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2259de0de7
(before using it for anything besides feeding the PRNG) Part of #17694
303 lines
8.8 KiB
C
303 lines
8.8 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2012-2015, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* Wrapper code for a curve25519 implementation. */
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#define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE
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#include "orconfig.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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#include "container.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
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#include "crypto_format.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "torlog.h"
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#include "ed25519/donna/ed25519_donna_tor.h"
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/* ==============================
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Part 1: wrap a suitable curve25519 implementation as curve25519_impl
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============================== */
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
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int curve25519_donna(uint8_t *mypublic,
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const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint);
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#endif
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_NACL
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#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H
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#include <crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
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#elif defined(HAVE_NACL_CRYPTO_SCALARMULT_CURVE25519_H)
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#include <nacl/crypto_scalarmult_curve25519.h>
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#endif
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#endif
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static void pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void);
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static int curve25519_use_ed = -1;
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STATIC int
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curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret,
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const uint8_t *basepoint)
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{
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uint8_t bp[CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
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int r;
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memcpy(bp, basepoint, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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/* Clear the high bit, in case our backend foolishly looks at it. */
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bp[31] &= 0x7f;
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#ifdef USE_CURVE25519_DONNA
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r = curve25519_donna(output, secret, bp);
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#elif defined(USE_CURVE25519_NACL)
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r = crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(output, secret, bp);
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#else
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#error "No implementation of curve25519 is available."
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#endif
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memwipe(bp, 0, sizeof(bp));
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return r;
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}
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STATIC int
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curve25519_basepoint_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret)
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{
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int r = 0;
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if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(curve25519_use_ed == -1)) {
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pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();
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}
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/* TODO: Someone should benchmark curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint versus
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* an optimized NaCl build to see which should be used when compiled with
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* NaCl available. I suspected that the ed25519 optimization always wins.
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*/
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if (PREDICT_LIKELY(curve25519_use_ed == 1)) {
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curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint_donna(output, secret);
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r = 0;
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} else {
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static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9};
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r = curve25519_impl(output, secret, basepoint);
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}
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return r;
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}
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void
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curve25519_set_impl_params(int use_ed)
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{
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curve25519_use_ed = use_ed;
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}
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/* ==============================
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Part 2: Wrap curve25519_impl with some convenience types and functions.
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============================== */
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/**
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* Return true iff a curve25519_public_key_t seems valid. (It's not necessary
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* to see if the point is on the curve, since the twist is also secure, but we
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* do need to make sure that it isn't the point at infinity.) */
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int
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curve25519_public_key_is_ok(const curve25519_public_key_t *key)
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{
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return !safe_mem_is_zero(key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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}
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/**
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* Generate CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN random bytes in <b>out</b>. If
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* <b>extra_strong</b> is true, this key is possibly going to get used more
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* than once, so use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on
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* failure.
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*
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* This function does not adjust the output of the RNG at all; the will caller
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* will need to clear or set the appropriate bits to make curve25519 work.
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*/
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int
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curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(uint8_t *out, int extra_strong)
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{
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if (extra_strong)
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crypto_strongest_rand(out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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else
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crypto_rand((char*)out, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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return 0;
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}
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/** Generate a new keypair and return the secret key. If <b>extra_strong</b>
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* is true, this key is possibly going to get used more than once, so
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* use a better-than-usual RNG. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
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int
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curve25519_secret_key_generate(curve25519_secret_key_t *key_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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if (curve25519_rand_seckey_bytes(key_out->secret_key, extra_strong) < 0)
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return -1;
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key_out->secret_key[0] &= 248;
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key_out->secret_key[31] &= 127;
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key_out->secret_key[31] |= 64;
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return 0;
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}
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void
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curve25519_public_key_generate(curve25519_public_key_t *key_out,
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const curve25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
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{
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curve25519_basepoint_impl(key_out->public_key, seckey->secret_key);
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}
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int
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curve25519_keypair_generate(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
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int extra_strong)
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{
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if (curve25519_secret_key_generate(&keypair_out->seckey, extra_strong) < 0)
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return -1;
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
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return 0;
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}
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/** DOCDOC */
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int
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curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair,
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const char *fname,
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const char *tag)
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{
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uint8_t contents[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
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int r;
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memcpy(contents, keypair->seckey.secret_key, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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memcpy(contents+CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
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keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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r = crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
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"c25519v1",
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tag,
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contents,
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sizeof(contents));
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memwipe(contents, 0, sizeof(contents));
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return r;
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}
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/** DOCDOC */
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int
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curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out,
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char **tag_out,
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const char *fname)
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{
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uint8_t content[CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
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ssize_t len;
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int r = -1;
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len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname, "c25519v1", tag_out,
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content, sizeof(content));
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if (len != sizeof(content))
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goto end;
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memcpy(keypair_out->seckey.secret_key, content, CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN);
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey);
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if (tor_memneq(keypair_out->pubkey.public_key,
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content + CURVE25519_SECKEY_LEN,
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CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN))
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goto end;
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r = 0;
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end:
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memwipe(content, 0, sizeof(content));
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if (r != 0) {
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memset(keypair_out, 0, sizeof(*keypair_out));
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tor_free(*tag_out);
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}
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return r;
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}
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/** Perform the curve25519 ECDH handshake with <b>skey</b> and <b>pkey</b>,
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* writing CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN bytes of output into <b>output</b>. */
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void
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curve25519_handshake(uint8_t *output,
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const curve25519_secret_key_t *skey,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *pkey)
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{
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curve25519_impl(output, skey->secret_key, pkey->public_key);
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}
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/** Check whether the ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint optimization seems to
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* be working. If so, return 0; otherwise return -1. */
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static int
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curve25519_basepoint_spot_check(void)
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{
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static const uint8_t alicesk[32] = {
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0x77,0x07,0x6d,0x0a,0x73,0x18,0xa5,0x7d,
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0x3c,0x16,0xc1,0x72,0x51,0xb2,0x66,0x45,
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0xdf,0x4c,0x2f,0x87,0xeb,0xc0,0x99,0x2a,
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0xb1,0x77,0xfb,0xa5,0x1d,0xb9,0x2c,0x2a
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};
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static const uint8_t alicepk[32] = {
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0x85,0x20,0xf0,0x09,0x89,0x30,0xa7,0x54,
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0x74,0x8b,0x7d,0xdc,0xb4,0x3e,0xf7,0x5a,
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0x0d,0xbf,0x3a,0x0d,0x26,0x38,0x1a,0xf4,
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0xeb,0xa4,0xa9,0x8e,0xaa,0x9b,0x4e,0x6a
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};
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const int loop_max=200;
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int save_use_ed = curve25519_use_ed;
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unsigned char e1[32] = { 5 };
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unsigned char e2[32] = { 5 };
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unsigned char x[32],y[32];
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int i;
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int r=0;
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/* Check the most basic possible sanity via the test secret/public key pair
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* used in "Cryptography in NaCl - 2. Secret keys and public keys". This
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* may catch catastrophic failures on systems where Curve25519 is expensive,
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* without requiring a ton of key generation.
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*/
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curve25519_use_ed = 1;
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r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, alicesk);
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if (fast_memneq(x, alicepk, 32))
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goto fail;
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/* Ok, the optimization appears to produce passable results, try a few more
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* values, maybe there's something subtle wrong.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < loop_max; ++i) {
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curve25519_use_ed = 0;
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r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(x, e1);
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curve25519_use_ed = 1;
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r |= curve25519_basepoint_impl(y, e2);
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if (fast_memneq(x,y,32))
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goto fail;
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memcpy(e1, x, 32);
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memcpy(e2, x, 32);
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}
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goto end;
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fail:
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r = -1;
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end:
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curve25519_use_ed = save_use_ed;
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return r;
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}
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/** Choose whether to use the ed25519-based curve25519-basepoint
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* implementation. */
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static void
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pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl(void)
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{
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curve25519_use_ed = 1;
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if (curve25519_basepoint_spot_check() == 0)
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return;
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log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "The ed25519-based curve25519 basepoint "
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"multiplication seems broken; using the curve25519 "
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"implementation.");
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curve25519_use_ed = 0;
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}
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/** Initialize the curve25519 implementations. This is necessary if you're
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* going to use them in a multithreaded setting, and not otherwise. */
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void
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curve25519_init(void)
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{
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pick_curve25519_basepoint_impl();
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}
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