* ADD new /src/common/crypto_rand.[ch] module.
* ADD new /src/common/crypto_util.[ch] module (contains the memwipe()
function, since all crypto_* modules need this).
* FIXES part of #24658: https://bugs.torproject.org/24658
We moved the crypto_pk_obselete_* functions into crypto_rsa.[ch] because they fit
better with the RSA module.
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Add two new files (crypto_digest.c, crypto_digest.h) as new module of
crypto.[ch]. This new module includes all functions and dependencies related
to digest and xof operations. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch].
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Add two new files (crypto_rsa.c, crypto_rsa.h) as new module of crypto.[ch].
This new module includes all functions and dependencies related to RSA
operations. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch].
All new changes related to RSA operations must be done in these files.
Follows #24658
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Add two new files (crypto_openssl.c, crypto_openssl.h) as new module of
crypto.[ch]. This new module includes all functions and dependencies related
to OpenSSL management. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch].
All new changes related to OpenSSL management must be done in these files.
Follows #24658
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffernandezmancera@gmail.com>
This commit was made mechanically by this perl script:
\#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p
next if /^#define FREE_AND_NULL/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL\((\w+),/FREE_AND_NULL\(${1}_t, ${1}_free_,/;
s/\bFREE_AND_NULL_UNMATCHED\(/FREE_AND_NULL\(/;
Use this value instead of hardcoded values of 32 everywhere. This also
addresses the use of REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 in
hs_lookup_last_hid_serv_request() for the HSDir encoded identity digest length
which is accurate but semantically wrong.
Fixes#23305.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We need to keep these around for TAP and old-style hidden services,
but they're obsolete, and we shouldn't encourage anyone to use them.
So I've added "obsolete" to their names, and a comment explaining
what the problem is.
Closes ticket 23026.
- Move some crypto structures so that they are visible by tests.
- Introduce a func to count number of hops in cpath which will be used
by the tests.
- Mark a function as mockable.
We have a mock for our RSA key generation function, so we now wire
it to pk_generate(). This covers all the cases that were not using
pk_generate() before -- all ~93 of them.
This is a big-ish patch, but it's very straightforward. Under this
clang warning, we're not actually allowed to have a global variable
without a previous extern declaration for it. The cases where we
violated this rule fall into three roughly equal groups:
* Stuff that should have been static.
* Stuff that was global but where the extern was local to some
other C file.
* Stuff that was only global when built for the unit tests, that
needed a conditional extern in the headers.
The first two were IMO genuine problems; the last is a wart of how
we build tests.
They are no longer "all" digests, but only the "common" digests.
Part of 17795.
This is an automated patch I made with a couple of perl one-liners:
perl -i -pe 's/crypto_digest_all/crypto_common_digests/g;' src/*/*.[ch]
perl -i -pe 's/\bdigests_t\b/common_digests_t/g;' src/*/*.[ch]
This is an eXtendable-Output Function with the following claimed
security strengths against *all* adversaries:
Collision: min(d/2, 256)
Preimage: >= min(d, 256)
2nd Preimage: min(d, 256)
where d is the amount of output used, in bits.
* DIGEST_SHA3_[256,512] added as supported algorithms, which do
exactly what is said on the tin.
* test/bench now benchmarks all of the supported digest algorithms,
so it's possible to see just how slow SHA-3 is, though the message
sizes could probably use tweaking since this is very dependent on
the message size vs the SHA-3 rate.
These functions must really never fail; so have crypto_rand() assert
that it's working okay, and have crypto_seed_rng() demand that
callers check its return value. Also have crypto_seed_rng() check
RAND_status() before returning.
