This commit adds the src/trace directory containing the basics for our tracing
subsystem. It is not used in the code base. The "src/trace/debug.h" file
contains an example on how we can map our tor trace events to log_debug().
The tracing subsystem can only be enabled by tracing framework at compile
time. This commit introduces the "--enable-tracing-debug" option that will
make all "tor_trace()" function be maped to "log_debug()".
Closes#13802
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
That log statement can be triggered if somebody on the Internet behaves badly
which is possible with buggy implementation for instance.
Fixes#21293
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The GETINFO extra-info/digest/<digest> broke in commit 568dc27a19 that
refactored the base16_decode() API to return the decoded length.
Unfortunately, that if() condition should have checked for the correct length
instead of an error which broke the command in tor-0.2.9.1-alpha.
Fixes#22034
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Pinning EntryNodes along with hidden services can be possibly harmful (for
instance #14917 and #21155) so at the very least warn the operator if this is
the case.
Fixes#21155
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When we "fixed" #18280 in 4e4a7d2b0c
in 0291 it appears that we introduced a bug: The base32_encode
function can read off the end of the input buffer, if the input
buffer size modulo 5 is not equal to 0 or 3.
This is not completely horrible, for two reasons:
* The extra bits that are read are never actually used: so this
is only a crash when asan is enabled, in the worst case. Not a
data leak.
* The input sizes passed to base32_encode are only ever multiples
of 5. They are all either DIGEST_LEN (20), REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN
(10), sizeof(rand_bytes) in addressmap.c (10), or an input in
crypto.c that is forced to a multiple of 5.
So this bug can't actually trigger in today's Tor.
Closes bug 21894; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
When a client tried to connect to an invalid port of an hidden service, a
warning was printed:
[warn] connection_edge_process_relay_cell (at origin) failed.
This is because the connection subsystem wants to close the circuit because
the port can't be found and then returns a negative reason to achieve that.
However, that specific situation triggered a warning. This commit prevents it
for the specific case of an invalid hidden service port.
Fixes#16706
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
In order to avoid src/or/hs_service.o to contain no symbols and thus making
clang throw a warning, the functions are now exposed not just to unit tests.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The old implementation had duplicated code in a bunch of places, and
it interspersed spool-management with resource management. The new
implementation should make it easier to add new resource types and
maintain the spooling code.
Closing ticket 21651.
When calculating max sampled size, Tor would only count the number of
bridges in torrc, without considering that our state file might already
have sampled bridges in it. This caused problems when people swap
bridges, since the following error would trigger:
[warn] Not expanding the guard sample any further; just hit the
maximum sample threshold of 1
This patch adds a new timer that is executed when it is time to expire
our current set of old onion keys. Because of proposal #274 this can no
longer be assumed to be at the same time we rotate our onion keys since
they will be updated less frequently.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21641
We could use one of these for holding "junk" descriptors and
unparseable things -- but we'll _need_ it for having cached
consensuses and diffs between them.
Windows doesn't let you check the socket error for a socket with
WSAGetLastError() and getsockopt(SO_ERROR). But
getsockopt(SO_ERROR) clears the error on the socket, so you can't
call it more than once per error.
When we introduced recv_ni to help drain alert sockets, back in
0.2.6.3-alpha, we had the failure path for recv_ni call getsockopt()
twice, though: once to check for EINTR and one to check for EAGAIN.
Of course, we never got the eagain, so we treated it as an error,
and warned about: "No error".
The fix here is to have these functions return -errno on failure.
Fixes bug 21540; bugfix on 0.2.6.3-alpha.
The 64-bit load and store code was generating pretty bad output with
my compiler, so I extracted the code from csiphash and used that instead.
Close ticket 21737
This patch removes the `tor_fgets()` wrapper around `fgets(3)` since it
is no longer needed. The function was created due to inconsistency
between the returned values of `fgets(3)` on different versions of Unix
when using `fgets(3)` on non-blocking file descriptors, but with the
recent changes in bug #21654 we switch from unbuffered to direct I/O on
non-blocking file descriptors in our utility module.
We continue to use `fgets(3)` directly in the geoip and dirserv module
since this usage is considered safe.
This patch also removes the test-case that was created to detect
differences in the implementation of `fgets(3)` as well as the changes
file since these changes was not included in any releases yet.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21654
This patch removes the buffered I/O stream usage in process_handle_t and
its related utility functions. This simplifies the code and avoids racy
code where we used buffered I/O on non-blocking file descriptors.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21654
Make hidden services with 8 to 10 introduction points check for failed
circuits immediately after startup. Previously, they would wait for 5
minutes before performing their first checks.
Fixes bug 21594; bugfix on commit 190aac0eab in Tor 0.2.3.9-alpha.
Reported by alecmuffett.
This change is the only one necessary to allow future versions of
the microdescriptor consensus to replace every 'published' date with
e.g. 2038-01-01 00:00:00; this will save 50-75% in compressed
microdescriptor diff size, which is quite significant.
This commit is a minimal change for 0.2.9; future series will
reduce the use of the 'published' date even more.
Implements part of ticket 21642; implements part of proposal 275.
Previously, they would stop checking when they exceeded their intro point
creation limit.
Fixes bug 21596; bugfix on commit d67bf8b2f2 in Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha.
Reported by alecmuffett.
Previously, they would stop checking when they exceeded their intro point
creation limit.
Fixes bug 21596; bugfix on commit d67bf8b2f2 in Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha.
Reported by alecmuffett.
This patch adds the `tor_fgets()` function to our compatibility layer.
`tor_fgets()` adds an additional check for whether the error-bit have
been enabled for the given file stream, if that is the case and `errno`
is set to `EAGAIN` we make sure that we always return NULL.
Unfortunately `fgets(3)` behaves differently on different versions of
the C library.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/21416
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/20988
- Make sure we check at least two guards for descriptor before making
circuits. We typically use the first primary guard for circuits, but
it can also happen that we use the second primary guard (e.g. if we
pick our first primary guard as an exit), so we should make sure we
have descriptors for both of them.
- Remove BUG() from the guard_has_descriptor() check since we now know
that this can happen in rare but legitimate situations as well, and we
should just move to the next guard in that case.
(But use bash if it's available.)
This is a workaround until we remove bash-specific code in 19699.
Fixes bug 21581; bugfix on 21562, not in any released version of tor.
Previously I'd made a bad assumption in the implementation of
prop271 in 0.3.0.1-alpha: I'd assumed that there couldn't be two
guards with the same identity. That's true for non-bridges, but in
the bridge case, we allow two bridges to have the same ID if they
have different addr:port combinations -- in order to have the same
bridge ID running multiple PTs.
Fortunately, this assumption wasn't deeply ingrained: we stop
enforcing the "one guard per ID" rule in the bridge case, and
instead enforce "one guard per <id,addr,port>".
We also needed to tweak our implementation of
get_bridge_info_for_guard, since it made the same incorrect
assumption.
Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
This feature makes it possible to turn off memory sentinels (like
those used for safety in buffers.c and memarea.c) when fuzzing, so
that we can catch bugs that they would otherwise prevent.
Since 0.2.4.11-alpha (in 0196647970) we've tried to randomize
the start time to up to some time in the past. But unfortunately we
allowed the start time to be in the future as well, which isn't
really legit.
The new behavior lets the start time be be up to
MAX(cert_lifetime-2days, 0) in the past, but never in the future.
Fixes bug 21420; bugfix on 0.2.4.11-alpha.
Increase the fallback stability requirement to 30 days.
When this was at 7 days, we chose far too many unstable fallbacks.
Decrease the guard flag requirement to 0.8.
When this was at 0.9, we lost too many fallbacks due to version upgrades.
(The running and v2dir flags ensure DirPorts are available to clients.)
Partial fixes to #20913.
When encoding a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, we were using the sizeof() on a
pointer instead of using the real size of the destination buffer leading to an
overflow passing an enormous value to the signing digest function.
Fortunately, that value was only used to make sure the destination buffer
length was big enough for the key size and in this case it always was because
of the overflow.
Fixes#21553
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
strto* and _atoi64 accept +, -, and various whitespace before numeric
characters. And permitted whitespace is different between POSIX and Windows.
Fixes bug 21507 and part of 21508; bugfix on 0.0.8pre1.
Instead of returning 404 error code, this led to a NULL pointer being used and
thus a crash of tor.
Fixes#21471
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
