Add the bootstrap tag name to the log messages, so people
troubleshooting connection problems can look up a symbol instead of a
number. Closes ticket 28731.
Merge Phoul's two lists into teor's list.
Replace the 150 fallbacks originally introduced in Tor 0.3.3.1-alpha in
January 2018 (of which ~115 were still functional), with a list of
157 fallbacks (92 new, 65 existing, 85 removed) generated in
December 2018.
Closes ticket 24803.
Replace the 150 fallbacks originally introduced in Tor 0.3.3.1-alpha in
January 2018 (of which ~115 were still functional), with a list of
148 fallbacks (89 new, 59 existing, 91 removed) generated in
December 2018.
Closes ticket 24803.
If a relay matches at least one fingerprint, IPv4 address, or IPv6
address in the fallback whitelist, it can become a fallback. This
reduces the work required to keep the list up to date.
Closes ticket 28768.
Tor clients on 0.3.5.6-rc? and later will use a consensus that will become
valid up to 24 hours in the future.
Clients on 0.3.5.5-alpha? and earlier won't accept future consensuses.
Update the fallback expiry tolerance to match tor's checks.
Part of 28768, follow-up on 28591.
Tor clients will use a consensus that expired up to 24 hours ago.
Clients on 0.3.5.5-alpha? and earlier won't select guards from an expired
consensus, but they can still bootstrap if they have existing guards.
Update the fallback expiry tolerance to match tor's checks.
Part of 28768, follow-up on 24661.
Removing a ".auth" file revokes a client access to the service but the
rendezvous circuit is not closed service side because the service simply
doesn't know which circuit is for which client.
This commit notes in the man page that to fully revoke a client access to the
service, the tor process should be restarted.
Closes#28275
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch explicitly specifies the path to our OpenSSL dependency and
disables the installation of an external OpenSSL version and instead
uses the OpenSSL version available from the MinGW environments.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/28574
Specifically, if the consensus is older than the (estimted or
measured) release date for this version of tor, we assume that the
required versions may have changed in between that consensus and
this release.
Implements ticket 27735 and proposal 297.
This patch has routers use the same canonicalization logic as
authorities when encoding their family lists. Additionally, they
now warn if any router in their list is given by nickname, since
that's error-prone.
This patch also adds some long-overdue tests for family formatting.
To succesful compile tor-print-ed-signing-cert.exe on Windows we
sometimes need to include the @TOR_LIB_GDI@ library.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/28485
By adding a file to the ClientOnionAuthDir and sending a HUP signal, tor would
load the new file and use it. However, that doesn't work with the Sandbox
since post initilization, nothing can be changed.
Document in the manpage that limitation within the Sandbox description.
Closes#28128
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Correctly identify Windows 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2008
and later from their NT versions.
On recent Windows versions, the GetVersionEx() function may report
an earlier Windows version than the running OS. To avoid user
confusion, add "[or later]" to Tor's version string on affected
versions of Windows.
Remove Windows versions that were never supported by the
GetVersionEx() function.
Stop duplicating the latest Windows version in get_uname().
Fixes bug 28096; bugfix on 0.2.2.34; reported by Keifer Bly.
In conn_close_if_marked(), we can decide to keep a connection open that still
has data to flush on the wire if it is being rate limited on the write side.
However, in this process, we were also looking at the read() side which can
still have token in its bucket and thus not stop the reading. This lead to a
BUG() introduced in 0.3.4.1-alpha that was expecting the read side to be
closed due to the rate limit but which only applies on the write side.
This commit removes any bandwidth check on the read side and simply stop the
read side on the connection regardless of the bucket state. If we keep the
connection open to flush it out before close, we should not read anything.
Fixes#27750
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
