Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
teor
f311c9ffa2 Replace OnionService* with HiddenService* in option names
And make consequential line-length adjustments.
2016-09-13 10:13:57 -04:00
teor
41f96078c2 Refactor UseEntryNodes so the original configured value is preserved
Parse the value to UseEntryNodes_option, then set UseEntryNodes before
validating options.

This way, Authorities, Tor2web, and Single Onion Services don't write
spurious "UseEntryNodes 0" lines to their configs. Document the fact that
these tor configurations ignore UseEntryNodes in the manual page.

Also reorder options validation so we modify UseEntryNodes first, then
check its value against EntryNodes.

And silence a warning about disabled UseEntryNodes for hidden services
when we're actually in non-anonymous single onion service mode.
2016-09-13 10:13:56 -04:00
teor
0285f4f34d Use CircuitBuildTimeout whenever circuit_build_times_disabled is true
Previously, we checked LearnCircuitBuildTimeout directly.

Fixes bug #20073 in commit 5b0b51ca3 on tor 0.2.4.12-alpha.
2016-09-13 10:13:56 -04:00
teor
e5ad00330c Make Tor2web work with ReachableAddresses and CRN_DIRECT_CONN
The changes in #19973 fixed ReachableAddresses being applied
too broadly, but they also broke Tor2web (somewhat unintentional)
compatibility with ReachableAddresses.

This patch restores that functionality, which makes intro and
rend point selection is consistent between Tor2web and Single Onion
Services.
2016-09-13 10:13:55 -04:00
teor (Tim Wilson-Brown)
b560f852f2 Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.

Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.

squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services

Redesign single onion service poisoning.

When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.

Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.

Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.

Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
2016-09-13 10:10:54 -04:00