It _should_ work, and I don't see a reason that it wouldn't, but
just in case, add a 10 second timer to make tor die with an
assertion failure if it's supposed to exit but it doesn't.
This function was never about 'finishing' the event loop, but rather
about making sure that the code outside the event loop would be run
at least once.
Sometimes when we call exit(), it's because the process is
completely hopeless: openssl has a broken AES-CTR implementation, or
the clock is in the 1960s, or something like that.
But sometimes, we should return cleanly from tor_main() instead, so
that embedders can keep embedding us and start another Tor process.
I've gone through all the exit() and _exit() calls to annotate them
with "exit ok" or "XXXX bad exit" -- the next step will be to fix
the bad exit()s.
First step towards 23848.
By convention, a function that frobs a foo_t should be called
foo_frob, and it should have a foo_t * as its first argument. But
for many of the buf_t functions, the buf_t was the final argument,
which is silly.
Our convention is that functions which manipulate a type T should be
named T_foo. But the buffer functions were super old, and followed
all kinds of conventions. Now they're uniform.
Here's the perl I used to do this:
\#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
s/read_to_buf\(/buf_read_from_socket\(/;
s/flush_buf\(/buf_flush_to_socket\(/;
s/read_to_buf_tls\(/buf_read_from_tls\(/;
s/flush_buf_tls\(/buf_flush_to_tls\(/;
s/write_to_buf\(/buf_add\(/;
s/write_to_buf_compress\(/buf_add_compress\(/;
s/move_buf_to_buf\(/buf_move_to_buf\(/;
s/peek_from_buf\(/buf_peek\(/;
s/fetch_from_buf\(/buf_get_bytes\(/;
s/fetch_from_buf_line\(/buf_get_line\(/;
s/fetch_from_buf_line\(/buf_get_line\(/;
s/buf_remove_from_front\(/buf_drain\(/;
s/peek_buf_startswith\(/buf_peek_startswith\(/;
s/assert_buf_ok\(/buf_assert_ok\(/;
The service needs the latest SRV and set of relays for the best accurate
hashring to upload its descriptor to so it needs a live consensus thus don't
do anything until we have it.
Fixes#23331
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This cache keeps track of the state of intro points which is needed when we
have failures when using them. It is similar to the failure cache of the
legacy system.
At this commit, it is unused but initialized, cleanup and freed.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Add the main loop entry point to the HS service subsystem. It is run every
second and make sure that all services are in their quiescent state after that
which means valid descriptors, all needed circuits opened and latest
descriptors have been uploaded.
For now, only v2 is supported and placeholders for v3 actions for that main
loop callback.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The condition was always true meaning that we would reconsider updating our
directory information every 2 minutes.
If valid_until is 6am today, then now - 24h == 1pm yesterday which means that
"valid_until < (now - 24h)" is false. But at 6:01am tomorrow, "valid_until <
(now - 24h)" becomes true which is that point that we shouldn't trust the
consensus anymore.
Fixes#23091
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Introduces hs_init() located in hs_common.c which initialize the entire HS v3
subsystem. This is done _prior_ to the options being loaded because we need to
allocate global data structure before we load the configuration.
The hs_free_all() is added to release everything from tor_free_all().
Note that both functions do NOT handle v2 service subsystem but does handle
the common interface that both v2 and v3 needs such as the cache and
circuitmap.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Add the hs_config.{c|h} files contains everything that the HS subsystem needs
to load and configure services. Ultimately, it should also contain client
functions such as client authorization.
This comes with a big refactoring of rend_config_services() which has now
changed to only configure a single service and it is stripped down of the
common directives which are now part of the generic handler.
This is ground work for prop224 of course but only touches version 2 services
and add XXX note for version 3.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
These statistics were largely ununsed, and kept track of statistical information
on things like how many time we had done TLS or how many signatures we had
verified. This information is largely not useful, and would only be logged
after receiving a SIGUSR1 signal (but only if the logging severity level was
less than LOG_INFO).
* FIXES#19871.
* REMOVES note_crypto_pk_op(), dump_pk_op(), and pk_op_counts from
src/or/rephist.c.
* REMOVES every external call to these functions.
Previously we could sometimes change our signing key, but not
regenerate the certificates (signing->link and signing->auth) that
were signed with it. Also, we would regularly replace our TLS x.509
link certificate (by rotating our TLS context) but not replace our
signing->link ed25519 certificate. In both cases, the resulting
inconsistency would make other relays reject our link handshakes.
Fixes two cases of bug 22460; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
This gives an indication in the log that Tor was built with Rust
support, as well as laying some groundwork for further string-returning
APIs to be converted to Rust
Failure to do this caused an assertion failure with #22246 . This
assertion failure can be triggered remotely, so we're tracking it as
medium-severity TROVE-2017-002.
