The ntor handshake--described in proposal 216 and in a paper by
Goldberg, Stebila, and Ustaoglu--gets us much better performance than
our current approach.
We want to use donna-c64 when we have a GCC with support for
64x64->uint128_t multiplying. If not, we want to use libnacl if we
can, unless it's giving us the unsafe "ref" implementation. And if
that isn't going to work, we'd like to use the
portable-and-safe-but-slow 32-bit "donna" implementation.
We might need more library searching for the correct libnacl,
especially once the next libnacl release is out -- it's likely to have
bunches of better curve25519 implementations.
I also define a set of curve25519 wrapper functions, though it really
shouldn't be necessary.
We should eventually make the -donna*.c files get build with
-fomit-frame-pointer, since that can make a difference.
There was one place in curve25519-donna-c64 that was relying on
unaligned access and relying on little-endian values. This patch
fixes that.
I've sent Adam a pull request.
Our old warn_nonlocal_client_ports() would give a bogus warning for
every nonlocal port every time it parsed any ports at all. So if it
parsed a nonlocal socksport, it would complain that it had a nonlocal
socksport...and then turn around and complain about the nonlocal
socksport again, calling it a nonlocal transport or nonlocal dnsport,
if it had any of those.
Fixes bug 7836; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha.
mr-4 reports on #7799 that he was seeing it several times per second,
which suggests that things had gone very wrong.
This isn't a real fix, but it should make Tor usable till we can
figure out the real issue.
This implements the server-side of proposal 198 by detecting when
clients lack the magic list of ciphersuites that indicates that
they're lying faking some ciphers they don't really have. When
clients lack this list, we can choose any cipher that we'd actually
like. The newly allowed ciphersuites are, currently, "All ECDHE-RSA
ciphers that openssl supports, except for ECDHE-RSA-RC4".
The code to detect the cipher list relies on on (ab)use of
SSL_set_session_secret_cb.
We already use this classification for deciding whether (as a server)
to do a v2/v3 handshake, and we're about to start using it for
deciding whether we can use good ciphersuites too.
This is less easy than you might think; we can't just look at the
client ciphers list, since openssl doesn't remember client ciphers if
it doesn't know about them. So we have to keep a list of the "v2"
ciphers, with the ones we don't know about removed.
It's important not to call choose_array_element_by_weight and then
pass its return value unchecked to smartlist_get : it is allowed to
return -1.
Fixes bug 7756; bugfix on 4e3d07a6 (not in any released Tor)
This is good enough to give P_success >= 999,999,999/1,000,000,000 so
long as the address space is less than 97.95 full. It'd be ridiculous
for that to happen for IPv6, and usome reasonable assumptions, it
would also be pretty silly for IPv4.
With an IPv6 virtual address map, we can basically hand out a new
IPv6 address for _every_ address we connect to. That'll be cool, and
will let us maybe get around prop205 issues.
This uses some fancy logic to try to make the code paths in the ipv4
and the ipv6 case as close as possible, and moves to randomly
generated addresses so we don't need to maintain those stupid counters
that will collide if Tor restarts but apps don't.
Also has some XXXX items to fix to make this useful. More design
needed.
This function gives us a single place to set reasonable default flags
for port_cfg_t entries, to avoid bugs like the one where we weren't
setting ipv4_traffic_ok to 1 on SocksPorts initialized in an older
way.
(This is part 2 of making DNS cache use enabled/disabled on a
per-client port basis. This implements the CacheIPv[46]DNS options,
but not the UseCachedIPv[46] ones.)
(This is part 1 of making DNS cache use enabled/disabled on a
per-client port basis. These options are shuffled around correctly,
but don't do anything yet.)
We want to be saying fast_mem{cmp,eq,neq} when we're doing a
comparison that's allowed to exit early, or tor_mem{cmp,eq,neq} when
we need a data-invariant timing. Direct use of memcmp tends to imply
that we haven't thought about the issue.
This has several advantages, including more resilience to ambient failure.
I still need to rename all the first_hop vars tho.. Saving that for a separate
commit.
Turns out there's more than one way to block a tagged circuit.
This seems to successfully handle all of the normal exit circuits. Hidden
services need additional tweaks, still.
This replaces the old FallbackConsensus notion, and should provide a
way -- assuming we pick reasonable nodes! -- to give clients
suggestions of placs to go to get their first consensus.
Now creating a dir_server_t and adding it are separate functions, and
there are frontend functions for adding a trusted dirserver and a
fallback dirserver.
We use trusted_dir_server_t for two pieces of functionality: a list of
all directory authorities, and a list of initial places to look for
a directory. With this patch we start to separate those two roles.
There is as of now no actual way to be a fallback directory without being
an authority.
This is a customizable extract-and-expand HMAC-KDF for deriving keys.
It derives from RFC5869, which derives its rationale from Krawczyk,
H., "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme",
Proceedings of CRYPTO 2010, 2010, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264>.
I'm also renaming the existing KDF, now that Tor has two of them.
This is the key derivation scheme specified in ntor.
There are also unit tests.
This one is necessary for sending BEGIN cells with sane flags when
self-testing a directory port. All real entry connections were
getting their ipv{4,6}_traffic_ok flags set from their listeners, and
for begindir entry connections we didn't care, but for directory
self-testing, we had a problem.
Fixes at least one more case of 7493; if there are more lingering
cases of 7493, this might fix them too.
Bug not in any released version of Tor.
Looks like when i was writing the code to set the ipv4_traffic flag on
port_cfg_t, I missed some cases, such as the one where the port was
set from its default value.
Fix for 7493. Bug not in any released Tor.
Previously, I was freaking out about passing an unspec address to
dns_found_answer() on an error, since I was using the address type to
determine whether the error was an error on an ipv4 address lookup or
on an ipv6 address lookup. But now dns_found_answer() has a separate
orig_query_type argument to tell what kind of query it is, so there's
no need to freak out.
* If there's an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, return both in the resolved
cell.
* Treat all resolve requests as permitting IPv6, since by the spec they're
allowed to, and by the code that won't break anything.
IPv4-only exits have an implicit "reject [::]/0", which was making
policy_is_reject_star() return 1 for them, making us refuse to do
hostname lookups.
This fix chanes policy_is_reject_star() to ask about which family we meant.
The code previously detected wildcarding and replaced wildcarded
answers with DNS_STATUS_FAILED_PERMANENT. But that status variable
was no longer used! Remove the status variable, and instead change
the value of 'result' in evdns_callback.
Thank goodness for compiler warnings. In this case,
unused-but-set-variable.
Thanks to Linus for finding this one.
Now, every cached_resolve_t can remember an IPv4 result *and* an IPv6
result. As a light protection against timing-based distinguishers for
IPv6 users (and against complexity!), every forward request generates
an IPv4 *and* an IPv6 request, assuming that we're an IPv6 exit. Once
we have answers or errors for both, we act accordingly.
This patch additionally makes some useful refactorings in the dns.c
code, though there is quite a bit more of useful refactoring that could
be done.
Additionally, have a new interface for the argument passed to the
evdns_callback function. Previously, it was just the original address
we were resolving. But it turns out that, on error, evdns doesn't
tell you the type of the query, so on a failure we didn't know whether
IPv4 or IPv6 queries were failing.
The new convention is to have the first byte of that argument include
the query type. I've refactored the code a bit to make that simpler.
This makes it so we can handle getting an IPv6 in the 3 different
formats we specified it for in RESOLVED cells,
END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY cells, and CONNECTED cells.
We don't cache IPv6 addresses yet, since proposal 205 isn't
implemented.
There's a refactored function for parsing connected cells; it has unit
tests.
These options are for telling the SOCKSPort that it should allow or
not allow connections to IPv4/IPv6 addresses.
These aren't implemented yet; this is just the code to read the
options and get them into the entrey_connection_t.
Also, count ipv6 timeouts vs others. If we have too many ipv6
requests time out, then we could be degrading performance because of a
broken DNS server that ignores AAAA requests. Other cases in which
we never learn an AAAA address aren't so bad, since they don't slow
A (ipv4) answers down very much.
This is a relatively simple set of changes: we mostly need to
remove a few "but not for IPv6" changes. We also needed to tweak
the handling of DNS code to generate RESOLVED cells that could get
an IPv6 answer in return.
Now, "accept *:80" means "accept all addresses on port 80", and not
just IPv4. For just v4, say "accept *4:80"; for just v6 say "accept
*6:80".
We can parse these policies from torrc just fine, and we should be
successfully keeping them out of descriptors for now.
We also now include appropriate IPv6 addresses in "reject private:*"
By default, "*" means "All IPv4 addresses" with
tor_addr_parse_mask_ports, so I won't break anything. But if the new
EXTENDED_STAR flag is provided, then * means "any address", *4 means
"any IPv4 address" (that is, 0.0.0.0/0), and "*6" means "any IPv6
address" (that is, [::]/0).
This is going to let us have a syntax for specifying exit policies in
torrc that won't drive people mad.
Also, add a bunch of unit tests for tor_addr_parse_mask_ports to test
these new features, and to increase coverage.
We'd like these functions to be circuit-relative so that we can
implement a per-circuit DNS cache and per-circuit DNS cache rules for
proposal 205 or its successors. I'm doing this now, as a part of the
IPv6 exits code, since there are about to be a few more instances
of code using this.
This is the simplest possible workaround: make it safe to call
circuit_cell_queue_clear() on a non-attached circuit, and make it
safe-but-a-LD_BUG-warning to call update_circuit_on_cmux() on a
non-attached circuit.
LocalWords: unstage src Untracked
Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on
data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest
possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this
is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it
is, we can work on that in 0.2.4.
Fixes bug 7352.
There is probably no code that can write the 2 bytes at the end of the
packed_cell_t when the cell is only a 512-byte cell, but let's not get
overconfident there.
Instead of warning about low ports that are advertised, we should have
been warning about low ports that we're listening on. Bug 7285, fix
on 0.2.3.9-alpha.
That's not where I'd want to put a $, but apparently the other
foo/id/<identity> things allow it, as does an arguably valid
interpretation of control-spec.txt. So let's be consistent.
Fix for a piece of bug 7059.
This is part of what's needed to build without warnings on mingw64:
it was warning about the cast from void* to long that happened in
the places we were using test_{n,}eq on pointers.
The alternative here would have been to broaden tt_int_op to accept
a long long or an intptr_t, but that's less correct (since pointers
aren't integers), and would hurt the portability of tinytest a
little.
Fixes part of 7260.
This is based on code by yayooo for 7260, but:
- It allows for SIZEOF_PID_T == SIZEOF_SHORT
- It addresses some additional cases where we weren't getting any
warnings only because we were casting pid_t to int.
We still want to build on compilers w/o c99 support, such as
(notoriously, shamefully) MSVC.
So I'm commenting out the designated initializers in
circuitmux_ewma.c. The alternative would have been to use some kind
of macros to use designated initializers only when they're
supported, but that's error-prone, and can lead to code having
different meanings under different compilers.
Bug 7286; fix on 0.2.4.4-alpha; spotted by Gisle Vanem.
When configuring tor without upnp support, ie ./configure --disable-upnp,
tor-fw-helper fails to link with undefined references to `ceil' and
`log'. This if fixed by linking to libm.
X-Gentoo-Bug: 435040
X-Gentoo-Bug-URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435040
Reported-by: Alexandre <alexandre.cortes@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony G. Basile <blueness@gentoo.org>
If we completed the handshake for the v2 link protocol but wound up
negotiating the wong protocol version, we'd become so confused about
what part of the handshake we were in that we'd promptly die with an
assertion.
This is a fix for CVE-2012-2250; it's a bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
All servers running that version or later should really upgrade.
Bug and fix from "some guy from France." I tweaked his code slightly
to make it log the IP of the offending node, and to forward-port it to
0.2.4.
If we completed the handshake for the v2 link protocol but wound up
negotiating the wong protocol version, we'd become so confused about
what part of the handshake we were in that we'd promptly die with an
assertion.
This is a fix for CVE-2012-2250; it's a bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
All servers running that version or later should really upgrade.
Bug and fix from "some guy from France." I tweaked his code slightly
to make it log the IP of the offending node.
The implementation we added has a tendency to crash with lists of 0 or
one element. That can happen if we get a consensus vote, v2
consensus, consensus, or geoip file with 0 or 1 element. There's a
DOS opportunity there that authorities could exploit against one
another, and which an evil v2 authority could exploit against anything
downloading v2 directory information..
This fix is minimalistic: It just adds a special-case for 0- and
1-element lists. For 0.2.4 (the current alpha series) we'll want a
better patch.
This is bug 7191; it's a fix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
Clients now consider the ClientRejectInternalAddresses config option
when using a microdescriptor consensus stanza to decide whether
an exit relay would allow exiting to an internal address. Fixes
bug 7190; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
Our implementation of parse_short_policy was screwed up: it would
ignore the last character of every short policy. Obviously, that's
broken.
This patch fixes the busted behavior, and adds a bunch of unit tests
to make sure the rest of that function is okay.
Fixes bug 7192; fix on 0.2.3.1-alpha.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
There was a huge-looking conflict in circuitbuild.c, but the only
change that had been made to circuitbuild.c since I forked off the
split_circuitbuild branch was 17442560c4. So I took the
split_circuitbuild version of the conflicting part, and manually
re-applied the change from 17442560c44e8093f9a..
OpenSSL 1.0.0 added an implementation of TLS session tickets, a
"feature" that let session resumption occur without server-side state
by giving clients an encrypted "ticket" that the client could present
later to get the session going again with the same keys as before.
OpenSSL was giving the keys to decrypt these tickets the lifetime of
the SSL contexts, which would have been terrible for PFS if we had
long-lived SSL contexts. Fortunately, we don't. Still, it's pretty
bad. We should also drop these, since our use of the extension stands
out with our non-use of session cacheing.
Found by nextgens. Bugfix on all versions of Tor when built with
openssl 1.0.0 or later. Fixes bug 7139.
Failure to do so left us open to a remotely triggerable assertion
failure. Fixes CVE-2012-2249; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. Reported by
"some guy from France".
This patch is a forward-port to 0.2.4, to work with the new channel
logic.
Failure to do so left us open to a remotely triggerable assertion
failure. Fixes CVE-2012-2249; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. Reported by
"some guy from France".
We were calling channel_get_actual_remote_descr() before we used the
output of a previous channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(), thus
invalidating its output.
When we merged the channel code, we made the 'address' field of linked
directory connections created with begindir (and their associated edge
connections) contain an address:port string, when they should only
have contained the address part.
This patch also tweaks the interface to the get_descr method of
channels so that it takes a set of flags rather than a single flag.
In 4768c0efe3 (not in any released
version of Tor), we removed a little block of code that set the addr
field of an exit connection used in making a tunneled directory
request. Turns out that wasn't right.
My scripts missed it because it was in eventdns.c, which was in ext,
but it _was_ using one of our identifiers. That's probably because
eventdns.c has drifted a bit since we forked it.
I'm not going to fix the other reserved identifiers in eventdns.c,
since that would make it drift even more.
There are as many divergent implementations of sys/queue.h as there
are operating systems shipping it, it would seem. They have some code
in common, but have drifted apart, and have added other stuff named
differently. So I'm taking a relatively sane one, and hoping for the
best.
I'm taking OpenBSD's in particular because of the lack of external
dependencies, the presence of a CIRCLEQ (we could use one of those in
places), and the liberal licensing terms.
I'm naming the file tor_queue.h, since historically we've run into
trouble having headers with the same names as system headers (log.h,
for example.)
In C, we technically aren't supposed to define our own things that
start with an underscore.
This is a purely machine-generated commit. First, I ran this script
on all the headers in src/{common,or,test,tools/*}/*.h :
==============================
use strict;
my %macros = ();
my %skipped = ();
FILE: for my $fn (@ARGV) {
my $f = $fn;
if ($fn !~ /^\.\//) {
$f = "./$fn";
}
$skipped{$fn} = 0;
open(F, $fn);
while (<F>) {
if (/^#ifndef ([A-Za-z0-9_]+)/) {
$macros{$fn} = $1;
next FILE;
}
}
}
print "#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p\n\n";
for my $fn (@ARGV) {
if (! exists $macros{$fn}) {
print "# No macro known for $fn!\n" if (!$skipped{$fn});
next;
}
if ($macros{$fn} !~ /_H_?$/) {
print "# Weird macro for $fn...\n";
}
my $goodmacro = uc $fn;
$goodmacro =~ s#.*/##;
$goodmacro =~ s#[\/\-\.]#_#g;
print "s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])$macros{$fn}(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_${goodmacro}/g;\n"
}
==============================
It produced the following output, which I then re-ran on those same files:
==============================
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ADDRESS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ADDRESS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_AES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_AES_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMPAT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMPAT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMPAT_LIBEVENT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMPAT_LIBEVENT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONTAINER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONTAINER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CRYPTO_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CRYPTO_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_DI_OPS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DI_OPS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MEMAREA_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MEMAREA_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MEMPOOL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MEMPOOL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_PROCMON_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_PROCMON_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORGZIP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORGZIP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORINT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORINT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_LOG_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORLOG_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TORTLS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TORTLS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_UTIL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_UTIL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_BUFFERS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_BUFFERS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CHANNEL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CHANNEL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CHANNEL_TLS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CHANNELTLS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITBUILD_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITMUX_EWMA_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CIRCUITUSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CIRCUITUSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_COMMAND_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_COMMAND_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONFIG_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONFIG_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_CONFPARSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONFPARSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONNECTION_OR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONNECTION_OR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CONTROL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CONTROL_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_CPUWORKER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_CPUWORKER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRECTORY_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRECTORY_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRSERV_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRSERV_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DIRVOTE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DIRVOTE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DNS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DNS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_DNSSERV_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_DNSSERV_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_EVENTDNS_TOR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_EVENTDNS_TOR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_GEOIP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_GEOIP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_HIBERNATE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_HIBERNATE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MAIN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MAIN_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_MICRODESC_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_MICRODESC_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NETWORKSTATUS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NETWORKSTATUS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NODELIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NODELIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_NTMAIN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_NTMAIN_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ONION_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ONION_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_OR_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_OR_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_POLICIES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_POLICIES_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REASONS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REASONS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RELAY_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RELAY_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDCLIENT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDCLIENT_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDCOMMON_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDCOMMON_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDMID_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDMID_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_RENDSERVICE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_RENDSERVICE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REPHIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REPHIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_REPLAYCACHE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTERLIST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERLIST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_ROUTERPARSE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERPARSE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_ROUTERSET_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_ROUTERSET_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_STATEFILE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_STATEFILE_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_STATUS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_STATUS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])TOR_TRANSPORTS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TRANSPORTS_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_TEST_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TEST_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_NATPMP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_NATPMP_H/g;
s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_TOR_FW_HELPER_UPNP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/TOR_TOR_FW_HELPER_UPNP_H/g;
==============================
The rationale for treating these files differently is that we should
be checking upstream for changes as applicable, and merging changes
upstream as warranted.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
The conflict was trivial, since no line of code actually changed in
both branches: There was a fmt_addr() that turned into fmt_addrport()
in bug7011, and a "if (!n_conn)" that turned into "if (!n_chan)" in
master.
This is mostly a conversion from this pattern:
log("... %s:%d ...", fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr), port);
to this:
log("... %s ...", fmt_addrport(&addr, port));
The output is the same in all cases.
Apparently BridgeDB is already expecting transport lines to be formatted
thus; see https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7011#comment:12 ff.
It may be that there are no extant IPv6 pluggable transport bridges yet,
so this didn't cause a problem.
state_transport_line_is_valid calls tor_addr_port_lookup, which expects
brackets around an IPv6 address. Without this, cached transport
addresses can't be parsed later:
[warn] state: Could not parse addrport.
[warn] state: State file seems to be broken.
See #7011.
