This way, all of the DA operators can upgrade immediately, without nuking
every client's set of entry guards as soon as a majority of them upgrade.
Until enough guards have upgraded, a majority of dirauths should set this
config option so that there are still enough guards in the network. After
a few days pass, all dirauths should use the default.
Also, define all commands > 128 as variable-length when using
v3 or later link protocol. Running into a var cell with an
unrecognized type is no longer a bug.
Conflicts:
src/or/connection.c
src/or/connection_edge.c
src/or/connection_edge.h
src/or/dnsserv.c
Some of these were a little tricky, since they touched code that
changed because of the prop171 fixes.
Now we track *which* stream with ISO_STREAM set is associated to a
particular circuit, so that we won't think that stream is incompatible
with its circuit and launch another one a second later, and we use that
same field to mark circuits which have had an ISO_STREAM stream attached
to them, so that we won't ever put a second stream on that circuit.
Fixes bug 3695.
They *are* non-NUL-terminated, after all (and they have to be, since
the SOCKS5 spec allows them to contain embedded NULs. But the code
to implement proposal 171 was copying them with tor_strdup and
comparing them with strcmp_opt.
Fix for bug on 3683; bug not present in any yet-released version.
Previously we'd just looked at the connection type, but that's
always CONN_TYPE_AP. Instead, we should be looking at the type of
the listener that created the connection.
Spotted by rransom; fixes bug 3636.
The conflicts are with the proposal 171 circuit isolation code, and
they're all trivial: they're just a matter of both branches adding
some unrelated code in the same places.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuituse.c
src/or/connection.c
One-hop dirconn streams all share a session group, and get the
ISO_SESSIONGRP flag: they may share circuits with each other and
nothing else.
Anonymized dirconn streams get a new internal-use-only ISO_STREAM
flag: they may not share circuits with anything, including each other.
The new candidate rule, which arma suggested and I like, is that
the original address as received from the client connection or as
rewritten by the controller is the address that counts.
This is mainly meant as a way to keep clients from accidentally
DOSing themselves by (e.g.) enabling IsolateDestAddr or
IsolateDestPort on a port that they use for HTTP.
Our old "do we need to launch a circuit for stream S" logic was,
more or less, that if we had a pending circuit that could handle S,
we didn't need to launch a new one.
But now that we have streams isolated from one another, we need
something stronger here: It's possible that some pending C can
handle either S1 or S2, but not both.
This patch reuses the existing isolation logic for a simple
solution: when we decide during circuit launching that some pending
C would satisfy stream S1, we "hypothetically" mark C as though S1
had been connected to it. Now if S2 is incompatible with S1, it
won't be something that can attach to C, and so we'll launch a new
stream.
When the circuit becomes OPEN for the first time (with no streams
attached to it), we reset the circuit's isolation status. I'm not
too sure about this part: I wanted some way to be sure that, if all
streams that would have used a circuit die before the circuit is
done, the circuit can still get used. But I worry that this
approach could also lead to us launching too many circuits. Careful
thought needed here.
The "nym epoch" of a stream is defined as the number of times that
NEWNYM had been called before the stream was opened. All streams
are isolated by nym epoch.
This feature should be redundant with existing signewnym stuff, but
it provides a good belt-and-suspenders way for us to avoid ever
letting any circuit type bypass signewnym.
