mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-14 07:03:44 +01:00
568dc27a19
base16_decodes() now returns the number of decoded bytes. It's interface changes from returning a "int" to a "ssize_t". Every callsite now checks the returned value. Fixes #14013 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2608 lines
98 KiB
C
2608 lines
98 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file circuituse.c
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* \brief Launch the right sort of circuits and attach streams to them.
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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#include "addressmap.h"
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#include "channel.h"
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#include "circpathbias.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuitstats.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "connection_edge.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "entrynodes.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "policies.h"
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#include "rendclient.h"
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#include "rendcommon.h"
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#include "rendservice.h"
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#include "rephist.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "routerlist.h"
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static void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void);
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static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void);
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/** Return 1 if <b>circ</b> could be returned by circuit_get_best().
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* Else return 0.
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*/
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static int
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circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
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const entry_connection_t *conn,
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int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
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int need_uptime, int need_internal,
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time_t now)
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{
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const circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(origin_circ);
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const node_t *exitnode;
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cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
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if (must_be_open && (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || !circ->n_chan))
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return 0; /* ignore non-open circs */
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if (circ->marked_for_close)
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return 0;
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/* if this circ isn't our purpose, skip. */
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED && !must_be_open) {
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
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return 0;
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} else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
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!must_be_open) {
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
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return 0;
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} else {
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if (purpose != circ->purpose)
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return 0;
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}
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/* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */
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if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
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if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
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circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
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return 0;
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}
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if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
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return 0;
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/* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */
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/* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the
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* circuit, it's the magical extra service hop. so just check the nickname
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* of the one we meant to finish at.
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*/
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build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
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exitnode = build_state_get_exit_node(build_state);
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if (need_uptime && !build_state->need_uptime)
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return 0;
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if (need_internal != build_state->is_internal)
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return 0;
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
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tor_addr_t addr;
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const int family = tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address);
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if (!exitnode && !build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Not considering circuit with unknown router.");
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return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet,
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* or is a rendezvous circuit. */
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}
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if (build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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if (!conn->want_onehop) {
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Skipping one-hop circuit.");
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return 0;
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}
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tor_assert(conn->chosen_exit_name);
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if (build_state->chosen_exit) {
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char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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if (hexdigest_to_digest(conn->chosen_exit_name, digest) < 0)
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return 0; /* broken digest, we don't want it */
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if (tor_memneq(digest, build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN))
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return 0; /* this is a circuit to somewhere else */
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) {
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/* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */
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if (family < 0 ||
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!tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) ||
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build_state->chosen_exit->port != conn->socks_request->port)
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return 0;
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}
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}
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} else {
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if (conn->want_onehop) {
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/* don't use three-hop circuits -- that could hurt our anonymity. */
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (origin_circ->prepend_policy && family != -1) {
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int r = compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&addr,
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conn->socks_request->port,
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origin_circ->prepend_policy);
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if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
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return 0;
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}
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if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode)) {
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/* can't exit from this router */
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return 0;
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}
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} else { /* not general */
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const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
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if ((edge_conn->rend_data && !origin_circ->rend_data) ||
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(!edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data) ||
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(edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data &&
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rend_cmp_service_ids(edge_conn->rend_data->onion_address,
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origin_circ->rend_data->onion_address))) {
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/* this circ is not for this conn */
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit(conn, origin_circ)) {
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/* conn needs to be isolated from other conns that have already used
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* origin_circ */
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/** Return 1 if circuit <b>a</b> is better than circuit <b>b</b> for
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* <b>conn</b>, and return 0 otherwise. Used by circuit_get_best.
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*/
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static int
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circuit_is_better(const origin_circuit_t *oa, const origin_circuit_t *ob,
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const entry_connection_t *conn)
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{
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const circuit_t *a = TO_CIRCUIT(oa);
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const circuit_t *b = TO_CIRCUIT(ob);
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const uint8_t purpose = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->purpose;
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int a_bits, b_bits;
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/* If one of the circuits was allowed to live due to relaxing its timeout,
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* it is definitely worse (it's probably a much slower path). */
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if (oa->relaxed_timeout && !ob->relaxed_timeout)
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return 0; /* ob is better. It's not relaxed. */
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if (!oa->relaxed_timeout && ob->relaxed_timeout)
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return 1; /* oa is better. It's not relaxed. */
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switch (purpose) {
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
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/* if it's used but less dirty it's best;
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* else if it's more recently created it's best
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*/
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if (b->timestamp_dirty) {
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if (a->timestamp_dirty &&
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a->timestamp_dirty > b->timestamp_dirty)
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return 1;
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} else {
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if (a->timestamp_dirty ||
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timercmp(&a->timestamp_began, &b->timestamp_began, OP_GT))
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return 1;
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if (ob->build_state->is_internal)
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/* XXXX++ what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I
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* think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already
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* makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to
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* be. -RD */
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return 1;
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}
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
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/* the closer it is to ack_wait the better it is */
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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return 1;
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
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/* the closer it is to rend_joined the better it is */
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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return 1;
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break;
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}
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/* XXXX Maybe this check should get a higher priority to avoid
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* using up circuits too rapidly. */
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a_bits = connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn,
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(origin_circuit_t*)oa, 1);
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b_bits = connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn,
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(origin_circuit_t*)ob, 1);
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/* if x_bits < 0, then we have not used x for anything; better not to dirty
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* a connection if we can help it. */
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if (a_bits < 0) {
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return 0;
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} else if (b_bits < 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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a_bits &= ~ oa->isolation_flags_mixed;
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a_bits &= ~ ob->isolation_flags_mixed;
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if (n_bits_set_u8(a_bits) < n_bits_set_u8(b_bits)) {
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/* The fewer new restrictions we need to make on a circuit for stream
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* isolation, the better. */
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Find the best circ that conn can use, preferably one which is
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* dirty. Circ must not be too old.
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*
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* Conn must be defined.
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*
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* If must_be_open, ignore circs not in CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
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*
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* circ_purpose specifies what sort of circuit we must have.
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* It can be C_GENERAL, C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, or C_REND_JOINED.
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*
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* If it's REND_JOINED and must_be_open==0, then return the closest
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* rendezvous-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*
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* If it's INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT and must_be_open==0, then return the
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* closest introduce-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*/
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static origin_circuit_t *
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circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn,
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int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
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int need_uptime, int need_internal)
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{
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origin_circuit_t *best=NULL;
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struct timeval now;
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int intro_going_on_but_too_old = 0;
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT ||
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purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
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tor_gettimeofday(&now);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
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origin_circuit_t *origin_circ;
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if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
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continue;
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origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
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/* Log an info message if we're going to launch a new intro circ in
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* parallel */
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
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!must_be_open && origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) {
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intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1;
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continue;
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}
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if (!circuit_is_acceptable(origin_circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose,
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need_uptime,need_internal, (time_t)now.tv_sec))
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continue;
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/* now this is an acceptable circ to hand back. but that doesn't
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* mean it's the *best* circ to hand back. try to decide.
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*/
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if (!best || circuit_is_better(origin_circ,best,conn))
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best = origin_circ;
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}
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
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if (!best && intro_going_on_but_too_old)
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log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "There is an intro circuit being created "
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"right now, but it has already taken quite a while. Starting "
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"one in parallel.");
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return best;
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}
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/** Return the number of not-yet-open general-purpose origin circuits. */
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static int
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count_pending_general_client_circuits(void)
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{
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int count = 0;
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
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if (circ->marked_for_close ||
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circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
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!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
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continue;
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++count;
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}
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
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return count;
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}
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#if 0
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/** Check whether, according to the policies in <b>options</b>, the
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* circuit <b>circ</b> makes sense. */
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/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more.
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* Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also,
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* it's never called. */
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int
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circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
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const or_options_t *options)
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{
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const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
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/* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */
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for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
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cpath_next = cpath->next;
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if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
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cpath->extend_info))
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return 0;
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}
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/* then consider the final hop */
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if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes,
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circ->cpath->prev->extend_info))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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#endif
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/** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born
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* at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago.
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*/
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void
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circuit_expire_building(void)
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{
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/* circ_times.timeout_ms and circ_times.close_ms are from
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* circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed
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* custom timeouts yet */
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struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff,
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close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
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cannibalized_cutoff, c_intro_cutoff, s_intro_cutoff, stream_cutoff;
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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struct timeval now;
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cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
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int any_opened_circs = 0;
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tor_gettimeofday(&now);
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/* Check to see if we have any opened circuits. If we don't,
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* we want to be more lenient with timeouts, in case the
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* user has relocated and/or changed network connections.
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* See bug #3443. */
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, next_circ) {
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if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(next_circ) || /* didn't originate here */
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next_circ->marked_for_close) { /* don't mess with marked circs */
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continue;
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}
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if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(next_circ)->has_opened &&
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next_circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
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TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(next_circ)->build_state &&
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TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(next_circ)->build_state->desired_path_len
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== DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN) {
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any_opened_circs = 1;
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break;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(next_circ);
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#define SET_CUTOFF(target, msec) do { \
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long ms = tor_lround(msec); \
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struct timeval diff; \
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diff.tv_sec = ms / 1000; \
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diff.tv_usec = (int)((ms % 1000) * 1000); \
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timersub(&now, &diff, &target); \
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} while (0)
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/**
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* Because circuit build timeout is calculated only based on 3 hop
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* general purpose circuit construction, we need to scale the timeout
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* to make it properly apply to longer circuits, and circuits of
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* certain usage types. The following diagram illustrates how we
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* derive the scaling below. In short, we calculate the number
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* of times our telescoping-based circuit construction causes cells
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* to traverse each link for the circuit purpose types in question,
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* and then assume each link is equivalent.
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*
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* OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C
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* OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C --d--> D
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*
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* Let h = a = b = c = d
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*
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* Three hops (general_cutoff)
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* RTTs = 3a + 2b + c
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* RTTs = 6h
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* Cannibalized:
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* RTTs = a+b+c+d
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* RTTs = 4h
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* Four hops:
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* RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c + d
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* RTTs = 10h
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* Client INTRODUCE1+ACK: // XXX: correct?
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* RTTs = 5a + 4b + 3c + 2d
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* RTTs = 14h
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* Server intro:
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* RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c
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* RTTs = 9h
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*/
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SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms());
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SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms());
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/* > 3hop circs seem to have a 1.0 second delay on their cannibalized
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* 4th hop. */
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SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (10/6.0) + 1000);
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/* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND behaves more like a RELAY cell.
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* Use the stream cutoff (more or less). */
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SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000);
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/* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official
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* CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */
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SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff,
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MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*(4/6.0),
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options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000);
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/* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */
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SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (14/6.0) + 1000);
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|
|
/* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */
|
|
SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (9/6.0) + 1000);
|
|
|
|
SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms());
|
|
SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000);
|
|
|
|
SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
|
|
MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000,
|
|
options->SocksTimeout * 1000));
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *,victim) {
|
|
struct timeval cutoff;
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim) || /* didn't originate here */
|
|
victim->marked_for_close) /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If we haven't yet started the first hop, it means we don't have
|
|
* any orconns available, and thus have not started counting time yet
|
|
* for this circuit. See circuit_deliver_create_cell() and uses of
|
|
* timestamp_began.
|
|
*
|
|
* Continue to wait in this case. The ORConn should timeout
|
|
* independently and kill us then.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state;
|
|
if (build_state && build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
cutoff = begindir_cutoff;
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
|
|
cutoff = close_cutoff;
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING ||
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
|
|
cutoff = c_intro_cutoff;
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
|
|
cutoff = s_intro_cutoff;
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND)
|
|
cutoff = stream_cutoff;
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING)
|
|
cutoff = close_cutoff;
|
|
else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened &&
|
|
victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
cutoff = cannibalized_cutoff;
|
|
else if (build_state && build_state->desired_path_len >= 4)
|
|
cutoff = fourhop_cutoff;
|
|
else
|
|
cutoff = general_cutoff;
|
|
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)
|
|
cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff;
|
|
|
|
if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_GT))
|
|
continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */
|
|
|
|
/* We need to double-check the opened state here because
|
|
* we don't want to consider opened 1-hop dircon circuits for
|
|
* deciding when to relax the timeout, but we *do* want to relax
|
|
* those circuits too if nothing else is opened *and* they still
|
|
* aren't either. */
|
|
if (!any_opened_circs && victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
/* It's still young enough that we wouldn't close it, right? */
|
|
if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &close_cutoff, OP_GT)) {
|
|
if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout) {
|
|
int first_hop_succeeded = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state
|
|
== CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"No circuits are opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit %d "
|
|
"(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s). "
|
|
"%d guards are live.",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose),
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
|
|
-1,
|
|
circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state),
|
|
num_live_entry_guards(0));
|
|
|
|
/* We count the timeout here for CBT, because technically this
|
|
* was a timeout, and the timeout value needs to reset if we
|
|
* see enough of them. Note this means we also need to avoid
|
|
* double-counting below, too. */
|
|
circuit_build_times_count_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),
|
|
first_hop_succeeded);
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
} else {
|
|
static ratelim_t relax_timeout_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
|
|
const double build_close_ms = get_circuit_build_close_time_ms();
|
|
log_fn_ratelim(&relax_timeout_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC,
|
|
"No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit %d "
|
|
"(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s) to "
|
|
"%ldms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out "
|
|
"anyway. %d guards are live.",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose),
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
|
|
-1,
|
|
circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state),
|
|
(long)build_close_ms,
|
|
num_live_entry_guards(0));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* some debug logs, to help track bugs */
|
|
if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
|
victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
|
|
if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d)."
|
|
"(clean).",
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
|
victim->n_circ_id);
|
|
else
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d). "
|
|
"%d secs since dirty.",
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
|
victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
(int)(now - victim->timestamp_dirty));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* if circ is !open, or if it's open but purpose is a non-finished
|
|
* intro or rend, then mark it for close */
|
|
if (victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
switch (victim->purpose) {
|
|
default: /* most open circuits can be left alone. */
|
|
continue; /* yes, continue inside a switch refers to the nearest
|
|
* enclosing loop. C is smart. */
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
break; /* too old, need to die */
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
|
|
/* it's a rend_ready circ -- has it already picked a query? */
|
|
/* c_rend_ready circs measure age since timestamp_dirty,
|
|
* because that's set when they switch purposes
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->rend_data ||
|
|
victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec)
|
|
continue;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING:
|
|
/* Open path bias testing circuits are given a long
|
|
* time to complete the test, but not forever */
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
/* We keep old introducing circuits around for
|
|
* a while in parallel, and they can end up "opened".
|
|
* We decide below if we're going to mark them timed
|
|
* out and eventually close them.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
|
|
/* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
|
|
* make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
|
|
* will reflect the time since the last attempt.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec)
|
|
continue;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else { /* circuit not open, consider recording failure as timeout */
|
|
int first_hop_succeeded = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath &&
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, "
|
|
"yet has attached streams!",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
|
|
victim->purpose,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)) &&
|
|
circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(get_circuit_build_times())) {
|
|
/* Circuits are allowed to last longer for measurement.
|
|
* Switch their purpose and wait. */
|
|
if (victim->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim),
|
|
CIRC_EVENT_FAILED,
|
|
END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(victim, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT);
|
|
/* Record this failure to check for too many timeouts
|
|
* in a row. This function does not record a time value yet
|
|
* (we do that later); it only counts the fact that we did
|
|
* have a timeout. We also want to avoid double-counting
|
|
* already "relaxed" circuits, which are counted above. */
|
|
if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout) {
|
|
circuit_build_times_count_timeout(
|
|
get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),
|
|
first_hop_succeeded);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut
|
|
* it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath,
|
|
* and we should discard the value.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &extremely_old_cutoff, OP_LT)) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. "
|
|
"Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)",
|
|
(long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_began.tv_sec),
|
|
victim->purpose,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
|
|
} else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(
|
|
get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),
|
|
first_hop_succeeded,
|
|
(time_t)victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) {
|
|
circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough
|
|
* along in connecting to its destination, and we haven't already
|
|
* flagged it as 'timed out', and the user has not told us to
|
|
* close such circs immediately on timeout, flag it as 'timed out'
|
|
* so we'll launch another intro or rend circ, but don't mark it
|
|
* for close yet.
|
|
*
|
|
* (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout
|
|
* period above, so we won't close them in the next call to
|
|
* circuit_expire_building.) */
|
|
if (!(options->CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) &&
|
|
!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) {
|
|
switch (victim->purpose) {
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
|
|
/* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in
|
|
* an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's
|
|
* pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ
|
|
* and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it.
|
|
* Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we
|
|
* want to not spare it. */
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state &&
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath ==
|
|
NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
/* fallthrough! */
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
/* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit() will relaunch for us */
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
|
|
/* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
|
|
"as timed-out HS circ",
|
|
(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
victim->purpose);
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
|
|
continue;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far
|
|
* enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing
|
|
* it. */
|
|
if (!(options->CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout) &&
|
|
!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) &&
|
|
victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
|
|
"as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.",
|
|
(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
victim->purpose);
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
|
|
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (victim->n_chan)
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Abandoning circ %u %s:%u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, "
|
|
"len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
|
|
channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(victim->n_chan),
|
|
(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened,
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
victim->purpose,
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
|
|
-1);
|
|
else
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Abandoning circ %u %u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, len %d)",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
|
|
(unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened,
|
|
victim->state,
|
|
circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose,
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
|
|
-1);
|
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
|
|
if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(victim, END_CIRC_REASON_MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED);
|
|
else
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(victim, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
|
|
pathbias_count_timeout(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(victim);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** For debugging #8387: track when we last called
|
|
* circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside. */
|
|
static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop
|
|
* circuits we have around that have been there for at least <b>age</b>
|
|
* seconds. Log a few of them.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age)
|
|
{
|
|
#define MAX_ANCIENT_ONEHOP_CIRCUITS_TO_LOG 10
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
time_t cutoff = now - age;
|
|
int n_found = 0;
|
|
smartlist_t *log_these = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
const origin_circuit_t *ocirc;
|
|
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_created.tv_sec >= cutoff)
|
|
continue;
|
|
ocirc = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
|
|
if (ocirc->build_state && ocirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
++n_found;
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(log_these) < MAX_ANCIENT_ONEHOP_CIRCUITS_TO_LOG)
|
|
smartlist_add(log_these, (origin_circuit_t*) ocirc);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
|
|
if (n_found == 0)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT,
|
|
"Diagnostic for issue 8387: Found %d one-hop circuits more "
|
|
"than %d seconds old! Logging %d...",
|
|
n_found, age, smartlist_len(log_these));
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(log_these, const origin_circuit_t *, ocirc) {
|
|
char created[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
int stream_num;
|
|
const edge_connection_t *conn;
|
|
char *dirty = NULL;
|
|
const circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc);
|
|
|
|
format_local_iso_time(created,
|
|
(time_t)circ->timestamp_created.tv_sec);
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty) {
|
|
char dirty_since[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
format_local_iso_time(dirty_since, circ->timestamp_dirty);
|
|
|
|
tor_asprintf(&dirty, "Dirty since %s (%ld seconds vs %ld-second cutoff)",
|
|
dirty_since, (long)(now - circ->timestamp_dirty),
|
|
(long) get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dirty = tor_strdup("Not marked dirty");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " #%d created at %s. %s, %s. %s for close. "
|
|
"Package window: %d. "
|
|
"%s for new conns. %s.",
|
|
ocirc_sl_idx,
|
|
created,
|
|
circuit_state_to_string(circ->state),
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose),
|
|
circ->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
|
|
circ->package_window,
|
|
ocirc->unusable_for_new_conns ? "Not usable" : "usable",
|
|
dirty);
|
|
tor_free(dirty);
|
|
|
|
stream_num = 0;
|
|
for (conn = ocirc->p_streams; conn; conn = conn->next_stream) {
|
|
const connection_t *c = TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
char stream_created[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
if (++stream_num >= 5)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
format_local_iso_time(stream_created, c->timestamp_created);
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " Stream#%d created at %s. "
|
|
"%s conn in state %s. "
|
|
"It is %slinked and %sreading from a linked connection %p. "
|
|
"Package window %d. "
|
|
"%s for close (%s:%d). Hold-open is %sset. "
|
|
"Has %ssent RELAY_END. %s on circuit.",
|
|
stream_num,
|
|
stream_created,
|
|
conn_type_to_string(c->type),
|
|
conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state),
|
|
c->linked ? "" : "not ",
|
|
c->reading_from_linked_conn ? "": "not",
|
|
c->linked_conn,
|
|
conn->package_window,
|
|
c->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
|
|
c->marked_for_close_file ? c->marked_for_close_file : "--",
|
|
c->marked_for_close,
|
|
c->hold_open_until_flushed ? "" : "not ",
|
|
conn->edge_has_sent_end ? "" : "not ",
|
|
conn->edge_blocked_on_circ ? "Blocked" : "Not blocked");
|
|
if (! c->linked_conn)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
c = c->linked_conn;
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " Linked to %s connection in state %s "
|
|
"(Purpose %d). %s for close (%s:%d). Hold-open is %sset. ",
|
|
conn_type_to_string(c->type),
|
|
conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state),
|
|
c->purpose,
|
|
c->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
|
|
c->marked_for_close_file ? c->marked_for_close_file : "--",
|
|
c->marked_for_close,
|
|
c->hold_open_until_flushed ? "" : "not ");
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ocirc);
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, "It has been %ld seconds since I last called "
|
|
"circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside().",
|
|
(long)(now - last_expired_clientside_circuits));
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
smartlist_free(log_these);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Remove any elements in <b>needed_ports</b> that are handled by an
|
|
* open or in-progress circuit.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
uint16_t *port;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
|
port = smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
tor_assert(*port);
|
|
if (circuit_stream_is_being_handled(NULL, *port,
|
|
MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM)) {
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is already being handled; removing.", port);
|
|
smartlist_del(needed_ports, i--);
|
|
tor_free(port);
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is not handled.", *port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if at least <b>min</b> general-purpose non-internal circuits
|
|
* will have an acceptable exit node for exit stream <b>conn</b> if it
|
|
* is defined, else for "*:port".
|
|
* Else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_stream_is_being_handled(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
uint16_t port, int min)
|
|
{
|
|
const node_t *exitnode;
|
|
int num=0;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
int need_uptime = smartlist_contains_int_as_string(
|
|
get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
|
|
conn ? conn->socks_request->port : port);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
|
(!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness > now)) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
|
|
if (build_state->is_internal || build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
exitnode = build_state_get_exit_node(build_state);
|
|
if (exitnode && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) {
|
|
int ok;
|
|
if (conn) {
|
|
ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode);
|
|
} else {
|
|
addr_policy_result_t r;
|
|
r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(NULL, port, exitnode);
|
|
ok = r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
if (++num >= min)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Don't keep more than this many unused open circuits around. */
|
|
#define MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS 14
|
|
|
|
/** Figure out how many circuits we have open that are clean. Make
|
|
* sure it's enough for all the upcoming behaviors we predict we'll have.
|
|
* But put an upper bound on the total number of circuits.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int num=0, num_internal=0, num_uptime_internal=0;
|
|
int hidserv_needs_uptime=0, hidserv_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
int port_needs_uptime=0, port_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
int flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* First, count how many of each type of circuit we have already. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ;
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
|
continue; /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty)
|
|
continue; /* only count clean circs */
|
|
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
continue; /* only pay attention to general-purpose circs */
|
|
origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
|
|
continue;
|
|
build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
|
|
if (build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
continue;
|
|
num++;
|
|
if (build_state->is_internal)
|
|
num_internal++;
|
|
if (build_state->need_uptime && build_state->is_internal)
|
|
num_uptime_internal++;
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
|
|
/* If that's enough, then stop now. */
|
|
if (num >= MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS)
|
|
return; /* we already have many, making more probably will hurt */
|
|
|
|
/* Second, see if we need any more exit circuits. */
|
|
/* check if we know of a port that's been requested recently
|
|
* and no circuit is currently available that can handle it.
|
|
* Exits (obviously) require an exit circuit. */
|
|
if (!circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(now, &port_needs_uptime,
|
|
&port_needs_capacity)
|
|
&& router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
|
|
if (port_needs_uptime)
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
if (port_needs_capacity)
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another exit circ.",
|
|
num, num_internal);
|
|
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Third, see if we need any more hidden service (server) circuits.
|
|
* HS servers only need an internal circuit. */
|
|
if (num_rend_services() && num_uptime_internal < 3
|
|
&& router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
flags = (CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME |
|
|
CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another internal "
|
|
"circ for my hidden service.",
|
|
num, num_internal);
|
|
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fourth, see if we need any more hidden service (client) circuits.
|
|
* HS clients only need an internal circuit. */
|
|
if (rep_hist_get_predicted_internal(now, &hidserv_needs_uptime,
|
|
&hidserv_needs_capacity) &&
|
|
((num_uptime_internal<2 && hidserv_needs_uptime) ||
|
|
num_internal<3)
|
|
&& router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
if (hidserv_needs_uptime)
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
if (hidserv_needs_capacity)
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d uptime-internal, %d internal), need"
|
|
" another hidden service circ.",
|
|
num, num_uptime_internal, num_internal);
|
|
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, check to see if we still need more circuits to learn
|
|
* a good build timeout. But if we're close to our max number we
|
|
* want, don't do another -- we want to leave a few slots open so
|
|
* we can still build circuits preemptively as needed.
|
|
* XXXX make the assumption that build timeout streams should be
|
|
* created whenever we can build internal circuits. */
|
|
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
|
if (num < MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS-2 &&
|
|
! circuit_build_times_disabled() &&
|
|
circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(get_circuit_build_times())) {
|
|
flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
/* if there are no exits in the consensus, make timeout
|
|
* circuits internal */
|
|
if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL)
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Have %d clean circs need another buildtime test circ.", num);
|
|
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Build a new test circuit every 5 minutes */
|
|
#define TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL 300
|
|
|
|
/** This function is called once a second, if router_have_min_dir_info() is
|
|
* true. Its job is to make sure all services we offer have enough circuits
|
|
* available. Some services just want enough circuits for current tasks,
|
|
* whereas others want a minimum set of idle circuits hanging around.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
/* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one
|
|
* XXXX make the assumption that (some) AP streams (i.e. HS clients)
|
|
* don't require an exit circuit, review in #13814.
|
|
* This allows HSs to function in a consensus without exits. */
|
|
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN)
|
|
connection_ap_rescan_and_attach_pending();
|
|
|
|
/* make sure any hidden services have enough intro points
|
|
* HS intro point streams only require an internal circuit */
|
|
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN)
|
|
rend_consider_services_intro_points();
|
|
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circs_as_needed(now);
|
|
|
|
if (!options->DisablePredictedCircuits)
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Called once a second either directly or from
|
|
* circuit_build_needed_circs(). As appropriate (once per NewCircuitPeriod)
|
|
* resets failure counts and expires old circuits.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circs_as_needed(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
static time_t time_to_expire_and_reset = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (time_to_expire_and_reset < now) {
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(1);
|
|
time_to_expire_and_reset = now + get_options()->NewCircuitPeriod;
|
|
if (proxy_mode(get_options()))
|
|
addressmap_clean(now);
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside();
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* disable for now, until predict-and-launch-new can cull leftovers */
|
|
|
|
/* If we ever re-enable, this has to move into
|
|
* circuit_build_needed_circs */
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_youngest_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
|
if (get_options()->RunTesting &&
|
|
circ &&
|
|
circ->timestamp_began.tv_sec + TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL < now) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Creating a new testing circuit.");
|
|
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If the stream <b>conn</b> is a member of any of the linked
|
|
* lists of <b>circ</b>, then remove it from the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
edge_connection_t *prevconn;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
|
|
entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
entry_conn->may_use_optimistic_data = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
conn->cpath_layer = NULL; /* don't keep a stale pointer */
|
|
conn->on_circuit = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
int removed = 0;
|
|
if (conn == origin_circ->p_streams) {
|
|
origin_circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
removed = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams;
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
;
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
removed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (removed) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP, "Removing stream %d from circ %u",
|
|
conn->stream_id, (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
/* If the stream was removed, and it was a rend stream, decrement the
|
|
* number of streams on the circuit associated with the rend service.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
|
|
tor_assert(origin_circ->rend_data);
|
|
origin_circ->rend_data->nr_streams--;
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
if (conn == or_circ->n_streams) {
|
|
or_circ->n_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (conn == or_circ->resolving_streams) {
|
|
or_circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (prevconn = or_circ->n_streams;
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
;
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (prevconn = or_circ->resolving_streams;
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
;
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Edge connection not in circuit's list.");
|
|
/* Don't give an error here; it's harmless. */
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If we haven't yet decided on a good timeout value for circuit
|
|
* building, we close idles circuits aggressively so we can get more
|
|
* data points. */
|
|
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_WHILE_LEARNING (10*60)
|
|
|
|
/** Find each circuit that has been unused for too long, or dirty
|
|
* for too long and has no streams on it: mark it for close.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval cutoff, now;
|
|
|
|
tor_gettimeofday(&now);
|
|
cutoff = now;
|
|
last_expired_clientside_circuits = now.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
if (! circuit_build_times_disabled() &&
|
|
circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(get_circuit_build_times())) {
|
|
/* Circuits should be shorter lived if we need more of them
|
|
* for learning a good build timeout */
|
|
cutoff.tv_sec -= IDLE_TIMEOUT_WHILE_LEARNING;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cutoff.tv_sec -= get_options()->CircuitIdleTimeout;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close || !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* If the circuit has been dirty for too long, and there are no streams
|
|
* on it, mark it for close.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <
|
|
now.tv_sec &&
|
|
!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_streams /* nothing attached */ ) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Closing n_circ_id %u (dirty %ld sec ago, "
|
|
"purpose %d)",
|
|
(unsigned)circ->n_circ_id,
|
|
(long)(now.tv_sec - circ->timestamp_dirty),
|
|
circ->purpose);
|
|
/* Don't do this magic for testing circuits. Their death is governed
|
|
* by circuit_expire_building */
|
|
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING)
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
} else if (!circ->timestamp_dirty && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
if (timercmp(&circ->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_LT)) {
|
|
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
|
(circ->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
|
circ->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) ||
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Closing circuit that has been unused for %ld msec.",
|
|
tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_began, &now));
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
} else if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient) {
|
|
/* Server-side rend joined circuits can end up really old, because
|
|
* they are reused by clients for longer than normal. The client
|
|
* controls their lifespan. (They never become dirty, because
|
|
* connection_exit_begin_conn() never marks anything as dirty.)
|
|
* Similarly, server-side intro circuits last a long time. */
|
|
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED &&
|
|
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after "
|
|
"%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
|
|
tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_began, &now),
|
|
circ->purpose,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose));
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How long do we wait before killing circuits with the properties
|
|
* described below?
|
|
*
|
|
* Probably we could choose a number here as low as 5 to 10 seconds,
|
|
* since these circs are used for begindir, and a) generally you either
|
|
* ask another begindir question right after or you don't for a long time,
|
|
* b) clients at least through 0.2.1.x choose from the whole set of
|
|
* directory mirrors at each choice, and c) re-establishing a one-hop
|
|
* circuit via create-fast is a light operation assuming the TLS conn is
|
|
* still there.
|
|
*
|
|
* I expect "b" to go away one day when we move to using directory
|
|
* guards, but I think "a" and "c" are good enough reasons that a low
|
|
* number is safe even then.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT 60
|
|
|
|
/** Find each non-origin circuit that has been unused for too long,
|
|
* has no streams on it, used a create_fast, and ends here: mark it
|
|
* for close.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
or_circuit_t *or_circ;
|
|
time_t cutoff = now - IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
continue;
|
|
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
/* If the circuit has been idle for too long, and there are no streams
|
|
* on it, and it ends here, and it used a create_fast, mark it for close.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (or_circ->is_first_hop && !circ->n_chan &&
|
|
!or_circ->n_streams && !or_circ->resolving_streams &&
|
|
or_circ->p_chan &&
|
|
channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan) <= cutoff) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Closing circ_id %u (empty %d secs ago)",
|
|
(unsigned)or_circ->p_circ_id,
|
|
(int)(now - channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan)));
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Number of testing circuits we want open before testing our bandwidth. */
|
|
#define NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS 4
|
|
|
|
/** True iff we've ever had enough testing circuits open to test our
|
|
* bandwidth. */
|
|
static int have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** Reset have_performed_bandwidth_test, so we'll start building
|
|
* testing circuits again so we can exercise our bandwidth. */
|
|
void
|
|
reset_bandwidth_test(void)
|
|
{
|
|
have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we've already exercised our bandwidth, or if we
|
|
* have fewer than NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS testing circuits
|
|
* established or on the way. Else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_enough_testing_circs(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int num = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (have_performed_bandwidth_test)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
|
|
if (!circ->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
num++;
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
return num >= NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has completed. Take whatever stats we want.
|
|
* Noticing reachability is taken care of in onionskin_answer(),
|
|
* so there's no need to record anything here. But if we still want
|
|
* to do the bandwidth test, and we now have enough testing circuits
|
|
* open, do it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
if (have_performed_bandwidth_test ||
|
|
!check_whether_orport_reachable(get_options())) {
|
|
/* either we've already done everything we want with testing circuits,
|
|
* or this testing circuit became open due to a fluke, e.g. we picked
|
|
* a last hop where we already had the connection open due to an
|
|
* outgoing local circuit. */
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
|
|
} else if (circuit_enough_testing_circs()) {
|
|
router_perform_bandwidth_test(NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS, time(NULL));
|
|
have_performed_bandwidth_test = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
consider_testing_reachability(1, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has failed to build. Take whatever stats we want. */
|
|
static void
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ, int at_last_hop)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
if (server_mode(options) && check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Our testing circuit (to see if your ORPort is reachable) "
|
|
"has failed. I'll try again later.");
|
|
|
|
/* These aren't used yet. */
|
|
(void)circ;
|
|
(void)at_last_hop;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The circuit <b>circ</b> has just become open. Take the next
|
|
* step: for rendezvous circuits, we pass circ to the appropriate
|
|
* function in rendclient or rendservice. For general circuits, we
|
|
* call connection_ap_attach_pending, which looks for pending streams
|
|
* that could use circ.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Remember that this circuit has finished building. Now if we start
|
|
* it building again later (e.g. by extending it), we will know not
|
|
* to consider its build time. */
|
|
circ->has_opened = 1;
|
|
|
|
switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
/* Start building an intro circ if we don't have one yet. */
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
|
|
/* This isn't a call to circuit_try_attaching_streams because a
|
|
* circuit in _C_ESTABLISH_REND state isn't connected to its
|
|
* hidden service yet, thus we can't attach streams to it yet,
|
|
* thus circuit_try_attaching_streams would always clear the
|
|
* circuit's isolation state. circuit_try_attaching_streams is
|
|
* called later, when the rend circ enters _C_REND_JOINED
|
|
* state. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
/* Tell any AP connections that have been waiting for a new
|
|
* circuit that one is ready. */
|
|
circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
/* at the service, waiting for introductions */
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
/* at the service, connecting to rend point */
|
|
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
/* default:
|
|
* This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
|
|
* controller did it. Just let it slide. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If the stream-isolation state of <b>circ</b> can be cleared, clear
|
|
* it. Return non-zero iff <b>circ</b>'s isolation state was cleared. */
|
|
static int
|
|
circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
if (/* The circuit may have become non-open if it was cannibalized.*/
|
|
circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
/* If !isolation_values_set, there is nothing to clear. */
|
|
circ->isolation_values_set &&
|
|
/* It's not legal to clear a circuit's isolation info if it's ever had
|
|
* streams attached */
|
|
!circ->isolation_any_streams_attached) {
|
|
/* If we have any isolation information set on this circuit, and
|
|
* we didn't manage to attach any streams to it, then we can
|
|
* and should clear it and try again. */
|
|
circuit_clear_isolation(circ);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when a circuit becomes ready for streams to be attached to
|
|
* it. */
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_try_attaching_streams(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Attach streams to this circuit if we can. */
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
|
|
|
|
/* The call to circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state here will do
|
|
* nothing and return 0 if we didn't attach any streams to circ
|
|
* above. */
|
|
if (circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state(circ)) {
|
|
/* Maybe *now* we can attach some streams to this circuit. */
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called whenever a circuit could not be successfully built.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
channel_t *n_chan = NULL;
|
|
/* we should examine circ and see if it failed because of
|
|
* the last hop or an earlier hop. then use this info below.
|
|
*/
|
|
int failed_at_last_hop = 0;
|
|
/* If the last hop isn't open, and the second-to-last is, we failed
|
|
* at the last hop. */
|
|
if (circ->cpath &&
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
failed_at_last_hop = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (circ->cpath &&
|
|
circ->cpath->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
! circ->base_.received_destroy) {
|
|
/* We failed at the first hop for some reason other than a DESTROY cell.
|
|
* If there's an OR connection to blame, blame it. Also, avoid this relay
|
|
* for a while, and fail any one-hop directory fetches destined for it. */
|
|
const char *n_chan_id = circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest;
|
|
int already_marked = 0;
|
|
if (circ->base_.n_chan) {
|
|
n_chan = circ->base_.n_chan;
|
|
|
|
if (n_chan->is_bad_for_new_circs) {
|
|
/* We only want to blame this router when a fresh healthy
|
|
* connection fails. So don't mark this router as newly failed,
|
|
* since maybe this was just an old circuit attempt that's
|
|
* finally timing out now. Also, there's no need to blow away
|
|
* circuits/streams/etc, since the failure of an unhealthy conn
|
|
* doesn't tell us much about whether a healthy conn would
|
|
* succeed. */
|
|
already_marked = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Our circuit failed to get a response from the first hop "
|
|
"(%s). I'm going to try to rotate to a better connection.",
|
|
channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
|
|
n_chan->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Our circuit died before the first hop with no connection");
|
|
}
|
|
if (n_chan_id && !already_marked) {
|
|
entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_chan_id, 0, 1, time(NULL));
|
|
/* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail
|
|
* them now so they can retry elsewhere. */
|
|
connection_ap_fail_onehop(n_chan_id, circ->build_state);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (circ->base_.purpose) {
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
/* If we never built the circuit, note it as a failure. */
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
if (failed_at_last_hop) {
|
|
/* Make sure any streams that demand our last hop as their exit
|
|
* know that it's unlikely to happen. */
|
|
circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(circ->cpath->prev->extend_info);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
/* at the service, waiting for introductions */
|
|
if (circ->base_.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
}
|
|
/* no need to care here, because the service will rebuild intro
|
|
* points periodically. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
/* at the client, connecting to intro point */
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since the service may have picked
|
|
* the introduction point maliciously */
|
|
/* The client will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
/* at the client, waiting for the service */
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
/* the client will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
/* at the service, connecting to rend point */
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since the client may have picked
|
|
* the rendezvous point maliciously */
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"Couldn't connect to the client's chosen rend point %s "
|
|
"(%s hop failed).",
|
|
escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)),
|
|
failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");
|
|
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ);
|
|
break;
|
|
/* default:
|
|
* This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
|
|
* controller did it. Just let it slide. */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Number of consecutive failures so far; should only be touched by
|
|
* circuit_launch_new and circuit_*_failure_count.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
|
/** Before the last time we called circuit_reset_failure_count(), were
|
|
* there a lot of failures? */
|
|
static int did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** Don't retry launching a new circuit if we try this many times with no
|
|
* success. */
|
|
#define MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES 5
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a new circuit; see circuit_launch_by_extend_info() for
|
|
* details on arguments. */
|
|
origin_circuit_t *
|
|
circuit_launch(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return circuit_launch_by_extend_info(purpose, NULL, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do we have enough descriptors to build paths?
|
|
* If need_exit is true, return 1 if we can build exit paths.
|
|
* (We need at least one Exit in the consensus to build exit paths.)
|
|
* If need_exit is false, return 1 if we can build internal paths.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
have_enough_path_info(int need_exit)
|
|
{
|
|
if (need_exit)
|
|
return router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT;
|
|
else
|
|
return router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a new circuit with purpose <b>purpose</b> and exit node
|
|
* <b>extend_info</b> (or NULL to select a random exit node). If flags
|
|
* contains CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME, choose among routers with high uptime. If
|
|
* CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY is set, choose among routers with high bandwidth.
|
|
* If CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL is true, the last hop need not be an exit node.
|
|
* If CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL is set, the circuit will have only one hop.
|
|
* Return the newly allocated circuit on success, or NULL on failure. */
|
|
origin_circuit_t *
|
|
circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
extend_info_t *extend_info,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0;
|
|
int have_path = have_enough_path_info(! (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) );
|
|
int need_specific_rp = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!onehop_tunnel && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Haven't %s yet; canceling "
|
|
"circuit launch.",
|
|
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
|
"fetched enough directory info" :
|
|
"received a consensus with exits");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If Tor2webRendezvousPoints is enabled and we are dealing with an
|
|
RP circuit, we want a specific RP node so we shouldn't canibalize
|
|
an already existing circuit. */
|
|
if (get_options()->Tor2webRendezvousPoints &&
|
|
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
|
|
need_specific_rp = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((extend_info || purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) &&
|
|
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
!onehop_tunnel && !need_specific_rp) {
|
|
/* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */
|
|
/* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for
|
|
* internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */
|
|
circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags);
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
uint8_t old_purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
|
|
struct timeval old_timestamp_began = circ->base_.timestamp_began;
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d (%s)",
|
|
build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
|
if ((purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
|
|
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) &&
|
|
circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
|
|
/* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a
|
|
* successfully built but unused closed circuit. We don't
|
|
* wait until the extend (or the close) because the rend
|
|
* point could be malicious.
|
|
*
|
|
* Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients
|
|
* can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them
|
|
* (especially web clients).
|
|
*
|
|
* If we decide to probe the initial portion of these circs,
|
|
* (up to the adversary's final hop), we need to remove this,
|
|
* or somehow mark the circuit with a special path state.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* This must be called before the purpose change */
|
|
pathbias_check_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), purpose);
|
|
/* Reset the start date of this circ, else expire_building
|
|
* will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
|
|
* began.
|
|
*
|
|
* Technically, the code should reset this when the
|
|
* create cell is finally sent, but we're close enough
|
|
* here. */
|
|
tor_gettimeofday(&circ->base_.timestamp_began);
|
|
|
|
control_event_circuit_cannibalized(circ, old_purpose,
|
|
&old_timestamp_began);
|
|
|
|
switch (purpose) {
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
/* it's ready right now */
|
|
break;
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
/* need to add a new hop */
|
|
tor_assert(extend_info);
|
|
if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info) < 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
"unexpected purpose %d when cannibalizing a circ.",
|
|
purpose);
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return circ;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (did_circs_fail_last_period &&
|
|
n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES) {
|
|
/* too many failed circs in a row. don't try. */
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"%d failures so far, not trying.",n_circuit_failures);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* try a circ. if it fails, circuit_mark_for_close will increment
|
|
* n_circuit_failures */
|
|
return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, extend_info, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Record another failure at opening a general circuit. When we have
|
|
* too many, we'll stop trying for the remainder of this minute.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count(void)
|
|
{
|
|
++n_circuit_failures;
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"n_circuit_failures now %d.",n_circuit_failures);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Reset the failure count for opening general circuits. This means
|
|
* we will try MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES times more (if necessary) before
|
|
* stopping again.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(int timeout)
|
|
{
|
|
if (timeout && n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES)
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
|
n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Find an open circ that we're happy to use for <b>conn</b> and return 1. If
|
|
* there isn't one, and there isn't one on the way, launch one and return
|
|
* 0. If it will never work, return -1.
|
|
*
|
|
* Write the found or in-progress or launched circ into *circp.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
uint8_t desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
origin_circuit_t **circp)
|
|
{
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
int check_exit_policy;
|
|
int need_uptime, need_internal;
|
|
int want_onehop;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(circp);
|
|
if (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
|
|
connection_t *c = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "Connection state mismatch: wanted "
|
|
"AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, but got %d (%s)",
|
|
c->state, conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state));
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
|
check_exit_policy =
|
|
conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
|
|
!conn->use_begindir &&
|
|
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
|
|
want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
|
|
|
|
need_uptime = !conn->want_onehop && !conn->use_begindir &&
|
|
smartlist_contains_int_as_string(options->LongLivedPorts,
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
need_internal = 1;
|
|
else if (conn->use_begindir || conn->want_onehop)
|
|
need_internal = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
need_internal = 0;
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 1, desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
need_uptime, need_internal);
|
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
return 1; /* we're happy */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int have_path = have_enough_path_info(!need_internal);
|
|
|
|
if (!want_onehop && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
|
|
if (!connection_get_by_type(CONN_TYPE_DIR)) {
|
|
int severity = LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
/* FFFF if this is a tunneled directory fetch, don't yell
|
|
* as loudly. the user doesn't even know it's happening. */
|
|
if (entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
|
|
entries_known_but_down(options)) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
|
"Application request when we haven't %s. "
|
|
"Optimistically trying known %s again.",
|
|
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
|
"used client functionality lately" :
|
|
"received a consensus with exits",
|
|
options->UseBridges ? "bridges" : "entrynodes");
|
|
entries_retry_all(options);
|
|
} else if (!options->UseBridges || any_bridge_descriptors_known()) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
|
"Application request when we haven't %s. "
|
|
"Optimistically trying directory fetches again.",
|
|
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
|
"used client functionality lately" :
|
|
"received a consensus with exits");
|
|
routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(time(NULL));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* the stream will be dealt with when router_have_minimum_dir_info becomes
|
|
* 1, or when all directory attempts fail and directory_all_unreachable()
|
|
* kills it.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do we need to check exit policy? */
|
|
if (check_exit_policy) {
|
|
if (!conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr, *addrp=NULL;
|
|
if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in)) {
|
|
tor_addr_from_in(&addr, &in);
|
|
addrp = &addr;
|
|
}
|
|
if (router_exit_policy_all_nodes_reject(addrp,
|
|
conn->socks_request->port,
|
|
need_uptime)) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_APP,
|
|
"No Tor server allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
|
|
safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* XXXX Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit:
|
|
* refactor into a single function. */
|
|
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
|
if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
|
|
"would refuse request. %s.",
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
if (opt) {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
/* Try again. */
|
|
return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
circp);
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* is one already on the way? */
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 0, desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
need_uptime, need_internal);
|
|
if (circ)
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "one on the way!");
|
|
if (!circ) {
|
|
extend_info_t *extend_info=NULL;
|
|
uint8_t new_circ_purpose;
|
|
const int n_pending = count_pending_general_client_circuits();
|
|
|
|
if (n_pending >= options->MaxClientCircuitsPending) {
|
|
static ratelim_t delay_limit = RATELIM_INIT(10*60);
|
|
char *m;
|
|
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&delay_limit, approx_time()))) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_APP, "We'd like to launch a circuit to handle a "
|
|
"connection, but we already have %d general-purpose client "
|
|
"circuits pending. Waiting until some finish.%s",
|
|
n_pending, m);
|
|
tor_free(m);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
|
|
/* need to pick an intro point */
|
|
rend_data_t *rend_data = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data;
|
|
tor_assert(rend_data);
|
|
extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(rend_data);
|
|
if (!extend_info) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"No intro points for '%s': re-fetching service descriptor.",
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_data);
|
|
connection_ap_mark_as_non_pending_circuit(conn);
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Chose %s as intro point for '%s'.",
|
|
extend_info_describe(extend_info),
|
|
safe_str_client(rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
|
|
* connection, then be sure to open a circuit to that exit node.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
const node_t *r;
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
|
r = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
if (r && node_has_descriptor(r)) {
|
|
/* We might want to connect to an IPv6 bridge for loading
|
|
descriptors so we use the preferred address rather than
|
|
the primary. */
|
|
extend_info = extend_info_from_node(r, conn->want_onehop ? 1 : 0);
|
|
if (!extend_info) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Could not make a one-hop connection to %s. "
|
|
"Discarding this circuit.", conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_debug(LD_DIR, "considering %d, %s",
|
|
want_onehop, conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
if (want_onehop && conn->chosen_exit_name[0] == '$') {
|
|
/* We're asking for a one-hop circuit to a router that
|
|
* we don't have a routerinfo about. Make up an extend_info. */
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
char *hexdigest = conn->chosen_exit_name+1;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
if (strlen(hexdigest) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
|
|
base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,
|
|
hexdigest,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken exit digest on tunnel conn. Closing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address) < 0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken address %s on tunnel conn. Closing.",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
extend_info = extend_info_new(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,
|
|
digest, NULL, NULL, &addr,
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We will need an onion key for the router, and we
|
|
* don't have one. Refuse or relax requirements. */
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
if (opt) {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
/* Try again with no requested exit */
|
|
return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
circp);
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND;
|
|
else if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
|
|
else
|
|
new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
|
|
if (options->Tor2webMode &&
|
|
(new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND ||
|
|
new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)) {
|
|
want_onehop = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
if (want_onehop) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
|
|
if (need_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
if (need_internal) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(new_circ_purpose, extend_info,
|
|
flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(extend_info);
|
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
|
/* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream.
|
|
* If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's
|
|
* a bad sign: we should tell the user. */
|
|
if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD &&
|
|
++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD)
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "The application request to %s:%d has launched "
|
|
"%d circuits without finding one it likes.",
|
|
escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
conn->socks_request->port,
|
|
conn->num_circuits_launched);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* help predict this next time */
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
/* write the service_id into circ */
|
|
circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data);
|
|
if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
|
|
circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
circuit_has_opened(circ);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} /* endif (!circ) */
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
/* Mark the circuit with the isolation fields for this connection.
|
|
* When the circuit arrives, we'll clear these flags: this is
|
|
* just some internal bookkeeping to make sure that we have
|
|
* launched enough circuits.
|
|
*/
|
|
connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn, circ, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,
|
|
"No safe circuit (purpose %d) ready for edge "
|
|
"connection; delaying.",
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>crypt_path</b> is one of the crypt_paths for
|
|
* <b>circ</b>. */
|
|
static int
|
|
cpath_is_on_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *crypt_path)
|
|
{
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
|
|
for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
|
|
cpath_next = cpath->next;
|
|
if (crypt_path == cpath)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff client-side optimistic data is supported. */
|
|
static int
|
|
optimistic_data_enabled(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
if (options->OptimisticData < 0) {
|
|
/* Note: this default was 0 before #18815 was merged. We can't take the
|
|
* parameter out of the consensus until versions before that are all
|
|
* obsolete. */
|
|
const int32_t enabled =
|
|
networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "UseOptimisticData", /*default*/ 1, 0, 1);
|
|
return (int)enabled;
|
|
}
|
|
return options->OptimisticData;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Attach the AP stream <b>apconn</b> to circ's linked list of
|
|
* p_streams. Also set apconn's cpath_layer to <b>cpath</b>, or to the last
|
|
* hop in circ's cpath if <b>cpath</b> is NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
{
|
|
const node_t *exitnode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* add it into the linked list of streams on this circuit */
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %u.",
|
|
(unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
|
|
/* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */
|
|
ENTRY_TO_CONN(apconn)->timestamp_lastread = time(NULL);
|
|
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->next_stream = circ->p_streams;
|
|
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
/* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */
|
|
circ->p_streams = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn);
|
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn))) {
|
|
/* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means
|
|
* that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just
|
|
* succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */
|
|
rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(
|
|
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->rend_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */
|
|
tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath));
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* use the last hop in the circuit */
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
cpath = circ->cpath->prev;
|
|
}
|
|
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->cpath_layer = cpath;
|
|
|
|
circ->isolation_any_streams_attached = 1;
|
|
connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(apconn, circ, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the exitnode if possible, for logging below */
|
|
if (cpath->extend_info)
|
|
exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
|
/* See if we can use optimistic data on this circuit */
|
|
if (optimistic_data_enabled() &&
|
|
(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
|
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED))
|
|
apconn->may_use_optimistic_data = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
apconn->may_use_optimistic_data = 0;
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Looks like completed circuit to %s %s allow "
|
|
"optimistic data for connection to %s",
|
|
circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ?
|
|
/* node_describe() does the right thing if exitnode is NULL */
|
|
safe_str_client(node_describe(exitnode)) :
|
|
"hidden service",
|
|
apconn->may_use_optimistic_data ? "does" : "doesn't",
|
|
safe_str_client(apconn->socks_request->address));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>address</b> is matched by one of the entries in
|
|
* TrackHostExits. */
|
|
int
|
|
hostname_in_track_host_exits(const or_options_t *options, const char *address)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!options->TrackHostExits)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(options->TrackHostExits, const char *, cp) {
|
|
if (cp[0] == '.') { /* match end */
|
|
if (cp[1] == '\0' ||
|
|
!strcasecmpend(address, cp) ||
|
|
!strcasecmp(address, &cp[1]))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else if (strcasecmp(cp, address) == 0) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cp);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If an exit wasn't explicitly specified for <b>conn</b>, consider saving
|
|
* the exit that we *did* choose for use by future connections to
|
|
* <b>conn</b>'s destination.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(const entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
char *new_address = NULL;
|
|
char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
|
/* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */
|
|
/* If they're not in the address map.. */
|
|
if (!options->TrackHostExits ||
|
|
addressmap_have_mapping(conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
options->TrackHostExitsExpire))
|
|
return; /* nothing to track, or already mapped */
|
|
|
|
if (!hostname_in_track_host_exits(options, conn->socks_request->address) ||
|
|
!circ->build_state->chosen_exit)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* write down the fingerprint of the chosen exit, not the nickname,
|
|
* because the chosen exit might not be named. */
|
|
base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* Add this exit/hostname pair to the addressmap. */
|
|
tor_asprintf(&new_address, "%s.%s.exit",
|
|
conn->socks_request->address, fp);
|
|
|
|
addressmap_register(conn->socks_request->address, new_address,
|
|
time(NULL) + options->TrackHostExitsExpire,
|
|
ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Attempt to attach the connection <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, and send a
|
|
* begin or resolve cell as appropriate. Return values are as for
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit. The stream will exit from the hop
|
|
* indicated by <b>cpath</b>, or from the last hop in circ's cpath if
|
|
* <b>cpath</b> is NULL. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT ||
|
|
base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
|
|
|
if (!circ->base_.timestamp_dirty ||
|
|
((conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags & ISO_SOCKSAUTH) &&
|
|
(conn->entry_cfg.socks_iso_keep_alive) &&
|
|
(conn->socks_request->usernamelen ||
|
|
conn->socks_request->passwordlen))) {
|
|
/* When stream isolation is in use and controlled by an application
|
|
* we are willing to keep using the stream. */
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = approx_time();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
|
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, circ, cpath);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
|
|
if (!conn->use_begindir)
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(conn, circ);
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Try to find a safe live circuit for CONN_TYPE_AP connection conn. If
|
|
* we don't find one: if conn cannot be handled by any known nodes,
|
|
* warn and return -1 (conn needs to die, and is maybe already marked);
|
|
* else launch new circuit (if necessary) and return 0.
|
|
* Otherwise, associate conn with a safe live circuit, do the
|
|
* right next step, and return 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* XXXX this function should mark for close whenever it returns -1;
|
|
* its callers shouldn't have to worry about that. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
|
|
int retval;
|
|
int conn_age;
|
|
int want_onehop;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
|
|
|
|
conn_age = (int)(time(NULL) - base_conn->timestamp_created);
|
|
|
|
if (conn_age >= get_options()->SocksTimeout) {
|
|
int severity = (tor_addr_is_null(&base_conn->addr) && !base_conn->port) ?
|
|
LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP,
|
|
"Tried for %d seconds to get a connection to %s:%d. Giving up.",
|
|
conn_age, safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn))) {
|
|
/* we're a general conn */
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Are we linked to a dir conn that aims to fetch a consensus?
|
|
* We check here because this conn might no longer be needed. */
|
|
if (base_conn->linked_conn &&
|
|
base_conn->linked_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
|
|
base_conn->linked_conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS) {
|
|
|
|
/* Yes we are. Is there a consensus fetch farther along than us? */
|
|
if (networkstatus_consensus_is_already_downloading(
|
|
TO_DIR_CONN(base_conn->linked_conn)->requested_resource)) {
|
|
/* We're doing the "multiple consensus fetch attempts" game from
|
|
* proposal 210, and we're late to the party. Just close this conn.
|
|
* The circuit and TLS conn that we made will time out after a while
|
|
* if nothing else wants to use them. */
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Closing extra consensus fetch (to %s) since one "
|
|
"is already downloading.", base_conn->linked_conn->address);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
|
if (!node && !want_onehop) {
|
|
/* We ran into this warning when trying to extend a circuit to a
|
|
* hidden service directory for which we didn't have a router
|
|
* descriptor. See flyspray task 767 for more details. We should
|
|
* keep this in mind when deciding to use BEGIN_DIR cells for other
|
|
* directory requests as well. -KL*/
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
if (opt) {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
|
|
"would refuse request. %s.",
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
if (opt) {
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. */
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, &circ);
|
|
if (retval < 1) // XXXX++ if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).",
|
|
(unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
/* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are
|
|
* sucking. */
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
|
|
|
|
/* We have found a suitable circuit for our conn. Hurray. */
|
|
return connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* we're a rendezvous conn */
|
|
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc=NULL, *introcirc=NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->cpath_layer);
|
|
|
|
/* start by finding a rendezvous circuit for us */
|
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED, &rendcirc);
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
|
tor_assert(rendcirc);
|
|
/* one is already established, attach */
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"rend joined circ %u already here. attaching. "
|
|
"(stream %d sec old)",
|
|
(unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
/* Mark rendezvous circuits as 'newly dirty' every time you use
|
|
* them, since the process of rebuilding a rendezvous circ is so
|
|
* expensive. There is a tradeoff between linkability and
|
|
* feasibility, at this point.
|
|
*/
|
|
rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* We've also attempted to use them. If they fail, we need to
|
|
* probe them for path bias */
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
|
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, rendcirc, NULL);
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
|
|
return 0; /* already marked, let them fade away */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point we need to re-check the state, since it's possible that
|
|
* our call to circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() changed the connection's
|
|
* state from "CIRCUIT_WAIT" to "RENDDESC_WAIT" because we decided to
|
|
* re-fetch the descriptor.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "This connection is no longer ready to attach; its "
|
|
"state changed."
|
|
"(We probably have to re-fetch its descriptor.)");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && (rendcirc->base_.purpose ==
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"pending-join circ %u already here, with intro ack. "
|
|
"Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
(unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* it's on its way. find an intro circ. */
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, &introcirc);
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
|
/* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc);
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Intro circ %u present and awaiting ack (rend %u). "
|
|
"Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
(unsigned)introcirc->base_.n_circ_id,
|
|
rendcirc ? (unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id : 0,
|
|
conn_age);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now rendcirc and introcirc are each either undefined or not finished */
|
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && introcirc &&
|
|
rendcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
"ready rend circ %u already here (no intro-ack yet on "
|
|
"intro %u). (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
(unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id,
|
|
(unsigned)introcirc->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
|
|
if (introcirc->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"found open intro circ %u (rend %u); sending "
|
|
"introduction. (stream %d sec old)",
|
|
(unsigned)introcirc->base_.n_circ_id,
|
|
(unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id,
|
|
conn_age);
|
|
switch (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc)) {
|
|
case 0: /* success */
|
|
rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case -1: /* transient error */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case -2: /* permanent error */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
default: /* oops */
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Intro (%u) and rend (%u) circs are not both ready. "
|
|
"Stalling conn. (%d sec old)",
|
|
introcirc ? (unsigned)introcirc->base_.n_circ_id : 0,
|
|
rendcirc ? (unsigned)rendcirc->base_.n_circ_id : 0, conn_age);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Change <b>circ</b>'s purpose to <b>new_purpose</b>. */
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_change_purpose(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t new_purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t old_purpose;
|
|
/* Don't allow an OR circ to become an origin circ or vice versa. */
|
|
tor_assert(!!(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) ==
|
|
!!(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(new_purpose)));
|
|
|
|
if (circ->purpose == new_purpose) return;
|
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
char old_purpose_desc[80] = "";
|
|
|
|
strncpy(old_purpose_desc, circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose), 80-1);
|
|
old_purpose_desc[80-1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"changing purpose of origin circ %d "
|
|
"from \"%s\" (%d) to \"%s\" (%d)",
|
|
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
|
|
old_purpose_desc,
|
|
circ->purpose,
|
|
circuit_purpose_to_string(new_purpose),
|
|
new_purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
old_purpose = circ->purpose;
|
|
circ->purpose = new_purpose;
|
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
control_event_circuit_purpose_changed(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
old_purpose);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark <b>circ</b> so that no more connections can be attached to it. */
|
|
void
|
|
mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX This is a kludge; we're only keeping it around in case there's
|
|
* something that doesn't check unusable_for_new_conns, and to avoid
|
|
* deeper refactoring of our expiration logic. */
|
|
if (! circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = approx_time();
|
|
if (options->MaxCircuitDirtiness >= circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = 1; /* prevent underflow */
|
|
else
|
|
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
|
|
|
|
circ->unusable_for_new_conns = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|