/* Copyright (c) 2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** * \file hs_cell.c * \brief Hidden service API for cell creation and handling. **/ #include "or.h" #include "config.h" #include "rendservice.h" #include "hs_cell.h" #include "hs_ntor.h" /* Trunnel. */ #include "ed25519_cert.h" #include "hs/cell_common.h" #include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h" #include "hs/cell_introduce1.h" #include "hs/cell_rendezvous.h" /* Compute the MAC of an INTRODUCE cell in mac_out. The encoded_cell param is * the cell content up to the ENCRYPTED section of length encoded_cell_len. * The encrypted param is the start of the ENCRYPTED section of length * encrypted_len. The mac_key is the key needed for the computation of the MAC * derived from the ntor handshake of length mac_key_len. * * The length mac_out_len must be at least DIGEST256_LEN. */ static void compute_introduce_mac(const uint8_t *encoded_cell, size_t encoded_cell_len, const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t encrypted_len, const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len) { size_t offset = 0; size_t mac_msg_len; uint8_t mac_msg[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}; tor_assert(encoded_cell); tor_assert(encrypted); tor_assert(mac_key); tor_assert(mac_out); tor_assert(mac_out_len >= DIGEST256_LEN); /* Compute the size of the message which is basically the entire cell until * the MAC field of course. */ mac_msg_len = encoded_cell_len + (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN); tor_assert(mac_msg_len <= sizeof(mac_msg)); /* First, put the encoded cell in the msg. */ memcpy(mac_msg, encoded_cell, encoded_cell_len); offset += encoded_cell_len; /* Second, put the CLIENT_PK + ENCRYPTED_DATA but ommit the MAC field (which * is junk at this point). */ memcpy(mac_msg + offset, encrypted, (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN)); offset += (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN); tor_assert(offset == mac_msg_len); crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac_out, mac_out_len, mac_key, mac_key_len, mac_msg, mac_msg_len); memwipe(mac_msg, 0, sizeof(mac_msg)); } /* From a set of keys, subcredential and the ENCRYPTED section of an * INTRODUCE2 cell, return a newly allocated intro cell keys structure. * Finally, the client public key is copied in client_pk. On error, return * NULL. */ static hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t * get_introduce2_key_material(const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key, const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_key, const uint8_t *subcredential, const uint8_t *encrypted_section, curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk) { hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *keys; tor_assert(auth_key); tor_assert(enc_key); tor_assert(subcredential); tor_assert(encrypted_section); tor_assert(client_pk); keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*keys)); /* First bytes of the ENCRYPTED section are the client public key. */ memcpy(client_pk->public_key, encrypted_section, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); if (hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(auth_key, enc_key, client_pk, subcredential, keys) < 0) { /* Don't rely on the caller to wipe this on error. */ memwipe(client_pk, 0, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); tor_free(keys); keys = NULL; } return keys; } /* Using the given encryption key, decrypt the encrypted_section of length * encrypted_section_len of an INTRODUCE2 cell and return a newly allocated * buffer containing the decrypted data. On decryption failure, NULL is * returned. */ static uint8_t * decrypt_introduce2(const uint8_t *enc_key, const uint8_t *encrypted_section, size_t encrypted_section_len) { uint8_t *decrypted = NULL; crypto_cipher_t *cipher = NULL; tor_assert(enc_key); tor_assert(encrypted_section); /* Decrypt ENCRYPTED section. */ cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((char *) enc_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 8); tor_assert(cipher); /* This is symmetric encryption so can't be bigger than the encrypted * section length. */ decrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_section_len); if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, (char *) decrypted, (const char *) encrypted_section, encrypted_section_len) < 0) { tor_free(decrypted); decrypted = NULL; goto done; } done: crypto_cipher_free(cipher); return decrypted; } /* Given a pointer to the decrypted data of the ENCRYPTED section of an * INTRODUCE2 cell of length decrypted_len, parse and validate the cell * content. Return a newly allocated cell structure or NULL on error. The * circuit and service object are only used for logging purposes. */ static trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t * parse_introduce2_encrypted(const uint8_t *decrypted_data, size_t decrypted_len, const origin_circuit_t *circ, const hs_service_t *service) { trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL; tor_assert(decrypted_data); tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(service); if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_parse(&enc_cell, decrypted_data, decrypted_len) < 0) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to parse the decrypted ENCRYPTED section of " "the INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto err; } if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell) != HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) { log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key type is invalid. Got %u but " "expected %u on circuit %u for service %s", trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell), HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto err; } if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell) != CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) { log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key length is invalid. Got %ld but " "expected %d on circuit %u for service %s", trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell), CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto err; } /* XXX: Validate NSPEC field as well. */ return enc_cell; err: trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell); return NULL; } /* Build a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and RSA * encryption key. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be * of the size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on * success else a negative value and cell_out is untouched. */ static ssize_t build_legacy_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce, crypto_pk_t *enc_key, uint8_t *cell_out) { ssize_t cell_len; char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}; tor_assert(circ_nonce); tor_assert(enc_key); tor_assert(cell_out); cell_len = rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell(buf, sizeof(buf), enc_key, circ_nonce); tor_assert(cell_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); if (cell_len >= 0) { memcpy(cell_out, buf, cell_len); } return cell_len; } /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ /* Build an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and intro point * object. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be of the * size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on success else * a negative value and cell_out is untouched. This function also supports * legacy cell creation. */ ssize_t hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce, const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, uint8_t *cell_out) { ssize_t cell_len = -1; uint16_t sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN; trn_cell_extension_t *ext; trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL; tor_assert(circ_nonce); tor_assert(ip); /* Quickly handle the legacy IP. */ if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) { tor_assert(ip->legacy_key); cell_len = build_legacy_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip->legacy_key, cell_out); tor_assert(cell_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE); /* Success or not we are done here. */ goto done; } /* Set extension data. None used here. */ ext = trn_cell_extension_new(); trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0); cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new(); trn_cell_establish_intro_set_extensions(cell, ext); /* Set signature size. Array is then allocated in the cell. We need to do * this early so we can use trunnel API to get the signature length. */ trn_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, sig_len); trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, sig_len); /* Set AUTH_KEY_TYPE: 2 means ed25519 */ trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_type(cell, HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519); /* Set AUTH_KEY and AUTH_KEY_LEN field. Must also set byte-length of * AUTH_KEY to match */ { uint16_t auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN; trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(cell, auth_key_len); trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(cell, auth_key_len); /* We do this call _after_ setting the length because it's reallocated at * that point only. */ uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell); memcpy(auth_key_ptr, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len); } /* Calculate HANDSHAKE_AUTH field (MAC). */ { ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0; ssize_t tmp_cell_mac_offset = sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len) + trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_handshake_mac(cell); uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}; uint8_t mac[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN], *handshake_ptr; /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can * compute the MAC using the raw bytes. */ tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc), cell); if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) { goto done; } /* Sanity check. */ tor_assert(tmp_cell_enc_len > tmp_cell_mac_offset); /* Circuit nonce is always DIGEST_LEN according to tor-spec.txt. */ crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac), (uint8_t *) circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN, tmp_cell_enc, tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_mac_offset); handshake_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell); memcpy(handshake_ptr, mac, sizeof(mac)); } /* Calculate the cell signature SIG. */ { ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0; ssize_t tmp_cell_sig_offset = (sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len)); uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}, *sig_ptr; ed25519_signature_t sig; /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can * compute the signature from the raw bytes of the cell. */ tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc), cell); if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) { goto done; } if (ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, tmp_cell_enc, tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_sig_offset, ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &ip->auth_key_kp)) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to make signature for ESTABLISH_INTRO cell."); goto done; } /* Copy the signature into the cell. */ sig_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell); memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, sig_len); } /* Encode the cell. Can't be bigger than a standard cell. */ cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell); done: trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell); return cell_len; } /* Parse the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell in the payload of size payload_len. If we * are successful at parsing it, return the length of the parsed cell else a * negative value on error. */ ssize_t hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len) { ssize_t ret; trn_cell_intro_established_t *cell = NULL; tor_assert(payload); /* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a * valid cell. */ ret = trn_cell_intro_established_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len); if (ret >= 0) { /* On success, we do not keep the cell, we just notify the caller that it * was successfully parsed. */ trn_cell_intro_established_free(cell); } return ret; } /* Parsse the INTRODUCE2 cell using data which contains everything we need to * do so and contains the destination buffers of information we extract and * compute from the cell. Return 0 on success else a negative value. The * service and circ are only used for logging purposes. */ ssize_t hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data, const origin_circuit_t *circ, const hs_service_t *service) { int ret = -1; uint8_t *decrypted = NULL; size_t encrypted_section_len; const uint8_t *encrypted_section; trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL; trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL; hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *intro_keys = NULL; tor_assert(data); tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(service); /* Parse the cell so we can start cell validation. */ if (trn_cell_introduce1_parse(&cell, data->payload, data->payload_len) < 0) { log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to parse INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u " "for service %s", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto done; } /* XXX: Add/Test replaycache. */ log_info(LD_REND, "Received a decodable INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u " "for service %s. Decoding encrypted section...", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); encrypted_section = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_encrypted(cell); encrypted_section_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell); /* Encrypted section must at least contain the CLIENT_PK and MAC which is * defined in section 3.3.2 of the specification. */ if (encrypted_section_len < (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted section length " "for service %s. Dropping cell.", safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto done; } /* Build the key material out of the key material found in the cell. */ intro_keys = get_introduce2_key_material(data->auth_pk, data->enc_kp, data->subcredential, encrypted_section, &data->client_pk); if (intro_keys == NULL) { log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted data. Unable to " "compute key material on circuit %u for service %s", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto done; } /* Validate MAC from the cell and our computed key material. The MAC field * in the cell is at the end of the encrypted section. */ { uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; /* The MAC field is at the very end of the ENCRYPTED section. */ size_t mac_offset = encrypted_section_len - sizeof(mac); /* Compute the MAC. Use the entire encoded payload with a length up to the * ENCRYPTED section. */ compute_introduce_mac(data->payload, data->payload_len - encrypted_section_len, encrypted_section, encrypted_section_len, intro_keys->mac_key, sizeof(intro_keys->mac_key), mac, sizeof(mac)); if (tor_memcmp(mac, encrypted_section + mac_offset, sizeof(mac))) { log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC validation for INTRODUCE2 cell on " "circuit %u for service %s", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto done; } } { /* The ENCRYPTED_DATA section starts just after the CLIENT_PK. */ const uint8_t *encrypted_data = encrypted_section + sizeof(data->client_pk); /* It's symmetric encryption so it's correct to use the ENCRYPTED length * for decryption. Computes the length of ENCRYPTED_DATA meaning removing * the CLIENT_PK and MAC length. */ size_t encrypted_data_len = encrypted_section_len - (sizeof(data->client_pk) + DIGEST256_LEN); /* This decrypts the ENCRYPTED_DATA section of the cell. */ decrypted = decrypt_introduce2(intro_keys->enc_key, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len); if (decrypted == NULL) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to decrypt the ENCRYPTED section of an " "INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s", TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, safe_str_client(service->onion_address)); goto done; } /* Parse this blob into an encrypted cell structure so we can then extract * the data we need out of it. */ enc_cell = parse_introduce2_encrypted(decrypted, encrypted_data_len, circ, service); memwipe(decrypted, 0, encrypted_data_len); if (enc_cell == NULL) { goto done; } } /* XXX: Implement client authorization checks. */ /* Extract onion key and rendezvous cookie from the cell used for the * rendezvous point circuit e2e encryption. */ memcpy(data->onion_pk.public_key, trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_onion_key(enc_cell), CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); memcpy(data->rendezvous_cookie, trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_rend_cookie(enc_cell), sizeof(data->rendezvous_cookie)); /* Extract rendezvous link specifiers. */ for (size_t idx = 0; idx < trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspec(enc_cell); idx++) { link_specifier_t *lspec = trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspecs(enc_cell, idx); smartlist_add(data->link_specifiers, hs_link_specifier_dup(lspec)); } /* Success. */ ret = 0; log_info(LD_REND, "Valid INTRODUCE2 cell. Launching rendezvous circuit."); done: if (intro_keys) { memwipe(intro_keys, 0, sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t)); tor_free(intro_keys); } tor_free(decrypted); trn_cell_introduce1_free(cell); trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell); return ret; } /* Build a RENDEZVOUS1 cell with the given rendezvous cookie and handshake * info. The encoded cell is put in cell_out and the length of the data is * returned. This can't fail. */ ssize_t hs_cell_build_rendezvous1(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie, size_t rendezvous_cookie_len, const uint8_t *rendezvous_handshake_info, size_t rendezvous_handshake_info_len, uint8_t *cell_out) { ssize_t cell_len; trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *cell; tor_assert(rendezvous_cookie); tor_assert(rendezvous_handshake_info); tor_assert(cell_out); cell = trn_cell_rendezvous1_new(); /* Set the RENDEZVOUS_COOKIE. */ memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie(cell), rendezvous_cookie, rendezvous_cookie_len); /* Set the HANDSHAKE_INFO. */ trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(cell, rendezvous_handshake_info_len); memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info(cell), rendezvous_handshake_info, rendezvous_handshake_info_len); /* Encoding. */ cell_len = trn_cell_rendezvous1_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell); tor_assert(cell_len > 0); trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(cell); return cell_len; }