Right now, we only consider sending stream-level SENDME cells when we
have completely flushed a connection_edge's outbuf, or when it sends
us a DATA cell. Neither of these is ideal for throughput.
This patch changes the behavior so we now call
connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme when we flush _some_ data from
an edge outbuf.
Fix for bug 2756; bugfix on svn r152.
Resolved nontrivial conflict around rewrite_x_address_for_bridge and
learned_bridge_descriptor. Now, since leanred_bridge_descriptor works
on nodes, we must make sure that rewrite_node_address_for_bridge also
works on nodes.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
It is important to verify the uptime claim of a relay instead of just
trusting it, otherwise it becomes too easy to blackhole a specific
hidden service. rephist already has data available that we can use here.
Bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
Partial backport of daa0326aaa .
Resolves bug 2402. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15 (for the part where we switched to
git) and on 0.2.1.30 (for the part where we dumped micro-revisions.)
We want to use the discard port correctly, so a htons() was missing.
Also we need to set it correctly depending on address family.
Review provided by danieldg
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
(Backport from 0.2.2's 5ed73e3807)
rransom noticed that a change of ORPort is just as bad as a change of IP
address from a client's perspective, because both mean that the relay is
not available to them while the new information hasn't propagated.
Change the bug1035 fix accordingly.
Also make sure we don't log a bridge's IP address (which might happen
when we are the bridge authority).
It is often not entirely clear what options Tor was built with, so it
might not be immediately obvious which config file Tor is using when it
found one. Log the config file at startup.
We detect and reject said attempts if there is no chosen exit node or
circuit: connecting to a private addr via a randomly chosen exit node
will usually fail (if all exits reject private addresses), is always
ill-defined (you're not asking for any particular host or service),
and usually an error (you've configured all requests to go over Tor
when you really wanted to configure all _remote_ requests to go over
Tor).
This can also help detect forwarding loop requests.
Found as part of bug2279.
If we got a signed digest that was shorter than the required digest
length, but longer than 20 bytes, we would accept it as long
enough.... and then immediately fail when we want to check it.
Fixes bug 2409; bug in 0.2.2.20-alpha; found by piebeer.
Previously if you wanted to say "All messages except network
messages", you needed to say "[*,~net]" and if you said "[~net]" by
mistake, you would get no messages at all. Now, if you say "[~net]",
you get everything except networking messages.
When we added support for separate client tls certs on bridges in
a2bb0bfdd5 we forgot to correctly initialize this when changing
from relay to bridge or vice versa while Tor is running. Fix that
by always initializing keys when the state changes.
Fixes bug 2433.
When we stopped using svn, 0.2.1.x lost the ability to notice its svn
revision and report it in the version number. However, it kept
looking at the micro-revision.i file... so if you switched to master,
built tor, then switched to 0.2.1.x, you'd get a micro-revision.i file
from master reported as an SVN tag. This patch takes out the "include
the svn tag" logic entirely.
Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.
Our regular DH parameters that we use for circuit and rendezvous
crypto are unchanged. This is yet another small step on the path of
protocol fingerprinting resistance.
This patch imposes (very long) limits on the length of a line in a
directory document, and on the length of a certificate. I don't
think it should actually be possible to overrun these remotely,
since we already impose a maximum size on any directory object we're
downloading, but a little defensive programming never hurt anybody.
Roger emailed me that doorss reported these on IRC, but nobody seems
to have put them on the bugtracker.
We need to make sure that the worst thing that a weird consensus param
can do to us is to break our Tor (and only if the other Tors are
reliably broken in the same way) so that the majority of directory
authorities can't pull any attacks that are worse than the DoS that
they can trigger by simply shutting down.
One of these worse things was the cbtnummodes parameter, which could
lead to heap corruption on some systems if the value was sufficiently
large.
This commit fixes this particular issue and also introduces sanity
checking for all consensus parameters.
Our public key functions assumed that they were always writing into a
large enough buffer. In one case, they weren't.
(Incorporates fixes from sebastian)
In dnsserv_resolved(), we carefully made a nul-terminated copy of the
answer in a PTR RESOLVED cell... then never used that nul-terminated
copy. Ouch.
Surprisingly this one isn't as huge a security problem as it could be.
The only place where the input to dnsserv_resolved wasn't necessarily
nul-terminated was when it was called indirectly from relay.c with the
contents of a relay cell's payload. If the end of the payload was
filled with junk, eventdns.c would take the strdup() of the name [This
part is bad; we might crash there if the cell is in a bad part of the
stack or the heap] and get a name of at least length
495[*]. eventdns.c then rejects any name of length over 255, so the
bogus data would be neither transmitted nor altered.
[*] If the name was less than 495 bytes long, the client wouldn't
actually be reading off the end of the cell.
Nonetheless this is a reasonably annoying bug. Better fix it.
Found while looking at bug 2332, reported by doorss. Bugfix on
0.2.0.1-alpha.
