The key here is to never touch ssl->cipher_list directly, but only
via SSL_get_ciphers(). But it's not so simple.
See, if there is no specialized cipher_list on the SSL object,
SSL_get_ciphers returns the cipher_list on the SSL_CTX. But we sure
don't want to modify that one! So we need to use
SSL_set_cipher_list first to make sure that we really have a cipher
list on the SSL object.
This field was only needed to work with the now-long-gone (I hope,
except for some horrible apples) openssl 0.9.8l; if your headers say
you have openssl 1.1, you won't even need it.
apparantly, "pragma GCC diagnostic push/pop" don't exist with older versions.
Fixes bug in 740e592790f570c446cbb5e6d4a77f842f75; bug not in any
released Tor.
This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
Found because LibreSSL has OPENSSL_NO_COMP always-on, but this
conflicts with the way that _we_ turn off compression. Patch from
dhill, who attributes it to "OpenBSD". Fixes bug 12602; bugfix on
0.2.1.1-alpha, which introduced this turn-compression-off code.
This function is supposed to construct a list of all the ciphers in
the "v2 link protocol cipher list" that are supported by Tor's
openssl. It does this by invoking ssl23_get_cipher_by_char on each
two-byte ciphersuite ID to see which ones give a match. But when
ssl23_get_cipher_by_char cannot find a match for a two-byte SSL3/TLS
ciphersuite ID, it checks to see whether it has a match for a
three-byte SSL2 ciphersuite ID. This was causing a read off the end
of the 'cipherid' array.
This was probably harmless in practice, but we shouldn't be having
any uninitialized reads.
(Using ssl23_get_cipher_by_char in this way is a kludge, but then
again the entire existence of the v2 link protocol is kind of a
kludge. Once Tor 0.2.2 clients are all gone, we can drop this code
entirely.)
Found by starlight. Fix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. Fixes bug 12227.
The server cipher list is (thanks to #11513) chosen systematically to
put the best choices for Tor first. The client cipher list is chosen
to resemble a browser. So let's set SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
to have the servers pick according to their own preference order.
A new set of unit test cases are provided, as well as introducing
an alternative paradigm and macros to support it. Primarily, each test
case is given its own namespace, in order to isolate tests from each
other. We do this by in the usual fashion, by appending module and
submodule names to our symbols. New macros assist by reducing friction
for this and other tasks, like overriding a function in the global
namespace with one in the current namespace, or declaring integer
variables to assist tracking how many times a mock has been called.
A set of tests for a small-scale module has been included in this
commit, in order to highlight how the paradigm can be used. This
suite gives 100% coverage to status.c in test execution.
Back in 175b2678, we allowed servers to recognize clients who are
telling them the truth about their ciphersuites, and select the best
cipher from on that list. This implemented the server side of proposal
198.
In bugs 11492, 11498, and 11499, cypherpunks found a bunch of mistakes
and omissions and typos in the UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST we had.
In #11513, I found a couple more.
Rather than try to hand-edit this list, I wrote a short python script
to generate our ciphersuite preferences from the openssl headers.
The new rules are:
* Require forward secrecy.
* Require RSA (since our servers only configure RSA keys)
* Require AES or 3DES. (This means, reject RC4, DES, SEED, CAMELLIA,
and NULL.)
* No export ciphersuites.
Then:
* Prefer AES to 3DES.
* If both suites have the same cipher, prefer ECDHE to DHE.
* If both suites have the same DHE group type, prefer GCM to CBC.
* If both suites have the same cipher mode, prefer SHA384 to SHA256
to SHA1.
* If both suites have the same digest, prefer AES256 to AES128.
Most of these are simple. The only nontrivial part is that our
pattern for using ENUM_BF was confusing doxygen by making declarations
that didn't look like declarations.
The previous commit from piet would have backed out some of proposal
198 and made servers built without the V2 handshake not use the
unrestricted cipher list from prop198.
Bug not in any released Tor.
According to the manpage, bridges use P256 for conformity and relays
use P224 for speed. But skruffy points out that we've gotten it
backwards in the code.
In this patch, we make the default P256 for everybody.
Fixes bug 9780; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
