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354 lines
17 KiB
TeX
354 lines
17 KiB
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\begin{document}
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\title{Design challenges and social factors in deploying low-latency anonymity}
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% Could still use a better title -PFS
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\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and
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Nick Mathewson\inst{1} \and
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Paul Syverson\inst{2}}
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\institute{The Tor Project \email{<\{arma,nickm\}@torproject.org>} \and
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Naval Research Laboratory \email{<syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil>}}
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\maketitle
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\pagestyle{plain}
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\begin{abstract}
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There are many unexpected or unexpectedly difficult obstacles to
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deploying anonymous communications. We describe Tor (\emph{the}
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onion routing), how to use it, our design philosophy, and some of
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the challenges that we have faced and continue to face in building,
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deploying, and sustaining a scalable, distributed, low-latency
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anonymity network.
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\end{abstract}
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\section{Introduction}
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This article describes Tor, a widely-used low-latency general-purpose
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anonymous communication system, and discusses some unexpected
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challenges arising from our experiences deploying Tor. We will tell
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you how to use it, who uses it, how it works, why we designed it the
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way we did, and why this makes it usable and stable.
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Tor is an overlay network for anonymizing TCP streams over the
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Internet~\cite{tor-design}. Tor works on the real-world Internet,
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requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires
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little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a
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reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency.
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Since deployment in October 2003 the public Tor network has grown to
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about a thousand volunteer-operated nodes worldwide and over 110
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megabytes average traffic per second from hundreds of thousands of
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concurrent users.
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\section{Tor Design and Design Philosophy: Distributed Trust and Usability}
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Tor enables users to connect to Internet sites without revealing their
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logical or physical locations to those sites or to observers. It
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enables hosts to be publicly accessible yet have similar protection
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against location through its \emph{location-hidden services}.
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To connect to a remote server via Tor the client software first learns
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a %signed
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list of Tor nodes from several central \emph{directory servers} via a
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voting protocol (to avoid dependence on or complete trust in any one
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of these servers). It then incrementally creates a private pathway or
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\emph{circuit} across the network. This circuit consists of
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encrypted connections through authenticated Tor nodes
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whose public keys were obtained from the directory servers. The client
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software negotiates a separate set of encryption keys for each hop along the
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circuit. The nodes in the circuit are chosen at random by the client
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subject to a preference for higher performing nodes to allocate
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resources effectively and with a client-chosen preferred set of first
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nodes called \emph{entry guards} to complicate profiling attacks by
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internal adversaries~\cite{hs-attack}.
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The circuit is extended one node at a time, tunneling extensions
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through already established portions of the circuit, and each node
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along the way knows only the immediately previous and following nodes
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in the circuit, so no individual Tor node knows the complete path that
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each fixed-sized data packet (or \emph{cell}) will take. Thus,
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neither an eavesdropper nor a compromised node can see both the
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connection's source and destination. Later requests use a new
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circuit to complicate long-term linkability between different actions
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by a single user.
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Tor attempts to anonymize the transport layer, not the application
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layer. Thus, applications such as SSH can provide
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authenticated communication that is hidden by Tor from outside observers.
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When anonymity from communication partners is desired,
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application-level protocols that transmit identifying
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information need additional scrubbing proxies, such as
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Privoxy~\cite{privoxy} for HTTP\@. Furthermore, Tor does not relay
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arbitrary IP packets; it only anonymizes TCP streams and DNS requests.
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Tor, the third generation of deployed onion-routing
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designs~\cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98,tor-design}, was researched, developed,
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and deployed by the Naval Research Laboratory and the Free Haven
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Project under ONR and DARPA funding for secure government
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communications. In 2005, continuing work by Free Haven was funded by
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the Electronic Frontier Foundation for maintaining civil liberties of
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ordinary citizens online. In 2006, The Tor Project incorporated as a
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non-profit and has received continued funding from the Omidyar Network,
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the U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau, and other groups to combat
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blocking and censorship on the Internet. This diversity of funding fits
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Tor's overall philosophy: a wide variety of interests helps maintain
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both the stability and the security of the network.
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Usability is also a central goal. Downloading and installing Tor is
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easy. Simply go to\\
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http://torproject.org/ and download. Tor comes with install
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wizards and a GUI for major operating systems: GNU/Linux, OS X, and
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Windows. It also runs on various flavors of BSD and UNIX\@. Basic
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instructions, documentation, FAQs, etc.\ are available in many
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languages. The Tor GUI Vidalia makes server configuration easy, e.g.,
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choosing how much bandwidth to allocate to Tor, exit policy choices,
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etc. And, the GUI Torbutton allows Firefox users a one-click toggle of
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whether browsing goes through Tor or not. Tor is easily configured by
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a site administrator to run at either individual desktops or just at a
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site firewall or combinations of these.
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The ideal Tor network would be practical, useful and anonymous. When
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trade-offs arise between these properties, Tor's research strategy has
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been to remain useful enough to attract many users, and practical
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enough to support them. Only subject to these constraints do we try
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to maximize anonymity. Tor thus differs from other deployed systems
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for traffic analysis resistance in its security and flexibility. Mix
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networks such as
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% Mixmaster~\cite{mixmaster-spec} or its successor
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Mixminion~\cite{minion-design} gain the highest degrees of practical
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anonymity at the expense of introducing highly variable delays, making
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them unsuitable for applications such as web browsing. Commercial
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single-hop proxies~\cite{anonymizer} can provide good performance, but
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a single-point compromise can expose all users' traffic, and a
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single-point eavesdropper can perform traffic analysis on the entire
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network. Also, their proprietary implementations place any
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infrastructure that depends on these single-hop solutions at the mercy
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of their providers' financial health as well as network security.
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There are numerous other designs for distributed anonymous low-latency
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communication~\cite{crowds-tissec,web-mix,freedom21-security,i2p,tarzan:ccs02,morphmix:fc04}.
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Some have been deployed or even commercialized; some exist only on
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paper. Though each has something unique to offer, we feel Tor has
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advantages over each of them that make it a superior choice for most
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users and applications. For example, unlike purely P2P designs we
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neither limit ordinary users to content and services available only
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within our network nor require them to take on responsibility for
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connections outside the network, unless they separately choose to run
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server nodes. Nonetheless because we support low-latency interactive
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communications, end-to-end \emph{traffic correlation}
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attacks~\cite{danezis:pet2004,defensive-dropping,SS03,hs-attack,bauer:tr2007}
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allow an attacker who can observe both ends of a communication to
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correlate packet timing and volume, quickly linking the initiator to
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her destination.
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Our defense lies in having a diverse enough set of nodes to prevent
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most real-world adversaries from being in the right places to attack
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users, by distributing each transaction over several nodes in the
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network. This ``distributed trust'' approach means the Tor network
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can be safely operated and used by a wide variety of mutually
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distrustful users, providing sustainability and security.
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The Tor network has a broad range of users, making it difficult for
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eavesdroppers to track them or profile interests. These include
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ordinary citizens concerned about their privacy, corporations who
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don't want to reveal information to their competitors, and law
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enforcement and government intelligence agencies who need to do
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operations on the Internet without being noticed. Naturally,
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organizations will not want to depend on others for their security.
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If most participating providers are reliable, Tor tolerates some
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hostile infiltration of the network.
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This distribution of trust is central to the Tor philosophy and
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pervades Tor at all levels: Onion routing has been open source since
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the mid-nineties (mistrusting users can inspect the code themselves);
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Tor is free software (anyone could take up the development of Tor from
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the current team); anyone can use Tor without license or charge (which
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encourages a broad user base with diverse interests); Tor is designed to be
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usable (also promotes a large, diverse user base) and configurable (so
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users can easily set up and run server nodes); the Tor
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infrastructure is run by volunteers (it is not dependent on the
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economic viability or business strategy of any company) who are
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scattered around the globe (not completely under the jurisdiction of
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any single country); ongoing development and deployment has been
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funded by diverse sources (development does not fully depend on
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funding from any one source or even funding for any one primary
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purpose or sources in any one jurisdiction). All of these contribute
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to Tor's resilience and sustainability.
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\section{Social challenges}
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Many of the issues the Tor project needs to address extend beyond
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system design and technology development. In particular, the Tor
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project's \emph{image} with respect to its users and the rest of the
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Internet impacts the security it can provide. With this image issue
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in mind, this section discusses the Tor user base and Tor's
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interaction with other services on the Internet.
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\subsection{Communicating security}
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Usability for anonymity systems contributes to their security, because
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usability affects the possible anonymity set~\cite{econymics,back01}.
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Conversely, an unusable system attracts few users and thus can't
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provide much anonymity.
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This phenomenon has a second-order effect: knowing this, users should
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choose which anonymity system to use based in part on how usable and
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secure \emph{others} will find it, in order to get the protection of a
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larger anonymity set. Thus we might supplement the adage ``usability
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is a security parameter''~\cite{back01} with a new one: ``perceived
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usability is a security parameter.''~\cite{usability-network-effect}.
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\subsection{Reputability and perceived social value}
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Another factor impacting the network's security is its reputability,
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the perception of its social value based on its current user base. If
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Alice is the only user who has ever downloaded the software, it might
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be socially accepted, but she's not getting much anonymity. Add a
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thousand activists, and she's anonymous, but everyone thinks she's an
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activist too. Add a thousand diverse citizens (cancer survivors,
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people concerned about identity theft, law enforcement agents, and so
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on) and now she's harder to profile.
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Furthermore, the network's reputability affects its operator base:
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more people are willing to run a service if they believe it will be
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used by human rights workers than if they believe it will be used
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exclusively for disreputable ends. This effect becomes stronger if
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node operators themselves think they will be associated with their
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users' ends.
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So the more cancer survivors on Tor, the better for the human rights
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activists. The more malicious hackers, the worse for the normal
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users. Thus, reputability is an anonymity issue for two
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reasons. First, it impacts the sustainability of the network: a
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network that's always about to be shut down has difficulty attracting
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and keeping adequate nodes. Second, a disreputable network is more
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vulnerable to legal and political attacks, since it will attract fewer
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supporters.
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Reputability becomes even more tricky in the case of privacy networks,
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since the good uses of the network (such as publishing by journalists
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in dangerous countries, protecting road warriors from profiling and
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potential physical harm, tracking of criminals by law enforcement,
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protecting corporate research interests, etc.) are typically kept private,
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whereas network abuses or other problems tend to be more widely
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publicized.
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\subsection{Abuse}
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\label{subsec:tor-and-blacklists}
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For someone willing to be antisocial or even break the law, Tor is
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usually a poor choice to hide bad behavior. For example, Tor nodes are
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publicly identified, unlike the million-node botnets that are now
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common on the Internet. Nonetheless, we always expected that,
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alongside legitimate users, Tor would also attract troublemakers who
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exploit Tor to abuse services on the Internet with vandalism, rude
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mail, and so on. \emph{Exit policies} have allowed individual nodes
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to block access to specific IP/port ranges. This approach aims to
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make operators more willing to run Tor by allowing them to prevent
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their nodes from being used for abusing particular services. For
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example, by default Tor nodes block SMTP (port 25), to avoid the issue
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of spam.
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Exit policies are useful but insufficient: if not all nodes block a
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given service, that service may try to block Tor instead. While being
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blockable is important to being good netizens, we would like to
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encourage services to allow anonymous access. Services should not need
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to decide between blocking legitimate anonymous use and allowing
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unlimited abuse. Nonetheless, blocking IP addresses is a
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course-grained solution~\cite{netauth}: entire apartment buildings,
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campuses, and even countries sometimes share a single IP address.
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Also, whether intended or not, such blocking supports repression of
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free speech. In many locations where Internet access of various kinds
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is censored or even punished by imprisonment, Tor is a path both to
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the outside world and to others inside. Blocking posts from Tor makes
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the job of censoring authorities easier. This is a loss for both Tor
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and services that block, such as Wikipedia: we don't want to compete
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for (or divvy up) the NAT-protected entities of the world. This is
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also unfortunate because there are relatively simple technical
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solutions~\cite{nym}. Various schemes for escrowing anonymous posts
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until they are reviewed by editors would both prevent abuse and remove
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incentives for attempts to abuse. Further, pseudonymous reputation
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tracking of posters through Tor would allow those who establish
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adequate reputation to post without escrow~\cite{nym,nymble}.
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We stress that as far as we can tell, most Tor uses are not
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abusive. Most services have not complained, and others are actively
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working to find ways besides banning to cope with the abuse. For
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example, the Freenode IRC network had a problem with a coordinated
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group of abusers joining channels and subtly taking over the
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conversation; but when they labelled all users coming from Tor IP
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addresses as ``anonymous users,'' removing the ability of the abusers
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to blend in, the abusers stopped using Tor. This is an illustration of
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how simple
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technical mechanisms can remove the ability to abuse anonymously
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without undermining the ability to communicate anonymously and can
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thus remove the incentive to attempt abusing in this way.
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\section{The Future}
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\label{sec:conclusion}
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Tor is the largest and most diverse low-latency anonymity network
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available, but we are still in the early stages. Several major
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questions remain.
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First, will our volunteer-based approach to sustainability continue to
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work as well in the long term as it has the first several years?
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Besides node operation, Tor research, deployment, maintainance, and
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development is increasingly done by volunteers: package maintenance
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for various OSes, document translation, GUI design and implementation,
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live CDs, specification of new design changes, etc.\
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%
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Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy
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online. For applications where it is desirable to keep identifying
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information out of application traffic, someone must build more and
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better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people.
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%
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Third, we need to maintain a reputation for social good, and learn how to
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coexist with the variety of Internet services and their established
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authentication mechanisms. We can't just keep escalating the blacklist
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standoff forever.
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%
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Fourth, the current Tor architecture hardly scales even to handle
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current user demand. We must deploy designs and incentives to further
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encourage clients to relay traffic too, without thereby trading away
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too much anonymity or other properties.
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These are difficult and open questions. Yet choosing not to solve them
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means leaving most users to a less secure network or no anonymizing
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network at all.\\
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\noindent{\bf Acknowledgment:} Thanks to Matt Edman for many
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helpful comments on a draft of this article.
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\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
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\end{document}
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