Filename: xxx-automatic-node-promotion.txt Title: Automatically promoting Tor clients to nodes Author: Steven Murdoch Created: 12-Mar-2010 Status: Draft Target: 1. Overview This proposal describes how Tor clients could determine when they have sufficient bandwidth capacity and are sufficiently reliable to become either bridges or Tor relays. When they meet this criteria, they will automatically promote themselves, based on user preferences. The proposal also defines the new controller messages and options which will control this process. 2. Motivation and history Tor has a growing user-base and one of the major impediments to the quality of service offered is the lack of network capacity. This is particularly the case for bridges, because these are gradually being blocked, and thus no longer of use to people within some countries. By automatically promoting Tor clients to bridges, and perhaps also to full public relays, this proposal aims to solve these problems. Only Tor clients which are sufficiently useful should be promoted, and the process of determining usefulness should be performed without reporting the existence of the client to the central authorities. The criteria used for determining usefulness will be in terms of bandwidth capacity and uptime, but parameters should be specified in the directory consensus. State stored at the client should be in no more detail than necessary, to prevent sensitive information being recorded. 3. Design 3.x Opt-in state model Tor can be in one of five node-promotion states: - off (O): Currently a client, and will stay as such - auto (A): Currently a client, but will consider promotion - bridge (B): Currently a bridge, and will stay as such - auto-bridge (AB): Currently a bridge, but will consider promotion - relay (R): Currently a public relay, and will stay as such The state can be fully controlled from the configuration file or controller, but the normal state transitions are as follows: Any state -> off: User has opted out of node promotion Off -> any state: Only permitted with user consent Auto -> auto-bridge: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable to be a *bridge* Auto -> bridge: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable to be a *relay*, but the user has chosen to remain a *bridge* Auto -> relay: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable to be *relay*, and will skip being a *bridge* Auto-bridge -> relay: Tor has detected that it is sufficiently reliable to be a *relay* Note that this model does not support automatic demotion. If this is desirable, there should be some memory as to whether the previous state was relay, bridge, or auto-bridge. Otherwise the user may be prompted to become a relay, although he has opted to only be a bridge. 3.x User interaction policy There are a variety of options in how to involve the user into the decision as to whether and when to perform node promotion. The choice also may be different when Tor is running from Vidalia (and thus can readily prompt the user for information), and standalone (where Tor can only log messages, which may or may not be read). The option requiring minimal user interaction is to automatically promote nodes according to reliability, and allow the user to opt out, by changing settings in the configuration file or Vidalia user interface. Alternatively, if a user interface is available, Tor could prompt the user when it detects that a transition is available, and allow the user to choose which of the available options to select. If Vidalia is not available, it still may be possible to solicit an email address on install, and contact the operator to ask whether a transition to bridge or relay is permitted. Finally, Tor could by default not make any transition, and the user would need to opt in by stating the maximum level (bridge or relay) to which the node may automatically promote itself. 3.x New options 3.x New controller message 4. Related proposals 5. Open questions: - What user interaction policy should we take? - When (if ever) should we turn a relay into an exit relay? - What should the rate limits be for auto-promoted bridges/relays? Should we prompt the user for this? - Perhaps the bridge authority should tell potential bridges whether to enable themselves, by taking into account whether their IP address is blocked