Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Deprecated in 0.2.9.2-alpha, this commits changes it as OBSOLETE() and cleans
up the code associated with it.
Partially fixes#22060
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This unifies CircuitIdleTimeout and PredictedCircsRelevanceTime into a single
option, and randomizes it.
It also gives us control over the default value as well as relay-to-relay
connection lifespan through the consensus.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/or/config.c
src/or/main.c
src/test/testing_common.c
This defense will cause Cisco, Juniper, Fortinet, and other routers operating
in the default configuration to collapse netflow records that would normally
be split due to the 15 second flow idle timeout.
Collapsing these records should greatly reduce the utility of default netflow
data for correlation attacks, since all client-side records should become 30
minute chunks of total bytes sent/received, rather than creating multiple
separate records for every webpage load/ssh command interaction/XMPP chat/whatever
else happens to be inactive for more than 15 seconds.
The defense adds consensus parameters to govern the range of timeout values
for sending padding packets, as well as for keeping connections open.
The defense only sends padding when connections are otherwise inactive, and it
does not pad connections used solely for directory traffic at all. By default
it also doesn't pad inter-relay connections.
Statistics on the total padding in the last 24 hours are exported to the
extra-info descriptors.
Bridge lines in torrc can contain key=value settings as per-connection
arguments to a pluggable transport. tor.1.txt hadn't been updated to
reflect this.
In addition to the comments in the ticket, couple hidden service options have
been improved to clarify the maximum and minimum values they can be set to.
Closes#21058
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Back when Roger had do do most of our testing on the moria host, we
needed a higher limit for the number of relays running on a single
IP address when that limit was shared with an authority. Nowadays,
the idea is pretty obsolete.
Also remove the router_addr_is_trusted_dir() function, which served
no other purpose.
Closes ticket 20960.
If there is some horrible bug in our ed25519 link authentication
code that causes us to label every single ed25519-having node as
non-running, we'll be glad we had this. Otherwise we can remove it
later.
I need to be able to turn on Ed25519 support in client generation
of extend cells so I can test it, but leave it off-by-default until
enough clients support it for us to turn it on for a bunch at once.
This is part of #15056 / prop#220.
The client addr is essentially meaningless in this context (yes, it is
possible to explicitly `bind()` AF_LOCAL client side sockets to a path,
but no one does it, and there are better ways to grant that sort of
feature if people want it like using `SO_PASSCRED`).
Parse the value to UseEntryNodes_option, then set UseEntryNodes before
validating options.
This way, Authorities, Tor2web, and Single Onion Services don't write
spurious "UseEntryNodes 0" lines to their configs. Document the fact that
these tor configurations ignore UseEntryNodes in the manual page.
Also reorder options validation so we modify UseEntryNodes first, then
check its value against EntryNodes.
And silence a warning about disabled UseEntryNodes for hidden services
when we're actually in non-anonymous single onion service mode.
Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
... when the directory authorities don't set min_paths_for_circs_pct.
Fixes bug 20117; bugfix on 02c320916e in tor-0.2.4.10-alpha.
Reported by Jesse V.
OnionTrafficOnly is equivalent to NoDNSRequest, NoIPv4Traffic,
and NoIPv6Traffic.
Add unit tests for parsing and checking option validity.
Add documentation for each flag to the man page.
Add changes file for all of #18693.
Parsing only: the flags do not change client behaviour (yet!)
Rely on onion_populate_cpath to check that we're only using
TAP for the rare hidden service cases.
Check and log if handshakes only support TAP when they should support
ntor.
This commit adds the commit(s) line in the vote as well as the SR values. It
also has the mechanism to add the majority SRVs in the consensus.
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
From 0.2.7.2-alpha onwards, Exits would reject all the IP addresses
they knew about in their exit policy. But this may have disclosed
addresses that were otherwise unlisted.
Now, only advertised addresses are rejected by default by
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate. All known addresses are only rejected when
ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces is explicitly set to 1.
This changes simply renames them by removing "Testing" in front of them and
they do not require TestingTorNetwork to be enabled anymore.
Fixes#18481
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Regardless of the setting of ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.
This fixes a bug with pluggable transports that ignore the
(potentially private) address in their bridge line.
Fixes bug 18517; bugfix on 23b088907f in tor-0.2.8.1-alpha.
When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is auto, bridges prefer the configured
bridge ORPort address. Otherwise, they use the value of the option.
Other clients prefer IPv4 ORPorts if ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is auto.
When ClientPreferIPv6DirPort is auto, all clients prefer IPv4 DirPorts.
Bridge clients ignore ClientUseIPv6, acting as if it is always 1.
This preserves existing behaviour.
Make ClientPreferIPv6OR/DirPort auto by default:
* Bridge clients prefer IPv6 by default.
* Other clients prefer IPv4 by default.
This preserves existing behaviour.
ClientUseIPv4 0 tells tor to avoid IPv4 client connections.
ClientPreferIPv6DirPort 1 tells tor to prefer IPv6 directory connections.
Refactor policy for IPv4/IPv6 preferences.
Fix a bug where node->ipv6_preferred could become stale if
ClientPreferIPv6ORPort was changed after the consensus was loaded.
Update documentation, existing code, add unit tests.
This will give relay operators the ability of disabling the caching of
directory data. In general, this should not be necessary, but on some
lower-resource systems it may beneficial.
* The option is now KeepBindCapabilities
* We now warn if the user specifically asked for KeepBindCapabilities
and we can't deliver.
* The unit tests are willing to start.
* Fewer unused-variable warnings.
* More documentation, fewer misspellings.
Once tor is downloading a usable consensus, any other connection
attempts are not needed.
Choose a connection to keep, favouring:
* fallback directories over authorities,
* connections initiated earlier over later connections
Close all other connections downloading a consensus.
Prop210: Add attempt-based connection schedules
Existing tor schedules increment the schedule position on failure,
then retry the connection after the scheduled time.
To make multiple simultaneous connections, we need to increment the
schedule position when making each attempt, then retry a (potentially
simultaneous) connection after the scheduled time.
(Also change find_dl_schedule_and_len to find_dl_schedule, as it no
longer takes or returns len.)
Prop210: Add multiple simultaneous consensus downloads for clients
Make connections on TestingClientBootstrapConsensus*DownloadSchedule,
incrementing the schedule each time the client attempts to connect.
Check if the number of downloads is less than
TestingClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries before trying any
more connections.
UseDefaultFallbackDirs enables any hard-coded fallback
directory mirrors. Default is 1, set it to 0 to disable fallbacks.
Implements ticket 17576.
Patch by "teor".
Refuse connection requests to private OR addresses unless
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set. Previously, tor would
connect, then refuse to send any cells to a private address.
Fixes bugs 17674 and 8976; bugfix on b7c172c9ec (28 Aug 2012)
Original bug 6710, released in 0.2.3.21-rc and an 0.2.2 maint
release.
Patch by "teor".
The slop testing options are the only spot where we try to enumerate multiple
options on the same line. Changing them to each be on their own line as we do
elsewhere.
When applying changes from proposal 171 Nick renamed SocksPort to SOCKSPort,
and SocksListenAddress to SOCKSListenAddress...
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=891ccd3cd0690e83f1dc4dde7698c3bd9d7fe98d
However, this didn't change the option itself in tor (it's still SocksPort),
and wasn't even uniform in the man page. Functionally this doesn't matter
(tor's config options are case insensitive) but this is a pretty clear
regression.
When logging to syslog, allow a tag to be added to the syslog identity
("Tor"), i.e. the string prepended to every log message. The tag can be
configured by setting SyslogIdentityTag and defaults to none. Setting
it to "foo" will cause logs to be tagged as "Tor-foo". Closes: #17194.
Update the definition of the private exit policy in the man page
and torrcs. It didn't get merged correctly into the man page, and
it was incomplete in the torrcs. (Unfortunately, we only reject the
primary configured IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, not all configured IPv4
and IPv6 addresses.)
Also fixup msn page formatting errors from changes in tickets 16069
and 17027, mainly unescaped *s.
Advise users how to configure separate IPv4 and IPv6 exit
policies in the manpage and sample torrcs.
Related to fixes in ticket #16069 and #17027. Patch by "teor".
Patch on 2eb7eafc9d and a96c0affcb (25 Oct 2012),
released in 0.2.4.7-alpha.
src/test/test_policy.c:
Merged calls to policies_parse_exit_policy by adding additional arguments.
fixup to remaining instance of ~EXIT_POLICY_IPV6_ENABLED.
Compacting logic test now produces previous list length of 4, corrected this.
src/config/torrc.sample.in:
src/config/torrc.minimal.in-staging:
Merged torrc modification dates in favour of latest.
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate now rejects more local addresses by default:
* the relay's published IPv6 address (if any), and
* any publicly routable IPv4 or IPv6 addresses on any local interfaces.
This resolves a security issue for IPv6 Exits and multihomed Exits that
trust connections originating from localhost.
Resolves ticket 17027. Patch by "teor".
Patch on 42b8fb5a15 (11 Nov 2007), released in 0.2.0.11-alpha.
In previous versions of Tor, ExitPolicy accept6/reject6 * produced
policy entries for IPv4 and IPv6 wildcard addresses.
To reduce operator confusion, change accept6/reject6 * to only produce
an IPv6 wildcard address.
Resolves bug #16069.
Patch on 2eb7eafc9d and a96c0affcb (25 Oct 2012),
released in 0.2.4.7-alpha.
This controls the circuit dirtyness reset behavior added for Tor
Browser's user experience fix (#15482). Unlike previous iterations
of this patch, the tunable actually works, and is documented.
When this is set, and Tor is running as a relay, it will not
generate or load its secret identity key. You can manage the secret
identity key with --keygen. Implements ticket 16944.
"option to prevent guard,exit,hsdir flag assignment"
"A node will never receive the corresponding flag unless
that node is specified in the
TestingDirAuthVote{Exit,Guard,HSDir} list, regardless of
its uptime, bandwidth, exit policy, or DirPort".
Patch modified by "teor": VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2
is now obsolete, so TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir always
votes on HSDirs.
Closes ticket 14882. Patch by "robgjansen".
Commit message and changes file by "teor"
with quotes from "robgjansen".
Fix an error in the manual page and comments for
TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir, which suggested that a
HSDir required "ORPort connectivity". While this is true,
it is in no way unique to the HSDir flag. Of all the flags,
only HSDirs need a DirPort configured in order for the
authorities to assign that particular flag.
Fixed as part of 14882. Patch by "teor".
Bugfix on 0.2.6.3 (f9d57473e1 on 10 January 2015).
This is a way to specify the amount of introduction points an hidden service
can have. Maximum value is 10 and the default is 3.
Fixes#4862
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
When set, this limits the maximum number of simultaneous streams per
rendezvous circuit on the server side of a HS, with further RELAY_BEGIN
cells being silently ignored.
This can be modified via "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit", which
if set will cause offending rendezvous circuits to be torn down instead.
Addresses part of #16052.
Parse the file just before voting and apply its information to the
provided vote_routerstatus_t. This follows the same logic as when
dirauths parse bwauth files.
This incidentally makes unix SocksSocket support all the same options
as SocksPort.
This patch breaks 'SocksSocket 0'; next will restore it.
Resolves 14254.
TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir ensures that authorities vote the HSDir flag
for the listed relays regardless of uptime or ORPort connectivity.
Respects the value of VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2.
Partial fix for bug 14067.
If we're not a relay, we ignore it.
If it's set to 1, we obey ExitPolicy.
If it's set to 0, we force ExitPolicy to 'reject *:*'
And if it's set to auto, then we warn the user if they're running an
exit, and tell them how they can stop running an exit if they didn't
mean to do that.
Fixes ticket 10067
This allows hidden services to disable the anti-scanning feature
introduced in 0.2.6.2-alpha. With this option not set, a connection
to an unlisted port closes the circuit. With this option set, only
a RELAY_DONE cell is sent.
Closes ticket #14084.
The two statistics are:
1. number of RELAY cells observed on successfully established
rendezvous circuits; and
2. number of .onion addresses observed as hidden-service
directory.
Both statistics are accumulated over 24 hours, obfuscated by rounding
up to the next multiple of a given number and adding random noise,
and written to local file stats/hidserv-stats.
Notably, no statistics will be gathered on clients or services, but
only on relays.
Authorities are no longer voting on Named, so specifying nodes by
nickname isn't a clever thing to do. (Not that it ever was!) So
remove the documentation that suggests that you should do it.
Additionally, add proper cross-references to our __node__ lists, and
explain about the optional $ before identity digests.
Also, the oxford comma: endorsed by Steven Pinker, my spouse, and my
11th grade English teacher.
Closes 13381.
Add the TestingDirAuthVoteExit option, a list of nodes to vote Exit for,
regardless of their uptime, bandwidth, or exit policy.
TestingTorNetwork must be set for this option to have any effect.
Works around an issue where authorities would take up to 35 minutes to
give nodes the Exit flag in a test network, despite short consensus
intervals. Partially implements ticket 13161.
This implements the meat of #12899. This commit should simply remove the
parts of Tor dirauths used to check whether a relay was supposed to be
named or not, it doesn't yet convert to a new mechanism for
reject/invalid/baddir/badexiting relays.
This is in preparation for a big patch series removing the entire Naming
system from Tor. In its wake, the approved-routers file is being
deprecated, and a replacement option to allow only pre-approved routers
is not being implemented.
When we merged the cookieauthfile creation logic in 33c3e60a37, we
accidentally took out this feature. Fixes bug 12864, bugfix on
0.2.5.1-alpha.
Also adds an ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable, since there's no
reason not to.
I don't know whether we missed these or misclassified them when we
first made the "DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS" section, but they
really belong there.
If we can't detect the physical memory, the new default is 8 GB on
64-bit architectures, and 1 GB on 32-bit architectures.
If we *can* detect the physical memory, the new default is
CLAMP(256 MB, phys_mem * 0.75, MAX_DFLT)
where MAX_DFLT is 8 GB on 64-bit architectures and 2 GB on 32-bit
architectures.
You can still override the default by hand. The logic here is simply
trying to choose a lower default value on systems with less than 12 GB
of physical RAM.
This means that tor can run without needing to communicate with ioctls
to the firewall, and therefore doesn't need to run with privileges to
open the /dev/pf device node.
A new TransProxyType is added for this purpose, "pf-divert"; if the user
specifies this TransProxyType in their torrc, then the pf device node is
never opened and the connection destination is determined with getsockname
(as per pf(4)). The default behaviour (ie., when TransProxyType is "default"
when using the pf firewall) is still to assume that pf is configured with
rdr-to rules.
This isn't on by default; to get it, you need to set "TransProxyType
ipfw". (The original patch had automatic detection for whether
/dev/pf is present and openable, but that seems marginally fragile.)
We are searching @CONFDIR@ before $HOME, but the documentation
implied otherwise.
I screwed this up in f5e86bcd6c, when I
first documented the $HOME/.torrc possibility.
Fix for bug 9213; bugfix on 0.2.3.18-rc.
In the end this required a slightly nasty hack using a dummy anchor as
an option heading in order to make the "Other recognized __flags__"
line indent properly.
Fixes bug 11061; Bugfix on 61d740ed.
