Because as Teor puts it: "[Resetting on 503] is exactly what we
don't want when relays are busy - imagine clients doing an automatic
reset every time they DoS a relay..."
Fixes bug 20593.
The test was broken and skipped because the hardcoded cross certificate didn't
include the dynamically generated signing key generated by the test. The only
way we could have fixed that is extracting the signing key from the hardcoded
string and put it in the descriptor object or dynamically generate the cross
certificate.
In the end, all this was kind of pointless as we already test the decoding of
multiple introduction points elsewhere and we don't gain anything with that
specific test thus the removal.
Fixes#20570
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
As of #19899, we decided to allow any relay understanding the onion service
version 3 protocol to be able to use it. The service and client will be the
one controlled by a consensus parameter (different one for both of them) but
if you are a relay and you can understand a protocol, basically you should use
the feature.
Closes#19899
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
It's only safe to remove the failure limit (per 20536) if we are in
fact waiting a bit longer each time we try to download.
Fixes bug 20534; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
If a consensus expires while we are waiting for certificates to download,
stop waiting for certificates.
If we stop waiting for certificates less than a minute after we started
downloading them, do not consider the certificate download failure a
separate failure.
Fixes bug 20533; bugfix on commit e0204f21 in 0.2.0.9-alpha.
Relays do not deliberately launch multiple attempts, so the impact of this
bug should be minimal. This fix also defends against bugs like #20499.
Bugfix on 0.2.8.1-alpha.
(OpenSSL 1.1 makes EVP_CIPHER_CTX opaque, _and_ adds acceleration
for counter mode on more architectures. So it won't work if we try
the older approach, and it might help if we try the newer one.)
Fixes bug 20588.
