Both client and service had their own code for this. Consolidate into one
place so we avoid duplication.
Closes#27549
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When freeing a configuration object from confparse.c in
dump_config(), we need to call the appropriate higher-level free
function (like or_options_free()) and not just config_free().
This only happens with options (since they're the one where
options_validate allocates extra stuff) and only when running
--dump-config with something other than minimal (since
OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL doesn't hit this code).
Fixes bug 27893; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
It differs from the rest of the rephist code in that it's actually
necessary for Tor to operate, so it should probably go somewhere
else. I'm not sure where yet, so I'll leave it in the same
directory, but give it its own file.
Since this is completely core functionality, I'm putting it in
core/mainloop, even though it depends on feature/hibernate. We'll
have to sort that out in the future.
The main.c code is responsible for initialization and shutdown;
the mainloop.c code is responsible for running the main loop of Tor.
Splitting the "generic event loop" part of mainloop.c from the
event-loop-specific part is not done as part of this patch.
The parts for handling cell formats should be in src/core/or.
The parts for handling onionskin queues should be in src/core/or.
Only the crypto wrapper belongs in src/core/crypto.
When sending the INTRODUCE1 cell, we acquire the needed data for the cell but
if the RP node_t has invalid data, we'll fail the send and completely kill the
SOCKS connection.
Instead, close the rendezvous circuit and return a transient error meaning
that Tor can recover by selecting a new rendezvous point. We'll also do the
same when we are unable to encode the INTRODUCE1 cell for which at that point,
we'll simply take another shot at a new rendezvous point.
Fixes#27774
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In dirauth:
* bwauth.c reads and uses bandwidth files
* guardfraction.c reads and uses the guardfraction file
* reachability.c tests relay reachability
* recommend_pkg.c handles the recommended-packages lines.
* recv_descs.c handles fingerprint files and processing incoming
routerinfos that relays upload to us
* voteflag.c computes flag thresholds and sets those thresholds on
routerstatuses when computing votes
In control:
* fmt_serverstatus.c generates the ancient "v1 server status"
format that controllers expect.
In nodelist:
* routerstatus_fmt.c formats routerstatus entries for a consensus,
a vote, or for the controller.
It is not enough to look at protover for v3 rendezvous support but also we
need to make sure that the curve25519 onion key is present or in other words
that the descriptor has been fetched and does contain it.
Fixes#27797.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
There are now separate modules for:
* the list of router descriptors
* the list of authorities and fallbacks
* managing authority certificates
* selecting random nodes
That unit test makes sure we don't have pending SOCK request if the descriptor
turns out to be unusable.
Part of #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Client side, when a descriptor is finally fetched and stored in the cache, we
then go over all pending SOCKS request for that descriptor. If it turns out
that the intro points are unusable, we close the first SOCKS request but not
the others for the same .onion.
This commit makes it that we'll close all SOCKS requests so we don't let
hanging the other ones.
It also fixes another bug which is having a SOCKS connection in RENDDESC_WAIT
state but with a descriptor in the cache. At some point, tor will expire the
intro failure cache which will make that descriptor usable again. When
retrying all SOCKS connection (retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()), we
won't end up in the code path where we have already the descriptor for a
pending request causing a BUG().
Bottom line is that we should never have pending requests (waiting for a
descriptor) with that descriptor in the cache (even if unusable).
Fixees #27410.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The trunnel functions are written under the assumption that their
allocators can fail, so GCC LTO thinks they might return NULL. In
point of fact, they're using tor_malloc() and friends, which can't
fail, but GCC won't necessarily figure that out.
Fixes part of #27772.
This patch changes HiddenServiceExportCircuitID so instead of being a
boolean it takes a string, which is the protocol. Currently only the
'haproxy' protocol is defined.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/4700
All node_get_all_orports() does is allocate and return a smartlist
with at most two tor_addr_port_t members that match ORPort's of
node configuration. This is harmful for memory efficiency, as it
allocates the same stuff every time it is called. However,
node_is_a_configured_bridge() does not need to call it, as it
already has all the information to check if there is configured
bridge for a given node.
The new code is arranged in a way that hopefully makes each succeeding
linear search through bridge_list less likely.
This commit makes it that the authorized clients in the descriptor are in
random order instead of ordered by how they were read on disk.
Fixes#27545
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Existing cached directory information can cause misleadingly high
bootstrap percentages. To improve user experience, defer reporting of
directory information progress until at least one connection has
succeeded to a relay or bridge.
Closes ticket 27169.
