It's only safe to remove the failure limit (per 20536) if we are in
fact waiting a bit longer each time we try to download.
Fixes bug 20534; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
If a consensus expires while we are waiting for certificates to download,
stop waiting for certificates.
If we stop waiting for certificates less than a minute after we started
downloading them, do not consider the certificate download failure a
separate failure.
Fixes bug 20533; bugfix on commit e0204f21 in 0.2.0.9-alpha.
Relays do not deliberately launch multiple attempts, so the impact of this
bug should be minimal. This fix also defends against bugs like #20499.
Bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha.
Note that the "signed key" in the signing key certificate is the
signing key. The "signing key" in the signing key certificate is
the key that signs the certificate -- that is, the blinded key.
This parameter controls if onion services version 3 (first version of prop224)
is enabled or not. If disabled, the tor daemon will not support the protocol
for all components such as relay, directory, service and client. If the
parameter is not found, it's enabled by default.
Closes#19899
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
This implements the proposal 224 directory descriptor cache store and lookup
functionalities. Furthermore, it merges the OOM call for the HSDir cache with
current protocol v2 and the new upcoming v3.
Add hs_cache.{c|h} with store/lookup API.
Closes#18572
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Add hs_descriptor.{c|h} with the needed ABI to represent a descriptor and
needed component.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
In order to implement proposal 224, we need the data structure rend_data_t to
be able to accomodate versionning that is the current version of hidden
service (2) and the new version (3) and future version.
For that, we implement a series of accessors and a downcast function to get
the v2 data structure. rend_data_t becomes a top level generic place holder.
The entire rend_data_t API has been moved to hs_common.{c|h} in order to
seperate code that is shared from between HS versions and unshared code (in
rendcommon.c).
Closes#19024
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
This function is allowed to return NULL if the certified key isn't
RSA. But in a couple of places we were treating this as a bug or
internal error, and in one other place we weren't checking for it at
all!
Caught by Isis during code review for #15055. The serious bug was
only on the 15055 branch, thank goodness.
This was a stopgap method, designed on the theory that some routers
might support it before they could support Ed25519. But it looks
like everybody who supports RFC5705 will also have an Ed25519 key,
so there's not a lot of reason to have this even supported.
This code stores the ed certs as appropriate, and tries to check
them. The Ed25519 result is not yet used, and (because of its
behavior) this will break RSA authenticate cells. That will get
fixed as we go, however.
This should implement 19157, but it needs tests, and it needs
to get wired in.
In particular, these functions are the ones that set the identity of
a given connection or channel, and/or confirm that we have learned
said IDs.
There's a lot of stub code here: we don't actually need to use the
new keys till we start looking up connections/channels by Ed25519
IDs. Still, we want to start passing the Ed25519 IDs in now, so it
makes sense to add these stubs as part of 15055.
The impact here isn't too bad. First, the only affected certs that
expire after 32-bit signed time overflows in Y2038. Second, it could
only make it seem that a non-expired cert is expired: it could never
make it seem that an expired cert was still live.
Fixes bug 20027; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
Also, adjust signing approach to more closely match the signing
scheme in the proposal.
(The format doesn't quite match the format in the proposal, since
RSA signatures aren't fixed-length.)
Closes 19020.
See proposal 244. This feature lets us stop looking at the internals
of SSL objects, *and* should let us port better to more SSL libraries,
if they have RFC5705 support.
Preparatory for #19156
We no longer generate certs cells by pasting the certs together one
by one. Instead we use trunnel to generate them.
Preliminary work for 19155 (send CERTS cell with ed certs)
Fixes bug 19969; bugfix on b1d56fc58. We can fix this some more in
later Tors, but for now, this is probably the simplest fix possible.
This is a belt-and-suspenders fix, where the earlier fix ("Ask
event_base_loop to finish when we add a pending stream") aims to respond
to new streams as soon as they arrive, and this one aims to make sure
that we definitely respond to all of the streams.
ome policies are default-reject, some default-accept. But
policy_is_reject_star() assumed they were all default_reject. Fix
that!
Also, document that policy_is_reject_star() treats a NULL policy as
empty. This allows us to simplify the checks in
parse_reachable_addresses() by quite a bit.
Fxes bug 20306; bugfix on 0.2.8.2-alpha.
(Also, refactor the code to create a hidden service directory into a
separate funcion, so we don't have to duplicate it.)
Fixes bug 20484; bugfix on 0.2.9.3-alpha.
This simplifies the function: if we have an ntor key, use ntor/EXTEND2,
otherwise, use TAP/EXTEND.
Bugfix on commit 10aa913 from 19163 in 0.2.9.3-alpha.
I had replaced a comment implying that a set of ifs was meant to be
exhaustive with an actual check for exhaustiveness. It turns out,
they were exhaustive, but not in the way I had assumed. :(
Bug introduced in f3e158edf7, not in any released Tor.
Use the following coccinelle script to change uses of
smartlist_add(sl, tor_strdup(str)) to
smartlist_add_strdup(sl, string) (coccinelle script from nickm
via bug 20048):
@@
expression a;
expression b;
@@
- smartlist_add
+ smartlist_add_strdup
(a,
- tor_strdup(
b
- )
)
The tor_fragile_assert() bug has existed here since c8a5e2d588
in tor-0.2.1.7-alpha forever, but tor_fragile_assert() was mostly a
no-op until 0.2.9.1-alpha.
Fixes bug 19869.
When we refactored purpose_needs_anonymity(), we made it so _all_
bridge requests required anonymity. But that missed the case
that we are allowed to ask a bridge for its own descriptor.
With this patch, we consider the resource, and allow "authority.z"
("your own descriptor, compressed") for a bridge's server descriptor
to be non-anonymous.
Fix for bug 20410; bug not in any released Tor.
I believe that this should never trigger, but if it does, it
suggests that there was a gap between is_sensitive_dir_purpose and
purpose_needs_anonymity that we need to fill. Related to 20077.
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
This commit adds or improves the module-level documenation for:
buffers.c circuitstats.c command.c connection_edge.c control.c
cpuworker.c crypto_curve25519.c crypto_curve25519.h
crypto_ed25519.c crypto_format.c dircollate.c dirserv.c dns.c
dns_structs.h fp_pair.c geoip.c hibernate.c keypin.c ntmain.c
onion.c onion_fast.c onion_ntor.c onion_tap.c periodic.c
protover.c protover.h reasons.c rephist.c replaycache.c
routerlist.c routerparse.c routerset.c statefile.c status.c
tor_main.c workqueue.c
In particular, I've tried to explain (for each documented module)
what each module does, what's in it, what the big idea is, why it
belongs in Tor, and who calls it. In a few cases, I've added TODO
notes about refactoring opportunities.
I've also renamed an argument, and fixed a few DOCDOC comments.
(I've done this instead of changing the semantics of
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy, because dns.c uses
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy too, in a slightly weird way.)
Some compilers apparently noticed that p2len was allowed to be equal
to msg, and so maybe we would be doing memset(prompt2, ' ', 0), and
decided that we probably meant to do memset(prompt2, 0, 0x20);
instead.
Stupid compilers, doing optimization before this kind of warning!
My fix is to just fill the entire prompt2 buffer with spaces,
because it's harmless.
Bugfix on e59f0d4cb9, not in any released Tor.
Previously, we would reject even rendezvous connections to IPv6
addresses when IPv6Exit was false. But that doesn't make sense; we
don't count that as "exit"ing. I've corrected the logic and tried
to make it a lottle more clear.
Fixes bug 18357; this code has been wrong since 9016d9e829 in
0.2.4.7-alpha.
We removed that feature in 0.2.4.2-alpha, but some comments seem to
have lingered.
I didn't add a changes/ file since this is just internal code cleanup.
(like clients do) rather than old-style router descriptors. Now bridges
will blend in with clients in terms of the circuits they build.
Fixes bug 6769; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha.
Clients that use bridges were ignoring their cached microdesc-flavor
consensus files, because they only thought they should use the microdesc
flavor once they had a known-working bridge that could offer microdescs,
and at first boot no bridges are known-working.
This bug caused bridge-using clients to download a new microdesc consensus
on each startup.
Fixes bug 20269; bugfix on 0.2.3.12-alpha.
The client addr is essentially meaningless in this context (yes, it is
possible to explicitly `bind()` AF_LOCAL client side sockets to a path,
but no one does it, and there are better ways to grant that sort of
feature if people want it like using `SO_PASSCRED`).
As before, we check server protocols whenever server_mode(options)
is true and we check client protocols whenever server_mode(options)
is false.
Additionally, we now _also_ check client protocols whenever any
client port is set.
(Technically, we could just remove extend2 cell checking entirely,
since all Tor versions on our network are required to have it, but
let's keep this around as an example of How To Do It.)
(Despite the increased size of the consensus, this should have
approximately zero effect on the compressed consensus size, since
the "proto" line should be completely implied by the "v" line.)
[This is a brute-force method that potentially uses way too much
RAM. Need to rethink this a little. Right now you can DOS an
authority by saying "Foo=1-4294967295".]
Not telling the cmux would sometimes cause an assertion failure in
relay.c when we tried to get an active circuit and found an "active"
circuit with no cells.
Additionally, replace that assert with a test and a log message.
Fix for bug 20203. This is actually probably a bugfix on
0.2.8.1-alpha, specifically my code in 8b4e5b7ee9 where I
made circuit_mark_for_close_() do less in order to simplify our call
graph. Thanks to "cypherpunks" for help diagnosing.
It's a macro that calls down to a function whose behavior has been
getting progresively more complicated.... but we named it as if it
were a variable. That's not so smart. So, replace it with a
function call to a function that was just doing "return
current_consensus".
Fixes bug 20176.
Commit 41cc1f612b introduced a "dns_request"
configuration value which wasn't set to 1 for an entry connection on the
DNSPort leading to a refusal to resolve the given hostname.
This commit set the dns_request flag by default for every entry connection
made to the DNSPort.
Fixes#20109
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
For a brief moment in networkstatus_set_current_consensus(), the old
consensus has been freed, but the node_t objects still have dead
pointers to the routerstatus_t objects within it. During that
interval, we absolutely must not do anything that would cause Tor to
look at those dangling pointers.
Unfortunately, calling the (badly labeled!) current_consensus macro
or anything else that calls into we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits(),
can make us look at the nodelist.
The fix is to make sure we identify the main consensus flavor
_outside_ the danger zone, and to make the danger zone much much
smaller.
Fixes bug 20103. This bug has been implicitly present for AGES; we
just got lucky for a very long time. It became a crash bug in
0.2.8.2-alpha when we merged 35bbf2e4a4 to make
find_dl_schedule start looking at the consensus, and 4460feaf28
which made node_get_all_orports less (accidentally) tolerant of
nodes with a valid ri pointer but dangling rs pointer.
* Check consistency between the two single onion torrc options
* Use the more relevant option each time we check for single onion mode
* Clarify log messages
* Clarify comments
* Otherwise, no behaviour change
Tor checks that the flag matches the configured onion service anonymity.
Tor refuses to create unflagged onion service using ADD_ONION, if they
would be non-anonymous. The error is:
512 Tor is in non-anonymous onion mode
Similarly, if the NonAnonymous flag is present, and Tor has the default
anonymous onion config:
512 Tor is in anonymous onion mode
Parse the value to UseEntryNodes_option, then set UseEntryNodes before
validating options.
This way, Authorities, Tor2web, and Single Onion Services don't write
spurious "UseEntryNodes 0" lines to their configs. Document the fact that
these tor configurations ignore UseEntryNodes in the manual page.
Also reorder options validation so we modify UseEntryNodes first, then
check its value against EntryNodes.
And silence a warning about disabled UseEntryNodes for hidden services
when we're actually in non-anonymous single onion service mode.
We log this message every time we validate tor's options.
There's no need to log a duplicate in main() as well.
(It is impossible to run main() without validating our options.)
The changes in #19973 fixed ReachableAddresses being applied
too broadly, but they also broke Tor2web (somewhat unintentional)
compatibility with ReachableAddresses.
This patch restores that functionality, which makes intro and
rend point selection is consistent between Tor2web and Single Onion
Services.
Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
(We check consensus method when deciding whether to assume a node is
valid. No need to check the consensus method for Running, since
we will never see a method before 13.)
Closes ticket 20001
g
The functions it warns about are:
assert, memcmp, strcat, strcpy, sprintf, malloc, free, realloc,
strdup, strndup, calloc.
Also, fix a few lingering instances of these in the code. Use other
conventions to indicate _intended_ use of assert and
malloc/realloc/etc.
Users can't run an anonymous client and non-anonymous single
onion service at the same time. We need to know whether we have
any client ports or sockets open to do this check.
When determining whether a client port (SOCKS, Trans, NATD, DNS)
is set, count unix sockets when counting client listeners. This
has no user-visible behaviour change, because these options are
set once and never read in the current tor codebase.
Don't count sockets when setting ControlPort_set, that's what
ControlSocket is for. (This will be reviewed in #19665.)
Don't count sockets when counting server listeners, because the code
that uses these options expects to count externally-visible ports.
(And it would change the behaviour of Tor.)
Check NoOnionTraffic before attaching a stream.
NoOnionTraffic refuses connections to all onion hostnames,
but permits non-onion hostnames and IP addresses.
Check NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic, and NoIPv6Traffic before
attaching a stream.
NoDNSRequest refuses connections to all non-onion hostnames,
but permits IP addresses.
NoIPv4Traffic refuses connections to IPv4 addresses, but resolves
hostnames.
NoIPv6Traffic refuses connections to IPv6 addresses, but resolves
hostnames.
Combined, they refuse all non-onion hostnames and IP addresses.
OnionTrafficOnly is equivalent to NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic,
and NoIPv6Traffic.
Add unit tests for parsing and checking option validity.
Add documentation for each flag to the man page.
Add changes file for all of #18693.
Parsing only: the flags do not change client behaviour (yet!)
Rely on onion_populate_cpath to check that we're only using
TAP for the rare hidden service cases.
Check and log if handshakes only support TAP when they should support
ntor.
When a client connects to an intro point not in the client's consensus,
or a hidden service connects to a rend point not in the hidden service's
consensus, we are stuck with using TAP, because there is no ntor link
specifier.
This bug had existed since 0.2.4.7-alpha, but now that we have
FallbackDirs by default, it actually matters.
Fixes bug 19947; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha or maybe 0.2.8.1-alpha.
Rubiate wrote the patch; teor wrote the changes file.
Longer and more explicit log message so we don't confuse users with behind NAT with working configurations and state that public IP addresses only should be provided with "Address", won't work with internal addresses.
These functions were there so that we could abstract the differences
between evbuffer and buf_t. But with the bufferevent removal, this
no longer serves a purpose.
If we know a node's version, and it can't do ntor, consider it not running.
If we have a node's descriptor, and it doesn't have a valid ntor key,
consider it not running.
Refactor these checks so they're consistent between authorities and clients.
