/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /* Wrapper code for an ed25519 implementation. */ #include "orconfig.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H #include #endif #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_curve25519.h" #include "crypto_ed25519.h" #include "torlog.h" #include "util.h" #include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h" #include int ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out, int extra_strong) { int r; uint8_t seed[32]; if (! extra_strong || crypto_strongest_rand(seed, sizeof(seed)) < 0) crypto_rand((char*)seed, sizeof(seed)); r = ed25519_ref10_seckey_expand(seckey_out->seckey, seed); memwipe(seed, 0, sizeof(seed)); return r < 0 ? -1 : 0; } int ed25519_secret_key_from_seed(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out, const uint8_t *seed) { if (ed25519_ref10_seckey_expand(seckey_out->seckey, seed) < 0) return -1; return 0; } int ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out, const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey) { if (ed25519_ref10_pubkey(pubkey_out->pubkey, seckey->seckey) < 0) return -1; return 0; } /** Generate a new ed25519 keypair in keypair_out. If * extra_strong is set, try to mix some system entropy into the key * generation process. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong) { if (ed25519_secret_key_generate(&keypair_out->seckey, extra_strong) < 0) return -1; if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair_out->pubkey, &keypair_out->seckey)<0) return -1; return 0; } /** * Set signature_out to a signature of the len-byte message * msg, using the secret and public key in keypair. */ int ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len, const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair) { if (ed25519_ref10_sign(signature_out->sig, msg, len, keypair->seckey.seckey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey) < 0) { return -1; } return 0; } /** * Check whether if signature is a valid signature for the * len-byte message in msg made with the key pubkey. * * Return 0 if the signature is valid; -1 if it isn't. */ int ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len, const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey) { return ed25519_ref10_open(signature->sig, msg, len, pubkey->pubkey) < 0 ? -1 : 0; } /** Validate every signature among those in checkable, which contains * exactly n_checkable elements. If okay_out is non-NULL, set * the i'th element of okay_out to 1 if the i'th element of * checkable is valid, and to 0 otherwise. Return 0 if every signature * was valid. Otherwise return -N, where N is the number of invalid * signatures. */ int ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out, const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable, int n_checkable) { int res, i; res = 0; for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) { const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i]; int r = ed25519_checksig(&ch->signature, ch->msg, ch->len, ch->pubkey); if (r < 0) --res; if (okay_out) okay_out[i] = (r == 0); } #if 0 const uint8_t **ms; size_t *lens; const uint8_t **pks; const uint8_t **sigs; int *oks; ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable); lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable); pks = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable); sigs = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable); oks = okay_out ? okay_out : tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*n_checkable); for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) { ms[i] = checkable[i].msg; lens[i] = checkable[i].len; pks[i] = checkable[i].pubkey->pubkey; sigs[i] = checkable[i].signature.sig; oks[i] = 0; } ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks); res = 0; for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) { if (!oks[i]) --res; } tor_free(ms); tor_free(lens); tor_free(pks); if (! okay_out) tor_free(oks); #endif return res; } /** * Given a curve25519 keypair in inp, generate a corresponding * ed25519 keypair in out, and set signbit_out to the * sign bit of the X coordinate of the ed25519 key. * * NOTE THAT IT IS PROBABLY NOT SAFE TO USE THE GENERATED KEY FOR ANYTHING * OUTSIDE OF WHAT'S PRESENTED IN PROPOSAL 228. In particular, it's probably * not a great idea to use it to sign attacker-supplied anything. */ int ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(ed25519_keypair_t *out, int *signbit_out, const curve25519_keypair_t *inp) { const char string[] = "Derive high part of ed25519 key from curve25519 key"; ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_check; SHA512_CTX ctx; uint8_t sha512_output[64]; memcpy(out->seckey.seckey, inp->seckey.secret_key, 32); SHA512_Init(&ctx); SHA512_Update(&ctx, out->seckey.seckey, 32); SHA512_Update(&ctx, string, sizeof(string)); SHA512_Final(sha512_output, &ctx); memcpy(out->seckey.seckey + 32, sha512_output, 32); ed25519_public_key_generate(&out->pubkey, &out->seckey); *signbit_out = out->pubkey.pubkey[31] >> 7; ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&pubkey_check, &inp->pubkey, *signbit_out); tor_assert(fast_memeq(pubkey_check.pubkey, out->pubkey.pubkey, 32)); memwipe(&pubkey_check, 0, sizeof(pubkey_check)); memwipe(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); memwipe(sha512_output, 0, sizeof(sha512_output)); return 0; } /** * Given a curve25519 public key and sign bit of X coordinate of the ed25519 * public key, generate the corresponding ed25519 public key. */ int ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, const curve25519_public_key_t *pubkey_in, int signbit) { return ed25519_ref10_pubkey_from_curve25519_pubkey(pubkey->pubkey, pubkey_in->public_key, signbit); } /** * Given an ed25519 keypair in inp, generate a corresponding * ed25519 keypair in out, blinded by the corresponding 32-byte input * in 'param'. * */ int ed25519_keypair_blind(ed25519_keypair_t *out, const ed25519_keypair_t *inp, const uint8_t *param) { ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_check; ed25519_ref10_derive_secret_key(out->seckey.seckey, inp->seckey.seckey, param); ed25519_public_blind(&pubkey_check, &inp->pubkey, param); ed25519_public_key_generate(&out->pubkey, &out->seckey); tor_assert(fast_memeq(pubkey_check.pubkey, out->pubkey.pubkey, 32)); memwipe(&pubkey_check, 0, sizeof(pubkey_check)); return 0; } int ed25519_public_blind(ed25519_public_key_t *out, const ed25519_public_key_t *inp, const uint8_t *param) { ed25519_ref10_derive_public_key(out->pubkey, inp->pubkey, param); return 0; } /** DOCDOC */ int ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey, const char *filename, const char *tag) { return crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(filename, "ed25519v1-secret", tag, seckey->seckey, sizeof(seckey->seckey)); } /** DOCDOC */ int ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out, char **tag_out, const char *filename) { ssize_t len; len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(filename, "ed25519v1-secret", tag_out, seckey_out->seckey, sizeof(seckey_out->seckey)); if (len != sizeof(seckey_out->seckey)) return -1; return 0; } /** DOCDOC */ int ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey, const char *filename, const char *tag) { return crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(filename, "ed25519v1-public", tag, pubkey->pubkey, sizeof(pubkey->pubkey)); } /** DOCDOC */ int ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out, char **tag_out, const char *filename) { ssize_t len; len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(filename, "ed25519v1-public", tag_out, pubkey_out->pubkey, sizeof(pubkey_out->pubkey)); if (len != sizeof(pubkey_out->pubkey)) return -1; return 0; }