SHOULD use this format whenever they know both key fingerprints for
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a desired certificate.
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Certificates SHOULD contain the following field (at most once):
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"dir-key-crosscert" NL CrossSignature NL
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where CrossSignature is a signature, made using the certificate's signing
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key, of the digest of the PKCS1-padded hash of the certificate's identity
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key. For backward compatibility with broken versions of the parser, we
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wrap the base64-encoded signature in -----BEGIN ID SIGNATURE---- and
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-----END ID SIGNATURE----- tags. (See bug 880.) Implementations MUST allow
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the "ID " portion to be omitted, however.
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When encountering a certificate with a dir-key-crosscert entry,
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implementations MUST verify that the signature is a correct signature of
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the hash of the identity key using the signing key.
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(In a future version of this specification, dir-key-crosscert entries will
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be required.)
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Why cross-certify too?
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Cross-certification protects clients who haven't updated yet, by reducing
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the number of caches that are willing to hold and serve bogus certificates.
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References:
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This is related to part 2 of bug 854.
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