/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "app/config/statefile.h"
#include "app/main/main.h"
#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/protover.h"
#include "feature/client/transports.h"
#include "feature/control/control_events.h"
#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h"
#include "feature/dirparse/signing.h"
#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
#include "feature/relay/relay_config.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
#include "lib/version/torversion.h"
#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
/**
* \file router.c
* \brief Miscellaneous relay functionality, including RSA key maintenance,
* generating and uploading server descriptors, picking an address to
* advertise, and so on.
*
* This module handles the job of deciding whether we are a Tor relay, and if
* so what kind. (Mostly through functions like server_mode() that inspect an
* or_options_t, but in some cases based on our own capabilities, such as when
* we are deciding whether to be a directory cache in
* router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver().)
*
* Also in this module are the functions to generate our own routerinfo_t and
* extrainfo_t, and to encode those to signed strings for upload to the
* directory authorities.
*
* This module also handles key maintenance for RSA and Curve25519-ntor keys,
* and for our TLS context. (These functions should eventually move to
* routerkeys.c along with the code that handles Ed25519 keys now.)
**/
/************************************************************/
/*****
* Key management: ORs only.
*****/
/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
*/
static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
static crypto_pk_t *onionkey=NULL;
/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
* generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
static crypto_pk_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
/** Current private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake. */
static curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_onion_key;
/** Previous private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake
* with clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
static curve25519_keypair_t last_curve25519_onion_key;
/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
* certificates. Never changes. */
static crypto_pk_t *server_identitykey=NULL;
/** Digest of server_identitykey. */
static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients'
* outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address
* change. */
static crypto_pk_t *client_identitykey=NULL;
/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
static crypto_pk_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
* authorities. */
static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
* with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
static crypto_pk_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
* authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
* but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's
* used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
* certificates. */
/** Return a readonly string with human readable description
* of err.
*/
const char *
routerinfo_err_to_string(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR:
return "No known exit address yet";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE:
return "Cannot parse descriptor";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER:
return "Not running in server mode";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED:
return "Key digest failed";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE:
return "Cannot generate descriptor";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet";
case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG:
return "Internal bug, see logs for details";
}
log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err);
tor_assert_unreached();
return "Unknown error";
}
/** Return true if we expect given error to be transient.
* Return false otherwise.
*/
int
routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err)
{
/**
* For simplicity, we consider all errors other than
* "not a server" transient - see discussion on
* https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034
*/
return err != TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
}
/** Replace the current onion key with k. Does not affect
* lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
*/
static void
set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
{
if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) {
/* k is already our onion key; free it and return */
crypto_pk_free(k);
return;
}
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
onionkey = k;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
mark_my_descriptor_dirty("set onion key");
}
/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
* loaded or generated. */
MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *,
get_onion_key,(void))
{
tor_assert(onionkey);
return onionkey;
}
/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *key, and a full
* copy of the most recent onion key into *last. Store NULL into
* a pointer if the corresponding key does not exist.
*/
void
dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last)
{
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(last);
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
if (onionkey)
*key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
else
*key = NULL;
if (lastonionkey)
*last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
else
*last = NULL;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
}
/** Expire our old set of onion keys. This is done by setting
* last_curve25519_onion_key and lastonionkey to all zero's and NULL
* respectively.
*
* This function does not perform any grace period checks for the old onion
* keys.
*/
void
expire_old_onion_keys(void)
{
char *fname = NULL;
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
/* Free lastonionkey and set it to NULL. */
if (lastonionkey) {
crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
lastonionkey = NULL;
}
/* We zero out the keypair. See the fast_mem_is_zero() check made in
* construct_ntor_key_map() below. */
memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old onion key file %s: %s",
fname, strerror(errno));
}
}
tor_free(fname);
fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old ntor onion key file %s: %s",
fname, strerror(errno));
}
}
tor_free(fname);
}
/** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only
* be called from the main thread. */
MOCK_IMPL(STATIC const struct curve25519_keypair_t *,
get_current_curve25519_keypair,(void))
{
return &curve25519_onion_key;
}
/** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor
* handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */
di_digest256_map_t *
construct_ntor_key_map(void)
{
di_digest256_map_t *m = NULL;
const uint8_t *cur_pk = curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key;
const uint8_t *last_pk = last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key;
if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char *)cur_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
dimap_add_entry(&m, cur_pk,
tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key,
sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
}
if (!fast_mem_is_zero((const char*)last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
tor_memneq(cur_pk, last_pk, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
dimap_add_entry(&m, last_pk,
tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
}
return m;
}
/** Helper used to deallocate a di_digest256_map_t returned by
* construct_ntor_key_map. */
static void
ntor_key_map_free_helper(void *arg)
{
curve25519_keypair_t *k = arg;
memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(*k));
tor_free(k);
}
/** Release all storage from a keymap returned by construct_ntor_key_map. */
void
ntor_key_map_free_(di_digest256_map_t *map)
{
if (!map)
return;
dimap_free(map, ntor_key_map_free_helper);
}
/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
* when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
* the process launched.
*/
time_t
get_onion_key_set_at(void)
{
return onionkey_set_at;
}
/** Set the current server identity key to k.
*/
void
set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
{
crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
server_identitykey = k;
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey,
server_identitykey_digest) < 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute our own identity key digest.");
tor_assert(0);
}
}
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
/** Testing only -- set the server's RSA identity digest to
* be digest */
void
set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest)
{
memcpy(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
* appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
static void
assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
{
if (1)
return;
tor_assert(client_identitykey);
if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
/* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
tor_assert(server_identitykey);
tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
} else {
/* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */
if (server_identitykey)
tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_MODULE_RELAY
/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
* been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
*/
MOCK_IMPL(crypto_pk_t *,
get_server_identity_key,(void))
{
tor_assert(server_identitykey);
tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
assert_identity_keys_ok();
return server_identitykey;
}
#endif /* defined(HAVE_MODULE_RELAY) */
/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key
* has been set. */
int
server_identity_key_is_set(void)
{
return server_mode(get_options()) && server_identitykey != NULL;
}
/** Set the current client identity key to k.
*/
void
set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
{
crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
client_identitykey = k;
}
/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS
* connections; requires that the key has been set.
*/
crypto_pk_t *
get_tlsclient_identity_key(void)
{
tor_assert(client_identitykey);
assert_identity_keys_ok();
return client_identitykey;
}
/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */
int
client_identity_key_is_set(void)
{
return client_identitykey != NULL;
}
/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
* if we have no such certificate. */
MOCK_IMPL(authority_cert_t *,
get_my_v3_authority_cert, (void))
{
return authority_key_certificate;
}
/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
* if we have no such key. */
crypto_pk_t *
get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
{
return authority_signing_key;
}
/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
* emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
* key. */
authority_cert_t *
get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
{
return legacy_key_certificate;
}
/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
* emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
crypto_pk_t *
get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
{
return legacy_signing_key;
}
/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
* a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
* the OR should:
* - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
* pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
* - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
*/
void
rotate_onion_key(void)
{
char *fname, *fname_prev;
crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
curve25519_keypair_t new_curve25519_keypair;
time_t now;
fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
/* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
goto error;
}
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname);
goto error;
}
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(fname_prev);
fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&new_curve25519_keypair, 1) < 0)
goto error;
/* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
goto error;
}
if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(&new_curve25519_keypair, fname,
"onion") < 0) {
log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write curve25519 onion key to \"%s\".",fname);
goto error;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
lastonionkey = onionkey;
onionkey = prkey;
memcpy(&last_curve25519_onion_key, &curve25519_onion_key,
sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
memcpy(&curve25519_onion_key, &new_curve25519_keypair,
sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
now = time(NULL);
state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
mark_my_descriptor_dirty("rotated onion key");
or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
goto done;
error:
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
if (prkey)
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
done:
memwipe(&new_curve25519_keypair, 0, sizeof(new_curve25519_keypair));
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(fname_prev);
}
/** Log greeting message that points to new relay lifecycle document the
* first time this function has been called.
*/
static void
log_new_relay_greeting(void)
{
static int already_logged = 0;
if (already_logged)
return;
tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "You are running a new relay. "
"Thanks for helping the Tor network! If you wish to know "
"what will happen in the upcoming weeks regarding its usage, "
"have a look at https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of"
"-a-new-relay");
already_logged = 1;
}
/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file fname, writing it into
* keys_out. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and generate
* is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are
* errors, log them at level severity. Generate files using tag
* in their ASCII wrapper. */
static int
init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keys_out,
const char *fname,
int generate,
int severity,
const char *tag)
{
switch (file_status(fname)) {
case FN_DIR:
case FN_ERROR:
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
/* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and, if generate
* is set, replace the empty file in curve25519_keypair_write_to_file() */
case FN_NOENT:
case FN_EMPTY:
if (generate) {
if (!have_lockfile()) {
if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
/* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
* if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
"Not writing any new keys.", fname);
/*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
* maybe we should wait for it. */
goto error;
}
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
fname);
if (curve25519_keypair_generate(keys_out, 1) < 0)
goto error;
if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(keys_out, fname, tag)<0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
"Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
memwipe(keys_out, 0, sizeof(*keys_out));
goto error;
}
} else {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
}
return 0;
case FN_FILE:
{
char *tag_in=NULL;
if (curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(keys_out, &tag_in, fname) < 0) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
tor_free(tag_in);
goto error;
}
if (!tag_in || strcmp(tag_in, tag)) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Unexpected tag %s on private key.",
escaped(tag_in));
tor_free(tag_in);
goto error;
}
tor_free(tag_in);
return 0;
}
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
error:
return -1;
}
/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
* directory authority, and make sure they match. If legacy, load a
* legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
* key/cert set. On success, store them into *key_out and
* *cert_out respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */
static int
load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
authority_cert_t **cert_out)
{
int r = -1;
char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
const char *eos = NULL;
crypto_pk_t *signing_key = NULL;
authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
fname = get_keydir_fname(
legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
if (!signing_key) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
goto done;
}
tor_free(fname);
fname = get_keydir_fname(
legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
if (!cert) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
fname);
goto done;
}
parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, strlen(cert), &eos);
if (!parsed) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
goto done;
}
if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
"certificate");
goto done;
}
crypto_pk_free(*key_out);
authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
*key_out = signing_key;
*cert_out = parsed;
r = 0;
signing_key = NULL;
parsed = NULL;
done:
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(cert);
crypto_pk_free(signing_key);
authority_cert_free(parsed);
return r;
}
/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
* present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
* return 0 on success. */
static int
init_v3_authority_keys(void)
{
if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
&authority_key_certificate)<0)
return -1;
if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
&legacy_key_certificate)<0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
* likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */
void
v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
{
time_t now, expires;
static time_t last_warned = 0;
int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
return;
now = time(NULL);
expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
time_left = (int)( expires - now );
if (time_left <= 0) {
badness = LOG_ERR;
warn_interval = 60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 24*60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
} else {
return;
}
if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
return;
if (time_left <= 0) {
tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
" Generate a new one NOW.");
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
"hours; Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
} else {
tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
"days; Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
}
last_warned = now;
}
/** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the
* network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a
* value between MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS and
* MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS.
*/
static int
get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void)
{
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"onion-key-rotation-days",
DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS);
}
/** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined
* by the network consensus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
* is converted to seconds.
*/
int
get_onion_key_lifetime(void)
{
return get_onion_key_rotation_days_()*24*60*60;
}
/** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by
* the network consensus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
* is converted to seconds.
*/
int
get_onion_key_grace_period(void)
{
int grace_period;
grace_period = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"onion-key-grace-period-days",
DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
get_onion_key_rotation_days_());
return grace_period*24*60*60;
}
/** Set up Tor's TLS contexts, based on our configuration and keys. Return 0
* on success, and -1 on failure. */
int
router_initialize_tls_context(void)
{
unsigned int flags = 0;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
int lifetime = options->SSLKeyLifetime;
if (public_server_mode(options))
flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER;
if (!lifetime) { /* we should guess a good ssl cert lifetime */
/* choose between 5 and 365 days, and round to the day */
unsigned int five_days = 5*24*3600;
unsigned int one_year = 365*24*3600;
lifetime = crypto_rand_int_range(five_days, one_year);
lifetime -= lifetime % (24*3600);
if (crypto_rand_int(2)) {
/* Half the time we expire at midnight, and half the time we expire
* one second before midnight. (Some CAs wobble their expiry times a
* bit in practice, perhaps to reduce collision attacks; see ticket
* 8443 for details about observed certs in the wild.) */
lifetime--;
}
}
/* It's ok to pass lifetime in as an unsigned int, since
* config_parse_interval() checked it. */
return tor_tls_context_init(flags,
get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
server_mode(options) ?
get_server_identity_key() : NULL,
(unsigned int)lifetime);
}
/** Compute fingerprint (or hashed fingerprint if hashed is 1) and write
* it to 'fingerprint' (or 'hashed-fingerprint'). Return 0 on success, or
* -1 if Tor should die,
*/
STATIC int
router_write_fingerprint(int hashed)
{
char *keydir = NULL, *cp = NULL;
const char *fname = hashed ? "hashed-fingerprint" :
"fingerprint";
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
char *fingerprint_line = NULL;
int result = -1;
keydir = get_datadir_fname(fname);
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping %sfingerprint to \"%s\"...",
hashed ? "hashed " : "", keydir);
if (!hashed) {
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
fingerprint, 0) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
goto done;
}
} else {
if (crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
fingerprint) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing hashed fingerprint");
goto done;
}
}
tor_asprintf(&fingerprint_line, "%s %s\n", options->Nickname, fingerprint);
/* Check whether we need to write the (hashed-)fingerprint file. */
cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing %sfingerprint line to file",
hashed ? "hashed " : "");
goto done;
}
}
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Your Tor %s identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
hashed ? "bridge's hashed" : "server's", options->Nickname,
fingerprint);
result = 0;
done:
tor_free(cp);
tor_free(keydir);
tor_free(fingerprint_line);
return result;
}
static int
init_keys_common(void)
{
if (!key_lock)
key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
return 0;
}
int
init_keys_client(void)
{
crypto_pk_t *prkey;
if (init_keys_common() < 0)
return -1;
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
return -1;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
return -1;
}
set_client_identity_key(prkey);
/* Create a TLS context. */
if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
* On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
* or -1 if Tor should die.
*/
int
init_keys(void)
{
char *keydir;
const char *mydesc;
crypto_pk_t *prkey;
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char v3_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
dirinfo_type_t type;
time_t now = time(NULL);
dir_server_t *ds;
int v3_digest_set = 0;
authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
/* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
* initialize the TLS context. */
if (!server_mode(options)) {
return init_keys_client();
}
if (init_keys_common() < 0)
return -1;
if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
return -1;
/* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
"were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
"Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
return -1;
}
cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
if (cert) {
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
v3_digest) < 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute my v3 authority identity key "
"digest.");
return -1;
}
v3_digest_set = 1;
}
}
/* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
bool created = false;
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
if (created)
log_new_relay_greeting();
set_server_identity_key(prkey);
/* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
* otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity
* key. */
if (public_server_mode(options)) {
set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */
} else {
if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
return -1;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
crypto_pk_free(prkey);
return -1;
}
set_client_identity_key(prkey);
}
/* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now);
if (new_signing_key < 0)
return -1;
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
if (created)
log_new_relay_greeting();
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_onion_key(prkey);
if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
/* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
/* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
* values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the
* onion key. */
onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
} else {
/* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
* or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case,
* start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
* if we don't stay up for the full lifetime of an onion key. */
state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
}
}
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
/* Load keys from non-empty files only.
* Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
if (prkey)
lastonionkey = prkey;
}
tor_free(keydir);
{
/* 2b. Load curve25519 onion keys. */
int r;
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
r = init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&curve25519_onion_key,
keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, "onion");
tor_free(keydir);
if (r<0)
return -1;
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
if (fast_mem_is_zero((const char *)
last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
/* Load keys from non-empty files only.
* Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, "onion");
}
tor_free(keydir);
}
/* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
return -1;
}
/* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate. Note that we need to do this
* after we set up the TLS context */
if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
return -1;
}
/* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
/* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
const char *m = NULL;
routerinfo_t *ri;
/* We need to add our own fingerprint and ed25519 key so it gets
* recognized. */
if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
get_master_identity_key())) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays");
return -1;
}
if (mydesc) {
was_router_added_t added;
ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (!ri) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
return -1;
}
added = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self");
if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(added)) {
if (!WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(added)) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
m?m:"");
return -1;
} else {
/* If the descriptor was outdated, that's ok. This can happen
* when some config options are toggled that affect workers, but
* we don't really need new keys yet so the descriptor doesn't
* change and the old one is still fresh. */
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't add own descriptor to directory "
"after key init: %s This is usually not a problem.",
m?m:"");
}
}
}
}
/* 5. Dump fingerprint and possibly hashed fingerprint to files. */
if (router_write_fingerprint(0)) {
log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint to file");
return -1;
}
if (!public_server_mode(options) && router_write_fingerprint(1)) {
log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing hashed fingerprint to file");
return -1;
}
if (!authdir_mode(options))
return 0;
/* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
return -1;
}
/* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
type = ((options->V3AuthoritativeDir ?
(V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) |
(options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO));
ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
if (!ds) {
ds = trusted_dir_server_new(options->Nickname, NULL,
router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0),
router_get_advertised_or_port(options),
NULL,
digest,
v3_digest,
type, 0.0);
if (!ds) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
"couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
return -1;
}
dir_server_add(ds);
}
if (ds->type != type) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority "
"type in DirAuthority list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
type, ds->type);
ds->type = type;
}
if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) &&
tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
"DirAuthority line. Adjusting.");
memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF, 0,
NULL)<0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
return -1;
}
}
return 0; /* success */
}
/** The lower threshold of remaining bandwidth required to advertise (or
* automatically provide) directory services */
/* XXX Should this be increased? */
#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER 51200
/** Return true iff we have enough configured bandwidth to advertise or
* automatically provide directory services from cache directory
* information. */
int
router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
return 0;
}
if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/** Helper: Return 1 if we have sufficient resources for serving directory
* requests, return 0 otherwise.
* dir_port is either 0 or the configured DirPort number.
* If AccountingMax is set less than our advertised bandwidth, then don't
* serve requests. Likewise, if our advertised bandwidth is less than
* MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER, don't bother trying to serve requests.
*/
static int
router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
{
static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
int new_choice=1;
const char *reason = NULL;
if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
/* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
* but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
* because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
* much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
* off if using AccountingRule in. */
int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
uint32_t effective_bw = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options);
uint64_t acc_bytes;
if (!interval_length) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero "
"seconds long. Raising to 1.");
interval_length = 1;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to advertise %s: effective "
"bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: %"PRIu64", "
"accounting interval length %d",
dir_port ? "dirport" : "begindir",
effective_bw, (options->AccountingMax),
interval_length);
acc_bytes = options->AccountingMax;
if (get_options()->AccountingRule == ACCT_SUM)
acc_bytes /= 2;
if (effective_bw >=
acc_bytes / interval_length) {
new_choice = 0;
reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
}
} else if (! router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options)) {
/* if we're advertising a small amount */
new_choice = 0;
reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
}
if (advertising != new_choice) {
if (new_choice == 1) {
if (dir_port > 0)
log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
else
log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising directory service support");
} else {
tor_assert(reason);
log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)",
dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason);
}
advertising = new_choice;
}
return advertising;
}
/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
* advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open or begindir support, else
* return 1.
*
* Where dir_port or supports_tunnelled_dir_requests are not relevant, they
* must be 0.
*
* Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish.
*/
static int
decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(const or_options_t *options,
uint16_t dir_port,
int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
{
/* Part one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
* worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
* or because they're normal behavior. */
/* short circuit the rest of the function */
if (!dir_port && !supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
return 0;
if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
return 1;
if (net_is_disabled())
return 0;
if (dir_port && !router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, dir_port))
return 0;
if (supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
!router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
return 0;
/* Part two: consider config options that could make us choose to
* publish or not publish that the user might find surprising. */
return router_should_be_dirserver(options, dir_port);
}
/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
* advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open, else return the
* DirPort we want to advertise.
*/
int
router_should_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
{
/* supports_tunnelled_dir_requests is not relevant, pass 0 */
return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, dir_port, 0) ? dir_port : 0;
}
/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
* advertise the fact that we support begindir requests, else return 1.
*/
static int
router_should_advertise_begindir(const or_options_t *options,
int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
{
/* dir_port is not relevant, pass 0 */
return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, 0,
supports_tunnelled_dir_requests);
}
/** Return true iff the combination of options in options and parameters
* in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits
* we got from addresses not known to be servers. */
int
should_refuse_unknown_exits(const or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) {
return options->RefuseUnknownExits;
} else {
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1);
}
}
/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
* - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
* and
* - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
* and
* - We have ORPort set
* and
* - We believe our ORPort and DirPort (if present) are reachable from
* the outside; or
* - We believe our ORPort is reachable from the outside, and we can't
* check our DirPort because the consensus has no exits; or
* - We are an authoritative directory server.
*/
static int
decide_if_publishable_server(void)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (options->ClientOnly)
return 0;
if (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ == NO_DIRINFO)
return 0;
if (!server_mode(options))
return 0;
if (authdir_mode(options))
return 1;
if (!router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
return 0;
if (!check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
return 0;
if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL) {
/* All set: there are no exits in the consensus (maybe this is a tiny
* test network), so we can't check our DirPort reachability. */
return 1;
} else {
return check_whether_dirport_reachable(options);
}
}
/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
* etc). force is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
*
* We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
* uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
* determine what IP address and ports to test.
*/
void
consider_publishable_server(int force)
{
int rebuilt;
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return;
rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
set_server_advertised(1);
if (rebuilt == 0)
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
} else {
set_server_advertised(0);
}
}
/** Return the port of the first active listener of type
* listener_type. Returns 0 if no port is found. */
/** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are
multiple listeners. */
uint16_t
router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
sa_family_t family)
{
/* Iterate all connections, find one of the right kind and return
the port. Not very sophisticated or fast, but effective. */
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
if (conn->type == listener_type && !conn->marked_for_close &&
conn->socket_family == family) {
return conn->port;
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
return 0;
}
/** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either
* the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to
* if ORPort is "auto". Returns 0 if no port is found. */
uint16_t
router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options)
{
return router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, AF_INET);
}
/** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but allows an address family argument.
*/
uint16_t
router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options,
sa_family_t family)
{
int port = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
family);
(void)options;
/* If the port is in 'auto' mode, we have to use
router_get_listener_port_by_type(). */
if (port == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
family);
return port;
}
/** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but returns the IPv6 address and
* port in ipv6_ap_out, which must not be NULL. Returns a null address and
* zero port, if no ORPort is found. */
void
router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(const or_options_t *options,
tor_addr_port_t *ipv6_ap_out)
{
/* Bug in calling function, we can't return a sensible result, and it
* shouldn't use the NULL pointer once we return. */
tor_assert(ipv6_ap_out);
/* If there is no valid IPv6 ORPort, return a null address and port. */
tor_addr_make_null(&ipv6_ap_out->addr, AF_INET6);
ipv6_ap_out->port = 0;
const tor_addr_t *addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(
CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
AF_INET6);
const uint16_t port = router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(
options,
AF_INET6);
if (!addr || port == 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "There is no advertised IPv6 ORPort.");
return;
}
/* If the relay is configured using the default authorities, disallow
* internal IPs. Otherwise, allow them. For IPv4 ORPorts and DirPorts,
* this check is done in resolve_my_address(). See #33681. */
const int default_auth = using_default_dir_authorities(options);
if (tor_addr_is_internal(addr, 0) && default_auth) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
"Unable to use configured IPv6 ORPort \"%s\" in a "
"descriptor. Skipping it. "
"Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly.",
fmt_addrport(addr, port));
return;
}
tor_addr_copy(&ipv6_ap_out->addr, addr);
ipv6_ap_out->port = port;
}
/** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort;
* this is one of three possibilities:
* The one that is passed as dirport if the DirPort option is 0, or
* the one configured in the DirPort option,
* or the one we actually bound to if DirPort is "auto". */
uint16_t
router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dirport)
{
int dirport_configured = get_primary_dir_port();
(void)options;
if (!dirport_configured)
return dirport;
if (dirport_configured == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
AF_INET);
return dirport_configured;
}
/*
* OR descriptor generation.
*/
/** My routerinfo. */
static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
/** My extrainfo */
static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
/** Why did we most recently decide to regenerate our descriptor? Used to
* tell the authorities why we're sending it to them. */
static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason";
/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
* now. */
STATIC time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
/** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */
STATIC const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
/** OR only: If force is true, or we haven't uploaded this
* descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
* all the directory servers we know about.
*/
void
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
{
const routerinfo_t *ri;
extrainfo_t *ei;
char *msg;
size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->PublishServerDescriptor_;
ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!ri) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
return;
}
ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
if (auth == NO_DIRINFO)
return;
if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
return;
log_info(LD_OR, "Uploading relay descriptor to directory authorities%s",
force ? " (forced)" : "");
desc_needs_upload = 0;
desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
if (ei) {
memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
}
msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
(auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ?
ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
tor_free(msg);
}
/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
* conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
*/
int
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
{
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
return -1;
/* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
'maybe' below. */
if (tor_addr_is_null(addr))
return -1;
/* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy for both the v4 and the
* v6 policies. The exit_policy field in router_get_my_routerinfo() is a
* bit unusual, in that it contains IPv6 and IPv6 entries. We don't want to
* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->ipv6_exit_policy, since that's a port
* summary. */
if ((tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET ||
tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)) {
return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(addr, port,
me->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
#if 0
} else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
return get_options()->IPv6Exit &&
desc_routerinfo->ipv6_exit_policy &&
compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(addr, port,
me->ipv6_exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
#endif /* 0 */
} else {
return -1;
}
}
/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't
* have a descriptor */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void))
{
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
return -1;
return me->policy_is_reject_star;
}
/** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to
* my server identity key digest. */
int
router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
{
return (server_identitykey &&
tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
}
/** Return my identity digest. */
const uint8_t *
router_get_my_id_digest(void)
{
return (const uint8_t *)server_identitykey_digest;
}
/** Return true iff I'm a server and digest is equal to
* my identity digest. */
int
router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
{
extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
if (!ei)
return 0;
return tor_memeq(digest,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
}
/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
int
router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router)
{
return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
}
/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
* necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
router_get_my_routerinfo,(void))
{
return router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err(NULL);
}
/** Return routerinfo of this OR. Rebuild it from
* scratch if needed. Set *err to 0 on success or to
* appropriate TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_* value on failure.
*/
MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err,(int *err))
{
if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
if (err)
*err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
return NULL;
}
if (!desc_clean_since) {
int rebuild_err = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
if (rebuild_err < 0) {
if (err)
*err = rebuild_err;
return NULL;
}
}
if (!desc_routerinfo) {
if (err)
*err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
return NULL;
}
if (err)
*err = 0;
return desc_routerinfo;
}
/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
* one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
*/
const char *
router_get_my_descriptor(void)
{
const char *body;
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (! me)
return NULL;
tor_assert(me->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&me->cache_info);
/* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
tor_assert(!body[me->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
return body;
}
/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
* Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
extrainfo_t *
router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
{
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return NULL;
if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
return NULL;
return desc_extrainfo;
}
/** Return a human-readable string describing what triggered us to generate
* our current descriptor, or NULL if we don't know. */
const char *
router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void)
{
return desc_gen_reason;
}
static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
* it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
* dirserver headers. Place the answer in *addr and return
* 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
*
* If cache_only is true, just return any cached answers, and
* don't try to get any new answers.
*/
MOCK_IMPL(int,
router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
int cache_only))
{
/* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
*addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
if (*addr)
return 0;
/* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
if (!cache_only) {
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
return 0;
}
}
/* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
return 0;
/* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
return -1;
}
/* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the
* ORPort or DirPort.
* listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */
static void
router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr,
int listener_type)
{
tor_assert(listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ||
listener_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
/* The first advertised Port may be the magic constant CFG_AUTO_PORT.
*/
int port_v4_cfg = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(listener_type,
AF_INET);
if (port_v4_cfg != 0 &&
!port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(listener_type,
ipv4h_desc_addr, port_v4_cfg, 1)) {
const tor_addr_t *port_addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(
listener_type,
AF_INET);
/* If we're building a descriptor with no advertised address,
* something is terribly wrong. */
tor_assert(port_addr);
tor_addr_t desc_addr;
char port_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
char desc_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
tor_addr_to_str(port_addr_str, port_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&desc_addr, ipv4h_desc_addr);
tor_addr_to_str(desc_addr_str, &desc_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
const char *listener_str = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ?
"OR" : "Dir");
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "The IPv4 %sPort address %s does not match the "
"descriptor address %s. If you have a static public IPv4 "
"address, use 'Address ' and 'OutboundBindAddress "
"'. If you are behind a NAT, use two %sPort lines: "
"'%sPort NoListen' and '%sPort "
"NoAdvertise'.",
listener_str, port_addr_str, desc_addr_str, listener_str,
listener_str, listener_str);
}
}
/* Tor relays only have one IPv4 address in the descriptor, which is derived
* from the Address torrc option, or guessed using various methods in
* router_pick_published_address().
* Warn the operator if there is no ORPort on the descriptor address
* ipv4h_desc_addr.
* Warn the operator if there is no DirPort on the descriptor address.
* This catches a few common config errors:
* - operators who expect ORPorts and DirPorts to be advertised on the
* ports' listen addresses, rather than the torrc Address (or guessed
* addresses in the absence of an Address config). This includes
* operators who attempt to put their ORPort and DirPort on different
* addresses;
* - discrepancies between guessed addresses and configured listen
* addresses (when the Address option isn't set).
* If a listener is listening on all IPv4 addresses, it is assumed that it
* is listening on the configured Address, and no messages are logged.
* If an operators has specified NoAdvertise ORPorts in a NAT setting,
* no messages are logged, unless they have specified other advertised
* addresses.
* The message tells operators to configure an ORPort and DirPort that match
* the Address (using NoListen if needed).
*/
static void
router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
{
router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER);
router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
}
/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family,
* for one reason or another. */
static smartlist_t *warned_family = NULL;
/**
* Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in
* options. Warn about invalid or missing entries. Return NULL
* if this relay should not declare a family.
**/
STATIC smartlist_t *
get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options)
{
if (!options->MyFamily)
return NULL;
if (options->BridgeRelay)
return NULL;
if (!warned_family)
warned_family = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new();
config_line_t *family;
/* First we try to get the whole family in the form of hexdigests. */
for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
char *name = family->value;
const node_t *member;
if (options->Nickname && !strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
continue; /* Don't list ourself by nickname, that's redundant */
else
member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
if (!member) {
/* This node doesn't seem to exist, so warn about it if it is not
* a hexdigest. */
int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name) &&
!is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
if (is_legal)
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
"There is a router named %s in my declared family, but "
"I have no descriptor for it. I'll use the nickname "
"as is, but this may confuse clients. Please list it "
"by identity digest instead.", escaped(name));
else
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
"family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. "
"Skipping it.", escaped(name));
smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
}
if (is_legal) {
smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name);
}
} else {
/* List the node by digest. */
char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
fp[0] = '$';
base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_add(declared_family, fp);
if (! is_legal_hexdigest(name) &&
!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name)) {
/* Warn if this node was not specified by hexdigest. */
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
"family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider "
"saying %s instead, if that's what you meant.",
escaped(name), fp);
smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
}
}
}
/* Now declared_family should have the closest we can come to the
* identities that the user wanted.
*
* Unlike older versions of Tor, we _do_ include our own identity: this
* helps microdescriptor compression, and helps in-memory compression
* on clients. */
nodefamily_t *nf = nodefamily_from_members(declared_family,
router_get_my_id_digest(),
NF_WARN_MALFORMED,
NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
smartlist_free(declared_family);
if (!nf) {
return NULL;
}
char *s = nodefamily_format(nf);
nodefamily_free(nf);
smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
smartlist_split_string(result, s, NULL,
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
tor_free(s);
if (smartlist_len(result) == 1) {
/* This is a one-element list containing only ourself; instead return
* nothing */
const char *singleton = smartlist_get(result, 0);
bool is_me = false;
if (singleton[0] == '$') {
char d[DIGEST_LEN];
int n = base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), singleton+1, strlen(singleton+1));
if (n == DIGEST_LEN &&
fast_memeq(d, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN)) {
is_me = true;
}
}
if (!is_me) {
// LCOV_EXCL_START
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a singleton family list with an element "
"that wasn't us! Element was %s", escaped(singleton));
// LCOV_EXCL_STOP
} else {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(result);
return NULL;
}
}
return result;
}
/** Allocate a fresh, unsigned routerinfo for this OR, without any of the
* fields that depend on the corresponding extrainfo.
*
* On success, set ri_out to the new routerinfo, and return 0.
* Caller is responsible for freeing the generated routerinfo.
*
* Returns a negative value and sets ri_out to NULL on temporary error.
*/
MOCK_IMPL(STATIC int,
router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo,(routerinfo_t **ri_out))
{
routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
uint32_t addr;
char platform[256];
int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
if (BUG(!ri_out)) {
result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
goto err;
}
if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor");
result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
goto err;
}
/* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort
* and DirPort addresses configured by the operator. */
router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(addr);
ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
ri->addr = addr;
ri->or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options);
ri->dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0);
ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests =
directory_permits_begindir_requests(options);
ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
/* get_onion_key() must invoke from main thread */
router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(get_onion_key(), &ri->onion_pkey,
&ri->onion_pkey_len);
ri->onion_curve25519_pkey =
tor_memdup(&get_current_curve25519_keypair()->pubkey,
sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
/* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */
tor_addr_port_t ipv6_orport;
router_get_advertised_ipv6_or_ap(options, &ipv6_orport);
/* If there is no valid IPv6 ORPort, the address and port are null. */
tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport.addr);
ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport.port;
ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) {
result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
goto err;
}
ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols());
/* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
ri->bandwidthrate = relay_get_effective_bwrate(options);
/* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
ri->bandwidthburst = relay_get_effective_bwburst(options);
/* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */
ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) {
/* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy);
} else {
policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(options,ri->addr,&ri->ipv6_addr,
&ri->exit_policy);
}
ri->policy_is_reject_star =
policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) &&
policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6, 1);
if (options->IPv6Exit) {
char *p_tmp = policy_summarize(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6);
if (p_tmp)
ri->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(p_tmp);
tor_free(p_tmp);
}
ri->declared_family = get_my_declared_family(options);
if (options->BridgeRelay) {
ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE;
/* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of
sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
} else {
ri->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
}
goto done;
err:
routerinfo_free(ri);
*ri_out = NULL;
return result;
done:
*ri_out = ri;
return 0;
}
/** Allocate and return a fresh, unsigned extrainfo for this OR, based on the
* routerinfo ri.
*
* Uses options->Nickname to set the nickname, and options->BridgeRelay to set
* ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted.
*
* If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL.
* Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo.
*/
static extrainfo_t *
router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
{
extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (BUG(!ri))
return NULL;
/* Now generate the extrainfo. */
ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
strlcpy(ei->nickname, options->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
if (options->BridgeRelay) {
/* See note in router_build_fresh_routerinfo(). */
ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
} else {
ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
}
return ei;
}
/** Dump the extrainfo descriptor body for ei, sign it, and add the body and
* signature to ei->cache_info. Note that the extrainfo body is determined by
* ei, and some additional config and statistics state: see
* extrainfo_dump_to_string() for details.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
* If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns -1.
* On error, ei->cache_info is not modified.
*/
static int
router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(extrainfo_t *ei)
{
if (BUG(!ei))
return -1;
if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ei, get_server_identity_key(),
get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
return -1;
}
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
DIGEST_SHA256);
return 0;
}
/** Allocate and return a fresh, signed extrainfo for this OR, based on the
* routerinfo ri.
*
* If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns NULL.
* Caller is responsible for freeing the generated extrainfo.
*/
STATIC extrainfo_t *
router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
{
int result = -1;
extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
if (BUG(!ri))
return NULL;
ei = router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo(ri);
/* router_build_fresh_unsigned_extrainfo() should not fail. */
if (BUG(!ei))
goto err;
result = router_dump_and_sign_extrainfo_descriptor_body(ei);
if (result < 0)
goto err;
goto done;
err:
extrainfo_free(ei);
return NULL;
done:
return ei;
}
/** Set the fields in ri that depend on ei.
*
* If ei is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and zeroes the relevant fields.
*/
STATIC void
router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(routerinfo_t *ri,
const extrainfo_t *ei)
{
if (BUG(!ei)) {
/* Just to be safe, zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
memset(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256, 0, DIGEST256_LEN);
return;
}
/* Now finish the router descriptor. */
memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
ei->digest256,
DIGEST256_LEN);
}
/** Dump the descriptor body for ri, sign it, and add the body and signature to
* ri->cache_info. Note that the descriptor body is determined by ri, and some
* additional config and state: see router_dump_router_to_string() for details.
*
* Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error.
* If ri is NULL, logs a BUG() warning and returns a negative value.
* On error, ri->cache_info is not modified.
*/
STATIC int
router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(routerinfo_t *ri)
{
if (BUG(!ri))
return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
get_onion_key(),
get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE;
}
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
return 0;
}
/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and signed extrainfo
* document for this OR.
*
* Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated extrainfo document.
* Failure to generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated
* by setting e to NULL.
* Return 0 on success, and a negative value on temporary error.
* Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents on success.
*/
int
router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
{
int result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
routerinfo_t *ri = NULL;
extrainfo_t *ei = NULL;
if (BUG(!r))
goto err;
if (BUG(!e))
goto err;
result = router_build_fresh_unsigned_routerinfo(&ri);
if (result < 0) {
goto err;
}
/* If ri is NULL, then result should be negative. So this check should be
* unreachable. */
if (BUG(!ri)) {
result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
goto err;
}
ei = router_build_fresh_signed_extrainfo(ri);
/* Failing to create an ei is not an error. */
if (ei) {
router_update_routerinfo_from_extrainfo(ri, ei);
}
result = router_dump_and_sign_routerinfo_descriptor_body(ri);
if (result < 0)
goto err;
if (ei) {
if (BUG(routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
&ri->cache_info, NULL))) {
result = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_INTERNAL_BUG;
goto err;
}
}
goto done;
err:
routerinfo_free(ri);
extrainfo_free(ei);
*r = NULL;
*e = NULL;
return result;
done:
*r = ri;
*e = ei;
return 0;
}
/** If force is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
* routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
* Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
*/
int
router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
{
int err = 0;
routerinfo_t *ri;
extrainfo_t *ei;
uint32_t addr;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (desc_clean_since && !force)
return 0;
if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0 ||
router_get_advertised_or_port(options) == 0) {
/* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
* learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed()
* marks it dirty. */
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
}
log_info(LD_OR, "Rebuilding relay descriptor%s", force ? " (forced)" : "");
err = router_build_fresh_descriptor(&ri, &ei);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
desc_routerinfo = ri;
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
desc_extrainfo = ei;
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
desc_needs_upload = 1;
desc_gen_reason = desc_dirty_reason;
if (BUG(desc_gen_reason == NULL)) {
desc_gen_reason = "descriptor was marked dirty earlier, for no reason.";
}
desc_dirty_reason = NULL;
control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
return 0;
}
/** If our router descriptor ever goes this long without being regenerated
* because something changed, we force an immediate regenerate-and-upload. */
#define FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (18*60*60)
/** If our router descriptor seems to be missing or unacceptable according
* to the authorities, regenerate and reupload it _this_ often. */
#define FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (90*60)
/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's been "too long" since we last tried
* to upload one. */
void
mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
{
networkstatus_t *ns;
const routerstatus_t *rs;
const char *retry_fast_reason = NULL; /* Set if we should retry frequently */
const time_t slow_cutoff = now - FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
const time_t fast_cutoff = now - FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
/* If it's already dirty, don't mark it. */
if (! desc_clean_since)
return;
/* If it's older than FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL, it's always
* time to rebuild it. */
if (desc_clean_since < slow_cutoff) {
mark_my_descriptor_dirty("time for new descriptor");
return;
}
/* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no. The
* rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the
* live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the
* descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old, or if the
* consensus lists us as "stale" and we haven't regenerated since the
* consensus was published. */
ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
if (ns) {
rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest);
if (rs == NULL)
retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus";
else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
else if (rs->is_staledesc && ns->valid_after > desc_clean_since)
retry_fast_reason = "listed as stale in consensus";
}
if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff)
mark_my_descriptor_dirty(retry_fast_reason);
}
/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
void
mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (BUG(reason == NULL)) {
reason = "marked descriptor dirty for unspecified reason";
}
if (server_mode(options) && options->PublishServerDescriptor_)
log_info(LD_OR, "Decided to publish new relay descriptor: %s", reason);
desc_clean_since = 0;
if (!desc_dirty_reason)
desc_dirty_reason = reason;
}
/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
* of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? Note: We don't use this constant
* if our previous bandwidth estimate was exactly 0. */
#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (3*60*60)
/** Maximum uptime to republish our descriptor because of large shifts in
* estimated bandwidth. */
#define MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE (24*60*60)
/** By which factor bandwidth shifts have to change to be considered large. */
#define BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR 2
/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
* bandwidth while the uptime is smaller than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE.
* If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
void
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
{
static time_t last_changed = 0;
uint64_t prev, cur;
const int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
/* If the relay uptime is bigger than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE,
* the next regularly scheduled descriptor update (18h) will be enough */
if (get_uptime() > MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE && !hibernating)
return;
const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!my_ri)
return;
prev = my_ri->bandwidthcapacity;
/* Consider ourselves to have zero bandwidth if we're hibernating or
* shutting down. */
cur = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
cur > (prev * BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ||
cur < (prev / BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ) {
if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now || !prev) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
mark_my_descriptor_dirty("bandwidth has changed");
last_changed = now;
}
}
}
/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
* prev to cur. */
static void
log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
const tor_addr_t *prev,
const tor_addr_t *cur,
const char *source)
{
char addrbuf_prev[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
char addrbuf_cur[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
if (BUG(!server_mode(get_options())))
return;
if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_prev, prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev), 1) == NULL)
strlcpy(addrbuf_prev, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_cur, cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur), 1) == NULL)
strlcpy(addrbuf_cur, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
if (!tor_addr_is_null(prev))
log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
"Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
"rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
else
log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
"Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
addrbuf_cur, source);
}
/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
* has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
* like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
void
check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
{
uint32_t prev, cur;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const char *method = NULL;
char *hostname = NULL;
const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
(void) now;
if (my_ri == NULL) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
return;
/* XXXX ipv6 */
prev = my_ri->addr;
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, &method, &hostname) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
return;
}
if (prev != cur) {
char *source;
tor_addr_t tmp_prev, tmp_cur;
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_prev, prev);
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_cur, cur);
tor_asprintf(&source, "METHOD=%s%s%s", method,
hostname ? " HOSTNAME=" : "",
hostname ? hostname : "");
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &tmp_prev, &tmp_cur, source);
tor_free(source);
ip_address_changed(0);
}
tor_free(hostname);
}
/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
* headers. */
static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
/** A directory server d_conn told us our IP address is
* suggestion.
* If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
* if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
void
router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
{
tor_addr_t addr;
uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
/* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
escaped(suggestion));
return;
}
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
if (!server_mode(options)) {
tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
return;
}
/* XXXX ipv6 */
cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
if (cur ||
resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
/* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
need it later */
return;
}
if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
return;
}
if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
"but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
suggestion);
return;
}
/* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
* us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
* resolve it. */
if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
suggestion);
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
d_conn->base_.address);
ip_address_changed(0);
tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
will fetch it */
}
}
/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
* a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
* about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
* 0; else return -1. */
static int
router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
{
if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
*guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
/** Set platform (max length len) to a NUL-terminated short
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
* currently running on.
*/
STATIC void
get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
{
tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s",
get_short_version(), get_uname());
}
/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
* refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
* near the end of maxlen?
*/
#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
* with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new
* string encoding the result, or NULL on failure.
*
* In addition to the fields in router, this function calls
* onion_key_lifetime(), get_options(), and we_are_hibernating(), and uses the
* results to populate some fields in the descriptor.
*/
char *
router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
{
char *address = NULL;
char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL;
char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
char *extra_info_line = NULL;
size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
char *family_line = NULL;
char *extra_or_address = NULL;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
char *output = NULL;
const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
router->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL;
char *ntor_cc_line = NULL;
char *proto_line = NULL;
/* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
"match router's public key!");
goto err;
}
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
if (!router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
!ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
&signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched "
"ed25519 key chain %d",
router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
goto err;
}
}
/* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
goto err;
}
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
/* Encode ed25519 signing cert */
char ed_cert_base64[256];
char ed_fp_base64[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
(const char*)router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
goto err;
}
ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key);
tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
"%s"
"-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
"master-key-ed25519 %s\n",
ed_cert_base64, ed_fp_base64);
}
/* PEM-encode the onion key */
rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey,
router->onion_pkey_len);
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(rsa_pubkey,
&onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
goto err;
}
/* PEM-encode the identity key */
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
&identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
goto err;
}
/* Cross-certify with RSA key */
if (tap_key && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
char buf[256];
int tap_cc_len = 0;
uint8_t *tap_cc =
make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key,
&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
router->identity_pkey,
&tap_cc_len);
if (!tap_cc) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
goto err;
}
if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!");
tor_free(tap_cc);
goto err;
}
tor_free(tap_cc);
tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line,
"onion-key-crosscert\n"
"-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
"%s"
"-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf);
}
/* Cross-certify with onion keys */
if (ntor_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
int sign = 0;
char buf[256];
/* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/
tor_cert_t *cert =
make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair,
&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
router->cache_info.published_on,
get_onion_key_lifetime(), &sign);
if (!cert) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
goto err;
}
tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
(const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!");
tor_cert_free(cert);
goto err;
}
tor_cert_free(cert);
tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line,
"ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
"%s"
"-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf);
}
/* Encode the publication time. */
format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family,
" ", 0, NULL);
tor_asprintf(&family_line, "family %s\n", family);
tor_free(family);
} else {
family_line = tor_strdup("");
}
if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) {
char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) {
char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256);
tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
extra_info_digest, d256_64);
} else {
tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n",
extra_info_digest);
}
}
if (router->ipv6_orport &&
tor_addr_family(&router->ipv6_addr) == AF_INET6) {
char addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
const char *a;
a = tor_addr_to_str(addr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addr), 1);
if (a) {
tor_asprintf(&extra_or_address,
"or-address %s:%d\n", a, router->ipv6_orport);
log_debug(LD_OR, "My or-address line is <%s>", extra_or_address);
}
}
if (router->protocol_list) {
tor_asprintf(&proto_line, "proto %s\n", router->protocol_list);
} else {
proto_line = tor_strdup("");
}
address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr);
chunks = smartlist_new();
/* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
"router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
"%s"
"%s"
"platform %s\n"
"%s"
"published %s\n"
"fingerprint %s\n"
"uptime %ld\n"
"bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
"%s%s"
"onion-key\n%s"
"signing-key\n%s"
"%s%s"
"%s%s%s",
router->nickname,
address,
router->or_port,
router_should_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "",
extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "",
router->platform,
proto_line,
published,
fingerprint,
get_uptime(),
(int) router->bandwidthrate,
(int) router->bandwidthburst,
(int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "",
(options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ?
"caches-extra-info\n" : "",
onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "",
ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "",
family_line,
we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "",
"hidden-service-dir\n");
if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
ci = escaped(ci);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "contact %s\n", ci);
}
if (options->BridgeRelay) {
char *bd = NULL;
if (options->BridgeDistribution && strlen(options->BridgeDistribution)) {
bd = tor_strdup(options->BridgeDistribution);
} else {
bd = tor_strdup("any");
}
// Make sure our value is lowercased in the descriptor instead of just
// forwarding what the user wrote in their torrc directly.
tor_strlower(bd);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "bridge-distribution-request %s\n", bd);
tor_free(bd);
}
if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
char kbuf[128];
base64_encode(kbuf, sizeof(kbuf),
(const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
} else {
/* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
goto err;
}
/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "reject *:*\n");
} else if (router->exit_policy) {
char *exit_policy = router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(router,1,0);
if (!exit_policy)
goto err;
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", exit_policy);
tor_free(exit_policy);
}
if (router->ipv6_exit_policy) {
char *p6 = write_short_policy(router->ipv6_exit_policy);
if (p6 && strcmp(p6, "reject 1-65535")) {
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
"ipv6-policy %s\n", p6);
}
tor_free(p6);
}
if (router_should_advertise_begindir(options,
router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)) {
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "tunnelled-dir-server\n");
}
/* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
ed25519_signature_t sig;
char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
signing_keypair) < 0)
goto err;
ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
}
/* Sign the descriptor with RSA */
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1);
{
char *sig;
if (!(sig = router_get_dirobj_signature(digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key))) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
goto err;
}
smartlist_add(chunks, sig);
}
/* include a last '\n' */
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "\n");
output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
{
char *s_dup;
const char *cp;
routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(output);
ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (!ri_tmp) {
log_err(LD_BUG,
"We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", output);
goto err;
}
tor_free(s_dup);
routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
}
#endif /* defined(DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING) */
goto done;
err:
tor_free(output); /* sets output to NULL */
done:
if (chunks) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(chunks);
}
crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey);
tor_free(address);
tor_free(family_line);
tor_free(onion_pkey);
tor_free(identity_pkey);
tor_free(extra_or_address);
tor_free(ed_cert_line);
tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line);
tor_free(ntor_cc_line);
tor_free(extra_info_line);
tor_free(proto_line);
return output;
}
/**
* OR only: Given router, produce a string with its exit policy.
* If include_ipv4 is true, include IPv4 entries.
* If include_ipv6 is true, include IPv6 entries.
*/
char *
router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router,
int include_ipv4,
int include_ipv6)
{
if ((!router->exit_policy) || (router->policy_is_reject_star)) {
return tor_strdup("reject *:*");
}
return policy_dump_to_string(router->exit_policy,
include_ipv4,
include_ipv6);
}
/** Load the contents of filename, find the last line starting with
* end_line, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in
* the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to now,
* and write the file contents starting with that line to *out.
* Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist or is empty, or -1
* if the file does not contain a line matching these criteria or other
* failure. */
static int
load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
char **out)
{
int r = -1;
char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename);
char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
time_t written;
switch (file_status(fname)) {
case FN_FILE:
/* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */
if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) {
tmp = strstr(contents, end_line);
/* Find last block starting with end_line */
while (tmp) {
start = tmp;
tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line);
}
if (!start)
goto notfound;
if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr))
goto notfound;
strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr));
if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0)
goto notfound;
if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60))
goto notfound;
*out = tor_strdup(start);
r = 1;
}
notfound:
tor_free(contents);
break;
/* treat empty stats files as if the file doesn't exist */
case FN_NOENT:
case FN_EMPTY:
r = 0;
break;
case FN_ERROR:
case FN_DIR:
default:
break;
}
tor_free(fname);
return r;
}
/** Add header strings to chunks, based on the extrainfo object extrainfo,
* and ed25519 keypair signing_keypair, if emit_ed_sigs is true.
* Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
* Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
static int
extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper(
smartlist_t *chunks,
const extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair,
int emit_ed_sigs)
{
char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
char *pre = NULL;
int rv = -1;
base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
!ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
&signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a "
"mismatched ed25519 key chain %d",
extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
goto err;
}
char ed_cert_base64[256];
if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
(const char*)extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
goto err;
}
tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
"-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
"%s"
"-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
} else {
ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
}
/* This is the first chunk in the file. If the file is too big, other chunks
* are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */
tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n",
extrainfo->nickname, identity,
ed_cert_line,
published);
smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
rv = 0;
goto done;
err:
rv = -1;
done:
tor_free(ed_cert_line);
return rv;
}
/** Add pluggable transport and statistics strings to chunks, skipping
* statistics if write_stats_to_extrainfo is false.
* Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
* Can not fail. */
static void
extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(smartlist_t *chunks,
int write_stats_to_extrainfo)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
char *contents = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
/* If the file is too big, these chunks are removed, starting with the last
* chunk. So each chunk must be a complete line, and the file must be valid
* after each chunk. */
/* Add information about the pluggable transports we support, even if we
* are not publishing statistics. This information is needed by BridgeDB
* to distribute bridges. */
if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
if (pluggable_transports)
smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
}
if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
/* Bandwidth usage stats don't have their own option */
{
contents = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
/* geoip hashes aren't useful unless we are publishing other stats */
if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
"dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats",
"hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->EntryStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats",
"entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->CellStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats",
"cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->ExitPortStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats",
"exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats",
"conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) {
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
if (contents)
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
}
/* bridge statistics */
if (should_record_bridge_info(options)) {
const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
if (bridge_stats) {
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
}
}
}
}
/** Add an ed25519 signature of chunks to chunks, using the ed25519 keypair
* signing_keypair.
* Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
* Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
static int
extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper(
smartlist_t *chunks,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
{
char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
int rv = -1;
/* These are two of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too
* big, other chunks are removed. So we must only add two chunks here. */
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
signing_keypair) < 0)
goto err;
ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig);
smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
rv = 0;
goto done;
err:
rv = -1;
done:
return rv;
}
/** Add an RSA signature of extrainfo_string to chunks, using the RSA key
* ident_key.
* Helper for extrainfo_dump_to_string().
* Returns 0 on success, negative on failure. */
static int
extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(smartlist_t *chunks,
crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
const char *extrainfo_string)
{
char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
int rv = -1;
memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(extrainfo_string, strlen(extrainfo_string),
digest) < 0 ||
router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
ident_key) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
"descriptor.");
goto err;
}
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
rv = 0;
goto done;
err:
rv = -1;
done:
return rv;
}
/** Write the contents of extrainfo, to * *s_out, signing them
* with ident_key.
*
* If ExtraInfoStatistics is 1, also write aggregated statistics and related
* configuration data before signing. Most statistics also have an option that
* enables or disables that particular statistic.
*
* Always write pluggable transport lines.
*
* Return 0 on success, negative on failure. */
int
extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
{
int result;
static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
char *s = NULL, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
int rv = 0;
rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_header_helper(chunks, extrainfo,
signing_keypair,
emit_ed_sigs);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
extrainfo_dump_to_string_stats_helper(chunks, write_stats_to_extrainfo);
if (emit_ed_sigs) {
rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_ed_sig_helper(chunks, signing_keypair);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
}
/* This is one of the three final chunks in the file. If the file is too big,
* other chunks are removed. So we must only add one chunk here. */
smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
/* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
* extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
* things. If emit_ed_sigs is true, we also keep 2 additional chunks at the
* end for the ed25519 signature. */
const int required_chunks = emit_ed_sigs ? 4 : 2;
if (smartlist_len(chunks) > required_chunks) {
/* We remove the next-to-last or 4th-last element (remember, len-1 is the
* last element), since we need to keep the router-signature elements. */
int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - required_chunks;
char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
"with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB "
"upload limit. Removing last added "
"statistics.");
tor_free(e);
tor_free(s);
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that "
"exceeds the 50 KB upload limit.");
goto err;
}
}
rv = extrainfo_dump_to_string_rsa_sig_helper(chunks, ident_key, s);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
tor_free(s);
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (!ei_tmp) {
if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
"with statistics that we can't parse. Not "
"adding statistics to this or any future "
"extra-info descriptors.");
write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key,
signing_keypair);
goto done;
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
"can't parse.");
goto err;
}
}
*s_out = s;
s = NULL; /* prevent free */
result = 0;
goto done;
err:
result = -1;
done:
tor_free(s);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk));
smartlist_free(chunks);
tor_free(s_dup);
extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
return result;
}
/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
* warn again if we see the same errors. */
void
router_reset_warnings(void)
{
if (warned_family) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_clear(warned_family);
}
}
/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
void
router_free_all(void)
{
crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
/* Destroying a locked mutex is undefined behaviour. This mutex may be
* locked, because multiple threads can access it. But we need to destroy
* it, otherwise re-initialisation will trigger undefined behaviour.
* See #31735 for details. */
tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
crypto_pk_free(authority_signing_key);
authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
crypto_pk_free(legacy_signing_key);
authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key));
memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
if (warned_family) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(warned_family);
}
}
/* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set
* the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set
* in onion_pkey_len_out. */
void
router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **onion_pkey_out,
size_t *onion_pkey_len_out)
{
int len;
char buf[1024];
tor_assert(pk);
tor_assert(onion_pkey_out);
tor_assert(onion_pkey_len_out);
len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (BUG(len < 0)) {
goto done;
}
*onion_pkey_out = tor_memdup(buf, len);
*onion_pkey_len_out = len;
done:
return;
}
/* From an ASN-1 encoded onion pkey, return a newly allocated RSA key object.
* It is the caller responsability to free the returned object.
*
* Return NULL if the pkey is NULL, malformed or if the length is 0. */
crypto_pk_t *
router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(const char *pkey, size_t pkey_len)
{
if (!pkey || pkey_len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return crypto_pk_asn1_decode(pkey, pkey_len);
}