on #9686, gmorehose reports that the 500 MB lower limit is too high
for raspberry pi users.
This is a backport of 647248729f to 0.2.4.
Note that in 0.2.4, the option is called MaxMemInCellQueues.
When clearing a list of tokens, it's important to do token_clear()
on them first, or else any keys they contain will leak. This didn't
leak memory on any of the successful microdescriptor parsing paths,
but it does leak on some failing paths when the failure happens
during tokenization.
Fixes bug 11618; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
The server cipher list is (thanks to #11513) chosen systematically to
put the best choices for Tor first. The client cipher list is chosen
to resemble a browser. So let's set SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
to have the servers pick according to their own preference order.
Back in 175b2678, we allowed servers to recognize clients who are
telling them the truth about their ciphersuites, and select the best
cipher from on that list. This implemented the server side of proposal
198.
In bugs 11492, 11498, and 11499, cypherpunks found a bunch of mistakes
and omissions and typos in the UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST we had.
In #11513, I found a couple more.
Rather than try to hand-edit this list, I wrote a short python script
to generate our ciphersuite preferences from the openssl headers.
The new rules are:
* Require forward secrecy.
* Require RSA (since our servers only configure RSA keys)
* Require AES or 3DES. (This means, reject RC4, DES, SEED, CAMELLIA,
and NULL.)
* No export ciphersuites.
Then:
* Prefer AES to 3DES.
* If both suites have the same cipher, prefer ECDHE to DHE.
* If both suites have the same DHE group type, prefer GCM to CBC.
* If both suites have the same cipher mode, prefer SHA384 to SHA256
to SHA1.
* If both suites have the same digest, prefer AES256 to AES128.
The major changes are to re-order some ciphers, to drop the ECDH suites
(note: *not* ECDHE: ECDHE is still there), to kill off some made-up
stuff (like the SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA suite), to drop
some of the DSS suites... *and* to enable the ECDHE+GCM ciphersuites.
This change is autogenerated by get_mozilla_ciphers.py from
Firefox 28 and OpenSSL 1.0.1g.
Resolves ticket 11438.
We are searching @CONFDIR@ before $HOME, but the documentation
implied otherwise.
I screwed this up in f5e86bcd6c, when I
first documented the $HOME/.torrc possibility.
Fix for bug 9213; bugfix on 0.2.3.18-rc.
This prevents long stalls when we're starting with a state file but
with no bridge descriptors. Fixes bug 9229. I believe this bug has
been present since 0.2.0.3-alpha.
See 1d2179bc90 in master for details.
"""
Fall back to registered country if necessary.
When extracting geoip and geoip6 files from MaxMind's GeoLite2 Country
database, we only look at country->iso_code which is the two-character ISO
3166-1 country code of the country where MaxMind believes the end user is
located.
But if MaxMind thinks a range belongs to anonymous proxies, they don't put
anything there. Hence, we omit those ranges and resolve them all to '??'.
That's not what we want.
What we should do is first try country->iso_code, and if there's no such
key, try registered_country->iso_code which is the country in which the
ISP has registered the IP address.
In short: let's fill all A1 entries with what ARIN et. al think.
"""
Apparently fedora currently has ECDH but not P224. This isn't a huge
deal, since we no longer use OpenSSL's P224 ever (see #9780 and
72c1e5acfe). But we shouldn't have segfaulting benchmarks really.
Fixes bug 10835; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
Right now this accounts for about 1% of circuits over all, but if you
pick a guard that's running 0.2.3, it will be about 6% of the circuits
running through that guard.
Making sure that every circuit has at least one ntor link means that
we're getting plausibly good forward secrecy on every circuit.
This implements ticket 9777,
When I introduced the unusable_for_new_circuits flag in
62fb209d83, I had a spurious ! in the
circuit_stream_is_being_handled loop. This made us decide that
non-unusable circuits (that is, usable ones) were the ones to avoid,
and caused it to launch a bunch of extra circuits.
Fixes bug 10456; bugfix on 0.2.4.12-alpha.
This fixes bug 10402, where the rdrand engine would use the rdrand
instruction, not as an additional entropy source, but as a replacement
for the entire userspace PRNG. That's obviously stupid: even if you
don't think that RDRAND is a likely security risk, the right response
to an alleged new alleged entropy source is never to throw away all
previously used entropy sources.
Thanks to coderman and rl1987 for diagnosing and tracking this down.
The 'body' field of a microdesc_t holds a strdup()'d value if the
microdesc's saved_location field is SAVED_IN_JOURNAL or
SAVED_NOWHERE, and holds a pointer to the middle of an mmap if the
microdesc is SAVED_IN_CACHE. But we weren't setting that field
until a while after we parsed the microdescriptor, which left an
interval where microdesc_free() would try to free() the middle of
the mmap().
This patch also includes a regression test.
This is a fix for #10409; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
Conflicts:
src/or/or.h
src/or/relay.c
Conflicts were simple to resolve. More fixes were needed for
compilation, including: reinstating the tv_to_msec function, and renaming
*_conn_cells to *_chan_cells.
Previously, when we ran low on memory, we'd close whichever circuits
had the most queued cells. Now, we close those that have the
*oldest* queued cells, on the theory that those are most responsible
for us running low on memory, and that those are the least likely to
actually drain on their own if we wait a little longer.
Based on analysis from a forthcoming paper by Jansen, Tschorsch,
Johnson, and Scheuermann. Fixes bug 9093.
Also fix a bug where if the guard we choose first doesn't answer, we
would try the second guard, but once we connected to the second guard
we would abandon it and retry the first one, slowing down bootstrapping.
The fix in both cases is to treat all our initially chosen guards as
acceptable to use.
Fixes bug 9946.
According to the manpage, bridges use P256 for conformity and relays
use P224 for speed. But skruffy points out that we've gotten it
backwards in the code.
In this patch, we make the default P256 for everybody.
Fixes bug 9780; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha.
This is probably not an exploitable bug, since you would need to have
errno be a large negative value in the unix pluggable-transport launcher
case. Still, best avoided.
Fixes bug 9928; bugfix on 0.2.3.18-rc.
By calling circuit_n_chan_done() unconditionally on close, we were
closing pending connections that might not have been pending quite for
the connection we were closing. Fix for bug 9880.
Thanks to skruffy for finding this and explaining it patiently until
we understood.
To fix#6033, we disabled TLS 1.1 and 1.2. Eventually, OpenSSL fixed
the bug behind #6033.
I've considered alternate implementations that do more testing to see
if there's secretly an OpenSSL 1.0.1c or something that secretly has a
backport of the OpenSSL 1.0.1e fix, and decided against it on the
grounds of complexity.
This isn't actually much of an issue, since only relays send
AUTHENTICATE cells, but while we're removing timestamps, we might as
well do this too.
Part of proposal 222. I didn't take the approach in the proposal of
using a time-based HMAC, since that was a bad-prng-mitigation hack
from SSL3, and in real life, if you don't have a good RNG, you're
hopeless as a Tor server.
For now, round down to the nearest 10 minutes. Later, eliminate entirely by
setting a consensus parameter.
(This rounding is safe because, in 0.2.2, where the timestamp mattered,
REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL was a nice generous 60 minutes.)
