/* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file test_hs_client.c
* \brief Test prop224 HS client functionality.
*/
#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE
#define MAIN_PRIVATE
#define HS_CLIENT_PRIVATE
#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
#define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE
#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE
#include "test.h"
#include "test_helpers.h"
#include "log_test_helpers.h"
#include "rend_test_helpers.h"
#include "hs_test_helpers.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "channeltls.h"
#include "main.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "routerset.h"
#include "hs_circuit.h"
#include "hs_client.h"
#include "hs_ident.h"
#include "hs_cache.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuitbuild.h"
#include "connection.h"
#include "connection_edge.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "cpath_build_state_st.h"
#include "crypt_path_st.h"
#include "dir_connection_st.h"
#include "entry_connection_st.h"
#include "origin_circuit_st.h"
static int
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *ap_conn)
{
(void) ap_conn;
return 0;
}
static networkstatus_t mock_ns;
/* Always return NULL. */
static networkstatus_t *
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false(time_t now)
{
(void) now;
return NULL;
}
static networkstatus_t *
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now)
{
(void) now;
return &mock_ns;
}
/* Test helper function: Setup a circuit and a stream with the same hidden
* service destination, and put them in circ_out and
* conn_out. Make the stream wait for circuits to be established to the
* hidden service. */
static int
helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test(origin_circuit_t **circ_out,
connection_t **conn_out,
int is_legacy)
{
int retval;
channel_tls_t *n_chan=NULL;
rend_data_t *conn_rend_data = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t service_pk;
/* Make a dummy connection stream and make it wait for our circuit */
conn = test_conn_get_connection(AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
CONN_TYPE_AP /* ??? */,
0);
if (is_legacy) {
/* Legacy: Setup rend_data of stream */
char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1] = {0};
TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data = mock_rend_data(service_id);
conn_rend_data = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data;
} else {
/* prop224: Setup hs conn identifier on the stream */
ed25519_secret_key_t sk;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_secret_key_generate(&sk, 0));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &sk));
/* Setup hs_conn_identifier of stream */
TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk);
}
/* Make it wait for circuit */
connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn));
/* This is needed to silence a BUG warning from
connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation() */
TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->original_dest_address =
tor_strdup(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->address);
/****************************************************/
/* Now make dummy circuit */
or_circ = origin_circuit_new();
or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
or_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
or_circ->build_state->is_internal = 1;
if (is_legacy) {
/* Legacy: Setup rend data and final cpath */
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state =
crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND);
tt_assert(
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state);
retval = crypto_dh_generate_public(
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
or_circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(conn_rend_data);
} else {
/* prop224: Setup hs ident on the circuit */
or_circ->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_pk,
HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_RENDEZVOUS);
}
TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
/* fake n_chan */
n_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_tls_t));
n_chan->base_.global_identifier = 1;
or_circ->base_.n_chan = &(n_chan->base_);
*circ_out = or_circ;
*conn_out = conn;
return 0;
done:
/* something failed */
return -1;
}
/* Test: Ensure that setting up legacy e2e rendezvous circuits works
* correctly. */
static void
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy(void *arg)
{
ssize_t retval;
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
(void) arg;
/** In this test we create a v2 legacy HS stream and a circuit with the same
* hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be
* established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using
* the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client() function. We then
* check that the end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream
* was attached to the circuit as expected. */
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin);
/* Setup */
retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test( &or_circ, &conn, 1);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(or_circ);
tt_assert(conn);
/* Check number of hops */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL);
/********************************************** */
/* Make a good RENDEZVOUS1 cell body because it needs to pass key exchange
* digest verification... */
uint8_t rend_cell_body[DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN] = {2};
{
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypto_dh_t *dh_state =
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state;
/* compute and overwrite digest of cell body with the right value */
retval = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh_state,
(char*)rend_cell_body, DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_GT, 0);
memcpy(rend_cell_body+DH_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/* Setup the circuit */
retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(or_circ,
rend_cell_body);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/**********************************************/
/* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
/* Check the digest algo */
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1);
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_crypto);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_crypto);
/* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */
tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
/* Test that stream got attached */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
done:
connection_free_minimal(conn);
if (or_circ)
tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
}
/* Test: Ensure that setting up v3 rendezvous circuits works correctly. */
static void
test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup(void *arg)
{
uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0};
origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
int retval;
connection_t *conn = NULL;
(void) arg;
/** In this test we create a prop224 v3 HS stream and a circuit with the same
* hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be
* established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using
* the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ() function. We then check that the
* end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream was attached to
* the circuit as expected. */
MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin,
mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin);
/* Setup */
retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test( &or_circ, &conn, 0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(or_circ);
tt_assert(conn);
/* Check number of hops: There should be no hops yet to this circ */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_ptr_op(or_circ->cpath, OP_EQ, NULL);
/* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL);
/**********************************************/
/* Setup the circuit */
retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(or_circ,
ntor_key_seed, sizeof(ntor_key_seed),
0);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
/**********************************************/
/* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */
retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1);
/* Check that the crypt path has prop224 algorithm parameters */
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_digest),
OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_crypto);
tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_crypto);
/* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */
tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
/* Test that stream got attached */
tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
done:
connection_free_minimal(conn);
if (or_circ)
tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan);
circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ));
}
/** Test client logic for picking intro points from a descriptor. Also test how
* ExcludeNodes and intro point failures affect picking intro points. */
static void
test_client_pick_intro(void *arg)
{
int ret;
ed25519_keypair_t service_kp;
hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
(void) arg;
hs_init();
/* Generate service keypair */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0));
/* Set time */
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
update_approx_time(mock_ns.fresh_until-10);
time_t now = approx_time();
/* Test logic:
*
* 1) Add our desc with intro points to the HS cache.
*
* 2) Mark all descriptor intro points except _the chosen one_ as
* failed. Then query the desc to get a random intro: check that we got
* _the chosen one_. Then fail the chosen one as well, and see that no
* intros are returned.
*
* 3) Then clean the intro state cache and get an intro point.
*
* 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work
*
* 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that
* nothing is returned.
*/
/* 1) Add desc to HS cache */
{
char *encoded = NULL;
desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, &encoded);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
tt_assert(encoded);
/* store it */
hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
/* fetch it to make sure it works */
const hs_descriptor_t *fetched_desc =
hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(fetched_desc);
tt_mem_op(fetched_desc->subcredential, OP_EQ, desc->subcredential,
DIGEST256_LEN);
tt_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)fetched_desc->subcredential,
DIGEST256_LEN));
tor_free(encoded);
}
/* 2) Mark all intro points except _the chosen one_ as failed. Then query the
* desc and get a random intro: check that we got _the chosen one_. */
{
/* Pick the chosen intro point and get its ei */
hs_desc_intro_point_t *chosen_intro_point =
smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
extend_info_t *chosen_intro_ei =
desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(chosen_intro_point);
tt_assert(chosen_intro_point);
tt_assert(chosen_intro_ei);
/* Now mark all other intro points as failed */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
/* Skip the chosen intro point */
if (ip == chosen_intro_point) {
continue;
}
ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_key = &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key;
hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey,
intro_auth_key,
INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
/* Try to get a random intro: Should return the chosen one! */
/* (We try several times, to make sure this behavior is consistent, and to
* cover the different cases of client_get_random_intro().) */
for (int i = 0; i < 64; ++i) {
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(ip);
tt_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)ip->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
tt_mem_op(ip->identity_digest, OP_EQ, chosen_intro_ei->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
extend_info_free(ip);
}
extend_info_free(chosen_intro_ei);
/* Now also mark the chosen one as failed: See that we can't get any intro
points anymore. */
hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey,
&chosen_intro_point->auth_key_cert->signed_key,
INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT);
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(!ip);
}
/* 3) Clean the intro state cache and get an intro point */
{
/* Pretend we are 5 mins in the future and order a cleanup of the intro
* state. This should clean up the intro point failures and allow us to get
* an intro. */
hs_cache_client_intro_state_clean(now + 5*60);
/* Get an intro. It should work! */
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(ip);
extend_info_free(ip);
}
/* 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work */
{
ed25519_keypair_t dummy_kp;
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&dummy_kp, 0));
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&dummy_kp.pubkey);
tor_assert(!ip);
}
/* 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that
* nothing is returned. */
{
get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes = routerset_new();
get_options_mutable()->StrictNodes = 1;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points,
hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) {
extend_info_t *intro_ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(ip);
if (intro_ei) {
const char *ptr;
char ip_addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
/* We need to decorate in case it is an IPv6 else routerset_parse()
* doesn't like it. */
ptr = tor_addr_to_str(ip_addr, &intro_ei->addr, sizeof(ip_addr), 1);
tt_assert(ptr == ip_addr);
ret = routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes,
ip_addr, "");
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
extend_info_free(intro_ei);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey);
tt_assert(!ip);
}
done:
hs_descriptor_free(desc);
}
static int
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false(void)
{
return 0;
}
static int
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true(void)
{
return 1;
}
static hs_client_fetch_status_t
mock_fetch_v3_desc_error(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
{
(void) key;
return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR;
}
static void
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason,
int line, const char *file)
{
(void) line;
(void) file;
conn->edge_.end_reason = endreason;
}
static void
test_descriptor_fetch(void *arg)
{
int ret;
entry_connection_t *ec = NULL;
ed25519_public_key_t service_pk;
ed25519_secret_key_t service_sk;
(void) arg;
hs_init();
memset(&service_sk, 'A', sizeof(service_sk));
ret = ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &service_sk);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
/* Initialize this so get_voting_interval() doesn't freak out. */
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.valid_after);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
&mock_ns.fresh_until);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
ec = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET);
tt_assert(ec);
ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk);
tt_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident);
TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec))->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &ec->edge_.base_);
/* 1. FetchHidServDescriptors is false so we shouldn't be able to fetch. */
get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 0;
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED);
get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 1;
/* 2. We don't have a live consensus. */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO);
/* From now on, return a live consensus. */
MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
/* 3. Not enough dir information. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO);
/* From now on, we do have enough directory information. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true);
/* 4. We do have a pending directory request. */
{
dir_connection_t *dir_conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
dir_conn->hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_ident_dir_conn_t));
TO_CONN(dir_conn)->purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC;
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, &service_pk);
smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn));
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
smartlist_remove(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn));
connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(dir_conn));
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING);
}
/* 5. We'll trigger an error on the fetch_desc_v3 and force to close all
* pending SOCKS request. */
MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true);
MOCK(fetch_v3_desc, mock_fetch_v3_desc_error);
MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_,
mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk);
UNMOCK(fetch_v3_desc);
UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR);
/* The close waiting for descriptor function has been called. */
tt_int_op(ec->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
done:
connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(ec));
UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
hs_free_all();
}
struct testcase_t hs_client_tests[] = {
{ "e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "client_pick_intro", test_client_pick_intro,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
{ "descriptor_fetch", test_descriptor_fetch,
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};