The total number of rendezvous circuit created and the number of established
ones which is a gauge that decreases to keep an updated counter.
Related to #40063
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
At this commit, a new service registers to the module and a store is created.
It also remove itself from the metrics module if it goes away.
In order to hook into the metrics subsystem, this commit attaches the HS
subsystem into the subsystem global list so its get_metrics() call can be
accessible.
HS initialization is still _not_ done through the subsys module as it is
likely require much more testing.
Related to #40063
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
First I began with a set of candidates:
The client's _required_ list starts with all the protocols
supported by every release in 0.2.9-stable through current
master.
The client's _required_ list starts with all the protocols
supported by every release in 0.3.5-stable through current
master.
Everybody's _recommended_ list starts with all the protocols
supported by every release in 0.3.5-stable through current master.
Then I removed the protocol versions that we do not actually want to
require or recommend:
DirCache=1 (deprecated)
HSDir=1, HSIntro=1-3, HSRend=1 (deprecated)
(All HS* protocol requirements for clients)
Link=1-3 (deprecated)
LinkAuth=1 (obsolete)
Relay=1 (obsolete)
Make it possible to specify multiple ConsensusParams torrc
lines.
Now directory authority operators can for example put the
main ConsensusParams config in one torrc file and then add to it
from a different torrc file.
Closes ticket 40164.
Cons=1 is the old format of consensuses, without ed25519 keys. It
is no longer required or recommended.
Cons=2 is the new format of consensuses, with ed25519 keys. It
is now required.
(Similarly for Desc=1,2 and Microdesc=1,2)
No supported client or relay versions should be affected by this
change, since these versions are supported by clients and relays
running 0.2.9 and later. It will only take effect once enough
authorities vote for it.
Closes ticket 40162.
These tests used a hardcoded vote with a hardcoded digest. That
vote didn't have any pr lines, and so it is now invalid. I've
adjusted the testing code so that it mocks the signature-checking,
so that we can more easily change the contents of the vote.
This patch adds support for exposing the environment variables
`TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V4` and `TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V6` to
Pluggable Transport proccesses. These two values will contain the IPv4
and IPv6 address that the user have specified in torrc that they wish
the PT to use for all outgoing IP packets.
It is important to note here that it is up to the indvidual Pluggable
Transport if they are willing to honor these values or ignore them
completely.
One can test this feature using the following dummy PT written in POSIX
shell script:
#!/bin/sh
echo "LOG SEVERITY=warning MESSAGE=\"Value for IPv4: ${TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V4}\""
echo "LOG SEVERITY=warning MESSAGE=\"Value for IPv6: ${TOR_PT_OUTBOUND_BIND_ADDRESS_V6}\""
while true ; do
sleep 1
done
with the following entries in your torrc:
OutboundBindAddressPT 203.0.113.4
OutboundBindAddress 203.0.113.5
OutboundBindAddressPT 2001:db8::4
OutboundBindAddress 2001:db8::5
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/5304
[This is a squashed patch for ticket 7193, based on taking a "git
diff" for the original branch, then applying it with "git apply
-3". I earlier attempted to squash the branch with "git rebase",
but there were too many conflicts. --nickm]
The option `--enable-all-bugs-are-fatal` when used with
`--disable-module-relay` caused GCC to warn about functions that
it thought should be labeled noreturn.
I've tried a couple of approaches, but disabling the warning on
these functions seems to be the best approach.
Fixed#40129; bugfix on 0.4.4.1-alpha.
We set this flag if we've launched the connection in order to
satisfy an origin circuit, or when we decide the connection _would_
satisfy an origin circuit. These are the only or_connections we
want to consider for bootstrapping: other or_connections are opened
because of client EXTEND requests, and they may succeed or fail
because of the clients' confusion or misconfiguration.
Closes#25061.
Our code was using [01] as for the key type of signed->link certs,
which was incorrect. The value should be [03], to indicate that the
value as the SHA256 of an x.509 cert.
Fortunately, nothing cares about this value, so there shouldn't be
compatibility issues.
Fixes bug 40124; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
This is an automated commit, generated by this command:
./scripts/maint/rename_c_identifier.py \
tor_cert_create tor_cert_create_ed25519
It was generated with --no-verify, so it probably breaks some commit hooks.
The commiter should be sure to fix them up in a subsequent commit.
tl;dr We were not counting cells flying from the client to the service, but we
were counting cells flying from the service to the client.
When a rendezvous cell arrives from the client to the RP, the RP forwards it to
the service.
For this to happen, the cell first passes through command_process_relay_cell()
which normally does the statistics counting. However because the `rend_circ`
circuit was not flagged with `circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats` in
rend_mid_rendezvous(), the cell is not counted there.
Then the cell goes to circuit_receive_relay_cell() which has a special code
block based on `rend_splice` specifically for rendezvous cells, and the cell
gets directly passed to `rend_circ` via a direct call to
circuit_receive_relay_cell(). The cell never passes through
command_process_relay_cell() ever again and hence is never counted by our
rephist module.
The fix here is to flag the `rend_circ` circuit with
`circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats` so that the cell is counted as soon as it
hits command_process_relay_cell().
Furthermore we avoid double-counting cells since the special code block of
circuit_receive_relay_cell() makes us count rendezvous cells only as they enter
the RP and not as they exit it.
Fixes#40117.
Previously, we would treat *any* incoming circuit on a non-local
channel as meaning that our ORPort was reachable. With this patch,
we make sure that the address that the peer _says_ we have is the
same as the one we're trying to advertise right now.
Closes 20165. Bugfix on 4f5192b280 in 0.1.0.1-rc, when
reachability self-tests were first introduced.
Instead of looking at the "Address" option alone, instead check if we have an
address in our cache (that is discovered by tor). If not, then it tells us
that tor does not have an address to work with so we can then ask a directory
authority for a suggestion.
Related #2178
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Turns out that the HS DoS defenses parameters were overwritten by the
consensus parameters everytime a new consensus would arrive.
This means that a service operator can still enable the defenses but as soon
as the intro point relay would get a new consensus, they would be overwritten.
And at this commit, the network is entirely disabling DoS defenses.
Fix this by introducing an "explicit" flag that indicate if the
ESTABLISH_INTRO cell DoS extension set those parameters or not. If set, avoid
using the consenus at once.
We are not bumping the protover HSIntro value for this because 0.4.2.x series
is EOL in 1 month and thus 0.4.3.x would be the only series with this bug. We
are confident that a backport and then upgrade path to the latest 0.4.4.x
stable coming up soon is enough to mitigate this problem in the coming months.
It avoids the upgrade path on the service side by keeping the requirement for
protover HSIntro=5.
Fixes#40109
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
(Unlike approaches in earlier versions of Tor, this one logs if and
only if we are launching a test, and we haven't said that we're
testing this port.)
Fixes bug 40068; bug not in any released version.
Closes#40068.
We used to have a single boolean, "FascistFirewall". Ages ago, in
tickets #17840 and #9067, we added an improved "ReachableAddresses"
mechanism. It's time to rename related identifiers in the code for
consistency. This closes#18106.
This is an automated commit, generated by this command:
./scripts/maint/rename_c_identifier.py \
fascist_firewall_allows_address reachable_addr_allows \
fascist_firewall_use_ipv6 reachable_addr_use_ipv6 \
fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_impl reachable_addr_prefer_ipv6_impl \
fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport reachable_addr_prefer_ipv6_orport \
fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport reachable_addr_prefer_ipv6_dirport \
fascist_firewall_allows_address_addr reachable_addr_allows_addr \
fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap reachable_addr_allows_ap \
fascist_firewall_allows_base reachable_addr_allows_base \
fascist_firewall_allows_ri_impl reachable_addr_allows_ri_impl \
fascist_firewall_allows_rs_impl reachable_addr_allows_rs_impl \
fascist_firewall_allows_rs reachable_addr_allows_rs \
fascist_firewall_allows_md_impl reachable_addr_allows_md_impl \
fascist_firewall_allows_node reachable_addr_allows_node \
fascist_firewall_allows_dir_server reachable_addr_allows_dir_server \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_impl reachable_addr_choose_impl \
fascist_firewall_choose_address reachable_addr_choose \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_base reachable_addr_choose_base \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_rs reachable_addr_choose_from_rs \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls reachable_addr_choose_from_ls \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_node reachable_addr_choose_from_node \
fascist_firewall_choose_address_dir_server reachable_addr_choose_from_dir_server
This is an automated commit, generated by this command:
./scripts/maint/rename_c_identifier.py \
protover_contains_long_protocol_names protover_list_is_invalid
Added tests for
1. commit_max
2. advance_obs
3. add_obs
4. rep_hist_fill_bandwidth_history
5. rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines
(Lightly edited by nickm to use new names from bwhist refactoring.)
Signed-off-by: Suraj Upadhyay <usuraj35@gmail.com>
