Cons=1 is the old format of consensuses, without ed25519 keys. It
is no longer required or recommended.
Cons=2 is the new format of consensuses, with ed25519 keys. It
is now required.
(Similarly for Desc=1,2 and Microdesc=1,2)
No supported client or relay versions should be affected by this
change, since these versions are supported by clients and relays
running 0.2.9 and later. It will only take effect once enough
authorities vote for it.
Closes ticket 40162.
The "protos" field is mandatory, and so are Ed25519 signatures.
Also, remove formats_rsa (the version without Ed25519), since
RSA-only relays are no longer supported.
Had to replace these since we're updating the list of required fields.
These are taken from a chutney instance. Shockingly, this is enough
to make the test_dir_handle_get.c tests pass again.
These tests used a hardcoded vote with a hardcoded digest. That
vote didn't have any pr lines, and so it is now invalid. I've
adjusted the testing code so that it mocks the signature-checking,
so that we can more easily change the contents of the vote.
This was fairly simple: just had to replace the examples with ones
that had ntor keys. There were a couple of example chutney
routerinfos that I had to replace too.
I also removed tests for producing microdescs via consensus methods
that we don't support any longer.
In brief: we go through a lot of gymnastics to handle huge protover
numbers, but after years of development we're not even close to 10
for any of our current versions. We also have a convenient
workaround available in case we ever run out of protocols: if (for
example) we someday need Link=64, we can just add Link2=0 or
something.
This patch is a minimal patch to change tor's behavior; it doesn't
take advantage of the new restrictions.
Implements #40133 and proposal 318.
Tor has a feature to preserve unrecognized state file entries in
order to maintain forward compatibility. But this feature, along
with some unused code that we never actually removed, led to us
keeping items that were of no use to the user, other than at worst
to preserve ancient information about them.
This commit adds a feature to remove obsolete entries when we load
the file.
Closes ticket 40137.
If at least one service is configured as a version 2, a log warning is emitted
once and only once.
Closes#40003
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
First, we introduce a flag to teach src/test/test to split its work
into chunks. Then we replace our invocation of src/test/test in our
"make check" target with a set of 8 scripts that invoke the first
8th of the tests, the second 8th, and so on.
This change makes our "make -kj4 check" target in our hardened
gitlab build more than twice as fast, since src/test/test was taking
the longest to finish.
Closes 40098.
This patch adds support for exposing the environment variables
`TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V4` and `TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V6` to
Pluggable Transport proccesses. These two values will contain the IPv4
and IPv6 address that the user have specified in torrc that they wish
the PT to use for all outgoing IP packets.
It is important to note here that it is up to the indvidual Pluggable
Transport if they are willing to honor these values or ignore them
completely.
One can test this feature using the following dummy PT written in POSIX
shell script:
#!/bin/sh
echo "LOG SEVERITY=warning MESSAGE=\"Value for IPv4: ${TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V4}\""
echo "LOG SEVERITY=warning MESSAGE=\"Value for IPv6: ${TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V6}\""
while true ; do
sleep 1
done
with the following entries in your torrc:
OutboundBindAddressPT 203.0.113.4
OutboundBindAddress 203.0.113.5
OutboundBindAddressPT 2001:db8::4
OutboundBindAddress 2001:db8::5
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/5304
This patch moves the logic for handling outbound addresses in torrc to
before we handle pluggable transports. Since we need access to the
values in OutboundBindAddress and friends for #5304 we have to parse
these values before we spawn any PT's.
This commit is code movement only.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/5304
This patch renames the enumeration value in `outbound_addr_t` from
`OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR` to `OUTBOUND_ADDR_ANY` since with the
arrival of `OUTBOUND_ADDR_PT` it no longer makes sense to call the
fallback value for "Exit and OR". Instead we rename it to "any".
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/5304
This patch adds a new option to torrc: `OutboundBindAddressPT`. This
option works in the same way as `OutboundBindAddressOR` and
`OutboundBindAddressExit` in that it allows the user to specify which
outbound IP address the user wants the PT to make its connections from.
There is one difference though in that OutboundBindAddressPT will only
be a suggestion for the PT to use since Tor cannot enforce whether or
not the PT actually uses this option for anything.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/5304
Style:
- We end our types with _t.
- Use 'static' to declare functions that only exist in a single
module.
Correctness:
- Many tt_...() macros can invoke "goto done;" -- we need to make
sure that all the variables that could get freed are initialized
before any "goto done" is hit, or else we might free an
uninitialized variable.
[This is a squashed patch for ticket 7193, based on taking a "git
diff" for the original branch, then applying it with "git apply
-3". I earlier attempted to squash the branch with "git rebase",
but there were too many conflicts. --nickm]
The option `--enable-all-bugs-are-fatal` when used with
`--disable-module-relay` caused GCC to warn about functions that
it thought should be labeled noreturn.
I've tried a couple of approaches, but disabling the warning on
these functions seems to be the best approach.
Fixed#40129; bugfix on 0.4.4.1-alpha.
We set this flag if we've launched the connection in order to
satisfy an origin circuit, or when we decide the connection _would_
satisfy an origin circuit. These are the only or_connections we
want to consider for bootstrapping: other or_connections are opened
because of client EXTEND requests, and they may succeed or fail
because of the clients' confusion or misconfiguration.
Closes#25061.
The rend_cache/entry_free was missing the rend cache allocation increment
before freeing the object.
Without it, it had an underflow bug:
Sep 17 08:40:13.845 [warn] rend_cache_decrement_allocation(): Bug: Underflow
in rend_cache_decrement_allocation (on Tor 0.4.5.0-alpha-dev
7eef9ced61)
Fixes#40125
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Coverity's first complaint was that we didn't check the return
values from chmod. That's easily fixed.
Coverity's second complaint was that there were code paths where we pass
NULL to chmod. For example, if this line failed, we'd "goto done",
and then pass NULL to chmod.
tt_ptr_op(dirname, OP_NE, NULL);
Closes#40103. Bug not in any released Tor.
Our code was using [01] as for the key type of signed->link certs,
which was incorrect. The value should be [03], to indicate that the
value as the SHA256 of an x.509 cert.
Fortunately, nothing cares about this value, so there shouldn't be
compatibility issues.
Fixes bug 40124; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
This is an automated commit, generated by this command:
./scripts/maint/rename_c_identifier.py \
tor_cert_create tor_cert_create_ed25519
It was generated with --no-verify, so it probably breaks some commit hooks.
The commiter should be sure to fix them up in a subsequent commit.
This patch disables the glob() support in the path library if glob() is
unavailable at build-time. This currently happens with the Android NDK
used for Tor Browser.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/40114
tl;dr We were not counting cells flying from the client to the service, but we
were counting cells flying from the service to the client.
When a rendezvous cell arrives from the client to the RP, the RP forwards it to
the service.
For this to happen, the cell first passes through command_process_relay_cell()
which normally does the statistics counting. However because the `rend_circ`
circuit was not flagged with `circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats` in
rend_mid_rendezvous(), the cell is not counted there.
Then the cell goes to circuit_receive_relay_cell() which has a special code
block based on `rend_splice` specifically for rendezvous cells, and the cell
gets directly passed to `rend_circ` via a direct call to
circuit_receive_relay_cell(). The cell never passes through
command_process_relay_cell() ever again and hence is never counted by our
rephist module.
The fix here is to flag the `rend_circ` circuit with
`circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats` so that the cell is counted as soon as it
hits command_process_relay_cell().
Furthermore we avoid double-counting cells since the special code block of
circuit_receive_relay_cell() makes us count rendezvous cells only as they enter
the RP and not as they exit it.
Fixes#40117.
When accessing the last_resolved_address cache we always need to convert the
AF family value to an index value else we are out of bound and thus
overflowing if we write to it.
This fix is on code that has not been released.
GeKo reported the following libasan crash using Tor Browser alpha with tor
0.4.5.0-alpha-dev (3c884bc9e0):
==4240==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address
0x55888490e388 at pc 0x5588842cc216 bp 0x7ffc8c421b00 sp 0x7ffc8c421af8
READ of size 2 at 0x55888490e388 thread T0
#0 0x5588842cc215 in tor_addr_compare_masked
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x5a6215)
#1 0x558884203210 in is_local_to_resolve_addr
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x4dd210)
#2 0x558883f7e252 in channel_tls_connect
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x258252)
#3 0x558883f87ff7 in channel_connect_for_circuit
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x261ff7)
#4 0x558883f8bc90 in circuit_handle_first_hop
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x265c90)
#5 0x558883f8c891 in circuit_establish_circuit
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x266891)
#6 0x558883fc3bbc in circuit_launch_by_extend_info
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x29dbbc)
#7 0x558883fc5900
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x29f900)
#8 0x558883fc6988 in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x2a0988)
#9 0x558883fd0d3f in connection_ap_attach_pending
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x2aad3f)
#10 0x7f4d50110885 (TorBrowser/Tor/libevent-2.1.so.7+0x22885)
#11 0x7f4d501110de in event_base_loop
(TorBrowser/Tor/libevent-2.1.so.7+0x230de)
#12 0x558883f69b3c in do_main_loop
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x243b3c)
#13 0x558883f3f70c in tor_run_main
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x21970c)
#14 0x558883f3c2f7 in tor_main
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x2162f7)
#15 0x558883f3531b in main
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x20f31b)
#16 0x7f4d4f76acc9 in __libc_start_main
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x26cc9)
#17 0x558883f3ba00
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x215a00)
0x55888490e388 is located 24 bytes to the left of global variable
'state_mgr' defined in 'src/app/config/statefile.c:184:22'
(0x55888490e3a0) of size 8
0x55888490e388 is located 32 bytes to the right of global variable
'global_state' defined in 'src/app/config/statefile.c:204:20'
(0x55888490e360) of size 8
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
(/home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/tor-browser-build/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor+0x5a6215)
in tor_addr_compare_masked
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0ab190919c20: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
0x0ab190919c30: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9
0x0ab190919c40: f9 f9 f9 f9 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
0x0ab190919c50: 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04
0x0ab190919c60: f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9
=>0x0ab190919c70: f9[f9]f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
0x0ab190919c80: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
0x0ab190919c90: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
0x0ab190919ca0: 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
0x0ab190919cb0: 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
0x0ab190919cc0: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==4240==ABORTING
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Opening a new listener connection can fail in many ways like a bind()
permission denied on a low port for instance.
And thus, we should expect to handle an error when creating a new one instead
of assert() on it.
To hit the removed assert:
ORPort 80
KeepBindCapabilities 0
Start tor. Then edit torrc:
ORPort <some-IP>:80
HUP tor and the assert is hit.
Fixes#40073
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Previously, we would treat *any* incoming circuit on a non-local
channel as meaning that our ORPort was reachable. With this patch,
we make sure that the address that the peer _says_ we have is the
same as the one we're trying to advertise right now.
Closes 20165. Bugfix on 4f5192b280 in 0.1.0.1-rc, when
reachability self-tests were first introduced.
Instead of looking at the "Address" option alone, instead check if we have an
address in our cache (that is discovered by tor). If not, then it tells us
that tor does not have an address to work with so we can then ask a directory
authority for a suggestion.
Related #2178
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Turns out that the HS DoS defenses parameters were overwritten by the
consensus parameters everytime a new consensus would arrive.
This means that a service operator can still enable the defenses but as soon
as the intro point relay would get a new consensus, they would be overwritten.
And at this commit, the network is entirely disabling DoS defenses.
Fix this by introducing an "explicit" flag that indicate if the
ESTABLISH_INTRO cell DoS extension set those parameters or not. If set, avoid
using the consenus at once.
We are not bumping the protover HSIntro value for this because 0.4.2.x series
is EOL in 1 month and thus 0.4.3.x would be the only series with this bug. We
are confident that a backport and then upgrade path to the latest 0.4.4.x
stable coming up soon is enough to mitigate this problem in the coming months.
It avoids the upgrade path on the service side by keeping the requirement for
protover HSIntro=5.
Fixes#40109
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
First, we introduce a flag to teach src/test/test to split its work
into chunks. Then we replace our invocation of src/test/test in our
"make check" target with a set of 8 scripts that invoke the first
8th of the tests, the second 8th, and so on.
This change makes our "make -kj4 check" target in our hardened
gitlab build more than twice as fast, since src/test/test was taking
the longest to finish.
Closes 40098.
