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2983 lines
100 KiB
C
2983 lines
100 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file connection_or.c
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* \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
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* cells on the network.
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*
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* An or_connection_t is a subtype of connection_t (as implemented in
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* connection.c) that uses a TLS connection to send and receive cells on the
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* Tor network. (By sending and receiving cells connection_or.c, it cooperates
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* with channeltls.c to implement a the channel interface of channel.c.)
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*
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* Every OR connection has an underlying tortls_t object (as implemented in
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* tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream. It is responsible for
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* sending and receiving cells over that TLS.
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*
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* This module also implements the client side of the v3 Tor link handshake,
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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#include "bridges.h"
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#include "buffers.h"
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/*
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* Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
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* part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
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*/
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#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
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#define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE
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#include "channel.h"
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#include "channeltls.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuitstats.h"
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#include "command.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "connection_or.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "dirserv.h"
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#include "entrynodes.h"
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#include "geoip.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "link_handshake.h"
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#include "microdesc.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "proto_cell.h"
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#include "reasons.h"
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#include "relay.h"
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#include "rephist.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "routerkeys.h"
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#include "routerlist.h"
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#include "ext_orport.h"
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#include "scheduler.h"
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#include "torcert.h"
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#include "channelpadding.h"
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static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
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int started_here,
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char *digest_rcvd_out);
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static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
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static unsigned int
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connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
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static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
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/*
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* Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning
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* channel can be handled.
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*/
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static void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state);
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static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn,
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int started_here);
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/**************************************************************/
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/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR
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* connections. */
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static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
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/** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data
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* structures as appropriate.*/
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void
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connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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tor_assert(conn);
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memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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/** Clear all identities in OR conns.*/
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void
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connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
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{
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smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
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{
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if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
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connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
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}
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});
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}
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/** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
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* the appropriate digest maps.
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*
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* NOTE that this function only allows two kinds of transitions: from
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* unset identity to set identity, and from idempotent re-settings
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* of the same identity. It's not allowed to clear an identity or to
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* change an identity. Return 0 on success, and -1 if the transition
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* is not allowed.
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**/
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static void
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connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn,
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const char *rsa_digest,
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const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
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{
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channel_t *chan = NULL;
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(rsa_digest);
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if (conn->chan)
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chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
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log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %p (%s): %s %s.",
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conn,
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escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address),
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hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
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ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
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log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, " (Previously: %s %s)",
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hex_str(conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
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chan ? ed25519_fmt(&chan->ed25519_identity) : "<null>");
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const int rsa_id_was_set = ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
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const int ed_id_was_set =
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chan && !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
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const int rsa_changed =
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tor_memneq(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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const int ed_changed = ed_id_was_set &&
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(!ed_id || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id, &chan->ed25519_identity));
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tor_assert(!rsa_changed || !rsa_id_was_set);
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tor_assert(!ed_changed || !ed_id_was_set);
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if (!rsa_changed && !ed_changed)
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return;
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/* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
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if (rsa_id_was_set) {
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connection_or_clear_identity(conn);
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if (chan)
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channel_clear_identity_digest(chan);
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}
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memcpy(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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/* If we're initializing the IDs to zero, don't add a mapping yet. */
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(rsa_digest) &&
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(!ed_id || ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)))
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return;
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/* Deal with channels */
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if (chan)
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channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id);
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}
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/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the
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* global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the
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* connection itself. */
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void
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connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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or_connection_t *tmp;
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if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
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return;
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if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
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return;
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tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id);
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if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
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tor_assert(tmp == conn);
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memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
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}
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/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such
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* connection is found. */
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or_connection_t *
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connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id)
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{
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if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
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return NULL;
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return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id);
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}
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/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */
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void
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connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void)
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{
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digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL);
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orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
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}
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/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn</b> and deposits
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* it into the global list of identifiers. */
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void
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connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN];
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or_connection_t *tmp;
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if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
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orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new();
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/* Remove any previous identifiers: */
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if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
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connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn);
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do {
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crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id));
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} while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id));
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if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
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conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
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memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
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tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn);
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tor_assert(!tmp);
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}
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/**************************************************************/
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/** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when
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* failed, to an intptr_t describing the count of connections that failed that
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* way. Note that the count is stored _as_ the pointer.
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*/
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static strmap_t *broken_connection_counts;
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/** If true, do not record information in <b>broken_connection_counts</b>. */
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static int disable_broken_connection_counts = 0;
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/** Record that an OR connection failed in <b>state</b>. */
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static void
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note_broken_connection(const char *state)
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{
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void *ptr;
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intptr_t val;
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if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
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return;
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if (!broken_connection_counts)
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broken_connection_counts = strmap_new();
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ptr = strmap_get(broken_connection_counts, state);
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val = (intptr_t)ptr;
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val++;
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ptr = (void*)val;
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strmap_set(broken_connection_counts, state, ptr);
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}
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/** Forget all recorded states for failed connections. If
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* <b>stop_recording</b> is true, don't record any more. */
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void
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clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
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{
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if (broken_connection_counts)
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strmap_free(broken_connection_counts, NULL);
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broken_connection_counts = NULL;
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if (stop_recording)
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disable_broken_connection_counts = 1;
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}
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/** Write a detailed description the state of <b>orconn</b> into the
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* <b>buflen</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. This description includes not
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* only the OR-conn level state but also the TLS state. It's useful for
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* diagnosing broken handshakes. */
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static void
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connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn,
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char *buf, size_t buflen)
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{
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connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(orconn);
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const char *conn_state;
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char tls_state[256];
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
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conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state);
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tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state));
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tor_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s with SSL state %s", conn_state, tls_state);
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}
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/** Record the current state of <b>orconn</b> as the state of a broken
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* connection. */
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static void
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connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_connection_t *orconn)
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{
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char buf[256];
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if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
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return;
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connection_or_get_state_description(orconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
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log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Connection died in state '%s'", buf);
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note_broken_connection(buf);
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}
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/** Helper type used to sort connection states and find the most frequent. */
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typedef struct broken_state_count_t {
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intptr_t count;
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const char *state;
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} broken_state_count_t;
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/** Helper function used to sort broken_state_count_t by frequency. */
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static int
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broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
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{
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const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr;
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if (b->count < a->count)
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return -1;
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else if (b->count == a->count)
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return 0;
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else
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return 1;
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}
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/** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection
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* failure. */
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#define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT 10
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/** Report a list of the top states for failed OR connections at log level
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* <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
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void
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connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
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{
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int total = 0;
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smartlist_t *items;
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if (!broken_connection_counts || disable_broken_connection_counts)
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return;
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items = smartlist_new();
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STRMAP_FOREACH(broken_connection_counts, state, void *, countptr) {
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broken_state_count_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(broken_state_count_t));
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c->count = (intptr_t)countptr;
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total += (int)c->count;
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c->state = state;
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smartlist_add(items, c);
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} STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
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smartlist_sort(items, broken_state_count_compare);
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tor_log(severity, domain, "%d connections have failed%s", total,
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smartlist_len(items) > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT ? ". Top reasons:" : ":");
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const broken_state_count_t *, c) {
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if (c_sl_idx > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT)
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break;
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tor_log(severity, domain,
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" %d connections died in state %s", (int)c->count, c->state);
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, broken_state_count_t *, c, tor_free(c));
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smartlist_free(items);
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}
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/** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
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* be notified.
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*/
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static void
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connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
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{
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uint8_t old_state;
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tor_assert(conn);
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old_state = conn->base_.state;
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conn->base_.state = state;
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if (conn->chan)
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channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn,
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old_state, state);
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}
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/** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
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* be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
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* shouldn't maintain two copies. */
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MOCK_IMPL(int,
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connection_or_get_num_circuits, (or_connection_t *conn))
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{
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tor_assert(conn);
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if (conn->chan) {
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return channel_num_circuits(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
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} else return 0;
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}
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/**************************************************************/
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/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
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* in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
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* wire format.
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*
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* Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>-\>next: the caller
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* should set it or clear it as appropriate.
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*/
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void
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cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
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{
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char *dest = dst->body;
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if (wide_circ_ids) {
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set_uint32(dest, htonl(src->circ_id));
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dest += 4;
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} else {
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/* Clear the last two bytes of dest, in case we can accidentally
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* send them to the network somehow. */
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memset(dest+CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE-2, 0, 2);
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set_uint16(dest, htons(src->circ_id));
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dest += 2;
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}
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set_uint8(dest, src->command);
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memcpy(dest+1, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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}
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/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
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* cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
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*/
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static void
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cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
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{
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if (wide_circ_ids) {
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dest->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(src));
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src += 4;
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} else {
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dest->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src));
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src += 2;
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}
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dest->command = get_uint8(src);
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memcpy(dest->payload, src+1, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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}
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/** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
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* bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. Returns number of bytes used. */
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int
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var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
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{
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int r;
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if (wide_circ_ids) {
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set_uint32(hdr_out, htonl(cell->circ_id));
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hdr_out += 4;
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r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE;
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} else {
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set_uint16(hdr_out, htons(cell->circ_id));
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hdr_out += 2;
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r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
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}
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set_uint8(hdr_out, cell->command);
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set_uint16(hdr_out+1, htons(cell->payload_len));
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return r;
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}
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/** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
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* payload space. */
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var_cell_t *
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var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
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{
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size_t size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + payload_len;
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var_cell_t *cell = tor_malloc_zero(size);
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cell->payload_len = payload_len;
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cell->command = 0;
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cell->circ_id = 0;
|
|
return cell;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Copy a var_cell_t
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
var_cell_t *
|
|
var_cell_copy(const var_cell_t *src)
|
|
{
|
|
var_cell_t *copy = NULL;
|
|
size_t size = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (src != NULL) {
|
|
size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + src->payload_len;
|
|
copy = tor_malloc_zero(size);
|
|
copy->payload_len = src->payload_len;
|
|
copy->command = src->command;
|
|
copy->circ_id = src->circ_id;
|
|
memcpy(copy->payload, src->payload, copy->payload_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return copy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
|
|
void
|
|
var_cell_free_(var_cell_t *cell)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_free(cell);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
|
|
connection_or_close_normally(conn, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
|
|
* If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
|
|
* connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
|
|
* (else do nothing).
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
/** Don't let the inbuf of a nonopen OR connection grow beyond this many
|
|
* bytes: it's either a broken client, a non-Tor client, or a DOS
|
|
* attempt. */
|
|
#define MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN 0
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
switch (conn->base_.state) {
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
|
|
ret = connection_read_proxy_handshake(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
|
|
/* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
|
|
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
|
|
return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
|
|
default:
|
|
break; /* don't do anything */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This check was necessary with 0.2.2, when the TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
|
|
* check would otherwise just let data accumulate. It serves no purpose
|
|
* in 0.2.3.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXXX Remove this check once we verify that the above paragraph is
|
|
* 100% true. */
|
|
if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) > MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated too much data (%d bytes) "
|
|
"on nonopen OR connection %s %s:%u in state %s; closing.",
|
|
(int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
|
|
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn) ? "to" : "from",
|
|
conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
|
|
conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
|
|
* from active circuits. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t datalen;
|
|
|
|
/* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
|
|
/* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
|
|
* high water mark. */
|
|
datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
|
|
/* Let the scheduler know */
|
|
scheduler_channel_wants_writes(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** This is for channeltls.c to ask how many cells we could accept if
|
|
* they were available. */
|
|
ssize_t
|
|
connection_or_num_cells_writeable(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t datalen, cell_network_size;
|
|
ssize_t n = 0;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we're under the high water mark, we're potentially
|
|
* writeable; note this is different from the calculation above
|
|
* used to trigger when to start writing after we've stopped.
|
|
*/
|
|
datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
if (datalen < OR_CONN_HIGHWATER) {
|
|
cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, cell_network_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
|
|
* its outbuf.
|
|
*
|
|
* Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
|
|
* return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
|
|
|
|
switch (conn->base_.state) {
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
|
|
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->base_.state);
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
|
|
connection_t *conn;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
|
|
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
|
|
conn->address,conn->port);
|
|
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
|
|
/* start proxy handshake */
|
|
if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_start_reading(conn);
|
|
connection_or_change_state(or_conn, OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
|
|
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an OR connection:
|
|
* perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
/* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
|
|
if (or_conn->chan) {
|
|
channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
|
|
/*
|
|
* NULL this out because the channel might hang around a little
|
|
* longer before channel_run_cleanup() gets it.
|
|
*/
|
|
or_conn->chan->conn = NULL;
|
|
or_conn->chan = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
|
|
if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
/* now mark things down as needed */
|
|
if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_conn)) {
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_conn);
|
|
/* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
|
|
entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
|
|
if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
|
|
int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
|
|
reason);
|
|
if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
|
|
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
|
|
orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason),
|
|
reason, or_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) {
|
|
/* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally
|
|
* closing a connection. */
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
|
|
tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
|
|
} else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
|
|
tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
|
|
* currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
|
|
{
|
|
if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
|
|
return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
|
|
if (router_get_by_id_digest(id_digest))
|
|
return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
|
|
* it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
|
|
* relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
|
|
* per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
|
|
* not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
|
|
* check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full. Otherwise, just
|
|
* clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset,
|
|
const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
int rate, burst; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
|
|
if (connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(conn->identity_digest)) {
|
|
/* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
|
|
* was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
|
|
* give it full bandwidth. */
|
|
rate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
|
|
burst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
|
|
* bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
|
|
* options to override. */
|
|
rate = options->PerConnBWRate ? (int)options->PerConnBWRate :
|
|
networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwrate",
|
|
(int)options->BandwidthRate, 1, INT32_MAX);
|
|
burst = options->PerConnBWBurst ? (int)options->PerConnBWBurst :
|
|
networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwburst",
|
|
(int)options->BandwidthBurst, 1, INT32_MAX);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->bandwidthrate = rate;
|
|
conn->bandwidthburst = burst;
|
|
if (reset) { /* set up the token buckets to be full */
|
|
conn->read_bucket = conn->write_bucket = burst;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If the new token bucket is smaller, take out the extra tokens.
|
|
* (If it's larger, don't -- the buckets can grow to reach the cap.) */
|
|
if (conn->read_bucket > burst)
|
|
conn->read_bucket = burst;
|
|
if (conn->write_bucket > burst)
|
|
conn->write_bucket = burst;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
|
|
* Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
|
|
* sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns,
|
|
const or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
|
|
{
|
|
if (connection_speaks_cells(conn))
|
|
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0, options);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Mark <b>or_conn</b> as canonical if <b>is_canonical</b> is set, and
|
|
* non-canonical otherwise. Adjust idle_timeout accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_set_canonical(or_connection_t *or_conn,
|
|
int is_canonical)
|
|
{
|
|
if (bool_eq(is_canonical, or_conn->is_canonical) &&
|
|
or_conn->idle_timeout != 0) {
|
|
/* Don't recalculate an existing idle_timeout unless the canonical
|
|
* status changed. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
or_conn->is_canonical = !! is_canonical; /* force to a 1-bit boolean */
|
|
or_conn->idle_timeout = channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(
|
|
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), is_canonical);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Channel " U64_FORMAT " chose an idle timeout of %d.",
|
|
or_conn->chan ?
|
|
U64_PRINTF_ARG(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)->global_identifier):0,
|
|
or_conn->idle_timeout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
|
|
* have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
|
|
* by checking to see if this describes a router we know.
|
|
* <b>started_here</b> is 1 if we are the initiator of <b>conn</b> and
|
|
* 0 if it's an incoming connection. */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
const char *id_digest,
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
|
|
int started_here)
|
|
{
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "init conn from address %s: %s, %s (%d)",
|
|
fmt_addr(addr),
|
|
hex_str((const char*)id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
ed25519_fmt(ed_id),
|
|
started_here);
|
|
|
|
connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id);
|
|
connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(conn, 1, get_options());
|
|
|
|
conn->base_.port = port;
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&conn->real_addr, addr);
|
|
|
|
connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check whether the identity of <b>conn</b> matches a known node. If it
|
|
* does, check whether the address of conn matches the expected address, and
|
|
* update the connection's is_canonical flag, nickname, and address fields as
|
|
* appropriate. */
|
|
static void
|
|
connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
|
|
const tor_addr_t *addr = &conn->real_addr;
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
|
|
|
|
const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
|
|
if (r &&
|
|
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(r, 1) &&
|
|
! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
|
|
/* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
|
|
* we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */
|
|
r = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
tor_addr_port_t node_ap;
|
|
node_get_pref_orport(r, &node_ap);
|
|
/* XXXX proposal 186 is making this more complex. For now, a conn
|
|
is canonical when it uses the _preferred_ address. */
|
|
if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr))
|
|
connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1);
|
|
if (!started_here) {
|
|
/* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
|
|
* This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
|
|
* its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
|
|
/* XXXX arma: this is stupid, and it's the reason we need real_addr
|
|
* to track is_canonical properly. What requires it? */
|
|
/* XXXX <arma> i believe the reason we did this, originally, is because
|
|
* we wanted to log what OR a connection was to, and if we logged the
|
|
* right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we
|
|
* log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2.
|
|
*/
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr);
|
|
conn->base_.port = node_ap.port;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(conn->nickname);
|
|
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
|
|
tor_free(conn->base_.address);
|
|
conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap.addr);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_free(conn->nickname);
|
|
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(conn->base_.address);
|
|
conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have to tell channeltls.c to update the channel marks (local, in
|
|
* particular), since we may have changed the address.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (conn->chan) {
|
|
channel_tls_update_marks(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
|
|
* channel_t */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (or_conn->chan)
|
|
return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (or_conn->chan)
|
|
channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
|
|
* too old for new circuits? */
|
|
#define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
|
|
|
|
/** Expire an or_connection if it is too old. Helper for
|
|
* connection_or_group_set_badness_ and fast path for
|
|
* channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if the connection was already expired, else 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now,
|
|
or_connection_t *or_conn,
|
|
int force)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXXX this function should also be about channels? */
|
|
if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
|
|
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (force ||
|
|
or_conn->base_.timestamp_created + TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
|
|
< now) {
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Marking OR conn to %s:%d as too old for new circuits "
|
|
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
|
|
or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
|
|
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
|
|
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given
|
|
* identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
|
|
* appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
|
|
*
|
|
* Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
|
|
* - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
|
|
* - all connections that are too old.
|
|
* - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
|
|
* exists to the same router.
|
|
* - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
|
|
* connection exists to the same router.
|
|
* - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
|
|
* connection exists to the same router at the same address.
|
|
*
|
|
* See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
|
|
* connection better than another.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXXX this function should be entirely about channels, not OR
|
|
* XXXX connections. */
|
|
|
|
or_connection_t *best = NULL;
|
|
int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
|
|
* everything else is. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
|
|
if (connection_or_single_set_badness_(now, or_conn, force))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
|
|
++n_old;
|
|
} else if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
++n_inprogress;
|
|
} else if (or_conn->is_canonical) {
|
|
++n_canonical;
|
|
} else {
|
|
++n_other;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
|
|
* expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
|
|
if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
|
|
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
|
|
continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
|
|
if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
|
|
* when the connection finishes. */
|
|
if (n_canonical && !or_conn->is_canonical) {
|
|
/* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
|
|
* and this one is open but not canonical. Mark it bad. */
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
|
|
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). It is not "
|
|
"canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
|
|
or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
|
|
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
|
|
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!best ||
|
|
channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
|
|
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan))) {
|
|
best = or_conn;
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (!best)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best. If it's canonical, mark as bad
|
|
* every other open connection. If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
|
|
* every other open connection to the same address.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
|
|
* addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
|
|
* bad every open connection that isn't best for its address. But this
|
|
* can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
|
|
* canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
|
|
* at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
|
|
* means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway). As
|
|
* 0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
|
|
* "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
|
|
*/
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
|
|
if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
|
|
connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn) ||
|
|
or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (or_conn != best &&
|
|
channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
|
|
TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan))) {
|
|
/* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
|
|
if (best->is_canonical) {
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
|
|
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
|
|
"We have a better canonical one "
|
|
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
|
|
or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
|
|
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
|
|
best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
|
|
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
|
|
} else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
|
|
&best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
"Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
|
|
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
|
|
"one with the "
|
|
"same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
|
|
or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
|
|
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
|
|
best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
|
|
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Lifetime of a connection failure. After that, we'll retry. This is in
|
|
* seconds. */
|
|
#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME 60
|
|
/* The interval to use with when to clean up the failure cache. */
|
|
#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 60
|
|
|
|
/* When is the next time we have to cleanup the failure map. We keep this
|
|
* because we clean it opportunistically. */
|
|
static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* OR connection failure entry data structure. It is kept in the connection
|
|
* failure map defined below and indexed by OR identity digest, address and
|
|
* port.
|
|
*
|
|
* We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
|
|
* want to avoid to wrongfully blacklist a relay if someone is trying to
|
|
* extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
|
|
* it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
|
|
* descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
|
|
* IP/port/identity all together, not only the relay identity. */
|
|
typedef struct or_connect_failure_entry_t {
|
|
HT_ENTRY(or_connect_failure_entry_t) node;
|
|
/* Identity digest of the connection where it is connecting to. */
|
|
uint8_t identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
/* This is the connection address from the base connection_t. After the
|
|
* connection is checked for canonicity, the base address should represent
|
|
* what we know instead of where we are connecting to. This is what we need
|
|
* so we can correlate known relays within the consensus. */
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
uint16_t port;
|
|
/* Last time we were unable to connect. */
|
|
time_t last_failed_connect_ts;
|
|
} or_connect_failure_entry_t;
|
|
|
|
/* Map where we keep connection failure entries. They are indexed by addr,
|
|
* port and identity digest. */
|
|
static HT_HEAD(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t)
|
|
or_connect_failures_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
|
|
|
|
/* Helper: Hashtable equal function. Return 1 if equal else 0. */
|
|
static int
|
|
or_connect_failure_ht_eq(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *a,
|
|
const or_connect_failure_entry_t *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return fast_memeq(a->identity_digest, b->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
|
|
tor_addr_eq(&a->addr, &b->addr) &&
|
|
a->port == b->port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Helper: Return the hash for the hashtable of the given entry. For this
|
|
* table, it is a combination of address, port and identity digest. */
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t offset = 0, addr_size;
|
|
const void *addr_ptr;
|
|
/* Largest size is IPv6 and IPv4 is smaller so it is fine. */
|
|
uint8_t data[16 + sizeof(uint16_t) + DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
|
|
/* Get the right address bytes depending on the family. */
|
|
switch (tor_addr_family(&entry->addr)) {
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
addr_size = 4;
|
|
addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in_addr.s_addr;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
addr_size = 16;
|
|
addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in6_addr.s6_addr;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data, addr_ptr, addr_size);
|
|
offset += addr_size;
|
|
memcpy(data + offset, entry->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
offset += DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
set_uint16(data + offset, entry->port);
|
|
offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
|
|
|
|
return (unsigned int) siphash24g(data, offset);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
|
|
or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq)
|
|
|
|
HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
|
|
or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq,
|
|
0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_)
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest,
|
|
* addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */
|
|
static void
|
|
or_connect_failure_init(const char *identity_digest, const tor_addr_t *addr,
|
|
uint16_t port, or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(ocf);
|
|
if (identity_digest) {
|
|
memcpy(ocf->identity_digest, identity_digest,
|
|
sizeof(ocf->identity_digest));
|
|
}
|
|
if (addr) {
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&ocf->addr, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
ocf->port = port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return a newly allocated connection failure entry. It is initialized with
|
|
* the given or_conn data. This can't fail. */
|
|
static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
|
|
or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
|
|
or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &or_conn->real_addr,
|
|
TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
|
|
return ocf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return a connection failure entry matching the given or_conn. NULL is
|
|
* returned if not found. */
|
|
static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
|
|
or_connect_failure_find(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connect_failure_entry_t lookup;
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
|
|
TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, &lookup);
|
|
return HT_FIND(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, &lookup);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note down in the connection failure cache that a failure occurred on the
|
|
* given or_conn. */
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
|
|
if (ocf == NULL) {
|
|
ocf = or_connect_failure_new(or_conn);
|
|
HT_INSERT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ocf);
|
|
}
|
|
ocf->last_failed_connect_ts = approx_time();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup the connection failure cache and remove all entries below the
|
|
* given cutoff. */
|
|
static void
|
|
or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(time_t cutoff)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connect_failure_entry_t **ptr, **next, *entry;
|
|
|
|
for (ptr = HT_START(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map);
|
|
ptr != NULL; ptr = next) {
|
|
entry = *ptr;
|
|
if (entry->last_failed_connect_ts <= cutoff) {
|
|
next = HT_NEXT_RMV(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
|
|
tor_free(entry);
|
|
} else {
|
|
next = HT_NEXT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return true iff the given OR connection can connect to its destination that
|
|
* is the triplet identity_digest, address and port.
|
|
*
|
|
* The or_conn MUST have gone through connection_or_check_canonicity() so the
|
|
* base address is properly set to what we know or doesn't know. */
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t now, cutoff;
|
|
time_t connect_failed_since_ts = 0;
|
|
or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(or_conn);
|
|
|
|
now = approx_time();
|
|
cutoff = now - OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME;
|
|
|
|
/* Opportunistically try to cleanup the failure cache. We do that at regular
|
|
* interval so it doesn't grow too big. */
|
|
if (or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts <= now) {
|
|
or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(cutoff);
|
|
or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts =
|
|
now + OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Look if we have failed previously to the same destination as this
|
|
* OR connection. */
|
|
ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
|
|
if (ocf) {
|
|
connect_failed_since_ts = ocf->last_failed_connect_ts;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If we do have an unable to connect timestamp and it is below cutoff, we
|
|
* can connect. Or we have never failed before so let it connect. */
|
|
if (connect_failed_since_ts > cutoff) {
|
|
goto no_connect;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ok we can connect! */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
no_connect:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
|
|
* a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
|
|
*
|
|
* <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
|
|
* <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
int reason, const char *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason);
|
|
if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(get_options()))
|
|
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn);
|
|
note_or_connect_failed(conn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
|
|
* connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
|
|
*
|
|
* <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
|
|
* <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
int reason, const char *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
channel_t *chan;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
/* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
|
|
if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
|
|
connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
|
|
|
|
/* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
|
|
if (conn->chan) {
|
|
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
|
|
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
|
|
if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
|
|
channel_close_for_error(chan);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
|
|
* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>. Optionally,
|
|
* pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
|
|
* return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
|
|
* new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
|
|
* call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
|
|
* ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
|
|
* OPs connecting to ORs.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(or_connection_t *,
|
|
connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
const char *id_digest,
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
|
|
channel_tls_t *chan))
|
|
{
|
|
or_connection_t *conn;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int socket_error = 0;
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
tor_addr_t proxy_addr;
|
|
uint16_t proxy_port;
|
|
int proxy_type;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(_addr);
|
|
tor_assert(id_digest);
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&addr, _addr);
|
|
|
|
if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 "
|
|
"identity. Refusing.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, tor_addr_family(&addr));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
|
|
*
|
|
* This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
|
|
* so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
|
|
* keep the channel up to date.
|
|
*/
|
|
conn->chan = chan;
|
|
chan->conn = conn;
|
|
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* We have a proper OR connection setup, now check if we can connect to it
|
|
* that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
|
|
* constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
|
|
if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to identity %s at %s:%u because we "
|
|
"failed earlier. Refusing.",
|
|
hex_str(id_digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr),
|
|
TO_CONN(conn)->port);
|
|
connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
|
|
|
|
conn->is_outgoing = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */
|
|
r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
if (r == 0) {
|
|
conn->proxy_type = proxy_type;
|
|
if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
|
|
tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr);
|
|
port = proxy_port;
|
|
conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that
|
|
references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines
|
|
defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to
|
|
output a useful log message to the user. */
|
|
const char *transport_name =
|
|
find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr,
|
|
TO_CONN(conn)->port);
|
|
|
|
if (transport_name) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We were supposed to connect to bridge '%s' "
|
|
"using pluggable transport '%s', but we can't find a pluggable "
|
|
"transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
|
|
"haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
|
|
"your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
|
|
fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port),
|
|
transport_name, transport_name);
|
|
|
|
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
|
|
"Can't connect to bridge",
|
|
END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING,
|
|
conn);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to '%s' through a proxy, but "
|
|
"the proxy address could not be found.",
|
|
fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->base_.address,
|
|
&addr, port, &socket_error)) {
|
|
case -1:
|
|
/* We failed to establish a connection probably because of a local
|
|
* error. No need to blame the guard in this case. Notify the networking
|
|
* system of this failure. */
|
|
connection_or_connect_failed(conn,
|
|
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
|
|
tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
|
|
connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
case 0:
|
|
connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), READ_EVENT | WRITE_EVENT);
|
|
/* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
|
|
error indicates broken link on windows */
|
|
return conn;
|
|
/* case 1: fall through */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
|
|
/* already marked for close */
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return conn;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
|
|
* the closing state.
|
|
*
|
|
* It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and
|
|
* channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside
|
|
* its control, like the remote end closing it. It can also be a local
|
|
* reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than
|
|
* the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in
|
|
* run_connection_housekeeping(). If you want to close a channel_t
|
|
* from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels
|
|
* rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also
|
|
* the comment on that function in channel.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
|
|
{
|
|
channel_t *chan = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(orconn);
|
|
if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
|
|
else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
|
|
if (orconn->chan) {
|
|
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
|
|
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
|
|
if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
|
|
channel_close_from_lower_layer(chan);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
|
|
* the error state.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(void,
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error,(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush))
|
|
{
|
|
channel_t *chan = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(orconn);
|
|
if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
|
|
else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
|
|
if (orconn->chan) {
|
|
chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
|
|
/* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
|
|
if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
|
|
channel_close_for_error(chan);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
|
|
* we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
|
|
*
|
|
* Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
|
|
* pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(int,
|
|
connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving))
|
|
{
|
|
channel_listener_t *chan_listener;
|
|
channel_t *chan;
|
|
|
|
/* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
|
|
* channel_tls_listener */
|
|
if (receiving) {
|
|
/* It shouldn't already be set */
|
|
tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
|
|
chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
|
|
if (!chan_listener) {
|
|
chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
|
|
command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
|
|
}
|
|
chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
|
|
channel_listener_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
|
|
tor_assert(!conn->tls);
|
|
conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->base_.s, receiving);
|
|
if (!conn->tls) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls, // XXX client and relay?
|
|
escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address));
|
|
|
|
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
|
|
conn->base_.s);
|
|
|
|
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Block all future attempts to renegotiate on 'conn' */
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_tls_t *tls = conn->tls;
|
|
if (!tls)
|
|
return;
|
|
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, NULL);
|
|
tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
|
|
* gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
|
|
static void
|
|
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
|
|
(void)tls;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't invoke this again. */
|
|
connection_or_block_renegotiation(conn);
|
|
|
|
if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
|
|
/* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
|
|
/* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
|
|
connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
|
|
* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
int result;
|
|
check_no_tls_errors();
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
|
|
// log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
|
|
result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
|
|
// log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
|
|
|
|
switch (result) {
|
|
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
|
|
tor_tls_err_to_string(result));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case TOR_TLS_DONE:
|
|
if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
|
|
if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
|
|
tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
|
|
return connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* v2/v3 handshake, but we are not a client. */
|
|
log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
|
|
"Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
|
|
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
|
|
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
|
|
conn);
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn,
|
|
OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
|
|
connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls));
|
|
return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
|
|
case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
|
|
connection_start_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
|
|
log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
|
|
* out as an incoming connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR ||
|
|
conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
|
|
if (!conn->tls)
|
|
return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
|
|
if (conn->handshake_state)
|
|
return conn->handshake_state->started_here;
|
|
return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
|
|
* return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
|
|
* the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
|
|
* connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
|
|
* the certificate to be weird or absent.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
|
|
* identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
|
|
* space in it.
|
|
* If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
|
|
* we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
|
|
* (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
|
|
*
|
|
* As side effects,
|
|
* 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
|
|
* 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
|
|
* descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
|
|
* this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
|
|
* 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
|
|
* fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
int started_here,
|
|
char *digest_rcvd_out)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
|
|
const char *safe_address =
|
|
started_here ? conn->base_.address :
|
|
safe_str_client(conn->base_.address);
|
|
const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
|
|
int has_cert = 0;
|
|
|
|
check_no_tls_errors();
|
|
has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
|
|
if (started_here && !has_cert) {
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
|
|
"send a cert! Closing.",
|
|
safe_address, conn->base_.port);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (!has_cert) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
|
|
"That's ok.");
|
|
}
|
|
check_no_tls_errors();
|
|
|
|
if (has_cert) {
|
|
int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
|
|
conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
|
|
if (started_here && v<0) {
|
|
log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
|
|
" has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
|
|
safe_address, conn->base_.port);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else if (v<0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
|
|
"chain; ignoring.");
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
"The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
|
|
"with %s:%d", conn_type, safe_address, conn->base_.port);
|
|
}
|
|
check_no_tls_errors();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (identity_rcvd) {
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out) < 0) {
|
|
crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->chan);
|
|
channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd, 1);
|
|
|
|
crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
|
|
|
|
if (started_here) {
|
|
/* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL
|
|
* here. */
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Calling client_learned_peer_id from "
|
|
"check_valid_tls_handshake");
|
|
return connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn,
|
|
(const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
|
|
* authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
|
|
* side of <b>conn</b> is <b>rsa_peer_id</b> and optionally <b>ed_peer_id</b>.
|
|
* For v1 and v2 handshakes,
|
|
* this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
|
|
* or renegotiation. For v3+ handshakes, this is right after we get a
|
|
* certificate chain in a CERTS cell.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message
|
|
* and return -1.
|
|
* On relays:
|
|
* - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match;
|
|
* On clients:
|
|
* - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning;
|
|
* - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and
|
|
* a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an
|
|
* info explaining that we will try another fallback.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id,
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
|
|
{
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
channel_tls_t *chan_tls = conn->chan;
|
|
channel_t *chan = channel_tls_to_base(chan_tls);
|
|
int changed_identity = 0;
|
|
tor_assert(chan);
|
|
|
|
const int expected_rsa_key =
|
|
! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
|
|
const int expected_ed_key =
|
|
! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %p (%s): %s, %s",
|
|
conn,
|
|
safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
|
|
hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
|
|
|
|
if (! expected_rsa_key && ! expected_ed_key) {
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no ID in mind when we made this "
|
|
"connection.");
|
|
connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
|
|
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
|
|
tor_free(conn->nickname);
|
|
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router %s at %s:%d without knowing "
|
|
"its key. Hoping for the best.",
|
|
conn->nickname, conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port);
|
|
/* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
|
|
* we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
|
|
learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
|
|
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
|
|
changed_identity = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const int rsa_mismatch = expected_rsa_key &&
|
|
tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
/* It only counts as an ed25519 mismatch if we wanted an ed25519 identity
|
|
* and didn't get it. It's okay if we get one that we didn't ask for. */
|
|
const int ed25519_mismatch =
|
|
expected_ed_key &&
|
|
(ed_peer_id == NULL ||
|
|
! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_peer_id));
|
|
|
|
if (rsa_mismatch || ed25519_mismatch) {
|
|
/* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
|
|
char seen_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
char expected_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
char seen_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
|
|
char expected_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
|
|
base16_encode(seen_rsa, sizeof(seen_rsa),
|
|
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
base16_encode(expected_rsa, sizeof(expected_rsa), conn->identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
if (ed_peer_id) {
|
|
ed25519_public_to_base64(seen_ed, ed_peer_id);
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(seen_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(seen_ed));
|
|
}
|
|
if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity)) {
|
|
ed25519_public_to_base64(expected_ed, &chan->ed25519_identity);
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(expected_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(expected_ed));
|
|
}
|
|
const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints =
|
|
!networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time(NULL),
|
|
usable_consensus_flavor());
|
|
const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir(
|
|
conn->identity_digest);
|
|
const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
|
|
conn->identity_digest);
|
|
int severity;
|
|
const char *extra_log = "";
|
|
|
|
if (server_mode(options)) {
|
|
severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) {
|
|
/* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of
|
|
* fallbacks includes the list of authorities */
|
|
if (is_authority_fingerprint) {
|
|
severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
} else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) {
|
|
/* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their
|
|
* hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */
|
|
severity = LOG_INFO;
|
|
extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback.";
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */
|
|
severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */
|
|
severity = LOG_WARN;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA identity key was not "
|
|
"as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
|
|
conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
|
|
expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
|
|
|
|
/* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
|
|
entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
|
|
END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
|
|
if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
|
|
control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
|
|
"Unexpected identity in router certificate",
|
|
END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY,
|
|
conn);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!expected_ed_key && ed_peer_id) {
|
|
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
|
|
"connection.");
|
|
connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
|
|
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
|
|
changed_identity = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (changed_identity) {
|
|
/* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
|
|
* just discovered it to be canonical. */
|
|
connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, conn->handshake_state->started_here);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
|
|
dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
|
|
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return when we last used this channel for client activity (origin
|
|
* circuits). This is called from connection.c, since client_used is now one
|
|
* of the timestamps in channel_t */
|
|
|
|
time_t
|
|
connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->chan) {
|
|
return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
} else return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
|
|
*
|
|
* Make sure we are happy with the peer we just handshaked with.
|
|
*
|
|
* If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
|
|
* then initialize conn from the information in router.
|
|
*
|
|
* If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
|
|
* that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
|
|
* directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
|
|
*
|
|
* If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!started_here);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done, using "
|
|
"ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
|
|
started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
|
|
conn,
|
|
safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
|
|
tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
|
|
|
|
if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
|
|
digest_rcvd) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
|
|
|
|
if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
|
|
conn->link_proto = 1;
|
|
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
|
|
conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
tor_tls_block_renegotiation(conn->tls);
|
|
rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(1, started_here);
|
|
return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
|
|
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
|
|
conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
|
return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
|
|
* that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
|
|
* Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
|
|
* Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn));
|
|
|
|
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
|
|
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
|
|
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
|
|
* <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
|
|
{
|
|
or_handshake_state_t *s;
|
|
if (conn->handshake_state) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to connection_init_or_handshake_state!");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
|
|
s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
|
|
s->digest_sent_data = 1;
|
|
s->digest_received_data = 1;
|
|
if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
|
|
s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
|
|
}
|
|
s->certs = or_handshake_certs_new();
|
|
s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
|
|
void
|
|
or_handshake_state_free_(or_handshake_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!state)
|
|
return;
|
|
crypto_digest_free(state->digest_sent);
|
|
crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
|
|
or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
|
|
tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
|
|
memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
|
|
tor_free(state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Remember that <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if <b>incoming</b> is
|
|
* false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a V3 handshake using
|
|
* <b>state</b>.
|
|
*
|
|
* (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
|
|
* received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
|
|
* authenticate cell.)
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
or_handshake_state_t *state,
|
|
const cell_t *cell,
|
|
int incoming)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
|
|
packed_cell_t packed;
|
|
if (incoming) {
|
|
if (!state->digest_received_data)
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!state->digest_sent_data)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!incoming) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells "
|
|
"while making a handshake digest. But we think we are sending "
|
|
"one with type %d.", (int)cell->command);
|
|
}
|
|
dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
|
|
if (! *dptr)
|
|
*dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
|
|
|
|
d = *dptr;
|
|
/* Re-packing like this is a little inefficient, but we don't have to do
|
|
this very often at all. */
|
|
cell_pack(&packed, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, cell_network_size);
|
|
memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if
|
|
* <b>incoming</b> is false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a
|
|
* V3 handshake using <b>state</b>.
|
|
*
|
|
* (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
|
|
* received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
|
|
* authenticate cell.)
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
or_handshake_state_t *state,
|
|
const var_cell_t *cell,
|
|
int incoming)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
|
|
int n;
|
|
char buf[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
|
|
if (incoming) {
|
|
if (!state->digest_received_data)
|
|
return;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!state->digest_sent_data)
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
|
|
if (! *dptr)
|
|
*dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
|
|
|
|
d = *dptr;
|
|
|
|
n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, buf, conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, n);
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
|
|
|
|
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
|
|
* as appropriate. Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection
|
|
* that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */
|
|
if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
|
|
channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
|
|
conn->handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
|
|
* For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
|
|
* connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
packed_cell_t networkcell;
|
|
size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(cell);
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
|
|
rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL);
|
|
if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
|
|
rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL);
|
|
|
|
connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
|
|
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan) {
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
|
|
if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->currently_padding) {
|
|
rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL);
|
|
if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
|
|
rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
|
|
or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
|
|
* <b>conn</b>'s outbuf. Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
|
|
* affect a circuit.
|
|
*/
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(void,
|
|
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell,
|
|
or_connection_t *conn))
|
|
{
|
|
int n;
|
|
char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
|
|
tor_assert(cell);
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload,
|
|
cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
|
|
or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
|
|
* inbuf. Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t *or_conn, var_cell_t **out)
|
|
{
|
|
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
|
|
return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out, or_conn->link_proto);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
|
|
*
|
|
* Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
|
|
* and hand it to command_process_cell().
|
|
*
|
|
* Always return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
var_cell_t *var_cell;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note on memory management for incoming cells: below the channel layer,
|
|
* we shouldn't need to consider its internal queueing/copying logic. It
|
|
* is safe to pass cells to it on the stack or on the heap, but in the
|
|
* latter case we must be sure we free them later.
|
|
*
|
|
* The incoming cell queue code in channel.c will (in the common case)
|
|
* decide it can pass them to the upper layer immediately, in which case
|
|
* those functions may run directly on the cell pointers we pass here, or
|
|
* it may decide to queue them, in which case it will allocate its own
|
|
* buffer and copy the cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_OR,
|
|
TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": starting, inbuf_datalen %d "
|
|
"(%d pending in tls object).",
|
|
conn->base_.s,(int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)),
|
|
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
|
|
if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
|
|
if (!var_cell)
|
|
return 0; /* not yet. */
|
|
|
|
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
|
|
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
|
|
channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
|
|
var_cell_free(var_cell);
|
|
} else {
|
|
const int wide_circ_ids = conn->wide_circ_ids;
|
|
size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
|
|
char buf[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn))
|
|
< cell_network_size) /* whole response available? */
|
|
return 0; /* not yet */
|
|
|
|
/* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
|
|
if (conn->chan)
|
|
channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
|
|
|
|
circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
|
|
connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
|
|
|
|
/* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
|
|
* network-order string) */
|
|
cell_unpack(&cell, buf, wide_circ_ids);
|
|
|
|
channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
|
|
static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
|
|
/** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
|
|
static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
|
|
(int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
|
|
* implementation believes it can support. */
|
|
int
|
|
is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
|
|
if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
|
|
* link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
|
|
* allow protocol version v3 or later. If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
|
|
* not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
|
|
* later.
|
|
**/
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
|
|
{
|
|
var_cell_t *cell;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int n_versions = 0;
|
|
const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
|
|
const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
|
|
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
|
|
!conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at);
|
|
cell = var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions * 2);
|
|
cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
|
|
uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
|
|
if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
|
|
continue;
|
|
set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
|
|
++n_versions;
|
|
}
|
|
cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
|
|
|
|
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
|
|
conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
var_cell_free(cell);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
|
|
* about their address, our address, and the current time. */
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(int,
|
|
connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn))
|
|
{
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
const routerinfo_t *me;
|
|
int len;
|
|
uint8_t *out;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
|
|
"where we already sent one.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
|
|
|
|
/* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */
|
|
if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing)
|
|
set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now));
|
|
|
|
/* Their address. */
|
|
out = cell.payload + 4;
|
|
/* We use &conn->real_addr below, unless it hasn't yet been set. If it
|
|
* hasn't yet been set, we know that base_.addr hasn't been tampered with
|
|
* yet either. */
|
|
len = append_address_to_payload(out, !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr)
|
|
? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr);
|
|
if (len<0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
out += len;
|
|
|
|
/* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a
|
|
* bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this
|
|
* is an outgoing connection, act like a normal client and omit it. */
|
|
if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) &&
|
|
(me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
|
|
tor_addr_t my_addr;
|
|
*out++ = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr);
|
|
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&my_addr, me->addr);
|
|
len = append_address_to_payload(out, &my_addr);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
out += len;
|
|
|
|
if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) {
|
|
len = append_address_to_payload(out, &me->ipv6_addr);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
*out = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
|
|
conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
|
|
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Helper used to add an encoded certs to a cert cell */
|
|
static void
|
|
add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
|
|
uint8_t cert_type,
|
|
const uint8_t *cert_encoded,
|
|
size_t cert_len)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(cert_len <= UINT16_MAX);
|
|
certs_cell_cert_t *ccc = certs_cell_cert_new();
|
|
ccc->cert_type = cert_type;
|
|
ccc->cert_len = cert_len;
|
|
certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc, cert_len);
|
|
memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc), cert_encoded, cert_len);
|
|
|
|
certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell, ccc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at
|
|
* <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are
|
|
* building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>.
|
|
* (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
|
|
static void
|
|
add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
|
|
uint8_t cert_type,
|
|
const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
|
|
{
|
|
if (NULL == cert)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *cert_encoded = NULL;
|
|
size_t cert_len;
|
|
tor_x509_cert_get_der(cert, &cert_encoded, &cert_len);
|
|
|
|
add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, cert_encoded, cert_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object
|
|
* that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>. Set its type field to
|
|
* <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
|
|
static void
|
|
add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
|
|
uint8_t cert_type,
|
|
const tor_cert_t *cert)
|
|
{
|
|
if (NULL == cert)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type,
|
|
cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
|
|
int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1
|
|
* on failure. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
|
|
tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL;
|
|
var_cell_t *cell;
|
|
|
|
certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
|
|
|
|
if (! conn->handshake_state)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */
|
|
if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode,
|
|
&global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (conn_in_server_mode) {
|
|
own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(id_cert);
|
|
|
|
certs_cell = certs_cell_new();
|
|
|
|
/* Start adding certs. First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */
|
|
if (conn_in_server_mode) {
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert);
|
|
add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_assert(global_link_cert);
|
|
add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */
|
|
add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024, id_cert);
|
|
|
|
/* Next the Ed25519 certs */
|
|
add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN,
|
|
get_master_signing_key_cert());
|
|
if (conn_in_server_mode) {
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert ||
|
|
certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing);
|
|
add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK,
|
|
conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert);
|
|
} else {
|
|
add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
|
|
CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH,
|
|
get_current_auth_key_cert());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* And finally the crosscert. */
|
|
{
|
|
const uint8_t *crosscert=NULL;
|
|
size_t crosscert_len;
|
|
get_master_rsa_crosscert(&crosscert, &crosscert_len);
|
|
if (crosscert) {
|
|
add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell,
|
|
CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID,
|
|
crosscert, crosscert_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We've added all the certs; make the cell. */
|
|
certs_cell->n_certs = certs_cell_getlen_certs(certs_cell);
|
|
|
|
ssize_t alloc_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(certs_cell);
|
|
tor_assert(alloc_len >= 0 && alloc_len <= UINT16_MAX);
|
|
cell = var_cell_new(alloc_len);
|
|
cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
|
|
ssize_t enc_len = certs_cell_encode(cell->payload, alloc_len, certs_cell);
|
|
tor_assert(enc_len > 0 && enc_len <= alloc_len);
|
|
cell->payload_len = enc_len;
|
|
|
|
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
|
|
var_cell_free(cell);
|
|
certs_cell_free(certs_cell);
|
|
tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that
|
|
* we can send and receive. */
|
|
int
|
|
authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (challenge_type) {
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type_a</b> is one that we would rather
|
|
* use than <b>challenge_type_b</b>. */
|
|
int
|
|
authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a,
|
|
uint16_t challenge_type_b)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Any supported type is better than an unsupported one;
|
|
* all unsupported types are equally bad. */
|
|
if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_a))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_b))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* It happens that types are superior in numerically ascending order.
|
|
* If that ever changes, this must change too. */
|
|
return (challenge_type_a > challenge_type_b);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0
|
|
* on success, -1 on failure. */
|
|
int
|
|
connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
var_cell_t *cell = NULL;
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
|
|
|
|
if (! conn->handshake_state)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32);
|
|
crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
|
|
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
|
|
/* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports
|
|
* the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */
|
|
/* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac));
|
|
|
|
cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac));
|
|
ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len,
|
|
ac);
|
|
if (len != cell->payload_len) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encoded auth challenge cell length not as expected");
|
|
goto done;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
|
|
|
|
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
var_cell_free(cell);
|
|
auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
|
|
* to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>. Return it
|
|
* in a var_cell_t.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
|
|
* V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
|
|
* determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
|
|
* exactly.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
|
|
* first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
|
|
* that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
|
|
* entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
|
|
*/
|
|
var_cell_t *
|
|
connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const int authtype,
|
|
crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
|
|
const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
|
|
int server)
|
|
{
|
|
auth1_t *auth = NULL;
|
|
auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
|
|
var_cell_t *result = NULL;
|
|
int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
|
|
const char *authtype_str = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int is_ed = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
|
|
switch (authtype) {
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
|
|
authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
|
|
old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
|
|
authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
|
|
break;
|
|
case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
|
|
authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
|
|
is_ed = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth = auth1_new();
|
|
ctx->is_ed = is_ed;
|
|
|
|
/* Type: 8 bytes. */
|
|
memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL;
|
|
const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
|
|
const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
|
|
if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
|
|
their_digests =
|
|
tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert);
|
|
tor_assert(my_digests);
|
|
tor_assert(their_digests);
|
|
my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
|
|
their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
|
|
|
|
client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
|
|
server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
|
|
|
|
/* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */
|
|
memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32);
|
|
|
|
/* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */
|
|
memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (is_ed) {
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id;
|
|
if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
my_ed_id = get_master_identity_key();
|
|
their_ed_id = &conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey;
|
|
const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_digest_t *server_d, *client_d;
|
|
if (server) {
|
|
server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
|
|
client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
|
|
} else {
|
|
client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
|
|
server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Server log digest : 32 octets */
|
|
crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32);
|
|
|
|
/* Client log digest : 32 octets */
|
|
crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
|
|
tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
|
|
if (server) {
|
|
cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
|
|
} else {
|
|
cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!cert) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
|
|
authtype_str);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(auth->scert,
|
|
tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
|
|
|
|
tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
|
|
if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
|
|
tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets);
|
|
} else {
|
|
char label[128];
|
|
tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
|
|
"EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
|
|
tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
|
|
auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
|
|
label);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
|
|
* of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing
|
|
* checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
|
|
crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
|
|
|
|
ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
|
|
if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
|
|
maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
|
|
} else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
|
|
maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
|
|
result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
|
|
uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
|
|
const size_t outlen = maxlen;
|
|
ssize_t len;
|
|
|
|
result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
|
|
set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
|
|
|
|
if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (server) {
|
|
auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
|
|
ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
|
|
if (!tmp) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that "
|
|
"we just encoded");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
|
|
|
|
auth1_free(tmp);
|
|
if (len2 != len) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
|
|
ed25519_signature_t sig;
|
|
if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to sign ed25519 authentication data");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
|
|
|
|
} else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
|
|
auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
|
|
|
|
char d[32];
|
|
crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
|
|
int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
|
|
(char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
|
|
auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
|
|
d, 32);
|
|
if (siglen < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
|
|
result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
|
|
set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
var_cell_free(result);
|
|
result = NULL;
|
|
done:
|
|
auth1_free(auth);
|
|
auth_ctx_free(ctx);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on
|
|
* success, -1 on failure */
|
|
MOCK_IMPL(int,
|
|
connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
|
|
{
|
|
var_cell_t *cell;
|
|
crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
|
|
/* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
|
|
|
|
if (!pk) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown "
|
|
"authentication type %d", authtype);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
|
|
authtype,
|
|
pk,
|
|
get_current_auth_keypair(),
|
|
0 /* not server */);
|
|
if (! cell) {
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_START */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
|
|
}
|
|
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
|
|
var_cell_free(cell);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|