/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. * Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #define ROUTER_PRIVATE #include "core/or/or.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "app/config/statefile.h" #include "app/main/main.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h" #include "core/or/policies.h" #include "core/or/protover.h" #include "feature/client/transports.h" #include "feature/control/control_events.h" #include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h" #include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h" #include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h" #include "feature/dircommon/directory.h" #include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h" #include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h" #include "feature/dirparse/signing.h" #include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h" #include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h" #include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h" #include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" #include "feature/relay/dns.h" #include "feature/relay/relay_config.h" #include "feature/relay/router.h" #include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h" #include "feature/relay/routermode.h" #include "feature/relay/selftest.h" #include "lib/geoip/geoip.h" #include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h" #include "feature/stats/rephist.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h" #include "lib/encoding/confline.h" #include "lib/osinfo/uname.h" #include "lib/tls/tortls.h" #include "lib/version/torversion.h" #include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h" #include "app/config/or_state_st.h" #include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h" #include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h" /** * \file router.c * \brief Miscellaneous relay functionality, including RSA key maintenance, * generating and uploading server descriptors, picking an address to * advertise, and so on. * * This module handles the job of deciding whether we are a Tor relay, and if * so what kind. (Mostly through functions like server_mode() that inspect an * or_options_t, but in some cases based on our own capabilities, such as when * we are deciding whether to be a directory cache in * router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver().) * * Also in this module are the functions to generate our own routerinfo_t and * extrainfo_t, and to encode those to signed strings for upload to the * directory authorities. * * This module also handles key maintenance for RSA and Curve25519-ntor keys, * and for our TLS context. (These functions should eventually move to * routerkeys.c along with the code that handles Ed25519 keys now.) **/ /************************************************************/ /***** * Key management: ORs only. *****/ /** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c. */ static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL; static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */ /** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */ static crypto_pk_t *onionkey=NULL; /** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */ static crypto_pk_t *lastonionkey=NULL; /** Current private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake. */ static curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_onion_key; /** Previous private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake * with clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */ static curve25519_keypair_t last_curve25519_onion_key; /** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS * certificates. Never changes. */ static crypto_pk_t *server_identitykey=NULL; /** Digest of server_identitykey. */ static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients' * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address * change. */ static crypto_pk_t *client_identitykey=NULL; /** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */ static crypto_pk_t *authority_signing_key = NULL; /** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for * authorities. */ static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL; /** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use * with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */ static crypto_pk_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL; /** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to * authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/ static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL; /* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key", * but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's * used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key * certificates. */ /** Return a readonly string with human readable description * of err. */ const char * routerinfo_err_to_string(int err) { switch (err) { case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR: return "No known exit address yet"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE: return "Cannot parse descriptor"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER: return "Not running in server mode"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED: return "Key digest failed"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE: return "Cannot generate descriptor"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING: return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet"; case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG: return "Internal bug, see logs for details"; } log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err); tor_assert_unreached(); return "Unknown error"; } /** Return true if we expect given error to be transient. * Return false otherwise. */ int routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err) { /** * For simplicity, we consider all errors other than * "not a server" transient - see discussion on * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034 */ return err != TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER; } /** Replace the current onion key with k. Does not affect * lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key(). */ static void set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k) { if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) { /* k is already our onion key; free it and return */ crypto_pk_free(k); return; } tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); crypto_pk_free(onionkey); onionkey = k; tor_mutex_release(key_lock); mark_my_descriptor_dirty("set onion key"); } /** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been * loaded or generated. */ MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *, get_onion_key,(void)) { tor_assert(onionkey); return onionkey; } /** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *key, and a full * copy of the most recent onion key into *last. Store NULL into * a pointer if the corresponding key does not exist. */ void dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last) { tor_assert(key); tor_assert(last); tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); if (onionkey) *key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey); else *key = NULL; if (lastonionkey) *last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey); else *last = NULL; tor_mutex_release(key_lock); } /** Expire our old set of onion keys. This is done by setting * last_curve25519_onion_key and lastonionkey to all zero's and NULL * respectively. * * This function does not perform any grace period checks for the old onion * keys. */ void expire_old_onion_keys(void) { char *fname = NULL; tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); /* Free lastonionkey and set it to NULL. */ if (lastonionkey) { crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey); lastonionkey = NULL; } /* We zero out the keypair. See the fast_mem_is_zero() check made in * construct_ntor_key_map() below. */ memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key)); tor_mutex_release(key_lock); fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old"); if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) { if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old onion key file %s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } } tor_free(fname); fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old"); if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) { if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old ntor onion key file %s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } } tor_free(fname); } /** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only * be called from the main thread. */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC const struct curve25519_keypair_t *, get_current_curve25519_keypair,(void)) { return &curve25519_onion_key; } /** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor * handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */ di_digest256_map_t * construct_ntor_key_map(void) { di_digest256_map_t *m = NULL; const uint8_t *cur_pk = curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key; const uint8_t *last_pk = last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key; if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char *)cur_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { dimap_add_entry(&m, cur_pk, tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t))); } if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) && tor_memneq(cur_pk, last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) { dimap_add_entry(&m, last_pk, tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t))); } return m; } /** Helper used to deallocate a di_digest256_map_t returned by * construct_ntor_key_map. */ static void ntor_key_map_free_helper(void *arg) { curve25519_keypair_t *k = arg; memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(*k)); tor_free(k); } /** Release all storage from a keymap returned by construct_ntor_key_map. */ void ntor_key_map_free_(di_digest256_map_t *map) { if (!map) return; dimap_free(map, ntor_key_map_free_helper); } /** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time * when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since * the process launched. */ time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void) { return onionkey_set_at; } /** Set the current server identity key to k. */ void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k) { crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey); server_identitykey = k; if (crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest) < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute our own identity key digest."); tor_assert(0); } } #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** Testing only -- set the server's RSA identity digest to * be digest */ void set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest) { memcpy(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN); } #endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ /** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */ static void assert_identity_keys_ok(void) { if (1) return; tor_assert(client_identitykey); if (public_server_mode(get_options())) { /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */ tor_assert(server_identitykey); tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); } else { /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */ if (server_identitykey) tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey)); } } #ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY /** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server. */ MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *, get_server_identity_key,(void)) { tor_assert(server_identitykey); tor_assert(server_mode(get_options())); assert_identity_keys_ok(); return server_identitykey; } #endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */ /** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key * has been set. */ int server_identity_key_is_set(void) { return server_mode(get_options()) && server_identitykey != NULL; } /** Set the current client identity key to k. */ void set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k) { crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey); client_identitykey = k; } /** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS * connections; requires that the key has been set. */ crypto_pk_t * get_tlsclient_identity_key(void) { tor_assert(client_identitykey); assert_identity_keys_ok(); return client_identitykey; } /** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */ int client_identity_key_is_set(void) { return client_identitykey != NULL; } /** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL * if we have no such certificate. */ MOCK_IMPL(authority_cert_t *, get_my_v3_authority_cert, (void)) { return authority_key_certificate; } /** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL * if we have no such key. */ crypto_pk_t * get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void) { return authority_signing_key; } /** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for * emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that * key. */ authority_cert_t * get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void) { return legacy_key_certificate; } /** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for * emergency migration purposes, return that key. */ crypto_pk_t * get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void) { return legacy_signing_key; } /** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate * a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function, * the OR should: * - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing * pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.) * - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo. */ void rotate_onion_key(void) { char *fname, *fname_prev; crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL; or_state_t *state = get_or_state(); curve25519_keypair_t new_curve25519_keypair; time_t now; fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key"); fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old"); /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) { if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev)) goto error; } if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key"); goto error; } if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key"); goto error; } if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) { log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname); goto error; } tor_free(fname); tor_free(fname_prev); fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor"); fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old"); if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&new_curve25519_keypair, 1) < 0) goto error; /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) { if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev)) goto error; } if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(&new_curve25519_keypair, fname, "onion") < 0) { log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write curve25519 onion key to \"%s\".",fname); goto error; } log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key"); tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock); crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey); lastonionkey = onionkey; onionkey = prkey; memcpy(&last_curve25519_onion_key, &curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)); memcpy(&curve25519_onion_key, &new_curve25519_keypair, sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)); now = time(NULL); state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now; tor_mutex_release(key_lock); mark_my_descriptor_dirty("rotated onion key"); or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0); goto done; error: log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key."); if (prkey) crypto_pk_free(prkey); done: memwipe(&new_curve25519_keypair, 0, sizeof(new_curve25519_keypair)); tor_free(fname); tor_free(fname_prev); } /** Log greeting message that points to new relay lifecycle document the * first time this function has been called. */ static void log_new_relay_greeting(void) { static int already_logged = 0; if (already_logged) return; tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "You are running a new relay. " "Thanks for helping the Tor network! If you wish to know " "what will happen in the upcoming weeks regarding its usage, " "have a look at https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of" "-a-new-relay"); already_logged = 1; } /** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file fname, writing it into * keys_out. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and generate * is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are * errors, log them at level severity. Generate files using tag * in their ASCII wrapper. */ static int init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keys_out, const char *fname, int generate, int severity, const char *tag) { switch (file_status(fname)) { case FN_DIR: case FN_ERROR: tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname); goto error; /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and, if generate * is set, replace the empty file in curve25519_keypair_write_to_file() */ case FN_NOENT: case FN_EMPTY: if (generate) { if (!have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) { /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */ tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". " "Not writing any new keys.", fname); /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two; * maybe we should wait for it. */ goto error; } } log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.", fname); if (curve25519_keypair_generate(keys_out, 1) < 0) goto error; if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(keys_out, fname, tag)<0) { tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname); memwipe(keys_out, 0, sizeof(*keys_out)); goto error; } } else { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname); } return 0; case FN_FILE: { char *tag_in=NULL; if (curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(keys_out, &tag_in, fname) < 0) { tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key."); tor_free(tag_in); goto error; } if (!tag_in || strcmp(tag_in, tag)) { tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Unexpected tag %s on private key.", escaped(tag_in)); tor_free(tag_in); goto error; } tor_free(tag_in); return 0; } default: tor_assert(0); } error: return -1; } /** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3 * directory authority, and make sure they match. If legacy, load a * legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular * key/cert set. On success, store them into *key_out and * *cert_out respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */ static int load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out, authority_cert_t **cert_out) { int r = -1; char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL; const char *eos = NULL; crypto_pk_t *signing_key = NULL; authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL; fname = get_keydir_fname( legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key"); signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL); if (!signing_key) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname); goto done; } tor_free(fname); fname = get_keydir_fname( legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate"); cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL); if (!cert) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s", fname); goto done; } parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, strlen(cert), &eos); if (!parsed) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname); goto done; } if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in " "certificate"); goto done; } crypto_pk_free(*key_out); authority_cert_free(*cert_out); *key_out = signing_key; *cert_out = parsed; r = 0; signing_key = NULL; parsed = NULL; done: tor_free(fname); tor_free(cert); crypto_pk_free(signing_key); authority_cert_free(parsed); return r; } /** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are * present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable; * return 0 on success. */ static int init_v3_authority_keys(void) { if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key, &authority_key_certificate)<0) return -1; if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey && load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key, &legacy_key_certificate)<0) return -1; return 0; } /** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's * likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */ void v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void) { time_t now, expires; static time_t last_warned = 0; int badness, time_left, warn_interval; if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate) return; now = time(NULL); expires = authority_key_certificate->expires; time_left = (int)( expires - now ); if (time_left <= 0) { badness = LOG_ERR; warn_interval = 60*60; } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) { badness = LOG_WARN; warn_interval = 60*60; } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) { badness = LOG_WARN; warn_interval = 24*60*60; } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) { badness = LOG_WARN; warn_interval = 24*60*60*5; } else { return; } if (last_warned + warn_interval > now) return; if (time_left <= 0) { tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired." " Generate a new one NOW."); } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) { tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d " "hours; Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60)); } else { tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d " "days; Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60)); } last_warned = now; } /** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the * network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a * value between MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS and * MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS. */ static int get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void) { return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "onion-key-rotation-days", DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS, MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS, MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS); } /** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined * by the network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value * is converted to seconds. */ int get_onion_key_lifetime(void) { return get_onion_key_rotation_days_()*24*60*60; } /** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by * the network consensus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value * is converted to seconds. */ int get_onion_key_grace_period(void) { int grace_period; grace_period = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "onion-key-grace-period-days", DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS, MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS, get_onion_key_rotation_days_()); return grace_period*24*60*60; } /** Set up Tor's TLS contexts, based on our configuration and keys. Return 0 * on success, and -1 on failure. */ int router_initialize_tls_context(void) { unsigned int flags = 0; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int lifetime = options->SSLKeyLifetime; if (public_server_mode(options)) flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER; if (!lifetime) { /* we should guess a good ssl cert lifetime */ /* choose between 5 and 365 days, and round to the day */ unsigned int five_days = 5*24*3600; unsigned int one_year = 365*24*3600; lifetime = crypto_rand_int_range(five_days, one_year); lifetime -= lifetime % (24*3600); if (crypto_rand_int(2)) { /* Half the time we expire at midnight, and half the time we expire * one second before midnight. (Some CAs wobble their expiry times a * bit in practice, perhaps to reduce collision attacks; see ticket * 8443 for details about observed certs in the wild.) */ lifetime--; } } /* It's ok to pass lifetime in as an unsigned int, since * config_parse_interval() checked it. */ return tor_tls_context_init(flags, get_tlsclient_identity_key(), server_mode(options) ? get_server_identity_key() : NULL, (unsigned int)lifetime); } /** Compute fingerprint (or hashed fingerprint if hashed is 1) and write * it to 'fingerprint' (or 'hashed-fingerprint'). Return 0 on success, or * -1 if Tor should die, */ STATIC int router_write_fingerprint(int hashed) { char *keydir = NULL, *cp = NULL; const char *fname = hashed ? "hashed-fingerprint" : "fingerprint"; char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1]; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); char *fingerprint_line = NULL; int result = -1; keydir = get_datadir_fname(fname); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping %sfingerprint to \"%s\"...", hashed ? "hashed " : "", keydir); if (!hashed) { if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), fingerprint, 0) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint"); goto done; } } else { if (crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), fingerprint) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing hashed fingerprint"); goto done; } } tor_asprintf(&fingerprint_line, "%s %s\n", options->Nickname, fingerprint); /* Check whether we need to write the (hashed-)fingerprint file. */ cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL); if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) { if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) { log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing %sfingerprint line to file", hashed ? "hashed " : ""); goto done; } } log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Your Tor %s identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'", hashed ? "bridge's hashed" : "server's", options->Nickname, fingerprint); result = 0; done: tor_free(cp); tor_free(keydir); tor_free(fingerprint_line); return result; } static int init_keys_common(void) { if (!key_lock) key_lock = tor_mutex_new(); return 0; } int init_keys_client(void) { crypto_pk_t *prkey; if (init_keys_common() < 0) return -1; if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) return -1; if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { crypto_pk_free(prkey); return -1; } set_client_identity_key(prkey); /* Create a TLS context. */ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client."); return -1; } return 0; } /** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary. * On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success, * or -1 if Tor should die. */ int init_keys(void) { char *keydir; const char *mydesc; crypto_pk_t *prkey; char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; char v3_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); dirinfo_type_t type; time_t now = time(NULL); dir_server_t *ds; int v3_digest_set = 0; authority_cert_t *cert = NULL; /* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and * initialize the TLS context. */ if (!server_mode(options)) { return init_keys_client(); } if (init_keys_common() < 0) return -1; if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0) return -1; /* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */ memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest)); if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) { if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we " "were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! " "Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying."); return -1; } cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert(); if (cert) { if (crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key, v3_digest) < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute my v3 authority identity key " "digest."); return -1; } v3_digest_set = 1; } } /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir); bool created = false; prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created); tor_free(keydir); if (!prkey) return -1; if (created) log_new_relay_greeting(); set_server_identity_key(prkey); /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key; * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity * key. */ if (public_server_mode(options)) { set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */ } else { if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) return -1; if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) { crypto_pk_free(prkey); return -1; } set_client_identity_key(prkey); } /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */ const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now); if (new_signing_key < 0) return -1; /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key"); log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir); prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created); if (created) log_new_relay_greeting(); tor_free(keydir); if (!prkey) return -1; set_onion_key(prkey); if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) { /* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */ or_state_t *state = get_or_state(); if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) { /* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting * values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the * onion key. */ onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey; } else { /* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key * or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case, * start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even * if we don't stay up for the full lifetime of an onion key. */ state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now; or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ? time(NULL)+3600 : 0); } } keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old"); if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) { /* Load keys from non-empty files only. * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, 0); if (prkey) lastonionkey = prkey; } tor_free(keydir); { /* 2b. Load curve25519 onion keys. */ int r; keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor"); r = init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&curve25519_onion_key, keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, "onion"); tor_free(keydir); if (r<0) return -1; keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old"); if (fast_mem_is_zero((const char *) last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) { /* Load keys from non-empty files only. * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */ init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&last_curve25519_onion_key, keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, "onion"); } tor_free(keydir); } /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context"); return -1; } /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate. Note that we need to do this * after we set up the TLS context */ if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert"); return -1; } /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor(); if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) { const char *m = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri; /* We need to add our own fingerprint and ed25519 key so it gets * recognized. */ if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(), get_master_identity_key())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays"); return -1; } if (mydesc) { was_router_added_t added; ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL); if (!ri) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse."); return -1; } added = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self"); if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(added)) { if (!WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(added)) { log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s", m?m:""); return -1; } else { /* If the descriptor was outdated, that's ok. This can happen * when some config options are toggled that affect workers, but * we don't really need new keys yet so the descriptor doesn't * change and the old one is still fresh. */ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't add own descriptor to directory " "after key init: %s This is usually not a problem.", m?m:""); } } } } /* 5. Dump fingerprint and possibly hashed fingerprint to files. */ if (router_write_fingerprint(0)) { log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint to file"); return -1; } if (!public_server_mode(options) && router_write_fingerprint(1)) { log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing hashed fingerprint to file"); return -1; } if (!authdir_mode(options)) return 0; /* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */ if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints"); return -1; } /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */ crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest); type = ((options->V3AuthoritativeDir ? (V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) | (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO)); ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest); if (!ds) { ds = trusted_dir_server_new(options->Nickname, NULL, router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0), router_get_advertised_or_port(options), NULL, digest, v3_digest, type, 0.0); if (!ds) { log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we " "couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing."); return -1; } dir_server_add(ds); } if (ds->type != type) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority " "type in DirAuthority list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)", type, ds->type); ds->type = type; } if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) && tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in " "DirAuthority line. Adjusting."); memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN); } if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */ log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert"); if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string( cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF, 0, NULL)<0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing."); return -1; } } return 0; /* success */ } /** The lower threshold of remaining bandwidth required to advertise (or * automatically provide) directory services */ /* XXX Should this be increased? */ #define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER 51200 /** Return true iff we have enough configured bandwidth to advertise or * automatically provide directory services from cache directory * information. */ int router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options) { if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) { return 0; } if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 && options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) { return 0; } return 1; } /** Helper: Return 1 if we have sufficient resources for serving directory * requests, return 0 otherwise. * dir_port is either 0 or the configured DirPort number. * If AccountingMax is set less than our advertised bandwidth, then don't * serve requests. Likewise, if our advertised bandwidth is less than * MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER, don't bother trying to serve requests. */ static int router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port) { static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */ int new_choice=1; const char *reason = NULL; if (accounting_is_enabled(options) && get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) { /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating, * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it * off if using AccountingRule in. */ int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length(); uint32_t effective_bw = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options); uint64_t acc_bytes; if (!interval_length) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero " "seconds long. Raising to 1."); interval_length = 1; } log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to advertise %s: effective " "bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: %"PRIu64", " "accounting interval length %d", dir_port ? "dirport" : "begindir", effective_bw, (options->AccountingMax), interval_length); acc_bytes = options->AccountingMax; if (get_options()->AccountingRule == ACCT_SUM) acc_bytes /= 2; if (effective_bw >= acc_bytes / interval_length) { new_choice = 0; reason = "AccountingMax enabled"; } } else if (! router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options)) { /* if we're advertising a small amount */ new_choice = 0; reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB"; } if (advertising != new_choice) { if (new_choice == 1) { if (dir_port > 0) log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port); else log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising directory service support"); } else { tor_assert(reason); log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)", dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason); } advertising = new_choice; } return advertising; } /** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open or begindir support, else * return 1. * * Where dir_port or supports_tunnelled_dir_requests are not relevant, they * must be 0. * * Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish. */ static int decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port, int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests) { /* Part one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't * worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious * or because they're normal behavior. */ /* short circuit the rest of the function */ if (!dir_port && !supports_tunnelled_dir_requests) return 0; if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */ return 1; if (net_is_disabled()) return 0; if (dir_port && !router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, dir_port)) return 0; if (supports_tunnelled_dir_requests && !router_get_advertised_or_port(options)) return 0; /* Part two: consider config options that could make us choose to * publish or not publish that the user might find surprising. */ return router_should_be_dirserver(options, dir_port); } /** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open, else return the * DirPort we want to advertise. */ int router_should_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port) { /* supports_tunnelled_dir_requests is not relevant, pass 0 */ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, dir_port, 0) ? dir_port : 0; } /** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to * advertise the fact that we support begindir requests, else return 1. */ static int router_should_advertise_begindir(const or_options_t *options, int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests) { /* dir_port is not relevant, pass 0 */ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, 0, supports_tunnelled_dir_requests); } /** Return true iff the combination of options in options and parameters * in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits * we got from addresses not known to be servers. */ int should_refuse_unknown_exits(const or_options_t *options) { if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) { return options->RefuseUnknownExits; } else { return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1); } } /** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if: * - We don't have the ClientOnly option set * and * - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty * and * - We have ORPort set * and * - We believe our ORPort and DirPort (if present) are reachable from * the outside; or * - We believe our ORPort is reachable from the outside, and we can't * check our DirPort because the consensus has no exits; or * - We are an authoritative directory server. */ static int decide_if_publishable_server(void) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (options->ClientOnly) return 0; if (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ == NO_DIRINFO) return 0; if (!server_mode(options)) return 0; if (authdir_mode(options)) return 1; if (!router_get_advertised_or_port(options)) return 0; if (!check_whether_orport_reachable(options)) return 0; if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL) { /* All set: there are no exits in the consensus (maybe this is a tiny * test network), so we can't check our DirPort reachability. */ return 1; } else { return check_whether_dirport_reachable(options); } } /** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable, * etc). force is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers. * * We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not * uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to * determine what IP address and ports to test. */ void consider_publishable_server(int force) { int rebuilt; if (!server_mode(get_options())) return; rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0); if (decide_if_publishable_server()) { set_server_advertised(1); if (rebuilt == 0) router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force); } else { set_server_advertised(0); } } /** Return the port of the first active listener of type * listener_type. Returns 0 if no port is found. */ /** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are multiple listeners. */ uint16_t router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type, sa_family_t family) { /* Iterate all connections, find one of the right kind and return the port. Not very sophisticated or fast, but effective. */ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) { if (conn->type == listener_type && !conn->marked_for_close && conn->socket_family == family) { return conn->port; } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); return 0; } /** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either * the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to * if ORPort is "auto". Returns 0 if no port is found. */ uint16_t router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options) { return router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, AF_INET); } /** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but allows an address family argument. */ uint16_t router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options, sa_family_t family) { int port = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, family); (void)options; /* If the port is in 'auto' mode, we have to use router_get_listener_port_by_type(). */ if (port == CFG_AUTO_PORT) return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, family); return port; } /** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but returns the IPv6 address and * port in ipv6_ap_out, which must not be NULL. Returns a null address and * zero port, if no ORPort is found. */ void router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(const or_options_t *options, tor_addr_port_t *ipv6_ap_out) { /* Bug in calling function, we can't return a sensible result, and it * shouldn't use the NULL pointer once we return. */ tor_assert(ipv6_ap_out); /* If there is no valid IPv6 ORPort, return a null address and port. */ tor_addr_make_null(&ipv6_ap_out->addr, AF_INET6); ipv6_ap_out->port = 0; const tor_addr_t *addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af( CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER, AF_INET6); const uint16_t port = router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af( options, AF_INET6); if (!addr || port == 0) { log_info(LD_CONFIG, "There is no advertised IPv6 ORPort."); return; } /* If the relay is configured using the default authorities, disallow * internal IPs. Otherwise, allow them. For IPv4 ORPorts and DirPorts, * this check is done in resolve_my_address(). See #33681. */ const int default_auth = using_default_dir_authorities(options); if (tor_addr_is_internal(addr, 0) && default_auth) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to use configured IPv6 ORPort \"%s\" in a " "descriptor. Skipping it. " "Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly.", fmt_addrport(addr, port)); return; } tor_addr_copy(&ipv6_ap_out->addr, addr); ipv6_ap_out->port = port; } /** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort; * this is one of three possibilities: * The one that is passed as dirport if the DirPort option is 0, or * the one configured in the DirPort option, * or the one we actually bound to if DirPort is "auto". */ uint16_t router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dirport) { int dirport_configured = get_primary_dir_port(); (void)options; if (!dirport_configured) return dirport; if (dirport_configured == CFG_AUTO_PORT) return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER, AF_INET); return dirport_configured; } /* * OR descriptor generation. */ /** My routerinfo. */ static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL; /** My extrainfo */ static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL; /** Why did we most recently decide to regenerate our descriptor? Used to * tell the authorities why we're sending it to them. */ static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason"; /** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it * now. */ STATIC time_t desc_clean_since = 0; /** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */ STATIC const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started"; /** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */ static int desc_needs_upload = 0; /** OR only: If force is true, or we haven't uploaded this * descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to * all the directory servers we know about. */ void router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force) { const routerinfo_t *ri; extrainfo_t *ei; char *msg; size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len; dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->PublishServerDescriptor_; ri = router_get_my_routerinfo(); if (!ri) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload"); return; } ei = router_get_my_extrainfo(); if (auth == NO_DIRINFO) return; if (!force && !desc_needs_upload) return; log_info(LD_OR, "Uploading relay descriptor to directory authorities%s", force ? " (forced)" : ""); desc_needs_upload = 0; desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len; extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0; total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1; msg = tor_malloc(total_len); memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len); if (ei) { memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len); } msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0; directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR, (auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL, auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len); tor_free(msg); } /** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to * conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject. */ int router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) { const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */ return -1; /* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a 'maybe' below. */ if (tor_addr_is_null(addr)) return -1; /* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy for both the v4 and the * v6 policies. The exit_policy field in router_get_my_routerinfo() is a * bit unusual, in that it contains IPv6 and IPv6 entries. We don't want to * look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->ipv6_exit_policy, since that's a port * summary. */ if ((tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET || tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)) { return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(addr, port, me->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED; #if 0 } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) { return get_options()->IPv6Exit && desc_routerinfo->ipv6_exit_policy && compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(addr, port, me->ipv6_exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED; #endif /* 0 */ } else { return -1; } } /** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't * have a descriptor */ MOCK_IMPL(int, router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void)) { const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */ return -1; return me->policy_is_reject_star; } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to * my server identity key digest. */ int router_digest_is_me(const char *digest) { return (server_identitykey && tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN)); } /** Return my identity digest. */ const uint8_t * router_get_my_id_digest(void) { return (const uint8_t *)server_identitykey_digest; } /** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to * my identity digest. */ int router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest) { extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo(); if (!ei) return 0; return tor_memeq(digest, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, DIGEST_LEN); } /** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */ int router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router) { return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest); } /** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if * necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */ MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *, router_get_my_routerinfo,(void)) { return router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err(NULL); } /** Return routerinfo of this OR. Rebuild it from * scratch if needed. Set *err to 0 on success or to * appropriate TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_* value on failure. */ MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *, router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err,(int *err)) { if (!server_mode(get_options())) { if (err) *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER; return NULL; } if (!desc_clean_since) { int rebuild_err = router_rebuild_descriptor(0); if (rebuild_err < 0) { if (err) *err = rebuild_err; return NULL; } } if (!desc_routerinfo) { if (err) *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING; return NULL; } if (err) *err = 0; return desc_routerinfo; } /** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh * one if necessary. Return NULL on error. */ const char * router_get_my_descriptor(void) { const char *body; const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); if (! me) return NULL; tor_assert(me->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE); body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&me->cache_info); /* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */ tor_assert(!body[me->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]); log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body); return body; } /** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none. * Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */ extrainfo_t * router_get_my_extrainfo(void) { if (!server_mode(get_options())) return NULL; if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0)) return NULL; return desc_extrainfo; } /** Return a human-readable string describing what triggered us to generate * our current descriptor, or NULL if we don't know. */ const char * router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void) { return desc_gen_reason; } static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess); /** Make a current best guess at our address, either because * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *addr and return * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess. * * If cache_only is true, just return any cached answers, and * don't try to get any new answers. */ MOCK_IMPL(int, router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr, int cache_only)) { /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */ *addr = get_last_resolved_addr(); if (*addr) return 0; /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */ if (!cache_only) { if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) { log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr)); return 0; } } /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */ if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0) return 0; /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */ return -1; } /* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the * ORPort or DirPort. * listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */ static void router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr, int listener_type) { tor_assert(listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER || listener_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER); /* The first advertised Port may be the magic constant CFG_AUTO_PORT. */ int port_v4_cfg = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(listener_type, AF_INET); if (port_v4_cfg != 0 && !port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(listener_type, ipv4h_desc_addr, port_v4_cfg, 1)) { const tor_addr_t *port_addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af( listener_type, AF_INET); /* If we're building a descriptor with no advertised address, * something is terribly wrong. */ tor_assert(port_addr); tor_addr_t desc_addr; char port_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; char desc_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; tor_addr_to_str(port_addr_str, port_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0); tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&desc_addr, ipv4h_desc_addr); tor_addr_to_str(desc_addr_str, &desc_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0); const char *listener_str = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ? "OR" : "Dir"); log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "The IPv4 %sPort address %s does not match the " "descriptor address %s. If you have a static public IPv4 " "address, use 'Address ' and 'OutboundBindAddress " "'. If you are behind a NAT, use two %sPort lines: " "'%sPort NoListen' and '%sPort " "NoAdvertise'.", listener_str, port_addr_str, desc_addr_str, listener_str, listener_str, listener_str); } } /* Tor relays only have one IPv4 address in the descriptor, which is derived * from the Address torrc option, or guessed using various methods in * router_pick_published_address(). * Warn the operator if there is no ORPort on the descriptor address * ipv4h_desc_addr. * Warn the operator if there is no DirPort on the descriptor address. * This catches a few common config errors: * - operators who expect ORPorts and DirPorts to be advertised on the * ports' listen addresses, rather than the torrc Address (or guessed * addresses in the absence of an Address config). This includes * operators who attempt to put their ORPort and DirPort on different * addresses; * - discrepancies between guessed addresses and configured listen * addresses (when the Address option isn't set). * If a listener is listening on all IPv4 addresses, it is assumed that it * is listening on the configured Address, and no messages are logged. * If an operators has specified NoAdvertise ORPorts in a NAT setting, * no messages are logged, unless they have specified other advertised * addresses. * The message tells operators to configure an ORPort and DirPort that match * the Address (using NoListen if needed). */ static void router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr) { router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr, CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER); router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER); } /** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family, * for one reason or another. */ static smartlist_t *warned_family = NULL; /** * Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in * options. Warn about invalid or missing entries. Return NULL * if this relay should not declare a family. **/ STATIC smartlist_t * get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options) { if (!options->MyFamily) return NULL; if (options->BridgeRelay) return NULL; if (!warned_family) warned_family = smartlist_new(); smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new(); config_line_t *family; /* First we try to get the whole family in the form of hexdigests. */ for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) { char *name = family->value; const node_t *member; if (options->Nickname && !strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname)) continue; /* Don't list ourself by nickname, that's redundant */ else member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0); if (!member) { /* This node doesn't seem to exist, so warn about it if it is not * a hexdigest. */ int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name); if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name) && !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) { if (is_legal) log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared family, but " "I have no descriptor for it. I'll use the nickname " "as is, but this may confuse clients. Please list it " "by identity digest instead.", escaped(name)); else log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared " "family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. " "Skipping it.", escaped(name)); smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name); } if (is_legal) { smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name); } } else { /* List the node by digest. */ char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2); fp[0] = '$'; base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, member->identity, DIGEST_LEN); smartlist_add(declared_family, fp); if (! is_legal_hexdigest(name) && !smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name)) { /* Warn if this node was not specified by hexdigest. */ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared " "family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider " "saying %s instead, if that's what you meant.", escaped(name), fp); smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name); } } } /* Now declared_family should have the closest we can come to the * identities that the user wanted. * * Unlike older versions of Tor, we _do_ include our own identity: this * helps microdescriptor compression, and helps in-memory compression * on clients. */ nodefamily_t *nf = nodefamily_from_members(declared_family, router_get_my_id_digest(), NF_WARN_MALFORMED, NULL); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s)); smartlist_free(declared_family); if (!nf) { return NULL; } char *s = nodefamily_format(nf); nodefamily_free(nf); smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new(); smartlist_split_string(result, s, NULL, SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); tor_free(s); if (smartlist_len(result) == 1) { /* This is a one-element list containing only ourself; instead return * nothing */ const char *singleton = smartlist_get(result, 0); bool is_me = false; if (singleton[0] == '$') { char d[DIGEST_LEN]; int n = base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), singleton+1, strlen(singleton+1)); if (n == DIGEST_LEN && fast_memeq(d, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN)) { is_me = true; } } if (!is_me) { // LCOV_EXCL_START log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a singleton family list with an element " "that wasn't us! Element was %s", escaped(singleton)); // LCOV_EXCL_STOP } else { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(result); return NULL; } } return result; } /** Allocate a fresh, unsigned routerinfo for this OR, without any of the * fields that depend on the corresponding extrainfo. * * On success, set ri_out to the new routerinfo, and return 0. * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated routerinfo. * * Returns a negative value and sets ri_out to NULL on temporary error. */ MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int, router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo,(routerinfo_t **ri_out)) { routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; uint32_t addr; char platform[256]; int hibernating = we_are_hibernating(); const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; if (BUG(!ri_out)) { result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; goto err; } if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor"); result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR; goto err; } /* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort * and DirPort addresses configured by the operator. */ router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(addr); ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t)); ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1; ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname); ri->addr = addr; ri->or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options); ri->dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0); ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests = directory_permits_begindir_requests(options); ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL); /* get_onion_key() must invoke from main thread */ router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(get_onion_key(), &ri->onion_pkey, &ri->onion_pkey_len); ri->onion_curve25519_pkey = tor_memdup(&get_current_curve25519_keypair()->pubkey, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t)); /* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */ tor_addr_port_t ipv6_orport; router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(options, &ipv6_orport); /* If there is no valid IPv6 ORPort, the address and port are null. */ tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport.addr); ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport.port; ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key()); if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey, ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) { result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED; goto err; } ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert()); get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform)); ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform); ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols()); /* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */ ri->bandwidthrate = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options); /* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */ ri->bandwidthburst = relay_get_effective_bwburst(options); /* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */ ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess(); if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) { /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */ policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy); } else { policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(options,ri->addr,&ri->ipv6_addr, &ri->exit_policy); } ri->policy_is_reject_star = policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) && policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6, 1); if (options->IPv6Exit) { char *p_tmp = policy_summarize(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6); if (p_tmp) ri->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(p_tmp); tor_free(p_tmp); } ri->declared_family = get_my_declared_family(options); if (options->BridgeRelay) { ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE; /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted, anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0; } else { ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL; ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1; } goto done; err: routerinfo_free(ri); *ri_out = NULL; return result; done: *ri_out = ri; return 0; } /** Allocate and return a fresh, unsigned extrainfo for this OR, based on the * routerinfo ri. * * Uses options->Nickname to set the nickname, and options->BridgeRelay to set * ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted. * * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL. * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo. */ static extrainfo_t * router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri) { extrainfo_t *ei = NULL; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (BUG(!ri)) return NULL; /* Now generate the extrainfo. */ ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t)); ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1; strlcpy(ei->nickname, options->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname)); ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on; ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert()); memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); if (options->BridgeRelay) { /* See note in router_build_fresh_routerinfo(). */ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0; } else { ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1; } return ei; } /** Dump the extrainfo descriptor body for ei, sign it, and add the body and * signature to ei->cache_info. Note that the extrainfo body is determined by * ei, and some additional config and statistics state: see * extrainfo_dump_to_string() for details. * * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. * If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns -1. * On error, ei->cache_info is not modified. */ static int router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(extrainfo_t *ei) { if (BUG(!ei)) return -1; if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, ei, get_server_identity_key(), get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor."); return -1; } ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body); router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest); crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len, DIGEST_SHA256); return 0; } /** Allocate and return a fresh, signed extrainfo for this OR, based on the * routerinfo ri. * * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL. * Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo. */ STATIC extrainfo_t * router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri) { int result = -1; extrainfo_t *ei = NULL; if (BUG(!ri)) return NULL; ei = router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(ri); /* router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo() should not fail. */ if (BUG(!ei)) goto err; result = router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(ei); if (result < 0) goto err; goto done; err: extrainfo_free(ei); return NULL; done: return ei; } /** Set the fields in ri that depend on ei. * * If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and zeroes the relevant fields. */ STATIC void router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(routerinfo_t *ri, const extrainfo_t *ei) { if (BUG(!ei)) { /* Just to be safe, zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */ memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN); memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, 0, DIGEST256_LEN); return; } /* Now finish the router descriptor. */ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, DIGEST_LEN); memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, ei->digest256, DIGEST256_LEN); } /** Dump the descriptor body for ri, sign it, and add the body and signature to * ri->cache_info. Note that the descriptor body is determined by ri, and some * additional config and state: see router_dump_router_to_string() for details. * * Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error. * If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns a negative value. * On error, ri->cache_info is not modified. */ STATIC int router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(routerinfo_t *ri) { if (BUG(!ri)) return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(), get_onion_key(), get_current_curve25519_keypair(), get_master_signing_keypair())) ) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor."); return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE; } ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body); router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body), ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest); return 0; } /** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and signed extrainfo * document for this OR. * * Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated extrainfo document. * Failure to generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated * by setting e to NULL. * Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error. * Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents on success. */ int router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e) { int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; extrainfo_t *ei = NULL; if (BUG(!r)) goto err; if (BUG(!e)) goto err; result = router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo(&ri); if (result < 0) { goto err; } /* If ri is NULL, then result should be negative. So this check should be * unreachable. */ if (BUG(!ri)) { result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; goto err; } ei = router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(ri); /* Failing to create an ei is not an error. */ if (ei) { router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(ri, ei); } result = router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(ri); if (result < 0) goto err; if (ei) { if (BUG(routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei, &ri->cache_info, NULL))) { result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG; goto err; } } goto done; err: routerinfo_free(ri); extrainfo_free(ei); *r = NULL; *e = NULL; return result; done: *r = ri; *e = ei; return 0; } /** If force is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh * routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR. * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. */ int router_rebuild_descriptor(int force) { int err = 0; routerinfo_t *ri; extrainfo_t *ei; uint32_t addr; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (desc_clean_since && !force) return 0; if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0 || router_get_advertised_or_port(options) == 0) { /* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll * learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed() * marks it dirty. */ desc_clean_since = time(NULL); return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING; } log_info(LD_OR, "Rebuilding relay descriptor%s", force ? " (forced)" : ""); err = router_build_fresh_descriptor(&ri, &ei); if (err < 0) { return err; } routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); desc_routerinfo = ri; extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); desc_extrainfo = ei; desc_clean_since = time(NULL); desc_needs_upload = 1; desc_gen_reason = desc_dirty_reason; if (BUG(desc_gen_reason == NULL)) { desc_gen_reason = "descriptor was marked dirty earlier, for no reason."; } desc_dirty_reason = NULL; control_event_my_descriptor_changed(); return 0; } /** If our router descriptor ever goes this long without being regenerated * because something changed, we force an immediate regenerate-and-upload. */ #define FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (18*60*60) /** If our router descriptor seems to be missing or unacceptable according * to the authorities, regenerate and reupload it _this_ often. */ #define FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (90*60) /** Mark descriptor out of date if it's been "too long" since we last tried * to upload one. */ void mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now) { networkstatus_t *ns; const routerstatus_t *rs; const char *retry_fast_reason = NULL; /* Set if we should retry frequently */ const time_t slow_cutoff = now - FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL; const time_t fast_cutoff = now - FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL; /* If it's already dirty, don't mark it. */ if (! desc_clean_since) return; /* If it's older than FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL, it's always * time to rebuild it. */ if (desc_clean_since < slow_cutoff) { mark_my_descriptor_dirty("time for new descriptor"); return; } /* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no. The * rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the * live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old, or if the * consensus lists us as "stale" and we haven't regenerated since the * consensus was published. */ ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now); if (ns) { rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest); if (rs == NULL) retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus"; else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff) retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old"; else if (rs->is_staledesc && ns->valid_after > desc_clean_since) retry_fast_reason = "listed as stale in consensus"; } if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff) mark_my_descriptor_dirty(retry_fast_reason); } /** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */ void mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (BUG(reason == NULL)) { reason = "marked descriptor dirty for unspecified reason"; } if (server_mode(options) && options->PublishServerDescriptor_) log_info(LD_OR, "Decided to publish new relay descriptor: %s", reason); desc_clean_since = 0; if (!desc_dirty_reason) desc_dirty_reason = reason; } /** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor * of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? Note: We don't use this constant * if our previous bandwidth estimate was exactly 0. */ #define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (3*60*60) /** Maximum uptime to republish our descriptor because of large shifts in * estimated bandwidth. */ #define MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE (24*60*60) /** By which factor bandwidth shifts have to change to be considered large. */ #define BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR 2 /** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced * bandwidth while the uptime is smaller than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE. * If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */ void check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now) { static time_t last_changed = 0; uint64_t prev, cur; const int hibernating = we_are_hibernating(); /* If the relay uptime is bigger than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE, * the next regularly scheduled descriptor update (18h) will be enough */ if (get_uptime() > MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE && !hibernating) return; const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo(); if (!my_ri) return; prev = my_ri->bandwidthcapacity; /* Consider ourselves to have zero bandwidth if we're hibernating or * shutting down. */ cur = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess(); if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) || cur > (prev * BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) || cur < (prev / BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ) { if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now || !prev) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor."); mark_my_descriptor_dirty("bandwidth has changed"); last_changed = now; } } } /** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from * prev to cur. */ static void log_addr_has_changed(int severity, const tor_addr_t *prev, const tor_addr_t *cur, const char *source) { char addrbuf_prev[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; char addrbuf_cur[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; if (BUG(!server_mode(get_options()))) return; if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_prev, prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev), 1) == NULL) strlcpy(addrbuf_prev, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN); if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_cur, cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur), 1) == NULL) strlcpy(addrbuf_cur, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN); if (!tor_addr_is_null(prev)) log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; " "rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).", addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source); else log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).", addrbuf_cur, source); } /** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration * has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service * like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */ void check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now) { uint32_t prev, cur; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); const char *method = NULL; char *hostname = NULL; const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo(); (void) now; if (my_ri == NULL) /* make sure routerinfo exists */ return; /* XXXX ipv6 */ prev = my_ri->addr; if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, &method, &hostname) < 0) { log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP."); return; } if (prev != cur) { char *source; tor_addr_t tmp_prev, tmp_cur; tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_prev, prev); tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_cur, cur); tor_asprintf(&source, "METHOD=%s%s%s", method, hostname ? " HOSTNAME=" : "", hostname ? hostname : ""); log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &tmp_prev, &tmp_cur, source); tor_free(source); ip_address_changed(0); } tor_free(hostname); } /** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory * headers. */ static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL; /** A directory server d_conn told us our IP address is * suggestion. * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */ void router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion, const dir_connection_t *d_conn) { tor_addr_t addr; uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */ const or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */ if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) { log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.", escaped(suggestion)); return; } log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion); if (!server_mode(options)) { tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); return; } /* XXXX ipv6 */ cur = get_last_resolved_addr(); if (cur || resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) { /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we need it later */ return; } if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) { /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */ return; } if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) { /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */ log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, " "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.", suggestion); return; } /* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to * resolve it. */ if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) { control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE, "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV", suggestion); log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr, d_conn->base_.address); ip_address_changed(0); tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor() will fetch it */ } } /** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return * 0; else return -1. */ static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess) { if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) { *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip); return 0; } return -1; } /** Set platform (max length len) to a NUL-terminated short * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're * currently running on. */ STATIC void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len) { tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s", get_short_version(), get_uname()); } /* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe * refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're * near the end of maxlen? */ #define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING /** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign * with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new * string encoding the result, or NULL on failure. * * In addition to the fields in router, this function calls * onion_key_lifetime(), get_options(), and we_are_hibernating(), and uses the * results to populate some fields in the descriptor. */ char * router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router, const crypto_pk_t *ident_key, const crypto_pk_t *tap_key, const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair) { char *address = NULL; char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */ crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL; char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */ char digest[DIGEST256_LEN]; char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1]; char *extra_info_line = NULL; size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen; char *family_line = NULL; char *extra_or_address = NULL; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *chunks = NULL; char *output = NULL; const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert; char *ed_cert_line = NULL; char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL; char *ntor_cc_line = NULL; char *proto_line = NULL; /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */ if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't " "match router's public key!"); goto err; } if (emit_ed_sigs) { if (!router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key, &signing_keypair->pubkey)) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched " "ed25519 key chain %d", router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included); goto err; } } /* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint"); goto err; } if (emit_ed_sigs) { /* Encode ed25519 signing cert */ char ed_cert_base64[256]; char ed_fp_base64[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1]; if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64), (const char*)router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!"); goto err; } ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64, &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key); tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n" "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" "%s" "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n" "master-key-ed25519 %s\n", ed_cert_base64, ed_fp_base64); } /* PEM-encode the onion key */ rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey, router->onion_pkey_len); if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(rsa_pubkey, &onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!"); goto err; } /* PEM-encode the identity key */ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey, &identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!"); goto err; } /* Cross-certify with RSA key */ if (tap_key && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) { char buf[256]; int tap_cc_len = 0; uint8_t *tap_cc = make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key, &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key, router->identity_pkey, &tap_cc_len); if (!tap_cc) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!"); goto err; } if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!"); tor_free(tap_cc); goto err; } tor_free(tap_cc); tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line, "onion-key-crosscert\n" "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n" "%s" "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf); } /* Cross-certify with onion keys */ if (ntor_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) { int sign = 0; char buf[256]; /* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/ tor_cert_t *cert = make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair, &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key, router->cache_info.published_on, get_onion_key_lifetime(), &sign); if (!cert) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!"); goto err; } tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1); if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) { log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!"); tor_cert_free(cert); goto err; } tor_cert_free(cert); tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line, "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n" "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" "%s" "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf); } /* Encode the publication time. */ format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on); if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) { char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family, " ", 0, NULL); tor_asprintf(&family_line, "family %s\n", family); tor_free(family); } else { family_line = tor_strdup(""); } if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) { char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest), router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN); if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) { char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1]; digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256); tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n", extra_info_digest, d256_64); } else { tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n", extra_info_digest); } } if (router->ipv6_orport && tor_addr_family(&router->ipv6_addr) == AF_INET6) { char addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; const char *a; a = tor_addr_to_str(addr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addr), 1); if (a) { tor_asprintf(&extra_or_address, "or-address %s:%d\n", a, router->ipv6_orport); log_debug(LD_OR, "My or-address line is <%s>", extra_or_address); } } if (router->protocol_list) { tor_asprintf(&proto_line, "proto %s\n", router->protocol_list); } else { proto_line = tor_strdup(""); } address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr); chunks = smartlist_new(); /* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "router %s %s %d 0 %d\n" "%s" "%s" "platform %s\n" "%s" "published %s\n" "fingerprint %s\n" "uptime %ld\n" "bandwidth %d %d %d\n" "%s%s" "onion-key\n%s" "signing-key\n%s" "%s%s" "%s%s%s", router->nickname, address, router->or_port, router_should_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port), ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "", extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "", router->platform, proto_line, published, fingerprint, get_uptime(), (int) router->bandwidthrate, (int) router->bandwidthburst, (int) router->bandwidthcapacity, extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "", (options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ? "caches-extra-info\n" : "", onion_pkey, identity_pkey, rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "", ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "", family_line, we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "", "hidden-service-dir\n"); if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) { const char *ci = options->ContactInfo; if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r')) ci = escaped(ci); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "contact %s\n", ci); } if (options->BridgeRelay) { char *bd = NULL; if (options->BridgeDistribution && strlen(options->BridgeDistribution)) { bd = tor_strdup(options->BridgeDistribution); } else { bd = tor_strdup("any"); } // Make sure our value is lowercased in the descriptor instead of just // forwarding what the user wrote in their torrc directly. tor_strlower(bd); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "bridge-distribution-request %s\n", bd); tor_free(bd); } if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey) { char kbuf[128]; base64_encode(kbuf, sizeof(kbuf), (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf); } else { /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */ log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key"); goto err; } /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */ if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) { smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "reject *:*\n"); } else if (router->exit_policy) { char *exit_policy = router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(router,1,0); if (!exit_policy) goto err; smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", exit_policy); tor_free(exit_policy); } if (router->ipv6_exit_policy) { char *p6 = write_short_policy(router->ipv6_exit_policy); if (p6 && strcmp(p6, "reject 1-65535")) { smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ipv6-policy %s\n", p6); } tor_free(p6); } if (router_should_advertise_begindir(options, router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)) { smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "tunnelled-dir-server\n"); } /* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */ if (emit_ed_sigs) { smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 "); crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256); ed25519_signature_t sig; char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1]; if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN, signing_keypair) < 0) goto err; ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf); } /* Sign the descriptor with RSA */ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n"); crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1); { char *sig; if (!(sig = router_get_dirobj_signature(digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key))) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor"); goto err; } smartlist_add(chunks, sig); } /* include a last '\n' */ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "\n"); output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); #ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING { char *s_dup; const char *cp; routerinfo_t *ri_tmp; cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(output); ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL); if (!ri_tmp) { log_err(LD_BUG, "We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse."); log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", output); goto err; } tor_free(s_dup); routerinfo_free(ri_tmp); } #endif /* defined(DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING) */ goto done; err: tor_free(output); /* sets output to NULL */ done: if (chunks) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(chunks); } crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey); tor_free(address); tor_free(family_line); tor_free(onion_pkey); tor_free(identity_pkey); tor_free(extra_or_address); tor_free(ed_cert_line); tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line); tor_free(ntor_cc_line); tor_free(extra_info_line); tor_free(proto_line); return output; } /** * OR only: Given router, produce a string with its exit policy. * If include_ipv4 is true, include IPv4 entries. * If include_ipv6 is true, include IPv6 entries. */ char * router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router, int include_ipv4, int include_ipv6) { if ((!router->exit_policy) || (router->policy_is_reject_star)) { return tor_strdup("reject *:*"); } return policy_dump_to_string(router->exit_policy, include_ipv4, include_ipv6); } /** Load the contents of filename, find the last line starting with * end_line, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in * the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to now, * and write the file contents starting with that line to *out. * Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist or is empty, or -1 * if the file does not contain a line matching these criteria or other * failure. */ static int load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now, char **out) { int r = -1; char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename); char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; time_t written; switch (file_status(fname)) { case FN_FILE: /* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */ if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) { tmp = strstr(contents, end_line); /* Find last block starting with end_line */ while (tmp) { start = tmp; tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line); } if (!start) goto notfound; if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr)) goto notfound; strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr)); if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0) goto notfound; if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60)) goto notfound; *out = tor_strdup(start); r = 1; } notfound: tor_free(contents); break; /* treat empty stats files as if the file doesn't exist */ case FN_NOENT: case FN_EMPTY: r = 0; break; case FN_ERROR: case FN_DIR: default: break; } tor_free(fname); return r; } /** Add header strings to chunks, based on the extrainfo object extrainfo, * and ed25519 keypair signing_keypair, if emit_ed_sigs is true. * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string(). * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */ static int extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper( smartlist_t *chunks, const extrainfo_t *extrainfo, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair, int emit_ed_sigs) { char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; char *ed_cert_line = NULL; char *pre = NULL; int rv = -1; base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity), extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on); if (emit_ed_sigs) { if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key, &signing_keypair->pubkey)) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a " "mismatched ed25519 key chain %d", extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included); goto err; } char ed_cert_base64[256]; if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64), (const char*)extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded, extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) { log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!"); goto err; } tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n" "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n" "%s" "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64); } else { ed_cert_line = tor_strdup(""); } /* This is the first chunk in the file. If the file is too big, other chunks * are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */ tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n", extrainfo->nickname, identity, ed_cert_line, published); smartlist_add(chunks, pre); rv = 0; goto done; err: rv = -1; done: tor_free(ed_cert_line); return rv; } /** Add pluggable transport and statistics strings to chunks, skipping * statistics if write_stats_to_extrainfo is false. * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string(). * Can not fail. */ static void extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(smartlist_t *chunks, int write_stats_to_extrainfo) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); char *contents = NULL; time_t now = time(NULL); /* If the file is too big, these chunks are removed, starting with the last * chunk. So each chunk must be a complete line, and the file must be valid * after each chunk. */ /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support, even if we * are not publishing statistics. This information is needed by BridgeDB * to distribute bridges. */ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) { char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(); if (pluggable_transports) smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports); } if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor."); /* Bandwidth usage stats don't have their own option */ { contents = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(); smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } /* geoip hashes aren't useful unless we are publishing other stats */ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET)) smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n", geoip_db_digest(AF_INET)); if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6)) smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n", geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6)); if (options->DirReqStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats", "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats", "hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->EntryStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats", "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->CellStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats", "cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->ExitPortStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats", "exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics && load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats", "conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) { smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } if (options->PaddingStatistics) { contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines(); if (contents) smartlist_add(chunks, contents); } /* bridge statistics */ if (should_record_bridge_info(options)) { const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now); if (bridge_stats) { smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats); } } } } /** Add an ed25519 signature of chunks to chunks, using the ed25519 keypair * signing_keypair. * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string(). * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */ static int extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper( smartlist_t *chunks, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair) { char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN]; ed25519_signature_t ed_sig; char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1]; int rv = -1; /* These are two of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too * big, other chunks are removed. So we must only add two chunks here. */ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 "); crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256); if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN, signing_keypair) < 0) goto err; ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig); smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf); rv = 0; goto done; err: rv = -1; done: return rv; } /** Add an RSA signature of extrainfo_string to chunks, using the RSA key * ident_key. * Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string(). * Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */ static int extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(smartlist_t *chunks, crypto_pk_t *ident_key, const char *extrainfo_string) { char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1]; char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; int rv = -1; memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig)); if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(extrainfo_string, strlen(extrainfo_string), digest) < 0 || router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key) < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info " "descriptor."); goto err; } smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig); rv = 0; goto done; err: rv = -1; done: return rv; } /** Write the contents of extrainfo, to * *s_out, signing them * with ident_key. * * If ExtraInfoStatistics is 1, also write aggregated statistics and related * configuration data before signing. Most statistics also have an option that * enables or disables that particular statistic. * * Always write pluggable transport lines. * * Return 0 on success, negative on failure. */ int extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo, crypto_pk_t *ident_key, const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair) { int result; static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1; char *s = NULL, *cp, *s_dup = NULL; smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new(); extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL; const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair && extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert; int rv = 0; rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper(chunks, extrainfo, signing_keypair, emit_ed_sigs); if (rv < 0) goto err; extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(chunks, write_stats_to_extrainfo); if (emit_ed_sigs) { rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper(chunks, signing_keypair); if (rv < 0) goto err; } /* This is one of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too big, * other chunks are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n"); s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) { /* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial * extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing * things. If emit_ed_sigs is true, we also keep 2 additional chunks at the * end for the ed25519 signature. */ const int required_chunks = emit_ed_sigs ? 4 : 2; if (smartlist_len(chunks) > required_chunks) { /* We remove the next-to-last or 4th-last element (remember, len-1 is the * last element), since we need to keep the router-signature elements. */ int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - required_chunks; char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx); smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx); log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor " "with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB " "upload limit. Removing last added " "statistics."); tor_free(e); tor_free(s); s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); } else { log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that " "exceeds the 50 KB upload limit."); goto err; } } rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(chunks, ident_key, s); if (rv < 0) goto err; tor_free(s); s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL); cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s); ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL, NULL); if (!ei_tmp) { if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor " "with statistics that we can't parse. Not " "adding statistics to this or any future " "extra-info descriptors."); write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0; result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key, signing_keypair); goto done; } else { log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we " "can't parse."); goto err; } } *s_out = s; s = NULL; /* prevent free */ result = 0; goto done; err: result = -1; done: tor_free(s); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk)); smartlist_free(chunks); tor_free(s_dup); extrainfo_free(ei_tmp); return result; } /** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll * warn again if we see the same errors. */ void router_reset_warnings(void) { if (warned_family) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_clear(warned_family); } } /** Release all static resources held in router.c */ void router_free_all(void) { crypto_pk_free(onionkey); crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey); crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey); crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey); /* Destroying a locked mutex is undefined behaviour. This mutex may be * locked, because multiple threads can access it. But we need to destroy * it, otherwise re-initialisation will trigger undefined behaviour. * See #31735 for details. */ tor_mutex_free(key_lock); routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo); extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo); crypto_pk_free(authority_signing_key); authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate); crypto_pk_free(legacy_signing_key); authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate); memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key)); memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key)); if (warned_family) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(warned_family); } } /* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set * the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set * in onion_pkey_len_out. */ void router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **onion_pkey_out, size_t *onion_pkey_len_out) { int len; char buf[1024]; tor_assert(pk); tor_assert(onion_pkey_out); tor_assert(onion_pkey_len_out); len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (BUG(len < 0)) { goto done; } *onion_pkey_out = tor_memdup(buf, len); *onion_pkey_len_out = len; done: return; } /* From an ASN-1 encoded onion pkey, return a newly allocated RSA key object. * It is the caller responsability to free the returned object. * * Return NULL if the pkey is NULL, malformed or if the length is 0. */ crypto_pk_t * router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(const char *pkey, size_t pkey_len) { if (!pkey || pkey_len == 0) { return NULL; } return crypto_pk_asn1_decode(pkey, pkey_len); }