Coverity doesn't like it when there are paths to the end of the
function where something doesn't get freed, even when those paths
are only reachable on unit test failure.
Fixes CID 1372899 and CID 1372900. Bug not in any released Tor.
Instead, refuse to start tor if any hidden service key has been used in
a different hidden service anonymity mode.
Fixes bug 20638; bugfix on 17178 in 0.2.9.3-alpha; reported by ahf.
The original single onion service poisoning code checked poisoning state
in options_validate, and poisoned in options_act. This was problematic,
because the global array of hidden services had not been populated in
options_validate (and there were ordrering issues with hidden service
directory creation).
This patch fixes this issue in rend_service_check_dir_and_add, which:
* creates the directory, or checks permissions on an existing directory, then
* checks the poisoning state of the directory, then
* poisons the directory.
When validating, only the permissions checks and the poisoning state checks
are perfomed (the directory is not modified).
In order to implement proposal 224, we need the data structure rend_data_t to
be able to accomodate versionning that is the current version of hidden
service (2) and the new version (3) and future version.
For that, we implement a series of accessors and a downcast function to get
the v2 data structure. rend_data_t becomes a top level generic place holder.
The entire rend_data_t API has been moved to hs_common.{c|h} in order to
seperate code that is shared from between HS versions and unshared code (in
rendcommon.c).
Closes#19024
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis <desnacked@riseup.net>
Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
Tor stores client authorization cookies in two slightly different forms.
The service's client_keys file has the standard base64-encoded cookie,
including two chars of padding. The hostname file and the client remove
the two padding chars, and store an auth type flag in the unused bits.
The distinction makes no sense. Refactor all decoding to use the same
function, which will accept either form, and use a helper function for
encoding the truncated format.
Previously we'd put these strings right on the controllers'
outbufs. But this could cause some trouble, for these reasons:
1) Calling the network stack directly here would make a huge portion
of our networking code (from which so much of the rest of Tor is
reachable) reachable from everything that potentially generated
controller events.
2) Since _some_ events (EVENT_ERR for instance) would cause us to
call connection_flush(), every control_event_* function would
appear to be able to reach even _more_ of the network stack in
our cllgraph.
3) Every time we generated an event, we'd have to walk the whole
connection list, which isn't exactly fast.
This is an attempt to break down the "blob" described in
http://archives.seul.org/tor/dev/Mar-2015/msg00197.html -- the set of
functions from which nearly all the other functions in Tor are
reachable.
Closes ticket 16695.
With #15881 implemented, this adds the missing descriptor ID at the end of
the expected control message.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
For FAILED and RECEIVED action of the HS_DESC event, we now sends back the
descriptor ID at the end like specified in the control-spec section 4.1.25.
Fixes#15881
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
The HS_DESC event was using rend_data_t from the dir connection to reply the
onion address and authentication type. With the new HSFETCH command, it's
now possible to fetch a descriptor only using the descriptor id thus
resulting in not having an onion address in any HS_DESC event.
This patch removes rend_query from the hs desc control functions and replace
it by an onion address string and an auth type.
On a successful fetch, the service id is taken from the fetched descriptor.
For that, an extra parameter is added to "store as a client" function that
contains the cache entry stored.
This will make the control event functions scale more easily over time if
other values not present in rend_data_t are needed since the rend_data from
the dir connection might not contained everything we need.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
As defined in section 4.1.26 in the control-spec.txt, this new event replies
the content of a successfully fetched HS descriptor. This also adds a unit
test for the controller event.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
According to control spec, longname should not contain any spaces and is
consists only of identy_digest + nickname
added two functions:
* node_get_verbose_nickname_by_id()
* node_describe_longname_by_id()
My OSX laptop rightly gave a warning because of sticking strlen() into
an int, but once I took a closer look... it appears that the strlen()
was part of a needlessly verbose implementation for tor_strdup().
While I was there, I fixed the usage of tor_free() in test_hs.c: It
checks for NULL, and it zeros its argument. So instead of
if (foo) {
tor_free(foo);
foo = NULL;
}
we should just say
tor_free(foo);
