If 'intro' is NULL in these functions, I'm pretty sure that the
error message must be set before we hit the end. But scan-build
doesn't notice that, and is worried that we'll do a null-pointer
dereference in the last-chance errormsg generation.
As it stands, it relies on the fact that onion_queue_entry_remove
will magically remove each onionskin from the right list. This
patch changes the logic to be more resilient to possible bugs in
onion_queue_entry_remove, and less confusing to static analysis tools.
scan-build doesn't realize that a request can't be timed at the end
unless it's timed at the start, and so it's not possible for us to
be subtracting start from end without start being set.
Nevertheless, let's not confuse it.
When get_proxy_addrport returned PROXY_NONE, it would leave
addr/port unset. This is inconsistent, and could (if we used the
function in a stupid way) lead to undefined behavior. Bugfix on
5b050a9b0, though I don't think it affects tor-as-it-is.
Throughout circuituse, when we log about a circuit, we log its
desired path length from build_state. scan-build is irrationally
concerned that build_state might be NULL.
In circuitmux_detach_all_circuits, we check whether an HT iterator
gives us NULL. That should be impossible for an HT iterator. But
our checking it has confused scan-build (justly) into thinking that
our later use of HT_NEXT_RMV might not be kosher. I'm taking the
coward's route here and strengthening the check. Bugfix on
fd31dd44. (Not a real bug though)
If we fail in circuit_get_by_rend_token_and_purpose because the
circuit has no rend_info, don't try to reference fiends from its
rend_info when logging an error. Bugfix on 8b9a2cb68, which is
going into Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha.
Previously we said "Sandbox is not implemented on this platform" on
Linux boxes without libseccomp. Now we say that you need to build
Tor built with libseccomp. Fixes bug 11543; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
Fixes a possible root cause of 11553 by only making 64 attempts at
most to pick a circuitID. Previously, we would test every possible
circuit ID until we found one or ran out.
This algorithm succeeds probabilistically. As the comment says:
This potentially causes us to give up early if our circuit ID
space is nearly full. If we have N circuit IDs in use, then we
will reject a new circuit with probability (N / max_range) ^
MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS. This means that in practice, a few percent
of our circuit ID capacity will go unused.
The alternative here, though, is to do a linear search over the
whole circuit ID space every time we extend a circuit, which is
not so great either.
This makes new vs old clients distinguishable, so we should try to
batch it with other patches that do that, like 11438.
The server cipher list is (thanks to #11513) chosen systematically to
put the best choices for Tor first. The client cipher list is chosen
to resemble a browser. So let's set SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
to have the servers pick according to their own preference order.
This means that tor can run without needing to communicate with ioctls
to the firewall, and therefore doesn't need to run with privileges to
open the /dev/pf device node.
A new TransProxyType is added for this purpose, "pf-divert"; if the user
specifies this TransProxyType in their torrc, then the pf device node is
never opened and the connection destination is determined with getsockname
(as per pf(4)). The default behaviour (ie., when TransProxyType is "default"
when using the pf firewall) is still to assume that pf is configured with
rdr-to rules.
This isn't on by default; to get it, you need to set "TransProxyType
ipfw". (The original patch had automatic detection for whether
/dev/pf is present and openable, but that seems marginally fragile.)
Older versions of Libevent are happy to open SOCK_DGRAM sockets
non-cloexec and non-nonblocking, and then set those flags
afterwards. It's nice to be able to allow a flag to be on or off in
the sandbox without having to enumerate all its values.
Also, permit PF_INET6 sockets. (D'oh!)
Libevent uses an arc4random implementation (I know, I know) to
generate DNS transaction IDs and capitalization. But it liked to
initialize it either with opening /dev/urandom (which won't work
under the sandbox if it doesn't use the right pointer), or with
sysctl({CTL_KERN,KERN_RANDOM,RANDOM_UUIC}). To make _that_ work, we
were permitting sysctl unconditionally. That's not such a great
idea.
Instead, we try to initialize the libevent PRNG _before_ installing
the sandbox, and make sysctl always fail with EPERM under the
sandbox.
The compiler doesn't warn about this code:
rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1,
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD),
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|...));
but note that the arg_cnt argument above is only 1. This means that
only the first filter (argument 0 == AT_FDCWD) is actually checked!
This patch also fixes the above error in the openat() filter.
Earlier I fixed corresponding errors in filters for rename() and
mprotect().
