$Id$ Legend: SPEC!! - Not specified SPEC - Spec not finalized N - nick claims R - arma claims P - phobos claims S - Steven claims M - Matt claims J - Jeff claims - Not done * Top priority . Partially done o Done d Deferrable D Deferred X Abandoned For Tor 0.2.0.13-alpha: - Put a consensus in place of the empty fallback-consensus file in src/config and see what breaks. - let bridges set relaybandwidthrate as low as 5kb - config option FetchDirInfoEagerly so the dnsel can fetch dir info like a mirror without needing to be a tor server. - nick has to pick a name for it Features blocking 0.2.0.x: - mirror tor downloads on (via) tor dir caches R . spec d deploy - geoip caching and publishing for bridges R . spec ? - deploy d let Vidalia use the geoip data too rather than doing its own anonymized queries - bridge address disbursal strategies o get the cached-descriptors* to bridges@moria - parse out bridge addresses from cached-descriptors* (or parse them out before Tonga sends them) (or get Tonga's Tor to write them out better in the first place) N * answer by IP/timestamp - run a little web server on moria? N d answer by answering email to bridges@torproject - keep track of which addresses have been answered already R - bridge communities - spec - deploy - man page entries for Alternate*Authority config options - make the Alternate*Authority config options pass a "default_type" to parse_dir_server_line() so they don't demand as much redundancy d some sort of reachability testing on bridges - interface for letting soat modify flags that authorities assign R . spec o add an AuthDirBadexit torrc option if we decide we want one. S * tor usb windows image (vidalia, polipo, tor, firefox) S/M - vidalia can launch firefox - build a community version of firefox - pick our favorite extensions Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x: - document the "3/4 and 7/8" business in the clients fetching consensus documents timeline. then document the bridge user download timeline. - config option __ControllerLimit that hangs up if there are a limit of controller connections already. - See also Flyspray tasks. - See also all items marked XXXX020 and DOCDOC in the code - https://www.torproject.org/eff/legal-faq.html#License doesn't mention licenses for other components of the bundles. - Before the feature freeze: (Nick) D 118 if feasible and obvious D Maintain a skew estimate and use ftime consistently. - 105+TLS, if possible. . TLS backend work - New list of ciphers for clients o Servers detect new ciphers, and only send ID cert when they get an older cipher list, and only request client cert when they get an older cipher list. - Clients only send certificates when asked for them. o Servers disable callback once negotiation is finished, so that renegotiation happens according to the old rules. o Clients initiate renegotiation immediately on completing a v2 connection. o Servers detect renegotiation, and if there is now a client cert, they adust the client ID. o Detect. o Adjust. - New revised handshake: post-TLS: - start by sending VERSIONS cells - once we have a version, send a netinfo and become open - Ban most cell types on a non-OPEN connection. - NETINFO fallout - Don't extend a circuit over a noncanonical connection with mismatched address. - Learn our outgoing IP address from netinfo cells? o Protocol revision. o Earliest stages of 110 (infinite-length) in v2 protocol: add support for RELAY_EARLY. - get more v3 authorities before 0.2.0.x comes out. - brainstorm about who those should be - Bugs. - Bug reports Roger has heard along the way that don't have enough details/attention to solve them yet. - arma noticed that when his network went away and he tried a new guard node and the connect() syscall failed to it, the guard wasn't being marked as down. 0.2.0.x. - after being without network for 12 hours, arma's tor decided it couldn't fetch any network statuses, and never tried again even when the network came back and arma clicked on things. also 0.2.0. - we need a config option to turn off proposal 109 behavior, else running a private tor network on your own computer is very hard. . man page entry for HidServDirectoryV2 and MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2. d Tor logs the libevent version on startup, for debugging purposes. This is great. But it does this before configuring the logs, so it only goes to stdout and is then lost. d we should do another bandwidth test every 12 hours or something if we're showing less than 50KB and our bandwidthrate says we can do more than that. I think some servers are forgetting the results of their first test, and then never seeing use. - Proposals: o 101: Voting on the Tor Directory System (plus 103) D Use if-modified-since on consensus download - Controller support - GETINFO to get consensus - Event when new consensus arrives - 105: Version negotiation for the Tor protocol . 111: Prioritize local traffic over relayed. - Merge into tor-spec.txt. - Refactoring: . Make cells get buffered on circuit, not on the or_conn. . Switch to pool-allocation for cells? - Benchmark pool-allocation vs straightforward malloc. - Adjust memory allocation logic in pools to favor a little less slack memory. . Remove socketpair-based bridges conns, and the word "bridge". (Use shared (or connected) buffers for communication, rather than sockets.) . Implement - Handle rate-limiting on directory writes to linked directory connections in a more sensible manner. - Find more ways to test this. D Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the extra-stable case. D Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have less magic and less control logic. - Refactor networkstatus generation: - Include "v" line in getinfo values. - Bridges: . Bridges users (rudimentary version) o Ability to specify bridges manually o Config option 'UseBridges' that bridge users can turn on. o uses bridges as first hop rather than entry guards. o if you don't have any routerinfos for your bridges, or you don't like the ones you have, ask a new bridge for its server/authority. . Ask all directory questions to bridge via BEGIN_DIR. - use the bridges for dir fetches even when our dirport is open. R - drop 'authority' queries if they're to our own identity key; accept them otherwise. X Design/implement the "local-status" or something like it, from the "Descriptor purposes: how to tell them apart" section of http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/May-2007/msg00008.html o timeout and retry schedules for fetching bridge descriptors - give extend_info_t a router_purpose again o react faster to download networkstatuses after the first bridge descriptor arrives o be more robust to bridges being marked as down and leaving us stranded without any known "running" bridges. - Bridges operators (rudimentary version) o Ability to act as dir cache without a dir port. o Bridges publish to bridge authorities o Fix BEGIN_DIR so that you connect to bridge of which you only know IP (and optionally fingerprint), and then use BEGIN_DIR to learn more about it. R - look at server_mode() and decide if it always applies to bridges too. - Bridges o Clients can ask bridge authorities for updates on known bridges. - Misc * Make BEGIN_DIR mandatory for asking questions of bridge authorities? (but only for bridge descriptors. not for ordinary cache stuff.) - Features (other than bridges): - Audit how much RAM we're using for buffers and cell pools; try to trim down a lot. - Base relative control socket paths on datadir. - Make TrackHostExits expire TrackHostExitsExpire seconds after their *last* use, not their *first* use. - Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP. - Or maybe close connections from same IP when we get a lot from one. - Or maybe block IPs that connect too many times at once. - Testing N - Hack up a client that gives out weird/no certificates, so we can test to make sure that this doesn't cause servers to crash. - Deprecations: - can we deprecate 'getinfo network-status'? - can we deprecate the FastFirstHopPK config option? - Documentation - HOWTO for DNSPort. - Quietly document NT Service options - More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list. - recommend pidgin (gaim is renamed) - unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug. - we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date. . Document transport and natdport in a good HOWTO. - Publicize torel. (What else? . Finish path-spec.txt P - Packaging: P - Plan a switch to polipo. Perhaps we'll offer two http proxies in the future. P - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc. P - Figure out why dll's compiled in mingw don't work right in WinXP. - Create packages for Nokia 800, requested by Chris Soghoian P - Consider creating special Tor-Polipo-Vidalia test packages, requested by Dmitri Vitalev o Get Vidalia supporting protocolinfo and using auth by default. P - create a "make win32-bundle" for vidalia-privoxy-tor-torbutton bundle P - Flyspray 487, create a universal binary privoxy for inclusion in packages. Planned for 0.2.1.x: - when somebody uses the controlport as an http proxy, give them a "tor isn't an http proxy" error too like we do for the socks port. - we try to build 4 test circuits to break them over different servers. but sometimes our entry node is the same for multiple test circuits. this defeats the point. - enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout. - configurable timestamp granularity. defaults to 'seconds'. - consider making 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too. - we should consider a single config option TorPrivateNetwork that turns on all the config options for running a private test tor network. having to keep updating all the tools, and the docs, just isn't working. - consider whether a single Guard flag lets us distinguish between "was good enough to be a guard when we picked it" and "is still adequate to be used as a guard even after we've picked it". We should write a real proposal for this. - switch out privoxy in the bundles and replace it with polipo. - make the new tls handshake blocking-resistant. - figure out some way to collect feedback about what countries are using bridges, in a way that doesn't screw anonymity too much. - let tor dir mirrors proxy connections to the tor download site, so if you know a bridge you can fetch the tor software. - more strategies for distributing bridge addresses in a way that doesn't rely on knowing somebody who runs a bridge for you. - A way to adjust router status flags from the controller. (How do we prevent the authority from clobbering them soon afterward?) - Bridge authorities should do reachability testing but only on the purpose==bridge descriptors they have. - Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last N seconds. - Investigate RAM use in Tor servers. - Start on the WSAENOBUFS solution. - Start on Windows auto-update for Tor Deferred from 0.2.0.x: - Proposals - 113: Simplifying directory authority administration - 110: prevent infinite-length circuits (phase one) - 118: Listen on and advertise multiple ports: - Tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is able to rotate through. (maybe. Possible overlap with proposal 118.) - config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too. (This is very similar to proposal 118.) - 117: IPv6 Exits - Internal code support for ipv6: o Clone ipv6 functions (inet_ntop, inet_pton) where they don't exist. - Most address variables need to become tor_addr_t - Teach resolving code how to handle ipv6. - Teach exit policies about ipv6 (consider ipv4/ipv6 interaction!) - Features - Let controller set router flags for authority to transmit, and for client to use. - add an 'exit-address' line in the descriptor for servers that exit from something that isn't their published address. - More work on AvoidDiskWrites? - Features - Make a TCP DNSPort - Protocol work - MAYBE kill stalled circuits rather than stalled connections. This is possible thanks to cell queues, but we need to consider the anonymity implications. - Implement TLS shutdown properly when possible. - Bugs - If the client's clock is too far in the past, it will drop (or just not try to get) descriptors, so it'll never build circuits. - Refactoring - Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless they are actually _on_ a socks connection: have edge_connection_t and (say) dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t. - Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the online config documentation from a single source. - Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make "who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what router is this?" - Blocking/scanning-resistance - It would be potentially helpful to respond to https requests on the OR port by acting like an HTTPS server. - Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as next hop after the bridge? Open research question; let's say no for 0.2.0 unless we learn otherwise. - Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached bridge. - Build: - Detect correct version of libraries from autoconf script. Future versions: - See also Flyspray tasks. - See also all OPEN/ACCEPTED proposals. - See also all items marked XXXX and FFFF in the code. - Protocol: - Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy is pretty lame; we should get a better one. - Allow small cells and large cells on the same network? - Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow connection (tls session key) rotation. - Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc. But see paper breaking morphmix. - Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own link crypto, unless we can bully DTLS into it. - Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends. (Pending a user who needs this) - Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that we've seen in the wild. (Pending a user who needs this) - Directory system - BEGIN_DIR items X turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit - handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set. - Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8? - Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory caching. (Is this actually a good idea??) - Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one at a time. Consider adding to controller as well. - Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities - a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp - Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination. - Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness before we approve them. - Hidden services: - Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services. . Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach. (Much of this will be superseded by 114.) - switch to an ascii format, maybe sexpr? - authdirservers publish blobs of them. - other authdirservers fetch these blobs. - hidserv people have the option of not uploading their blobs. - you can insert a blob via the controller. - and there's some amount of backwards compatibility. - teach clients, intro points, and hidservs about auth mechanisms. - come up with a few more auth mechanisms. - auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter connection requests. - Let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own OutboundBindAddress? - Hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort - Server operation X When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with this nickname' message... or maybe instead when we see in the networkstatuses that somebody else is Named with the name we want: warn the user, send a STATUS_SERVER message, and fall back to unnamed. - If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n, we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other people can notice too. - When we hit a funny error from a dir request (eg 403 forbidden), but tor is working and happy otherwise, and we haven't seen many such errors recently, then don't warn about it. - Controller - Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos - DIR_REACHABLE - BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind a firewall.) - BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy) - UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable) - Status events related to hibernation - something about failing to parse our address? from resolve_my_address() in config.c - sketchy OS, sketchy threading - too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU? - Implement missing status event fields: - TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY - GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect." We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so on. - More information in events: - Include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events. - Change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose, whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become too dirty for further circuits, etc. - Change stream status events analogously. - Expose more information via getinfo: - import and export rendezvous descriptors - Review all static fields for additional candidates - Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server. - We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download. - Make everything work with hidden services - Performance/resources - per-conn write buckets - separate config options for read vs write limiting (It's hard to support read > write, since we need better congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So, defer the whole thing.) - Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive. - Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it also introduces DoS opportunities. - Consider truncating rather than destroying failed circuits, in order to save the effort of restarting. There are security issues here that need thinking, though. - Handle full buffers without totally borking - Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and maybe per subnet. - Misc - Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by design. - Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under some circumstances? - Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what it's for. - Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not working"). - Security - some better fix for bug #516? - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy? (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common) - Directory guards - Mini-SoaT: - Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if they come back self-signed, declare themselves to be non-exits. Similar to how we test for broken/evil dns now. - Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have the BadExit flag set. - Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions from Snakes on a Tor. - More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string(). I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak. - Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers, to reduce remote sniping attacks. - Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to be us as not. - Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps? - DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion. - Needs thinking - Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions, we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper. - Windows server usability - Solve the ENOBUFS problem. - make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets, so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one. - make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c. - We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash. - Merge code from Urz into libevent - Make Tor use evbuffers. - Documentation - a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. (svg? or imagemagick?) . Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c . multiple sample torrc files . figure out how to make nt service stuff work? . Document it. - Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from less useful ones? - Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift too far from arma's undocumented styleguide. Also, document that styleguide in HACKING. (See r9634 for example.) - exactly one space at beginning and at end of comments, except i guess when there's line-length pressure. - if we refer to a function name, put a () after it. - only write foo when foo is an argument to this function. - doxygen comments must always end in some form of punctuation. - capitalize the first sentence in the doxygen comment, except when you shouldn't. - avoid spelling errors and incorrect comments. ;) - Packaging - The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting, to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps the RPM and other startup scripts should too? - add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can fix the https thing in the default configuration: http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort - Related tools - Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser. Documentation, non-version-specific. - Specs - Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers NR - write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor' - Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff - Mention controller libs someplace. - Remove need for HACKING file. - document http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy on freebsd and osx P - figure out why x86_64 won't build rpms from tor.spec P - figure out spec files for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo P - figure out polipo install scripts for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo on osx, win32 - figure out selinux policy for tor P - change packaging system to more automated and specific for each platform, suggested by Paul Wouter P - Setup repos for redhat and suse rpms & start signing the rpms the way package management apps prefer Website: J - tor-in-the-media page P - Figure out licenses for website material. (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License at http://opencontent.org/openpub/) P - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on stickers directly, etc. P - put the source image for the stickers on the website, so people can print their own P - figure out a license for the logos and docs we publish (trademark figures into this) (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License at http://opencontent.org/openpub/) R - make a page with the hidden service diagrams. P - ask Jan/Jens to be the translation coordinator? add to volunteer page. - add a page for localizing all tor's components. - It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place. P - create a 'blog badge' for tor fans to link to and feature on their blogs. A sample can be found at http://interloper.org/tmp/tor/tor-button.png - Tor mirrors - make a mailing list with the mirror operators - make an automated tool to check /project/trace/ at mirrors to learn which ones are lagging behind. - auto (or manually) cull the mirrors that are broken; and contact their operator? - a set of instructions for mirror operators to make their apaches serve our charsets correctly, and bonus points for language negotiation. - figure out how to load-balance the downloads across mirrors? - ponder how to get users to learn that they should google for "tor mirrors" if the main site is blocked. - find a mirror volunteer to coordinate all of this