Fix a memory leak where directory authorities would leak a chunk of
memory for every router descriptor every time they considered voting.
This bug was taking down directory authorities in the live network due
to out-of-memory issues.
Fixes bug 26435; bugfix on 0.3.3.6.
We'd like to feature gate code that calls C from Rust, as a workaround
to several linker issues when running `cargo test` (#25386), and we
can't feature gate anything out of test code if `cargo test` is called
with `--all-features`.
* FIXES#26400: https://bugs.torproject.org/26400
Previously we had code like this for bad things happening from
signal handlers, but it makes sense to use the same logic to handle
cases when something is happening at a level too low for log.c to be
involved.
My raw_assert*() stuff now uses this code.
We had accumulated a bunch of cruft here. Now let's only include
src and src/ext. (exception: src/trunnel is autogenerated code, and
need to include src/trunnel.)
This commit will break the build hard. The next commit will fix it.
The doctests for src/rust/crypto don't compile for multiple reasons,
including some missing exports and incorrect identifier paths. Fixes
bug 26415; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha.
We need this trick because some of our Rust tests depend on our C
code, which in turn depend on other native libraries, which thereby
pulls a whole mess of our build system into "cargo test".
To solve this, we add a build script (build.rs) to set most of the
options that we want based on the contents of config.rust. Some
options can't be set, and need to go to the linker directly: we use
a linker replacement (link_rust.sh) for these. Both config.rust and
link_rust.sh are generated by autoconf for us.
This patch on its own should enough to make the crypto test build,
but not necessarily enough to make it pass.
After the big or.h refactoring, one single unit test file was missing two
headers for node_t and microdesc_t.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Also make sure that we're actually running the test from within the right
cwd, like we do when we're building. This seems necessary to avoid
an error when running offline.
Amusingly, it appears that we had this bug before: we just weren't
noticing it, because of bug 26258.
Here is how this changes the HSv3 client-side and service-side:
For service side we already required live consensus to upload descriptors (see
9e900d1db7) so we should never get there without
a live consensus.
For the client-side we now require a live consensus to attempt to connect to
HS. While this changes the client behavior in principle, it doesn't really
change it, because we always required live consensus to set HSDir indices, so
before this patch a client with no live consensus would try to compute
responsible HSDirs without any HSDir indices and bug out. This makes the client
behavior more consistent, by requiring a live consensus (and hence a
semi-synced clock) for the client to connect to an HS entirely.
The alternative would have been to allow setting HSDir indices with a non-live
consensus, but this would cause the various problems outlined by commit
b89d2fa1db.
There are a few reasons that relays might be uploading desciptors
without saying X-Desc-Gen-Reason:
1. They are running an old version of our software, before 0.3.2.stable.
2. They are not running our software, but they are claiming they
are.
3. They are uploading through a proxy that strips X-Desc-Gen-Reason.
4. They somehow had a bug in their software.
According to the 25686 data, 1 is the most common reason. This
ticket is an attempt to diagnose case 4, or prove that case 4
doesn't actually happen.
With the work on #25500 (reducing CPU client usage), the HS service main loop
callback is enabled as soon as the HS service map changes which happens when
registering a new service.
Unfortunately, for an ephemeral service, we were building the onion address
*after* the registration leading to the "service->onion_address` to be an
empty string.
This broke the "HS_DESC CREATED" event which had no onion address in it. And
also, we were logging an empty onion address for that service.
Fixes#25939
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
* REFACTORS `UnvalidatedProtoEntry::from_str` to place the bulk of the
splitting/parsing logic in to a new
`UnvalidatedProtoEntry::parse_protocol_and_version_str()` method (so that
both `from_str()` and `from_str_any_len()` can call it.)
* ADD a new `UnvalidatedProtoEntry::from_str_any_len()` method in order to
maintain compatibility with consensus methods older than 29.
* ADD a limit on the number of characters in a protocol name.
* FIXES part of #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES#25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
* REFACTORS `UnvalidatedProtoEntry::from_str` to place the bulk of the
splitting/parsing logic in to a new
`UnvalidatedProtoEntry::parse_protocol_and_version_str()` method (so that
both `from_str()` and `from_str_any_len()` can call it.)
* ADD a new `UnvalidatedProtoEntry::from_str_any_len()` method in order to
maintain compatibility with consensus methods older than 29.
* ADD a limit on the number of characters in a protocol name.
* FIXES part of #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of
`proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number.
For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t));
proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa");
proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1;
range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in
`expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the
string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1"
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2"
[…]
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead
expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031,
and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is
subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol.
(Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug
has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in
parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list().
* ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught.
* FIXES#25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517
Apparently, even though I had tested on OpenSSL 1.1.1 with
no-deprecated, OpenSSL 1.1.0 is different enough that I should have
tested with that as well.
Fixes bug 26156; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha where we first declared
support for this configuration.
Add two new files (crypto_hkdf.c, crypto_hkdf.h) as new module of crypto.[ch].
This new module includes all functions and dependencies related to HKDF
operations. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch].
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
i don't know if whitespace is ok to have before preprocessing
directives on all platforms, but anyway we almost never have it,
so now things are more uniform.
Before this commit, the control events were never triggered. It was introduced
with commit 0c19ce7bde.
Fixes#26082
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We alloc/free X.509 structures in three ways:
1) X509 structure allocated with X509_new() and X509_free()
2) Fake X509 structure allocated with fake_x509_malloc() and fake_x509_free()
May contain valid pointers inside.
3) Empty X509 structure shell allocated with tor_malloc_zero() and
freed with tor_free()
The specification describes the signature token to be right after a newline
(\n) then the token "signature" and then a white-space followed by the encoded
signature.
This commit makes sure that when we parse the signature from the descriptor,
we are always looking for that extra white-space at the end of the token.
It will allow us also to support future fields that might start with
"signature".
Fixes#26069
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
There are three cases where this can happen: changes in our
controller events, changes in our DisableNetwork setting, and
changes in our hibernation state.
Closes ticket 26063.
Two new values in each direction. DELIVERED counts valid end-to-end circuit
data that is accepted by our end and OVERHEAD counts the slack unused data in
each of the relay command cells for those accepted cells.
Control port changes are in the next commit.
We still do this time update here, since we do it from all
callbacks, but it is no longer a reason to keep the once-per-second
callback enabled.
Closes ticket 26009.
Since we're going to be disabling the second-elapsed callback, we're
going to sometimes have long periods when no events file, and so the
current second is not updated. Handle that by having a better means
to detect "clock jumps" as opposed to "being idle for a while".
Tolerate far more of the latter.
Part of #26009.
The any_client_port_set() returns true if the ControlPort is set which is
wrong because we can have that port open but still not behave as a tor client
(like many relays for instance).
Fixes#26062
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The options_any_client_port_set() returns true if the ControlPort is set which
is wrong because we can have that port open but still not behave as a tor
client (like many relays for instance).
Fixes#26062
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This functions is now used outside of networkstatus.c and makes more sense to
be in config.c.
It is also renamed to options_any_client_port_set() for the config.c
namespace.
No code behavior change.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Now it has a function that can tell the rest of Tor whether any
once-a-second controller item should fire, and a function to fire
all the once-a-second events.
When directory authorities read a zero-byte bandwidth file, they log
a warning with the contents of an uninitialised buffer. Log a warning
about the empty file instead.
Fixes bug 26007; bugfix on 0.2.2.1-alpha.
Remove v3 optimization which made Tor not detect disabling services.
This optimization is not so needed because we only call that function after HUP
anyway.
Fixes bug #25761.
During service configuration, rend_service_prune_list_impl_() sets
rend_service_staging_list to NULL, which blocked pruning after a HUP.
This patch initializes rend_service_staging_list when needed, so that HUP can
detect disabled onion services.
Fixes bug #25761.
Previously the coverage on this function was mostly accidental,
coming as it did from test_entryconn.c. These new tests use mocking
to ensure that we actually hit the different failure and retry cases
of addressmap_get_virtual_address(), and make our test coverage a
bit more deterministic.
Closes ticket 25993.
Previously, an authority with a clock more than 60 seconds ahead could
cause a client with a correct clock to warn that the client's clock
was behind. Now the clocks of a majority of directory authorities
have to be ahead of the client before this warning will occur.
Relax the early-consensus check so that a client's clock must be 60
seconds behind the earliest time that a given sufficiently-signed
consensus could possibly be available.
Add a new unit test that calls warn_early_consensus() directly.
Fixes bug 25756; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha.
construct_consensus() in test_routerlist.c created votes using a
timestamp from time(). Tests that called construct_consensus() might
have nondeterministic results if they rely on time() not changing too
much on two successive calls.
Neither existing of the two existing tests that calls
construct_consensus is likely to have a failure due to this problem.
Included crypto_dh.h in some files in order to solve DH module dependency
issues.
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Add two new files (crypto_dh.c, crypto_dh.h) as new module of crypto.[ch]. This
new module includes all functions and dependencies related to DH operations.
Those have been removed from crypto.[ch].
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
crypto_log_errors() has been moved to crypto_util.[ch]. It was duplicated in
some files so they have been removed too.
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Code movement for the refactoring for ticket 24658 didn't copy the
inclusion of sys/random.h, which is needed to get a prototype for
getentropy() on macOS 10.12 Sierra. It also didn't copy the inclusion
of sys/syscall.h, which might prevent the getrandom() syscall from
being properly detected. Move these inclusions. Bug not in any
released Tor.
Our previous algorithm had a nonzero probability of picking no
events to cancel, which is of course incorrect. The new code uses
Vitter's good old reservoir sampling "algorithm R" from 1985.
Fixes bug 26008; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
This functionality was covered only accidentally by our voting-test
code, and as such wasn't actually tested at all. The tests that
called it made its coverage nondeterministic, depending on what time
of day you ran the tests.
Closes ticket 26014.
This is needed for libressl-2.6.4 compatibility, which we broke when
we merged a15b2c57e1 to fix bug 19981. Fixes bug 26005; bug
not in any released Tor.
We cleared this value in second_elapsed_callback. But what were we
using it for? For detecting if Libevent returned EINVAL too often!
We already have a way to detect too-frequent events, and that's with
a ratelim_t. Refactor the code to use that instead. Closes ticket
26016.
