We would stash the certs in the handshake state before checking them
for validity... and then if they turned out to be invalid, we'd give
an error and free them. Then, later, we'd free them again when we
tore down the connection.
Fixes bug 4343; fix on 0.2.3.6-alpha.
Right now we can take the digests only of an RSA key, and only expect to
take the digests of an RSA key. The old tor_cert_get_id_digests() would
return a good set of digests for an RSA key, and an all-zero one for a
non-RSA key. This behavior is too error-prone: it carries the risk that
we will someday check two non-RSA keys for equality and conclude that
they must be equal because they both have the same (zero) "digest".
Instead, let's have tor_cert_get_id_digests() return NULL for keys we
can't handle, and make its callers explicitly test for NULL.
Also, define all commands > 128 as variable-length when using
v3 or later link protocol. Running into a var cell with an
unrecognized type is no longer a bug.
The conflicts were mainly caused by the routerinfo->node transition.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
src/or/command.c
src/or/connection_edge.c
src/or/directory.c
src/or/dirserv.c
src/or/relay.c
src/or/rendservice.c
src/or/routerlist.c
Most instances were dead code; for those, I removed the assignments.
Some were pieces of info we don't currently plan to use, but which
we might in the future. For those, I added an explicit cast-to-void
to indicate that we know that the thing's unused. Finally, one was
a case where we were testing the wrong variable in a unit test.
That one I fixed.
This resolves bug 3208.
This patch introduces a few new functions in router.c to produce a
more helpful description of a node than its nickame, and then tweaks
nearly all log messages taking a nickname as an argument to call these
functions instead.
There are a few cases where I left the old log messages alone: in
these cases, the nickname was that of an authority (whose nicknames
are useful and unique), or the message already included an identity
and/or an address. I might have missed a couple more too.
This is a fix for bug 3045.
Changed received_netinfo_from_trusted_dir into a
tristate in order to keep track of whether we have
already tried contacting a trusted dir. So we don't
send multiple requests if we get a bunch of skews.
Some of these functions only work for routerinfo-based nodes, and as
such are only usable for advisory purposes. Fortunately, our uses
of them are compatible with this limitation.
A node_t is an abstraction over routerstatus_t, routerinfo_t, and
microdesc_t. It should try to present a consistent interface to all
of them. There should be a node_t for a server whenever there is
* A routerinfo_t for it in the routerlist
* A routerstatus_t in the current_consensus.
(note that a microdesc_t alone isn't enough to make a node_t exist,
since microdescriptors aren't usable on their own.)
There are three ways to get a node_t right now: looking it up by ID,
looking it up by nickname, and iterating over the whole list of
microdescriptors.
All (or nearly all) functions that are supposed to return "a router"
-- especially those used in building connections and circuits --
should return a node_t, not a routerinfo_t or a routerstatus_t.
A node_t should hold all the *mutable* flags about a node. This
patch moves the is_foo flags from routerinfo_t into node_t. The
flags in routerstatus_t remain, but they get set from the consensus
and should not change.
Some other highlights of this patch are:
* Looking up routerinfo and routerstatus by nickname is now
unified and based on the "look up a node by nickname" function.
This tries to look only at the values from current consensus,
and not get confused by the routerinfo_t->is_named flag, which
could get set for other weird reasons. This changes the
behavior of how authorities (when acting as clients) deal with
nodes that have been listed by nickname.
* I tried not to artificially increase the size of the diff here
by moving functions around. As a result, some functions that
now operate on nodes are now in the wrong file -- they should
get moved to nodelist.c once this refactoring settles down.
This moving should happen as part of a patch that moves
functions AND NOTHING ELSE.
* Some old code is now left around inside #if 0/1 blocks, and
should get removed once I've verified that I don't want it
sitting around to see how we used to do things.
There are still some unimplemented functions: these are flagged
with "UNIMPLEMENTED_NODELIST()." I'll work on filling in the
implementation here, piece by piece.
I wish this patch could have been smaller, but there did not seem to
be any piece of it that was independent from the rest. Moving flags
forces many functions that once returned routerinfo_t * to return
node_t *, which forces their friends to change, and so on.
The new rule is: safe_str_X() means "this string is a piece of X
information; make it safe to log." safe_str() on its own means
"this string is a piece of who-knows-what; make it safe to log".
We were triggering a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
we connect via the v2 connection protocol to any relay that has
a wrong clock. Instead, we should only inform the controller when
it's a trusted authority that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix
on 0.2.0.20-rc; starts to fix bug 1074. Reported by SwissTorExit.
The problem is that clients and hidden services are receiving
relay_early cells, and they tear down the circuit.
Hack #1 is for rendezvous points to rewrite relay_early cells to
relay cells. That way there are never any incoming relay_early cells.
Hack #2 is for clients and hidden services to never send a relay_early
cell on an established rendezvous circuit. That works around rendezvous
points that haven't upgraded yet.
Hack #3 is for clients and hidden services to not tear down the circuit
when they receive an inbound relay_early cell. We already refuse extend
cells at clients.