$Id$ Tor directory protocol for 0.1.1.x series 0. Scope and preliminaries This document should eventually be merged to replace and supplement the existing notes on directories in tor-spec.txt. This is not a finalized version; what we actually wind up implementing may be different from the system described here. 0.1. Goals There are several problems with the way Tor handles directory information in version 0.1.0.x and earlier. Here are the problems we try to fix with this new design, already partially implemented in 0.1.1.x: 1. Directories are very large and use up a lot of bandwidth: clients download descriptors for all router several times an hour. 2. Every directory authority is a trust bottleneck: if a single directory authority lies, it can make clients believe for a time an arbitrarily distorted view of the Tor network. 3. Our current "verified server" system is kind of nonsensical. 4. Getting more directory authorities adds more points of failure and worsens possible partitioning attacks. There are two problems that remain unaddressed by this design. 5. Requiring every client to know about every router won't scale. 6. Requiring every directory cache to know every router won't scale. 1. Outline There is a small set (say, around 10) of semi-trusted directory authorities. A default list of authorities is shipped with the Tor software. Users can change this list, but are encouraged not to do so, in order to avoid partitioning attacks. Routers periodically upload signed "descriptors" to the directory authorities describing their keys, capabilities, and other information. Routers may act as directory mirrors (also called "caches"), to reduce load on the directory authorities. They announce this in their descriptors. Each directory authority periodically generates and signs a compact "network status" document that lists that authority's view of the current descriptors and status for known routers, but which does not include the descriptors themselves. Directory mirrors download, cache, and re-serve network-status documents to clients. Clients, directory mirrors, and directory authorities all use network-status documents to find out when their list of routers is out-of-date. If it is, they download any missing router descriptors. Clients download missing descriptors from mirrors; mirrors and authorities download from authorities. Descriptors are downloaded by the hash of the descriptor, not by the server's identity key: this prevents servers from attacking clients by giving them descriptors nobody else uses. All directory information is uploaded and downloaded with HTTP. Coordination among directory authorities is done client-side: clients compute a vote-like algorithm among the network-status documents they have, and base their decisions on the result. 1.1. What's different from 0.1.0.x? Clients used to download a signed concatenated set of router descriptors (called a "directory") from directory mirrors, regardless of which descriptors had changed. Between downloading directories, clients would download "network-status" documents that would list which servers were supposed to running. Clients would always believe the most recently published network-status document they were served. Routers used to upload fresh descriptors all the time, whether their keys and other information had changed or not. 2. Router operation The router descriptor format is unchanged from tor-spec.txt. ORs SHOULD generate a new router descriptor whenever any of the following events have occurred: - A period of time (18 hrs by default) has passed since the last time a descriptor was generated. - A descriptor field other than bandwidth or uptime has changed. - Bandwidth has changed by more than +/- 50% from the last time a descriptor was generated, and at least a given interval of time (20 mins by default) has passed since then. - Its uptime has been reset (by restarting). After generating a descriptor, ORs upload it to every directory authority they know, by posting it to the URL http:///tor/ 3. Network status format Directory authorities generate, sign, and compress network-status documents. Directory servers SHOULD generate a fresh network-status document when the contents of such a document would be different from the last one generated, and some time (at least one second, possibly longer) has passed since the last one was generated. The network status document contains a preamble, a set of router status entries, and a signature, in that order. We use the same meta-format as used for directories and router descriptors in "tor-spec.txt". Implementations MAY insert blank lines for clarity between sections; these blank lines are ignored. Implementations MUST NOT depend on blank lines in any particular location. The preamble contains: "network-status-version" -- A document format version. For this specification, the version is "2". "dir-source" -- The authority's hostname, current IP address, and directory port, all separated by spaces. "fingerprint" -- A base16-encoded hash of the signing key's fingerprint, with no additional spaces added. "contact" -- An arbitrary string describing how to contact the directory server's administrator. Administrators should include at least an email address and a PGP fingerprint. "dir-signing-key" -- The directory server's public signing key. "client-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended client versions. "server-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended server versions. "published" -- The publication time for this network-status object. "dir-options" -- A set of flags separated by spaces: "Names" if this directory authority performs name bindings. "Versions" if this directory authority recommends software versions. The dir-options entry is optional. The "-versions" entries are required if the "Versions" flag is present. The other entries are required and must appear exactly once. The "network-status-version" entry must appear first; the others may appear in any order. Implementations MUST ignore additional arguments to the items above, and MUST ignore unrecognized flags. For each router, the router entry contains: (This format is designed for conciseness.) "r" -- followed by the following elements, separated by spaces: - The OR's nickname, - A hash of its identity key, encoded in base64, with trailing = signs removed. - A hash of its most recent descriptor, encoded in base64, with trailing = signs removed. (The hash is calculated as for computing the signature of a descriptor.) - The publication time of its most recent descriptor, in the form YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS, in GMT. - An IP address - An OR port - A directory port (or "0" for none") "s" -- A series of space-separated status flags: "Authority" if the router is a directory authority. "Exit" if the router is useful for building general-purpose exit circuits. "Fast" if the router has high bandwidth. "Named" if the router's identity-nickname mapping is canonical, and this authority binds names. "Stable" if the router tends to stay up for a long time. "Running" if the router is currently usable. "Valid" if the router has been 'validated'. "V2Dir" if the router implements this protocol. The "r" entry for each router must appear first and is required. The 's" entry is optional. Unrecognized flags and extra elements on the "r" line must be ignored. The signature section contains: "directory-signature". A signature of the rest of the document using the directory authority's signing key. We compress the network status list with zlib before transmitting it. 3.1. Establishing server status [[XXXXX Describe how authorities actually decide Fast, Named, Stable, Running, Valid For each OR, a directory server remembers whether the OR was running and functional the last time they tried to connect to it, and possibly other liveness information. Directory server administrators may label some servers or IPs as blacklisted, and elect not to include them in their network-status lists. Thus, the network-status list includes all non-blacklisted, non-expired, non-superseded descriptors for ORs that the directory has observed at least once to be running. Directory server administrators may decide to support name binding. If they do, then they must maintain a file of nickname-to-identity-key mappings, and try to keep this file consistent with other directory servers. If they don't, they act as clients, and report bindings made by other directory servers (name X is bound to identity Y if at least one binding directory lists it, and no directory binds X to some other Y'.) ]] 4. Directory server operation All directory authorities and directory mirrors ("directory servers") implement this section, except as noted. 4.1. Accepting uploads (authorities only) When a router posts a signed descriptor to a directory authority, the authority first checks whether it is well-formed and correctly self-signed. If it is, the authority next verifies that the nickname question is already assigned to a router with a different public key. Finally, the authority MAY check that the router is not blacklisted because of its key, IP, or another reason. If the descriptor passes these tests, and the authority does not already have a descriptor for a router with this public key, it accepts the descriptor and remembers it. If the authority _does_ have a descriptor with the same public key, the newly uploaded descriptor is remembered if its publication time is more recent than the most recent old descriptor for that router, and either: - There are non-cosmetic differences between the old descriptor and the new one. - Enough time has passed between the descriptors' publication times. (Currently, 12 hours.) Differences between router descriptors are "non-cosmetic" if they would be sufficient to force an upload as described in section 2 above. Note that the "cosmetic difference" test only applies to uploaded descriptors, not to descriptors that the authority downloads from other authorities. 4.2. Downloading network-status documents All directory servers (authorities and mirrors) try to keep a fresh set of network-status documents from every authority. To do so, every 5 minutes, an authority asks every other authority for its most recent network-status document. Every 15 minutes, a mirror picks a random authority and asks it for the most recent network-status documents for all the authorities it knows about (including the chosen authority itself). [XXXX Should mirrors just do what authorities do? Should they do it at the same interval?] Directory servers and mirrors remember and serve the most recent network-status document they have from each authority. Other network-status don't need to be stored. If the most recent network-status document is over 10 days old, it is discarded anyway. 4.3. Downloading and storing router descriptors Periodically (currently, every 10 seconds), directory servers check whether there are any specific descriptors (as identified by descriptor hash in a network-status document) that they do not have and that they are not currently trying to download. If so, the directory server launches requests to the authorities for these descriptors, such that each authority is only asked for descriptors listed in its most recent network-status. When more than one authority lists the descriptor, we choose which to ask at random. If one of these downloads fails, we do not try to download that descriptor from the authority that failed to serve it again unless we receive a newer network-status from that authority that lists the same descriptor. Directory servers must potentially cache multiple descriptors for each router. Servers must not discard any descriptor listed by any current network-status document from any authority. If there is enough space to store additional descriptors [XXXXXX then how do we pick.] Authorities SHOULD NOT download descriptors for routers that they would immediately reject for reasons listed in 3.1. 4.4. HTTP URLs "Fingerprints" in these URLs are base-16-encoded SHA1 hashes. The authoritative network-status published by a host should be available at: http:///tor/status/authority.z The network-status published by a host with fingerprint should be available at: http:///tor/status/fp/.z The network-status documents published by hosts with fingerprints ,, should be available at: http:///tor/status/fp/++.z The most recent network-status documents from all known authorities, concatenated, should be available at: http:///tor/status/all.z The most recent descriptor for a server whose identity key has a fingerprint of should be available at: http:///tor/server/fp/.z The most recent descriptors for servers with fingerprints ,, should be available at: http:///tor/server/fp/++.z The descriptor for a server whose digest (in hex) is should be available at: http:///tor/server/d/.z The most recent descriptors with digests ,, should be available at: http:///tor/server/d/++.z The most recent descriptor for this server should be at: http:///tor/server/authority.z A concatenated set of the most recent descriptors for all known servers should be available at: http:///tor/server/all.z For debugging, directories SHOULD expose non-compressed objects at URLs like the above, but without the final ".z". Clients MUST handle compressed concatenated information in two forms: - A concatenated list of zlib-compressed objects. - A zlib-compressed concatenated list of objects. Directory servers MAY generate either format: the former requires less CPU, but the latter requires less bandwidth. 5. Client operation: downloading information Every Tor that is not a directory server (that is, clients and ORs that do not have a DirPort set) implements this section. 5.1. Downloading network-status documents Each client maintains an ordered list of directory authorities. Insofar as possible, clients SHOULD all use the same ordered list. Client check whether they have enough recently published network-status documents (currently, this means that they must have a network-status published within the last 48 hours for over half of the authorities). If they do not, they download enough network-status documents so that this is so. Also, if the most recently published network-status document is over 30 minutes old, the client downloads a network-status document. When choosing which documents to download, clients treat their list of directory authorities as a circular ring, and begin with the authority appearing immediately after the authority for their most recently published network-status document. If enough mirrors (currently 4) claim not to have a given network status, we stop trying to download that authority's network-status, until we download a new network-status that makes us believe that the authority in question is running. Network-status documents published over 10 hours in the past are discarded. 5.2. Downloading router descriptors Clients try to have the best descriptor for each router. A descriptor is "best" if: * it the most recently published descriptor listed for that router by at least two network-status documents. * OR, no descriptor for that router is listed by two or more network-status documents, and it is the most recently published descriptor listed by any network-status document. Periodically (currently every 10 seconds) clients check whether there are any "downloadable" descriptors. A descriptor is downloadable if: - It is the "best" descriptor for some router. - The descriptor was published at least 5 minutes (???) in the past. [This prevents clients from trying to fetch descriptors that the mirrors have not yet retrieved and cached.] - The client does not currently have it. - The client is not currently trying to download it. If at least 1/16 of known routers have downloadable descriptors, or if enough time (currently 10 minutes) has passed since the last time the client tried to download descriptors, it launches requests for all downloadable descriptors, as described in 5.3 below. When a descriptor download fails, the client notes it, and does not consider the descriptor downloadable again until a certain amount of time has passed. (Currently 0 seconds for the first failure, 60 seconds for the second, 5 minutes for the third, 10 minutes for the fourth, and 1 day thereafter.) Periodically (currently once an hour) clients reset the failure count. No descriptors are downloaded until the client has downloaded more than half of the network-status documents. 5.3. Managing downloads When a client has no live network-status documents, it downloads network-status documents from a randomly chosen authority. In all other cases, the client downloads from mirrors randomly chosen from among those believed to be V2 directory servers. (This information comes from the network-status documents; see 6 below.) When downloading multiple router descriptors, the client chooses multiple mirrors so that: - At least 3 different mirrors are used, except when this would result in more than one request for under 4 descriptors. - No more than 128 descriptors are requested from a single mirror. - Otherwise, as few mirrors as possible are used. After choosing mirrors, the client divides the descriptors among them randomly. After receiving any response client MUST reject any network-status documents and descriptors that it did not request. 6. Using directory information Everyone besides directory authorities uses the approaches in this section to decide which servers to use and what their keys are likely to be. (Directory authorities just believe their own opinions, as in 3.1 above.) 6.1. Choosing routers for circuits. Tor implementations only pay attention to "live" network-status documents. A network status is "live" if it is the most recently downloaded network status document for a given directory server, and the server is a directory server trusted by the client, and the network-status document is no more than 2 days old. For time-sensitive information, Tor implementations focus on "recent" network-status documents. A network status is "recent" if it is live, and if it was published in the last 60 minutes. If there are fewer than 3 such documents, the most recently published 3 are "recent." If there are fewer than 3 in all, all are "recent.") No circuits must be built until the client has enough directory information: at least two live network-status documents, and descriptors for at least 1/4 of the servers believed to be running. A server is "listed" if it is included by more than half of the live network status documents. Clients SHOULD NOT use unlisted servers. A server is "valid" if it is listed as valid by more than half of the live network-status documents. Clients SHOULD NOT use non-valid servers unless specifically configured to do so. A server is "running" if it is listed as running by more than half of the recent network-status documents. Clients SHOULD NOT try to use non-running servers. A server is believed to be a directory mirror if it is listed as a V2 directory by more than half of the recent network-status documents. 6.1. Managing naming In order to provide human-memorable names for individual server identities, some directory servers bind names to IDs. Clients handle names in two ways: When a client encounters a name it has not mapped before: If all the live "Naming" network-status documents the client has claim that the name binds to some identity ID, and the client has at least three live network-status documents, the client maps the name to ID. If a client encounters a name it has mapped before: It uses the last-mapped identity value, unless all of the "Naming" network status documents that list the name bind it to some other identity. When a user tries to refer to a router with a name that does not have a mapping under the above rules, the implementation SHOULD warn the user. After giving the warning, the implementation MAY use a router that at least one Naming authority maps the name to, so long as no other naming authority maps that name to a different router. 6.2. Software versions Implementations of Tor SHOULD warn when it has live network-statuses from more than half of the authorities, and it is running a software version not listed on more than half of the live "Versioning" network-status documents. TODO: - Resolve XXXXs - Are the magic numbers above sane? - Client-knowledge partitioning is worrisome. Most versions of this don't seem to be worse than the Danezis-Murdoch tracing attack, since an attacker can't do more than deduce probable exits from entries (or vice versa). But what about when the client connects to A and B but in a different order? How bad can it be partitioned based on its knowledge?