Filename: 153-automatic-software-update-protocol.txt Title: Automatic software update protocol Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Jacob Appelbaum Created: 14-July-2008 Status: Draft Automatic Software Update Protocol Proposal 0.0 Introduction The Tor project and its users require a robust method to update shipped software bundles. The software bundles often includes Vidalia, Privoxy, Polipo, Torbutton and of course Tor itself. It is not inconcievable that an update could include all of the Tor Browser Bundle. It seems reasonable to make this a standalone program that can be called in shell scripts, cronjobs or by various Tor controllers. 0.1 Minimal Tasks To Implement Automatic Updating At the most minimal, an update must be able to do the following: 0 - Detect the curent Tor version, note the working status of Tor. 1 - Detect the latest Tor version. 2 - Fetch the latest version in the form of a platform specific package(s). 3 - Verify the itegrity of the downloaded package(s). 4 - Install the verified package(s). 5 - Test that the new package(s) works properly. 0.2 Specific Enumeration Of Minimal Tasks To implement requirement 0, we need to detect the current Tor version of both the updater and the current running Tor. The update program itself should be versioned internally. This requirement should also test connecting through Tor itself and note if such connections are possible. To implement requirement 1, we need to learn the concensus from the directory authorities or fail back to a known good URL with cryptographically signed content. To implement requirement 2, we need to download Tor - hopefully over Tor. To implement requirement 3, we need to verify the package signature. To implement requirement 4, we need to use a platform specific method of installation. The Tor controller performing the update perform these platform specific methods. To implement requirement 5, we need to be able to extend circuits and reach the internet through Tor. 0.x Implementation Goals The update system will be cross platform and rely on as little external code as possible. If the update system uses it, it must be updated by the update system itself. It will consist only of free software and will not rely on any non-free components until the actual installation phase. If a package manager is in use, it will be platform specific and thus only invoked by the update system implementing the update protocol. The update system itself will attempt to perform update related network activity over Tor. Possibly it will attempt to use a hidden service first. It will attempt to use novel and not so novel caching when possible, it will always verify cryptographic signatures before any remotely fetched code is executed. In the event of an unusable Tor system, it will be able to attempt to fetch updates without Tor. This should be user configurable, some users will be unwilling to update without the protection of using Tor - others will simply be unable because of blocking of the main Tor website. The update system will track current version numbers of Tor and supporting software. The update system will also track known working versions to assist with automatic The update system itself will be a standalone library. It will be strongly versioned internally to match the Tor bundle it was shiped with. The update system will keep track of the given platform, cpu architecture, lsb_release, package management functionality and any other platform specific metadata. We have referenced two popular automatic update systems, though neither fit our needs, both are useful as an idea of what others are doing in the same area. The first is sparkle[0] but it is sadly only available for Cocoa environments and is written in Objective C. This doesn't meet our requirements because it is directly tied into the private Apple framework. The second is the Mozilla Automatic Update System[1]. It is possibly useful as an idea of how other free software projects automatically update. It is however not useful in its currently documented form. [0] http://sparkle.andymatuschak.org/documentation/ [1] http://wiki.mozilla.org/AUS:Manual 0.x Previous methods of Tor and related software update Previously, Tor users updated their Tor related software by hand. There has been no fully automatic method for any user to update. In addition, there hasn't been any specific way to find out the most current stable version of Tor or related software as voted on by the directory authority concensus. 0.x Changes to the directory specification We will want to supplement client-versions and server-versions in the concensus voting with another version identifier known as 'auto-update-versions'. This will keep track of the current concensus of specific versions that are best per platform and per architecture. It should be noted that while the Mac OS X universal binary may be the best for x86 processers with Tiger, it may not be the best for PPC users on Panther. This goes for all of the package updates. We want to prevent updates that cause Tor to break even if the updating program can recover gracefully. x.x Assumptions About Operating System Package Management It is assumed that users will use their package manager unless they are on Microsoft Windows (any version) or Mac OS X (any version). Microsoft Windows users will have integration with the normal "add/remove program" functionality that said users would expect. x.x Package Update System Failure Modes The package update will try to ensure that a user always has a working Tor at the very least. It will keep state to remember versions of Tor that were able to bootstrap properly and reach the rest of the Tor network. It will also keep note of which versions broke. It will select the best Tor that works for the user. It will also allow for anonymized bug reporting on the packages available and tested by the auto-update system. x.x Package Signature Verification The update system will be aware of replay attacks against the update signature system itself. It will not allow package update signatures that are radically out of date. It will be a multi-key system to prevent any single party from forging an update. The key will be updated regularly. This is like authority key (see proposal 103) usage. x.x Package Caching The update system will iterate over different update methods. Whichever method is picked will have caching functionality. Each Tor server itself should be able to serve cached update files. This will be an option that friendly server administrators can turn on should they wish to support caching. In addition, it is possible to cache the full contents of a package in an authoratative DNS zone. Users can then query the DNS zone for their package. If we wish to further distribute the update load, we can also offer packages with encrypted bittorrent. Clients who wish to share the updates but do not wish to be a server can help distribute Tor updates. This can be tied together with the DNS caching[2][3] if needed. [2] http://www.netrogenic.com/dnstorrent/ [3] http://www.doxpara.com/ozymandns_src_0.1.tgz x.x Helping Our Users Spread Tor There should be a way for a user to participate in the packaging caching as described in section x.x. This option should be presented by the Tor controller. x.x Simple HTTP Proxy To The Tor Project Website It has been suggested that we should provide a simple proxy that allows a user to visit the main Tor website to download packages. This was part of a previous proposal and has not been closely examined. x.x Package Installation Platform specific methods for proper package installation will be left to the controller that is calling for an update. Each platform is different, the installation options and user interface will be specific to the controller in question. x.x Other Things Other things should be added to this proposal. What are they?