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a5903b737a
svn:r2721
347 lines
14 KiB
Groff
347 lines
14 KiB
Groff
.TH TOR 1 "November 2004" "TOR"
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.SH NAME
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tor \- The second-generation onion router
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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.B tor
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[\fIOPTION value\fR]...
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.I tor
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is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
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service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
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negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
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knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
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the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
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the downstream node.
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.PP
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Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
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routers"). Users bounce their tcp streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
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around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
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themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
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.SH OPTIONS
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\fB-h, -help\fP
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Display a short help message and exit.
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.TP
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\fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
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FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
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.TP
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Other options can be specified either on the commandline (\fI--option
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value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR).
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Options are case-insensitive.
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.TP
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\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
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Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
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the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
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log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
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severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. If only one
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severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
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sent to the listed destination.
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.TP
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\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR-\fImaxSeverity\fR \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
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As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
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option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
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are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
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.TP
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\fBBandwidthRateBytes \fR\fINUM\fP
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A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth on this node to NUM bytes per second. (Default: 800000)
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.TP
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\fBBandwidthBurstBytes \fR\fINUM\fP
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Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to NUM bytes. (Default: 50000000)
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.TP
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\fBDirServer \fR\fIaddress:port fingerprint\fP
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Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
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address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
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be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
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servers. If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
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directory servers: moria1, moria2, and tor26.
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.TP
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\fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
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On startup, setgid to this user.
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.TP
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\fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
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If set, Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port,
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rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
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.TP
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\fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
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To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
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cell on open connections every NUM seconds. (Default: 300)
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.TP
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\fBMaxConn \fR\fINUM\fP
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Maximum number of simultaneous sockets allowed. You probably don't need
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to adjust this. (Default: 1024)
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.TP
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\fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
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Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
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is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
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of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
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.TP
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\fBPIDFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
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On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
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.TP
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\fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. (Default: 0)
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.TP
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\fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
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On startup, setuid to this user.
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.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
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.PP
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The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSOCKSPort\fP is non-zero):
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.TP
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\fBAllowUnverifiedNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
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Where on our circuits should we allow Tor servers that the directory
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servers haven't authenticated as "verified"? (Default: middle,rendezvous.)
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\fBdirfetchpostperiod \fR\fIseconds\fP
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Every N seconds, Tor downloads a fresh directory, and re-uploads
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information about hidden services to the directory servers. If
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running as a server, Tor also re-uploads information about itself to
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the directory servers. (Tor also uploads this information whenever it
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changes.) (Default: 600.)
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.TP
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\fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. (Usually,
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you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
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you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a good server.)
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.TP
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\fBEntryNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
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.TP
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\fBExitNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.
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.TP
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\fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
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.TP
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\fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "exitnodes" for
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the last hop of a circuit.
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.TP
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\fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "entrynodes" for
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the first hop of a circuit.
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.TP
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\fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
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your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
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allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
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but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
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.TP
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\fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
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A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
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\fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. (Default: 80, 443.)
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.TP
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\fB
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\fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
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Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 60)
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.TP
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\fBNodeFamily \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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The named Tor servers constitute a "family" of similar or
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co-administared servers, so never use any two of them in the same
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circuit. This option can be used multiple times.
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.TP
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.\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
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.\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight. Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
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.\" .TP
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\fBRendNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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A list of preferred nodes to use for the rendezvous point, if possible.
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.TP
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\fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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A list of nodes to never use when choosing a rendezvous point.
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.TP
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\fBSOCKSPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
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Bind to this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications.
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Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections. (Default:
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9050)
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.TP
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\fBSOCKSBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
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Bind to this address to listen for connections from socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
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.TP
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\fBSOCKSPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
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Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the socks ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
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.SH SERVER OPTIONS
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.PP
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The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
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.TP
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\fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
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The IP or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu).
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.TP
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\fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
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Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
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.TP
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\fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
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Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
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"\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP\fB:\fP\fIPORT\fP".
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If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
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given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
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denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can either be a single port number
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or an interval of ports: "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP".
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For example, "reject 127.0.0.1:*,reject 192.168.1.0/24:*,accept *:*" would
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reject any traffic destined for localhost and any 192.168.1.* address, but
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accept anything else.
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This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
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it all on one line.
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See RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address
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space. The default exit policy is:
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.PD 0
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.RS 12
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.IP "reject 0.0.0.0/8" 0
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.IP "reject 169.254.0.0/16" 4
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.IP "reject 127.0.0.0/8"
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.IP "reject 192.168.0.0/16"
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.IP "reject 10.0.0.0/8"
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.IP "reject 172.16.0.0/12"
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.IP "accept *:20-22"
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.IP "accept *:53"
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.IP "accept *:79-81"
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.IP "accept *:110"
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.IP "accept *:143"
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.IP "accept *:443"
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.IP "accept *:873"
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.IP "accept *:993"
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.IP "accept *:995" 4
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.IP "reject *:4661-4662"
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.IP "reject *:1214"
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.IP "reject *:6346"
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.IP "accept *:1024-65535"
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.IP "reject *:*"
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.RE
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.PD
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.TP
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\fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
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If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
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.TP
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\fBMyFamily \fR\fInickname,nickname,...\fP
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Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
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or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
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When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
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will not use them in the same circuit.
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.TP
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\fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
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Set the server's nickname to 'name'.
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.TP
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\fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
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How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
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.TP
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\fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
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Bind to this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
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.TP
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\fBORBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
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Bind to this address to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
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.TP
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\fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
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Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
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of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
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The address
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pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
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address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
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\fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
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successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
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redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
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special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
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considered.
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.TP
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\fBAccountingMaxKB \fR\fInum\fP
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Never send or receive more than \fInum\fP kilobytes in a given
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accounting period (currently, only months are supported). When the
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number of kilobytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time
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in the next accounting period. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
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using this option is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
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provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
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the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
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always "available".
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.TP
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\fBMonthlyAccountingStart \fR\fIday\fP
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Always start the accounting period on the provided day of the month,
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which must be between 1 and 28. (Defaults to 1.)
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.SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
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.PP
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The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
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.TP
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\fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
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directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
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own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
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Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
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probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
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admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
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.TP
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\fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail address\fP
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Administrative contact information for server.
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.TP
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\fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
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Bind the directory service to this port.
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.TP
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\fBDirBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
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Bind the directory service to this address. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
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.TP
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\fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy,policy,...\fP
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Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
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.TP
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\fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
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STRING is a command-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
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to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
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pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
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option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
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spliced together.
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.TP
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\fBRunTesting \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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If set to 1, Tor tries to build circuits through all of the servers it
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knows about, so it can tell which are up and which are down. This
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option is only useful for authoritative directories, so you probably
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don't want to use it.
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.SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
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.PP
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The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
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.TP
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\fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
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Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
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service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
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times to specify multiple services.
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.TP
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\fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
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Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
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option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
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hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
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same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
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by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.
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.TP
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\fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInickname,nicknamme,...\fP
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If possible, use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
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service.
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.TP
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\fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname,nicknamme,...\fP
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Do not use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
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service.
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.\" UNDOCUMENTED
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.\" ignoreversion
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.SH FILES
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.TP
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.I @CONFDIR@/torrc
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The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
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.TP
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.I @CONFDIR@/dirservers
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A list of directory servers, to bootstrap into the network.
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.TP
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.I @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
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The tor process stores keys and other data here.
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.SH SEE ALSO
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.BR privoxy (1),
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.BR tsocks (1),
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.BR torify (1)
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.BR http://freehaven.net/tor/
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.SH BUGS
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Plenty, probably. It's still in alpha. Please report them.
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.SH AUTHORS
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Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.
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