This is a feature removal: we no longer fake any ciphersuite other
than the not-really-standard SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
(0xfeff). This change will let servers rely on our actually
supporting what we claim to support, and thereby let Tor migrate to
better TLS ciphersuites.
As a drawback, Tor instances that use old openssl versions and
openssl builds with ciphers disabled will no longer give the
"firefox" cipher list.
Manually removed range 0.116.0.0 to 0.119.255.255 which Maxmind says is
assigned to AT. This is very likely a bug in their database, because
0.0.0.0/8 is a reserved range.
The function is not guaranteed to NUL-terminate its output. It
*is*, however, guaranteed not to generate more than two bytes per
multibyte character (plus terminating nul), so the general approach
I'm taking is to try to allocate enough space, AND to manually add a
NUL at the end of each buffer just in case I screwed up the "enough
space" thing.
Fixes bug 5909.
This feature can make Tor relays less identifiable by their use of the
mod_ssl DH group, but at the cost of some usability (#4721) and bridge
tracing (#6087) regressions.
We should try to turn this on by default again if we find that the
mod_ssl group is uncommon and/or we move to a different DH group size
(see #6088). Before we can do so, we need a fix for bugs #6087 and
Resolves ticket #5598 for now.
These stats are currently discarded, but we might as well
hard-disable them on bridges, to be clean.
Fix for bug 5824; bugfix on 0.2.1.17-rc.
Patch originally by Karsten Loesing.
This code shouldn't have any effect in 0.2.3, since we already accept
(and handle) data received while we are expecting a renegotiation.
(That's because the 0.2.3.x handshake _does_ have data there instead of
the renegotiation.)
I'm leaving it in anyway, since if it breaks anything, we'll want it
broken in master too so we can find out about it. I added an XXX023
comment so that we can come back later and fix that.
This fixes a DoS issue where a client could send so much data in 5
minutes that they exhausted the server's RAM. Fix for bug 5934 and
6007. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc, which enabled the v2 handshake.
It appears that when OpenSSL negotiates a 1.1 or 1.2 connection, and it
decides to renegotiate, the client will send a record with version "1.0"
rather than with the current TLS version. This would cause the
connection to fail whenever both sides had OpenSSL 1.0.1, and the v2 Tor
handshake was in use.
As a workaround, disable TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. When a later version of
OpenSSL is released, we can make this conditional on running a fixed
version of OpenSSL.
Alternatively, we could disable TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 only on the client
side. But doing it this way for now means that we not only fix TLS with
patched clients; we also fix TLS when the server has this patch and the
client does not. That could be important to keep the network running
well.
Fixes bug 6033.
Conflicts:
src/test/test_util.c
Merge the unit tests; I added some when I did this branch against
0.2.2, and then the test format changed and master added more tests.
Conflicts:
src/common/compat.h
Conflict was between replacement of MS_WINDOWS with _WIN32 in
master, and with removal of file_handle from tor_mmap_t struct in
close_file_mapping branch (for bug 5951 fix).
