nihilist/tor
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git synced 2024-11-29 00:53:38 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
16a201e703
tor/src/test/test_hs_client.c

1362 lines
47 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* Copyright (c) 2016-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file test_hs_client.c
* \brief Test prop224 HS client functionality.
*/
#define CONFIG_PRIVATE
#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE
#define MAINLOOP_PRIVATE
#define HS_CLIENT_PRIVATE
#define CHANNEL_OBJECT_PRIVATE
#define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE
#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE
#define CRYPT_PATH_PRIVATE
#include "test/test.h"
#include "test/test_helpers.h"
#include "test/log_test_helpers.h"
#include "test/rend_test_helpers.h"
#include "test/hs_test_helpers.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_config.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
#include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendcache.h"
#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h"
#include "core/or/crypt_path.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h"
#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
#include "core/or/socks_request_st.h"
static int
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
{
(void) ap_conn;
return 0;
}
static networkstatus_t mock_ns;
/* Always return NULL. */
static networkstatus_t *
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false(time_t now)
{
(void) now;
return NULL;
}
static networkstatus_t *
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now)
{
(void) now;
return &mock_ns;
}
static int
helper_config_client(const char *conf, int validate_only)
{
int ret = 0;
or_options_t *options = NULL;
tt_assert(conf);
options = helper_parse_options(conf);
tt_assert(options);
ret = hs_config_client_auth_all(options, validate_only);
done:
or_options_free(options);
return ret;
}
static void
helper_add_random_client_auth(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
{
char *conf = NULL;
#define conf_fmt "ClientOnionAuthDir %s\n"
tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, get_fname("auth_keys"));
#undef conf_fmt
helper_config_client(conf, 0);
tor_free(conf);
digest256map_t *client_auths = get_hs_client_auths_map();
hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_client_service_authorization_t));
curve25519_secret_key_generate(&auth->enc_seckey, 0);
hs_build_address(service_pk, HS_VERSION_THREE, auth->onion_address);
digest256map_set(client_auths, service_pk->pubkey, auth);
}
/* Test helper function: Setup a circuit and a stream with the same hidden
* service destination, and put them in <b>circ_out</b> and
* <b>conn_out</b>. Make the stream wait for circuits to be established to the
* hidden service. */
static int
helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test(origin_circuit_t **circ_out,
connection_t **conn_out,
int is_legacy)
{
int retval;
channel_tls_t *n_chan=NULL;
rend_data_t *conn_rend_data = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t service_pk;
/* Make a dummy connection stream and make it wait for our circuit */
conn = test_conn_get_connection(AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
CONN_TYPE_AP /* ??? */,
0);
if (is_legacy) {
/* Legacy: Setup rend_data of stream */
char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1] = {0};
TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data = mock_rend_data(service_id);
conn_rend_data = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data;
} else {
/* prop224: Setup hs conn identifier on the stream */
ed25519_secret_key_t sk;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_secret_key_generate(&sk, 0));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &sk));
/* Setup hs_conn_identifier of stream */
TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk);
}
/* Make it wait for circuit */
connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
/* This is needed to silence a BUG warning from
connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation() */
TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->original_dest_address =
tor_strdup(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->address);
/****************************************************/
/* Now make dummy circuit */
or_circ = origin_circuit_new();
or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
or_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
or_circ->build_state->is_internal = 1;
if (is_legacy) {
/* Legacy: Setup rend data and final cpath */
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state =
crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND);
tt_assert(
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state);
retval = crypto_dh_generate_public(
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
or_circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(conn_rend_data);
} else {
/* prop224: Setup hs ident on the circuit */
or_circ->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_pk);
}
TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
/* fake n_chan */
n_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_tls_t));
n_chan->base_.global_identifier = 1;
or_circ->base_.n_chan = &(n_chan->base_);
*circ_out = or_circ;
*conn_out = conn;
return 0;
done:
/* something failed */
return -1;
}
/* Test: Ensure that setting up legacy e2e rendezvous circuits works
* correctly. */
static void
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy(void *arg)
{
ssize_t retval;
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
(void) arg;
/** In this test we create a v2 legacy HS stream and a circuit with the same
* hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be
* established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using
* the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client() function. We then
* check that the end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream
* was attached to the circuit as expected. */
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin);
/* Setup */
retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test( &or_circ, &conn, 1);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(or_circ);
tt_assert(conn);
/* Check number of hops */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL);
/********************************************** */
/* Make a good RENDEZVOUS1 cell body because it needs to pass key exchange
* digest verification... */
uint8_t rend_cell_body[DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN] = {2};
{
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypto_dh_t *dh_state =
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state;
/* compute and overwrite digest of cell body with the right value */
retval = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh_state,
(char*)rend_cell_body, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_GT, 0);
memcpy(rend_cell_body+DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/* Setup the circuit */
retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(or_circ,
rend_cell_body);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/**********************************************/
/* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
/* Check the digest algo */
tt_int_op(
crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.f_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1);
tt_int_op(
crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.b_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.f_crypto);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.b_crypto);
/* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */
tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
/* Test that stream got attached */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
done:
connection_free_minimal(conn);
if (or_circ)
tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
}
/* Test: Ensure that setting up v3 rendezvous circuits works correctly. */
static void
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup(void *arg)
{
uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0};
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
int retval;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
(void) arg;
/** In this test we create a prop224 v3 HS stream and a circuit with the same
* hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be
* established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using
* the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ() function. We then check that the
* end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream was attached to
* the circuit as expected. */
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin);
/* Setup */
retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test(&or_circ, &conn, 0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(or_circ);
tt_assert(conn);
/* Check number of hops: There should be no hops yet to this circ */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_ptr_op(or_circ->cpath, OP_EQ, NULL);
/* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL);
/**********************************************/
/* Setup the circuit */
retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(or_circ, ntor_key_seed,
sizeof(ntor_key_seed), 0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/**********************************************/
/* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
/* Check that the crypt path has prop224 algorithm parameters */
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.f_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.b_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.f_crypto);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->pvt_crypto.b_crypto);
/* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */
tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
/* Test that stream got attached */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
done:
connection_free_minimal(conn);
if (or_circ)
tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
}
/** Test client logic for picking intro points from a descriptor. Also test how
* ExcludeNodes and intro point failures affect picking intro points. */
static void
test_client_pick_intro(void *arg)
{
int ret;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp;
hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
(void) arg;
hs_init();
/* Generate service keypair */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0));
/* Set time */
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
update_approx_time(mock_ns.fresh_until-10);
time_t now = approx_time();
/* Test logic:
*
* 1) Add our desc with intro points to the HS cache.
*
* 2) Mark all descriptor intro points except _the chosen one_ as
* failed. Then query the desc to get a random intro: check that we got
* _the chosen one_. Then fail the chosen one as well, and see that no
* intros are returned.
*
* 3) Then clean the intro state cache and get an intro point.
*
* 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work
*
* 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that
* nothing is returned.
*/
/* 1) Add desc to HS cache */
{
char *encoded = NULL;
desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, NULL, &encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(encoded);
/* store it */
ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_OK);
/* fetch it to make sure it works */
const hs_descriptor_t *fetched_desc =
hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(fetched_desc);
tt_mem_op(fetched_desc->subcredential, OP_EQ, desc->subcredential,
DIGEST256_LEN);
tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero((char*)fetched_desc->subcredential,
DIGEST256_LEN));
tor_free(encoded);
}
/* 2) Mark all intro points except _the chosen one_ as failed. Then query the
* desc and get a random intro: check that we got _the chosen one_. */
{
/* Tell hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs() to skip the private address check.
*/
get_options_mutable()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses = 1;
/* Pick the chosen intro point and get its ei */
hs_desc_intro_point_t *chosen_intro_point =
smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
extend_info_t *chosen_intro_ei =
desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(chosen_intro_point);
tt_assert(chosen_intro_point);
tt_assert(chosen_intro_ei);
/* Now mark all other intro points as failed */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
/* Skip the chosen intro point */
if (ip == chosen_intro_point) {
continue;
}
ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_key = &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key;
hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey,
intro_auth_key,
INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
/* Try to get a random intro: Should return the chosen one! */
/* (We try several times, to make sure this behavior is consistent, and to
* cover the different cases of client_get_random_intro().) */
for (int i = 0; i < 64; ++i) {
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(ip);
tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero((char*)ip->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
tt_mem_op(ip->identity_digest, OP_EQ, chosen_intro_ei->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
extend_info_free(ip);
}
extend_info_free(chosen_intro_ei);
/* Now also mark the chosen one as failed: See that we can't get any intro
points anymore. */
hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey,
&chosen_intro_point->auth_key_cert->signed_key,
INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT);
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(!ip);
}
/* 3) Clean the intro state cache and get an intro point */
{
/* Pretend we are 5 mins in the future and order a cleanup of the intro
* state. This should clean up the intro point failures and allow us to get
* an intro. */
hs_cache_client_intro_state_clean(now + 5*60);
/* Get an intro. It should work! */
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(ip);
extend_info_free(ip);
}
/* 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work */
{
ed25519_keypair_t dummy_kp;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&dummy_kp, 0));
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&dummy_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(!ip);
}
/* 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that
* nothing is returned. */
{
get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes = routerset_new();
get_options_mutable()->StrictNodes = 1;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
extend_info_t *intro_ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(ip);
/* desc_intro_point_to_extend_info() doesn't return IPv6 intro points
* yet, because we can't extend to them. See #24404, #24451, and #24181.
*/
if (intro_ei == NULL) {
/* Pretend we're making a direct connection, and that we can use IPv6
*/
get_options_mutable()->ClientUseIPv6 = 1;
intro_ei = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(ip->link_specifiers,
&ip->onion_key, 1);
tt_assert(tor_addr_family(&intro_ei->addr) == AF_INET6);
}
tt_assert(intro_ei);
if (intro_ei) {
const char *ptr;
char ip_addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
/* We need to decorate in case it is an IPv6 else routerset_parse()
* doesn't like it. */
ptr = tor_addr_to_str(ip_addr, &intro_ei->addr, sizeof(ip_addr), 1);
tt_assert(ptr == ip_addr);
ret = routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes,
ip_addr, "");
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
extend_info_free(intro_ei);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(!ip);
}
done:
hs_descriptor_free(desc);
}
static int
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false(void)
{
return 0;
}
static int
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true(void)
{
return 1;
}
static hs_client_fetch_status_t
mock_fetch_v3_desc_error(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
{
(void) key;
return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR;
}
static void
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason,
int line, const char *file)
{
(void) line;
(void) file;
conn->edge_.end_reason = endreason;
/* This function ultimately will flag this so make sure we do also in the
* MOCK one so we can assess closed connections vs open ones. */
conn->edge_.base_.marked_for_close = 1;
}
static void
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_no_close(entry_connection_t *conn,
int endreason, int line,
const char *file)
{
(void) conn;
(void) endreason;
(void) line;
(void) file;
}
static void
test_descriptor_fetch(void *arg)
{
int ret;
entry_connection_t *ec = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t service_pk;
ed25519_secret_key_t service_sk;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
memset(&service_sk, 'A', sizeof(service_sk));
ret = ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &service_sk);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Initialize this so get_voting_interval() doesn't freak out. */
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ec = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
tt_assert(ec);
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk);
tt_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident);
TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec))->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &ec->edge_.base_);
/* 1. FetchHidServDescriptors is false so we shouldn't be able to fetch. */
get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 0;
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED);
get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 1;
/* 2. We don't have a live consensus. */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO);
/* From now on, return a live consensus. */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
/* 3. Not enough dir information. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO);
/* From now on, we do have enough directory information. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true);
/* 4. We do have a pending directory request. */
{
dir_connection_t *dir_conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
dir_conn->hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_ident_dir_conn_t));
TO_CONN(dir_conn)->purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC;
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, &service_pk);
smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn));
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
smartlist_remove(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn));
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING);
}
/* 5. We'll trigger an error on the fetch_desc_v3 and force to close all
* pending SOCKS request. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true);
MOCK(fetch_v3_desc, mock_fetch_v3_desc_error);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_,
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(fetch_v3_desc);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR);
/* The close waiting for descriptor function has been called. */
tt_int_op(ec->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
done:
connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(ec));
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
hs_free_all();
}
static void
test_auth_key_filename_is_valid(void *arg)
{
(void) arg;
/* Valid file name. */
tt_assert(auth_key_filename_is_valid("a.auth_private"));
/* Valid file name with special character. */
tt_assert(auth_key_filename_is_valid("a-.auth_private"));
/* Invalid extension. */
tt_assert(!auth_key_filename_is_valid("a.ath_private"));
/* Nothing before the extension. */
tt_assert(!auth_key_filename_is_valid(".auth_private"));
done:
;
}
static void
test_parse_auth_file_content(void *arg)
{
hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
(void) arg;
/* Valid authorized client. */
auth = parse_auth_file_content(
"4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:"
"x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq");
tt_assert(auth);
/* Wrong number of fields. */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("a:b"));
/* Wrong auth type. */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content(
"4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:x:"
"x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq"));
/* Wrong key type. */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content(
"4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:"
"x:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq"));
/* Some malformed string. */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:aa=="));
/* Bigger key than it should be */
tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:"
"vjqea4jbhwwc4hto7ekyvqfbeodghbaq6nxi45hz4wr3qvhqv3yqa"));
done:
tor_free(auth);
}
static char *
mock_read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out)
{
char *ret = NULL;
(void) flags;
(void) stat_out;
if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR
"client1.auth_private"))) {
ret = tor_strdup(
"4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:"
"x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq");
goto done;
}
if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR "dummy.xxx"))) {
ret = tor_strdup(
"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:descriptor:"
"x25519:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx");
goto done;
}
if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR
"client2.auth_private"))) {
ret = tor_strdup(
"25njqamcweflpvkl73j4szahhihoc4xt3ktcgjnpaingr5yhkenl5sid:descriptor:"
"x25519:fdreqzjqso7d2ac7qscrxfl5qfpamdvgy5d6cxejcgzc3hvhurmq");
goto done;
}
done:
return ret;
}
static int
mock_check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check,
const char *effective_user)
{
(void) dirname;
(void) check;
(void) effective_user;
return 0;
}
static smartlist_t *
mock_tor_listdir(const char *dirname)
{
smartlist_t *file_list = smartlist_new();
(void) dirname;
smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client1.auth_private"));
smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("dummy.xxx"));
smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client2.auth_private"));
return file_list;
}
static void
test_config_client_authorization(void *arg)
{
int ret;
char *conf = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t pk1, pk2;
digest256map_t *global_map = NULL;
char *key_dir = tor_strdup(get_fname("auth_keys"));
(void) arg;
MOCK(read_file_to_str, mock_read_file_to_str);
MOCK(tor_listdir, mock_tor_listdir);
MOCK(check_private_dir, mock_check_private_dir);
#define conf_fmt \
"ClientOnionAuthDir %s\n"
tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, key_dir);
ret = helper_config_client(conf, 0);
tor_free(conf);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
#undef conf_fmt
global_map = get_hs_client_auths_map();
tt_int_op(digest256map_size(global_map), OP_EQ, 2);
hs_parse_address("4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad",
&pk1, NULL, NULL);
hs_parse_address("25njqamcweflpvkl73j4szahhihoc4xt3ktcgjnpaingr5yhkenl5sid",
&pk2, NULL, NULL);
tt_assert(digest256map_get(global_map, pk1.pubkey));
tt_assert(digest256map_get(global_map, pk2.pubkey));
done:
tor_free(key_dir);
hs_free_all();
UNMOCK(read_file_to_str);
UNMOCK(tor_listdir);
UNMOCK(check_private_dir);
}
static entry_connection_t *
helper_build_socks_connection(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk,
int conn_state)
{
entry_connection_t *socks = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(service_pk);
TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks))->state = conn_state;
smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &socks->edge_.base_);
return socks;
}
static void
test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup(void *arg)
{
/* The goal of this test is to make sure we clean up everything in between
* two descriptors from the same .onion. Because intro points can change
* from one descriptor to another, once we received a new descriptor, we
* need to cleanup the remaining circuits so they aren't used or selected
* when establishing a connection with the newly stored descriptor.
*
* This test was created because of #27410. */
int ret;
char *desc_str = NULL;
hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc;
ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp;
entry_connection_t *socks1 = NULL, *socks2 = NULL;
hs_ident_dir_conn_t hs_dir_ident;
dir_connection_t *dir_conn = NULL;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_,
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true);
/* Set consensus time before our time so the cache lookup can always
* validate that the entry is not expired. */
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_after);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.fresh_until);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_until);
/* Build a descriptor for a specific .onion. */
ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&signing_kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&signing_kp);
tt_assert(desc);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &signing_kp, NULL, &desc_str);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Store in the client cache. */
ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_str, &signing_kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_OK);
cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&signing_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(cached_desc);
hs_helper_desc_equal(desc, cached_desc);
/* Create two SOCKS connection for the same .onion both in the waiting for a
* descriptor state. */
socks1 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey,
AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
tt_assert(socks1);
socks2 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey,
AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
tt_assert(socks2);
/* Now, we'll make the intro points in the current descriptor unusable so
* the hs_client_desc_has_arrived() will take the right code path that we
* want to test that is the fetched descriptor has bad intro points. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&signing_kp.pubkey,
&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key,
INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
/* Simulate that a new descriptor just arrived. We should have both of our
* SOCKS connection to be ended with a resolved failed. */
hs_ident_dir_conn_init(&signing_kp.pubkey,
&desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey, &hs_dir_ident);
dir_conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
dir_conn->hs_ident = hs_ident_dir_conn_dup(&hs_dir_ident);
hs_client_dir_fetch_done(dir_conn, "A reason", desc_str, 200);
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
tt_int_op(socks1->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
tt_int_op(socks2->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
/* Now let say tor cleans up the intro state cache which resets all intro
* point failure count. */
hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge();
/* Retrying all SOCKS which should basically do nothing since we don't have
* any pending SOCKS connection in AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state. */
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc();
done:
connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks1));
connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks2));
hs_descriptor_free(desc);
tor_free(desc_str);
hs_free_all();
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
}
static void
test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg)
{
int ret;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp;
circuit_t *circ = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
hs_descriptor_t *desc1 = NULL, *desc2 = NULL;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
/* This is needed because of the client cache expiration timestamp is based
* on having a consensus. See cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(). */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
/* Set consensus time */
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_until);
/* Generate service keypair */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0));
/* Create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction circuits.
* We'll then make sure the hs_ident is attached to a dummy descriptor. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
/* Build the first descriptor and cache it. */
{
char *encoded;
desc1 = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
tt_assert(desc1);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc1, &service_kp, NULL, &encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(encoded);
/* Store it */
ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_OK);
tor_free(encoded);
tt_assert(hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey));
}
/* We'll pick one introduction point and associate it with the circuit. */
{
const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip =
smartlist_get(desc1->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
tt_assert(ip);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
}
/* Before we are about to clean up the intro circuits, make sure it is
* actually there. */
tt_assert(circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
/* Build the second descriptor for the same service and cache it. */
{
char *encoded;
desc2 = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
tt_assert(desc2);
tt_mem_op(&desc1->plaintext_data.signing_pubkey, OP_EQ,
&desc2->plaintext_data.signing_pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
/* To replace the existing descriptor, the revision counter needs to be
* bigger. */
desc2->plaintext_data.revision_counter =
desc1->plaintext_data.revision_counter + 1;
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc2, &service_kp, NULL, &encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(encoded);
ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_OK);
tor_free(encoded);
tt_assert(hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey));
}
/* Once stored, our intro circuit should be closed because it is related to
* an old introduction point that doesn't exists anymore. */
tt_assert(!circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
done:
circuit_free(circ);
hs_descriptor_free(desc1);
hs_descriptor_free(desc2);
hs_free_all();
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
}
static void
test_close_intro_circuits_cache_clean(void *arg)
{
int ret;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp;
circuit_t *circ = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
hs_descriptor_t *desc1 = NULL;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
rend_cache_init();
/* This is needed because of the client cache expiration timestamp is based
* on having a consensus. See cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(). */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
/* Set consensus time */
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_until);
/* Generate service keypair */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0));
/* Create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction circuits.
* We'll then make sure the hs_ident is attached to a dummy descriptor. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
/* Build the first descriptor and cache it. */
{
char *encoded;
desc1 = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
tt_assert(desc1);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc1, &service_kp, NULL, &encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(encoded);
/* Store it */
ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tor_free(encoded);
tt_assert(hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey));
}
/* We'll pick one introduction point and associate it with the circuit. */
{
const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip =
smartlist_get(desc1->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
tt_assert(ip);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
}
/* Before we are about to clean up the intro circuits, make sure it is
* actually there. */
tt_assert(circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
/* Cleanup the client cache. The ns valid after time is what decides if the
* descriptor has expired so put it in the future enough (72h) so we are
* sure to always expire. */
mock_ns.valid_after = approx_time() + (72 * 24 * 60 * 60);
hs_cache_clean_as_client(0);
/* Once stored, our intro circuit should be closed because it is related to
* an old introduction point that doesn't exists anymore. */
tt_assert(!circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
done:
circuit_free(circ);
hs_descriptor_free(desc1);
hs_free_all();
rend_cache_free_all();
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
}
static void
test_socks_hs_errors(void *arg)
{
int ret;
char *desc_encoded = NULL;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp;
ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp;
entry_connection_t *socks_conn = NULL;
dir_connection_t *dir_conn = NULL;
hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN];
(void) arg;
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_,
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_no_close);
MOCK(read_file_to_str, mock_read_file_to_str);
MOCK(tor_listdir, mock_tor_listdir);
MOCK(check_private_dir, mock_check_private_dir);
/* Set consensus time */
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_until);
hs_init();
ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&signing_kp, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
socks_conn = helper_build_socks_connection(&service_kp.pubkey,
AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT);
tt_assert(socks_conn);
/* Create directory connection. */
dir_conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
dir_conn->hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_ident_dir_conn_t));
TO_CONN(dir_conn)->purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC;
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, &service_kp.pubkey);
/* Encode descriptor so we can decode it. */
desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
tt_assert(desc);
crypto_rand((char *) descriptor_cookie, sizeof(descriptor_cookie));
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, descriptor_cookie,
&desc_encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(desc_encoded);
/* Try decoding. Point this to an existing descriptor. The following should
* fail thus the desc_out should be set to NULL. */
hs_descriptor_t *desc_out = desc;
ret = hs_client_decode_descriptor(desc_encoded, &service_kp.pubkey,
&desc_out);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_NEED_CLIENT_AUTH);
tt_assert(desc_out == NULL);
/* The caching will fail to decrypt because the descriptor_cookie used above
* is not known to the HS subsystem. This will lead to a missing client
* auth. */
hs_client_dir_fetch_done(dir_conn, "Reason", desc_encoded, 200);
tt_int_op(socks_conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code, OP_EQ,
SOCKS5_HS_MISSING_CLIENT_AUTH);
/* Add in the global client auth list bad creds for this service. */
helper_add_random_client_auth(&service_kp.pubkey);
ret = hs_client_decode_descriptor(desc_encoded, &service_kp.pubkey,
&desc_out);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH);
tt_assert(desc_out == NULL);
/* Simmulate a fetch done again. This should replace the cached descriptor
* and signal a bad client authorization. */
hs_client_dir_fetch_done(dir_conn, "Reason", desc_encoded, 200);
tt_int_op(socks_conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code, OP_EQ,
SOCKS5_HS_BAD_CLIENT_AUTH);
done:
connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks_conn));
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
hs_descriptor_free(desc);
tor_free(desc_encoded);
hs_free_all();
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
UNMOCK(read_file_to_str);
UNMOCK(tor_listdir);
UNMOCK(check_private_dir);
}
static void
test_close_intro_circuit_failure(void *arg)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
circuit_t *circ = NULL;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp, intro_kp;
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
tor_addr_t addr;
const hs_cache_intro_state_t *entry;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
/* Generate service keypair */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&intro_kp, 0));
/* Create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction circuit at
* the ACK WAIT state. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ocirc->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
/* Code path will log this exit so build it. */
ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit = extend_info_new("TestNickname", digest,
NULL, NULL, NULL, &addr,
4242);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk, &intro_kp.pubkey);
/* We'll make for close the circuit for a timeout failure. It should _NOT_
* end up in the failure cache just yet. We do that on free() only. */
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
tt_assert(!hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(&service_kp.pubkey,
&intro_kp.pubkey));
/* Time to free. It should get removed. */
circuit_free(circ);
entry = hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(&service_kp.pubkey,
&intro_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(entry);
tt_uint_op(entry->timed_out, OP_EQ, 1);
hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge();
/* Again, create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction
* circuit at the INTRODUCING state. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ocirc->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
/* Code path will log this exit so build it. */
ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit = extend_info_new("TestNickname", digest,
NULL, NULL, NULL, &addr,
4242);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk, &intro_kp.pubkey);
/* On free, we should get an unreachable failure. */
circuit_free(circ);
entry = hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(&service_kp.pubkey,
&intro_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(entry);
tt_uint_op(entry->unreachable_count, OP_EQ, 1);
hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge();
/* Again, create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction
* circuit at the INTRODUCING state but we'll close it for timeout. It
* should not be noted as a timeout failure. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ocirc->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
/* Code path will log this exit so build it. */
ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit = extend_info_new("TestNickname", digest,
NULL, NULL, NULL, &addr,
4242);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk, &intro_kp.pubkey);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
circuit_free(circ);
tt_assert(!hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(&service_kp.pubkey,
&intro_kp.pubkey));
/* Again, create and add to the global list a dummy client introduction
* circuit at the INTRODUCING state but without a chosen_exit. In theory, it
* can not happen but we'll make sure it doesn't end up in the failure cache
* anyway. */
circ = dummy_origin_circuit_new(0);
tt_assert(circ);
circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ocirc->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk, &intro_kp.pubkey);
circuit_free(circ);
tt_assert(!hs_cache_client_intro_state_find(&service_kp.pubkey,
&intro_kp.pubkey));
done:
circuit_free(circ);
hs_free_all();
}
struct testcase_t hs_client_tests[] = {
{ "e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "client_pick_intro", test_client_pick_intro,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "descriptor_fetch", test_descriptor_fetch,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "auth_key_filename_is_valid", test_auth_key_filename_is_valid, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "parse_auth_file_content", test_parse_auth_file_content, TT_FORK,
NULL, NULL },
{ "config_client_authorization", test_config_client_authorization,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "desc_has_arrived_cleanup", test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "close_intro_circuit_failure", test_close_intro_circuit_failure,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "close_intro_circuits_new_desc", test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "close_intro_circuits_cache_clean", test_close_intro_circuits_cache_clean,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
/* SOCKS5 Extended Error Code. */
{ "socks_hs_errors", test_socks_hs_errors, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink