* Make tor_tls_context_new internal to tortls.c, and return the new
tor_tls_context_t from it.
* Add a public tor_tls_context_init wrapper function to replace it.
This requires the latest Git version of Libevent as of 24 March 2010.
In the future, we'll just say it requires Libevent 2.0.5-alpha or
later.
Since Libevent doesn't yet support hierarchical rate limit groups,
there isn't yet support for tracking relayed-bytes separately when
using the bufferevent system. If a future version does add support
for hierarchical buckets, we can add that back in.
This should make us conflict less with system files named "log.h".
Yes, we shouldn't have been conflicting with those anyway, but some
people's compilers act very oddly.
The actual change was done with one "git mv", by editing
Makefile.am, and running
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs perl -i -pe 'if (/^#include.*\Wlog.h/) {s/log.h/torlog.h/; }'
Our code assumed that any version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8l could not
possibly require SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION. This is
so... except that many vendors have backported the flag from later
versions of openssl when they backported the RFC5476 renegotiation
feature.
The new behavior is particularly annoying to detect. Previously,
leaving SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION unset meant that
clients would fail to renegotiate. People noticed that one fast!
Now, OpenSSL's RFC5476 support means that clients will happily talk to
any servers there are, but servers won't accept renegotiation requests
from unpatched clients unless SSL_OP_ALLOW_etc is set. More fun:
servers send back a "no renegotiation for you!" error, which unpatched
clients respond to by stalling, and generally producing no useful
error message.
This might not be _the_ cause of bug 1346, but it is quite likely _a_
cause for bug 1346.
This time, set the SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION flag on every
version before OpenSSL 0.9.8l. I can confirm that the option value (0x0010)
wasn't reused until OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3.
In brief: you mustn't use the SSL3_FLAG solution with anything but 0.9.8l,
and you mustn't use the SSL_OP solution with anything before 0.9.8m, and
you get in _real_ trouble if you try to set the flag in 1.0.0beta, since
they use it for something different.
For the ugly version, see my long comment in tortls.c
We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
[backported]
We need to do this because Apple doesn't update its dev-tools headers
when it updates its libraries in a security patch. On the bright
side, this might get us out of shipping a statically linked OpenSSL on
OSX.
May fix bug 1225.
We were checking for msg==NULL, but not lib or proc. This case can
only occur if we have an error whose string we somehow haven't loaded,
but it's worth coding defensively here.
Spotted by rieo on IRC.
Some *_free functions threw asserts when passed NULL. Now all of them
accept NULL as input and perform no action when called that way.
This gains us consistence for our free functions, and allows some
code simplifications where an explicit null check is no longer necessary.
It turns out that OpenSSL 0.9.8m is likely to take a completely
different approach for reenabling renegotiation than OpenSSL 0.9.8l
did, so we need to work with both. :p Fixes bug 1158.
(patch by coderman; commit message by nickm)
To fix a major security problem related to incorrect use of
SSL/TLS renegotiation, OpenSSL has turned off renegotiation by
default. We are not affected by this security problem, however,
since we do renegotiation right. (Specifically, we never treat a
renegotiated credential as authenticating previous communication.)
Nevertheless, OpenSSL's new behavior requires us to explicitly
turn renegotiation back on in order to get our protocol working
again.
Amusingly, this is not so simple as "set the flag when you create
the SSL object" , since calling connect or accept seems to clear
the flags.
For belt-and-suspenders purposes, we clear the flag once the Tor
handshake is done. There's no way to exploit a second handshake
either, but we might as well not allow it.
The big change is to add a function to display the current SSL handshake
state, and to log it everywhere reasonable. (A failure in
SSL23_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A is different from one in
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A.)
This patch also adds a new log domain for OR handshaking, so you can pull out
all the handshake log messages without having to run at debug for everything.
For example, you'd just say "log notice-err [handshake]debug-err file
tor.log".
The subversion $Id$ fields made every commit force a rebuild of
whatever file got committed. They were not actually useful for
telling the version of Tor files in the wild.
svn:r17867
Implement code to manually force the OpenSSL client cipher list to match the one recommended in proposal 124, *even if* we do not know all those ciphers. This is a bit of a kludge, but it is at least decently well commented.
svn:r15173
Make dumpstats() log the size and fullness of openssl-internal buffers, so I can test my hypothesis that many of them are empty, and my alternative hypothesis that many of them are mostly empty, against the null hypothesis that we really need to be burning 32K per open OR connection on this.
svn:r14350
Fix for bug 614: always look at the network BIO for the SSL object, not at the buffering BIO (if one exists because we are renegotiating or something). Bugfix on 0.1.2.x, oddly enough, though it should be impossible to trigger the problem there. Backport candidate. See comments in tortls.c for detailed implementation note.
svn:r13975
<weasel> tortls.c:634: warning: passing arg 1 of `SSL_get_session' discards
qualifiers from pointer target type
Nick, see if you like this patch.
svn:r13690
Fix all remaining shorten-64-to-32 errors in src/common. Some were genuine problems. Many were compatibility errors with libraries (openssl, zlib) that like predate size_t. Partial backport candidate.
svn:r13665
Answer one xxx020 item; move 7 other ones to a new "XXX020rc" category: they should get fixed before we cut a release candidate. arma: please review these to see whether you have fixes/answers for any. Please check out the other 14 XXX020s to see if any look critical for the release candidate.
svn:r13640
Re-tune mempool parametes based on testing on peacetime: use smaller chuncks, free them a little more aggressively, and try very hard to concentrate allocations on fuller chunks. Also, lots of new documentation.
svn:r13484
The SSL portion of the revised handshake now seems to work: I just finally got a client and a server to negotiate versions. Now to make sure certificate verification is really happening, connections are getting opened, etc.
svn:r13409
Add a reverse mapping from SSL to tor_tls_t*: we need this in order to do a couple of things the sensible way from inside callbacks. Also, add a couple of missing cases in connection_or.c
svn:r13040
Aaand, do the code to enable the client side of the new TLS handshake. There are some loose ends that need tying up in connection_or, and a lot of half-baked code to remove, and some special cases to test for, and lots and lots of testing to do, but that is what weekends are for.
svn:r12721
Add support to get a callback invoked when the client renegotiate a connection. Also, make clients renegotiate. (not enabled yet, until they detect that the server acted like a v2 server)
svn:r12623
Start getting freaky with openssl callbacks in tortls.c: detect client ciphers, and if the list doesn't look like the list current Tors use, present only a single cert do not ask for a client cert. Also, support for client-side renegotiation. None of this is enabled unless you define V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER.
svn:r12622
Make TLS contexts reference-counted, and add a reference from TLS objects to their corresponding context. This lets us reliably get the certificates for a given TLS connection, even if we have rotated TLS contexts.
svn:r12383
New code (disabled for now) to use the SSL context's cert store instead of using its "extra chain cert" list to get our identity certificate sent. This is a little close to what OpenSSL expects people to do, and it has the advantage that we should be able to keep the id cert from being sent by setting the NO_CHAIN_CERT bit. I have tried turning new code on, and it seemed to work fine.
svn:r12086
Cheesy attempt to break some censorware. Not a long-term fix, but it will be intersting to watch the epidemiology of the workarounds as the censors apply them.
svn:r10975
Implement proposal 106: stop requiring clients to have certificates, and stop checking for nicknames in certificates. [See proposal 106 for rationale.] Also improve messages when checking TLS handshake, to re-resolve bug 382.
svn:r9568
Removing the last DOCDOC comment hurt so much that I had to use Doxygen to identify undocumented macros and comments, and add 150 more DOCDOCs to point out where they were. Oops. Hey, kids! Fixing some of these could be your first Tor patch!
svn:r9477
Tidy up ORCONN reason patch from Mike Perry. Changes: make some of the handling of TLS error codes less error prone. Enforce house style wrt spaces. Make it compile with --enable-gcc-warnings. Only set or_conn->tls_error in the case of an actual error. Add a changelog entry.
svn:r9355
"read this if you don't understand the code and want some help."
which is not the same as "hey, you think you understand this code,
but you don't."
svn:r9307
Count TLS bytes accurately: previously, we counted only the number of bytes read or transmitted via tls, not the number of extra bytes used to do so. This has been a lonstanding wart. The fix "Works for me".
svn:r9207
Try to appease some warnings with newer gccs that believe that ignoring a return value is okay, but casting a return value and then ignoring it is a sign of madness.
svn:r8312
This is needed because Windows already has an err() that we
can't clobber. And we need to be able to make the log functions
a macro so we can print the function's name in the log entry.
svn:r6000
