Add a bunch of function documentation; clean up a little code; fix some XXXXs; tag the nonsensical EXTRAINFO_PURPOSE_GENERAL as nonsesnse; note another bit of "do not cache special routers" code to nuke.
svn:r11761
Finish implementing and documenting proposal 108: Authorities now use MTBF data to set their stability flags, once they have at least 4 days of data to use.
svn:r11240
Clean up MTBF storage code. Do not count times that we have been down toward the current run. Handle backward timewarps correctly. Store MTBF data on exit in addition to periodically.
svn:r11225
When we are loading state info from disk, never believe any date in the future. Doing so can keep us from retrying guards, rotating onion keys, storing bandwidth info, etc. Fixes bug 434, and others. Backport candidate, once it has been tested.
svn:r11166
Link note_router_reachable and note_router_unreachable to mtbf code. decouple mtbf from connect/disconnect. log it in USR1. do not blow it away on cleanup if we are an authority.
svn:r11151
Minor cleanups on hidden service usage patch from Karsten: tidy documentation; make free_all idempotent (and safe to call even if we have not yet initialized rephist); and stop using "l" as a variable name (it is too easy to confuse with "1").
svn:r10068
Initial version of patch from Karsten Loesing: Add an HSAuthorityRecordStats option to track statistics of overall hidden service usage without logging information that would be useful to an attacker.
svn:r10067
Removing the last DOCDOC comment hurt so much that I had to use Doxygen to identify undocumented macros and comments, and add 150 more DOCDOCs to point out where they were. Oops. Hey, kids! Fixing some of these could be your first Tor patch!
svn:r9477
Round stored/transmitted values for bandwidth usage. This might make some attacks work less well. This might well be voodoo, but it gives me a warm fuzzy feeling.
svn:r9048
Revise logic used to flush state to disk. Now, we try to batch non-urgent changes so that we do not do too many writes, and we save very-non-urgent changes every once in a rare while, and we never save more than once per second.
svn:r9047
Change logging format of state file to only include non-default values. Adjust clients to never store bandwidth history in the state file. (Possible backport candidate.)
svn:r9043
1) Surround all constants by (parens), whether we'll be using them
in a denominator or not.
2) Express all time periods as products (24*60*60), not as multiplied-out
constants (86400).
3) Comments like "(60*60) /* one hour */" are as pointless as comments
like "c = a + b; /* set c to the sum of a and b */". Remove them.
4) All time periods should be #defined constants, not given inline.
5) All time periods should have doxygen comments.
6) All time periods, unless specified, are in seconds. It's not necessary
to say so.
To summarize, the old (lack of) style would allow:
#define FOO_RETRY_INTERVAL 60*60 /* one hour (seconds) */
next_try = now + 3600;
The new style is:
/** How often do we reattempt foo? */
#define FOO_RETRY_INTERVAL (60*60)
next_try = now + RETRY_INTERVAL;
svn:r6142
separately. It's important to keep them separate because internal
circuits have their last hops picked like middle hops, rather than like
exit hops. So exiting on them will break the user's expectations.
- Stop cannibalizing internal circuits for general exits, and stop
cannibalizing exit circuits for rendezvous stuff.
- Don't let new exit streams attach to internal circuits.
- When deciding if we have enough circuits for internal and for exit,
don't count the wrong ones.
- Treat predicted resolves as predicted port 80 exits.
svn:r5457
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
Stop treating the uint16_t's as null-terminated strings,
and stop looking at the byte after them to see if it's null,
because sometimes you're not allowed to look there.
svn:r3108
that will handle each such port. (We can extend this to include addresses
if exit policies shift to require that.) Seed us with port 80 so web
browsers won't complain that Tor is "slow to start up".
This was necessary because our old circuit building strategy just involved
counting circuits, and as time went by we would build up a big pile of
circuits that had peculiar exit policies (e.g. only exit to 9001-9100)
which would take up space in the circuit pile but never get used.
Fix router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy: it was not treating a port of *
as always matching, so we were picking reject *:* nodes as exit nodes too.
If you haven't used a clean circuit in an hour, throw it away, just to
be on the safe side.
This means after 6 hours a totally unused Tor client will have no
circuits open.
svn:r3078
More docs and (way more!) testing needed.
Done:
- Authdirservers down directories from others.
- Generate and use running-routers lists
- Cache directories; store across reboots.
- Refactor directory parsing a bit; note potential trouble spots.
svn:r1985
successful/failed connections, successful/failed extends, and
connection uptimes.
It's still not done: more tests are needed, and not everything calls
connection/circuit_mark_for_close properly. This skews the results.
Also, there needs to be a 'testing' mode for non-OP ORs, where they
periodically build circuits just to test whether extends work.
svn:r1313
