$Id$ Legend: SPEC!! - Not specified SPEC - Spec not finalized N - nick claims R - arma claims P - phobos claims - Not done * Top priority . Partially done o Done d Deferrable D Deferred X Abandoned X "Let's try to find a way to make it run and make the version match, but if not, let's just make it run." X "should we detect if we have a --with-ssl-dir and try the -R by default, if it works?" Items for 0.1.2.x, real soon now: ? - Bug: combination of things: When we've been idle a long time, we stop fetching server descriptors. When we then get a socks request, we build circuits immediately using whatever descriptors we have, rather than waiting until we've fetched correct ones. N - Test guard unreachable logic; make sure that we actually attempt to connect to guards that we think are unreachable from time to time. Make sure that we don't freak out when the network is down. Items for 0.1.2.x: o weight dir requests by advertised bandwidth? with maybe a lower cutoff than for tor traffic. perhaps also weighted by the expected size of the response. . Have (and document) a BEGIN_DIR relay cell that means "Connect to your directory port." o Implement R - turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit - be able to connect without having a server descriptor, to bootstrap. R - handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set. o include ORPort in DirServers lines so we can know where to connect. list the orport as 0 if it can't handle begin_dir. o List orports of actual dirservers.. . option to dl directory info via tor: TunnelDirConns and PreferTunneledDirConns R - actually cause the directory.c functions to know about or_port and use it when we're supposed to. o for tunneled edge conns, stop reading to the bridge connection when the or_conn we're writing to has a full outbuf. o make directory bridge data not get produced when the corresponding or_conn is full, and accept the sometimes directory data will just never get written. N - DNS improvements . Asynchronous DNS - Make evdns use windows strerror equivalents. o Make sure patches get into libevent. - Verify that it works well on windows o Debug and re-enable server-side reverse DNS caching - Critical but minor bugs, backport candidates. - support dir 503s better o clients don't log as loudly when they receive them o they don't count toward the 3-strikes rule D But eventually, we give up after getting a lot of 503s. D Delay when we get a lot of 503s, rather than punting onto the servers that have given us 503s? o Add a 'BadDirectory' flag to statuses. o authorities should *never* 503 a cache, and should never 503 network status requests. D They can 503 client descriptor requests when they feel like it. How can they distinguish? Not implemented for now, maybe should abandon. - update dir-spec with what we decided for each of these N - Controller fixes - Make REMAP stream events have a SOURCE (cache or exit), and make them generated in every case where we get a connected or resolved cell. N - Libevent fixes - Try to get the pthread_sigprocmask situation under control; see coderman's or-dev post of 20-Feb-2007. NR. Write path-spec.txt - Polishing - Profile client and server; fix slow spots - Address XXX012 items - Packaging - Tell people about OSX Uninstaller - Quietly document NT Service options - Switch canonical win32 compiler to mingw. - If we haven't replaced privoxy, lock down its configuration in all packages, as documented in tor-doc-unix.html - Docs - More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list. - recommend gaim. - unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug. N - we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date. N . Document transport and natdport o In man page - In a good HOWTO. . Forward compatibility fixes - Start uploading short and long descriptors; authorities should support URLs to retrieve long descriptors, and should discard short descriptors for now. Later, once tools use the "long descriptor" URLs, authorities will serve the short descriptors every time they're asked for a descriptor. NR - Design N - Implement, if we think it's smart. o Check for any outstanding checks we do on the form or number of client certificates that would prevent us from executing certain blocking-resistance strategies. o Design (proposal 106) o Implement N - Hack up a client that gives out weird/no certificates, so we can test to make sure that this doesn't cause servers to crash. Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x: - Proposals: - 101: Voting on the Tor Directory System - 104: Long and Short Router Descriptors - 105: Version negotiation for the Tor protocol - Refactoring: - Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless needed. - Make cells get buffered on circuit, not on the or_conn. - Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make "who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what router is this?" - Remove socketpair-based bridges conns, and the word "bridge". - Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the online config documentation from a single source. - Features: - Implement a DNS proxy - Bridges. - Let controller set router flags for authority to transmit, and for client to use. - Support relaying streams to ipv6. - Deprecations: - Remove v0 control protocol. Deferred from 0.1.2.x: - finish status event implementation and accompanying getinfos - More work on AvoidDiskWrites? - Get some kind of "meta signing key" to be used solely to sign releases/to certify releases when signed by the right people/ to certify sign the right people's keys? Also use this to cert the SSL key, etc. (Proposal 103) - per-conn write buckets - separate config options for read vs write limiting (It's hard to support read > write, since we need better congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So, defer the whole thing.) P - Figure out why dll's compiled in mingw don't work right in WinXP. P - Figure out why openssl 0.9.8d "make test" fails at sha256t test. - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy? (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common) - Directory guards - RAM use in directory authorities. - Memory use improvements: - Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive. - Save and mmap v1 directories, and networkstatus docs; store them zipped, not uncompressed. - Switch cached_router_t to use mmap. - What to do about reference counts on windows? (On Unix, this is easy: unlink works fine. (Right?) On Windows, I have doubts. Do we need to keep multiple files?) - What do we do about the fact that people can't read zlib- compressed files manually? - Change the way we handle cells, flow-control, and bridges. - The issue is that we package from edge connections aggressively until we hit their package windows or the circuit package windows, even if the buffer on the corresponding OR connection is pretty damn big. This sucks from a RAM usage POV. Now, we could try to stop reading on the edges (or just the edges connected to a local bridge) when an or_conn's outbuf is full. But if we're a server, and we stop reading on some exit conns when OR conns are full, soon OR conns will contain only traffic from other OR conns, and the exit data in question will never get written. - Remove socketpair-based bridges: use shared (or connected) buffers for communication, rather than sockets. - When relaying cells from an OR conn to an OR conn, have them wait in a queue on the or_circuit_t object; don't move them onto the target conn until there is space in the target conn's outbuf. Also, only package data from exitconns when there is space in the target conn's outbuf. - As an added advantage, this would let us kill stalled _circuits_ when their buffers get too full, rather than killing entire OR conns. But we must think about anonymity implications of that. - We'll probably want to do some kind of big refactoring of our dataflow when we do these changes; stuff is hairy enough already, and it will only get harrier with this stuff. - If the client's clock is too far in the past, it will drop (or just not try to get) descriptors, so it'll never build circuits. - Tolerate clock skew on bridge relays. - A more efficient dir protocol. (Proposal 101) - Authorities should fetch the network-statuses amongst each other, consensus them, and advertise a communal network-status. This is not so much for safety/complexity as it is to reduce bandwidth requirements for Alice. - How does this interact with our goal of being able to choose your own dir authorities? I guess we're now assuming that all dir authorities know all the other authorities in their "group"? - Should we also look into a "delta since last network-status checkpoint" scheme, to reduce overhead further? - Extend the "r" line in network-status to give a set of buckets (say, comma-separated) for that router. - Buckets are deterministic based on IP address. - Then clients can choose a bucket (or set of buckets) to download and use. - Improvements to versioning. (Proposal 105) - When we connect to a Tor server, it sends back a cell listing the IP it believes it is using. Use this to block dvorak's attack. Also, this is a fine time to say what time you think it is. o Verify that a new cell type is okay with deployed codebase . Specify HELLO cells . Figure out v0 compatibility. - Implement - Eventdns improvements - Have a way to query for AAAA and A records simultaneously. - Improve request API: At the very least, add the ability to construct a more-or-less arbitrary request and get a response. - (Can we suppress cnames? Should we?) - Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions, we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper. - We should ship with a list of stable dir mirrors -- they're not trusted like the authorities, but they'll provide more robustness and diversity for bootstrapping clients. - Simplify authority operation - Follow weasel's proposal, crossed with mixminion dir config format - A way to adjust router flags from the controller. (How do we prevent the authority from clobbering them soon after?) - a way to pick entry guards based wholly on extend_info equivalent; a way to export extend_info equivalent. - Better estimates in the directory of whether servers have good uptime (high expected time to failure) or good guard qualities (high fractional uptime). - AKA Track uptime as %-of-time-up, as well as time-since-last-down - Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8? - spec - implement - Failed rend desc fetches sometimes don't get retried. True/false? - Windows server usability - Solve the ENOBUFS problem. - make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets, so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one. - make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c. - We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash. M - rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow. - Add overlapped IO - Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory caching. - More status event features: - Missing events: - DIR_REACHABLE - BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind a firewall.) - BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy) - UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable) - Status events related to hibernation - something about failing to parse our address? from resolve_my_address() in config.c - sketchy OS, sketchy threading - too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU? - Missing fields: - TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY - GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect." We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so on. - Improvements to bandwidth counting - look into "uncounting" bytes spent on local connections, so we can bandwidthrate but still have fast downloads. - "bandwidth classes", for incoming vs initiated-here conns, and to give dir conns lower priority. Minor items for 0.1.2.x as time permits: - include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events. - getinfo ns/name/moria2 doesn't include a "v" line, even when some network-statuses I have show it. I suppose the fix should go in networkstatus_getinfo_helper_single() in routerlist.c. - Unify autoconf search code for libevent and openssl. Make code suggest platform-appropriate "devel" / "dev" / whatever packages if we can link but we can't find the headers. - Recommend polipo? Please? - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc. - Review torrc.sample to make it more discursive. o when reporting clock skew (both to logs and to controller), if it's taken 126 seconds to read from the directory, our clock skew estimate is 126 seconds wrong. use conn->timestamp_create or _lastwritten for a closer estimate? - a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. R - add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one at a time. spec and then do. - When we export something from foo.c file for testing purposes only, make a foo_test.h file for test.c to include. - The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting, to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps the RPM and other startup scripts should too? - add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can fix the https thing in the default configuration: http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort . Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c o Don't let 'newnym' be triggered more often than every n seconds. X If we try to publish as a nickname that's already claimed, should we append a number (or increment the number) and try again? This way people who read their logs can fix it as before, but people who don't read their logs will still offer Tor servers. - Fall back to unnamed; warn user; send controller event. ("When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with this nickname' message... or maybe instead when we see in the networkstatuses that somebody else is Named with the name we want: warn the user, send a STATUS_SERVER message, and fall back to unnamed.") ! - Tor should bind its ports before dropping privs, so users don't have to do the ipchains dance. - Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it also introduces DoS opportunities. - Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have less magic and less control logic. - Christian Grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit. the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type which is used for the first N data cells, and only extend-data cells can be extend requests. - Specify, including thought about anonymity implications. - Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under some circumstances? - We need a way for the authorities to declare that nodes are in a family. Also, it kinda sucks that family declarations use O(N^2) space in the descriptors. - If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n, we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other people can notice too. - cpu fixes: - see if we should make use of truncate to retry X kill dns workers more slowly . Directory changes . Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval - a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp - Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination. - packaging and ui stuff: . multiple sample torrc files . figure out how to make nt service stuff work? . Document it. - Vet all pending installer patches - Win32 installer plus privoxy, sockscap/freecap, etc. - Vet win32 systray helper code - Improve controller - a NEWSTATUS event similar to NEWDESC. - change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose, whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become too dirty for further circuits, etc. - What do we want here, exactly? - Specify and implement it. - Change stream status events analogously. - What do we want here, exactly? - Specify and implement it. - Make other events "better". - Change stream status events analogously. - What do we want here, exactly? - Specify and implement it. - Make other events "better" analogously - What do we want here, exactly? - Specify and implement it. . Expose more information via getinfo: - import and export rendezvous descriptors - Review all static fields for additional candidates - Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server. - We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download. - Make everything work with hidden services - Directory system improvements - config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too. - Parse this. - Relay this in networkstatus. - Be a DNS proxy. - Need a way to request address lookups (and allocate a stream ID for them) without having a corresponding client socket. - Once this is done, it would be nice to have a way to request address lookups from the controller without using SOCKS. - Refactor exit/entry side of DNS resolve: we don't need a connection_t; we can have an edge_connection_t and (say) dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t. Future version: - Configuration format really wants sections. - Good RBL substitute. - Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have the BadExit flag set. - Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy is pretty lame; we should get a better one. . Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach. - switch to an ascii format, maybe sexpr? - authdirservers publish blobs of them. - other authdirservers fetch these blobs. - hidserv people have the option of not uploading their blobs. - you can insert a blob via the controller. - and there's some amount of backwards compatibility. - teach clients, intro points, and hidservs about auth mechanisms. - come up with a few more auth mechanisms. - auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter connection requests. - Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers, to reduce remote sniping attacks. - Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness before we approve them. - Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last N seconds. - Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what it's for. - Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to be us as not. - Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps? - Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not working"). - Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP. - Handle full buffers without totally borking - Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and maybe per subnet. - Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by design. - DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion. - Specify? - tor-resolve script should use socks5 to get better error messages. - hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort * figure out what breaks for this, and do it. - tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is able to rotate through. (maybe) - Specify; implement. - let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own OutboundBindAddress? - Stop using tor_socketpair to make connection bridges: do an implementation that uses buffers only. Blue-sky: - Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser. - Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services. - Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors. - The "China problem" - Allow small cells and large cells on the same network? - Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow connection (tls session key) rotation. - Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc. - Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it. - Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends. (Pending a user who needs this) - Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that we've seen in the wild. (Pending a user who needs this) Non-Coding: - Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers - Mention controller libs someplace. . more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake NR- write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor' - tor-in-the-media page - Remove need for HACKING file. - Figure out licenses for website material. - Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff Website: - and remove home and make the "Tor" picture be the link to home. - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on stickers directly, etc. R - make a page with the hidden service diagrams. - ask Jan to be the translation coordinator? add to volunteer page. - add a page for localizing all tor's components. - It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place.