URI syntax (and DNS syntax) allows for a single trailing `.` to
explicitly distinguish between a relative and absolute
(fully-qualified) domain name. While this is redundant in that RFC 1928
DOMAINNAME addresses are *always* fully-qualified, certain clients
blindly pass the trailing `.` along in the request.
Fixes bug 16674; bugfix on 0.2.6.2-alpha.
The workqueue test help message has two issues. First, the message uses 4 space
indentation when 2 space indentation seems more common. Second, the help
message misses some options.
This commit fixes both issues.
Add a new and slow unit test that checks if libscrypt_scrypt() and
EBP_PBE_scrypt() yield the same keys from test vectors.
squash! Assert interoperability betweeen libscrypt and OpenSSL EBP_PBE_scrypt().
squash! Assert interoperability betweeen libscrypt and OpenSSL EBP_PBE_scrypt().
squash! Assert interoperability betweeen libscrypt and OpenSSL EBP_PBE_scrypt().
The runtime sanity checking is slightly different from the optimized
basepoint stuff in that it uses a given implementation's self tests if
available, and checks if signing/verification works with a test vector
from the IETF EdDSA draft.
The unit tests include a new testcase that will fuzz donna against ref0,
including the blinding and curve25519 key conversion routines. If this
is something that should be done at runtime (No?), the code can be
stolen from there.
Note: Integrating batch verification is not done yet.
Integration work scavanged from nickm's `ticket8897_9663_v2` branch,
with minor modifications. Tor will still sanity check the output but
now also attempts to catch extreme breakage by spot checking the
optimized implementation vs known values from the NaCl documentation.
Implements feature 9663.
RFC 952 is approximately 30 years old, and people are failing to comply,
by serving A records with '_' as part of the hostname. Since relaxing
the check is a QOL improvement for our userbase, relax the check to
allow such abominations as destinations, especially since there are
likely to be other similarly misconfigured domains out there.
When I fixed#11243, I made it so we would take the digest of a
descriptor before tokenizing it, so we could desist from download
attempts if parsing failed. But when I did that, I didn't remove an
assertion that the descriptor began with "onion-key". Usually, this
was enforced by "find_start_of_next_microdescriptor", but when
find_start_of_next_microdescriptor returned NULL, the assertion was
triggered.
Fixes bug 16400. Thanks to torkeln for reporting and
cypherpunks_backup for diagnosing and writing the first fix here.
clang 3.7 complains that using a preprocessor directive inside
a macro invocation in test_util_writepid in test_util.c is undefined.
Fix on 79e85313aa on 0.2.7.1-alpha.
# The first commit's message is:
Regenerate ed25519 keys when they will expire soon.
Also, have testing-level options to set the lifetimes and
expiration-tolerances of all key types, plus a non-testing-level
option to set the lifetime of any auto-generated signing key.
# The 2nd commit message will be skipped:
# fixup! Regenerate ed25519 keys when they will expire soon.
Extrainfo documents are now ed-signed just as are router
descriptors, according to proposal 220. This patch also includes
some more tests for successful/failing parsing, and fixes a crash
bug in ed25519 descriptor parsing.
An earlier version of these tests was broken; now they're a nicer,
more robust, more black-box set of tests. The key is to have each
test check a handshake message that is wrong in _one_ way.
When there are annotations on a router descriptor, the
ed25519-identity element won't be at position 0 or 1; it will be at
router+1 or router-1.
This patch also adds a missing smartlist function to search a list for
an item with a particular pointer.
This module implements a key-pinning mechanism to ensure that it's
safe to use RSA keys as identitifers even as we migrate to Ed25519
keys. It remembers, for every Ed25519 key we've seen, what the
associated Ed25519 key is. This way, if we see a different Ed25519
key with that RSA key, we'll know that there's a mismatch.
We persist these entries to disk using a simple format, where each
line has a base64-encoded RSA SHA1 hash, then a base64-endoded
Ed25519 key. Empty lines, misformed lines, and lines beginning with
a # are ignored. Lines beginning with @ are reserved for future
extensions.
Routers now use TAP and ntor onion keys to sign their identity keys,
and put these signatures in their descriptors. That allows other
parties to be confident that the onion keys are indeed controlled by
the router that generated the descriptor.
For prop220, we have a new ed25519 certificate type. This patch
implements the code to create, parse, and validate those, along with
code for routers to maintain their own sets of certificates and
keys. (Some parts of master identity key encryption are done, but
the implementation of that isn't finished)
