When a relay is collecting internal statistics about how many
create cell requests it has seen of each type, accurately count the
requests from relays that temporarily fall out of the consensus.
(To be extra conservative, we were already ignoring requests from clients
in our counts, and we continue ignoring them here.)
Fixes bug 24910; bugfix on 0.2.4.17-rc.
Directory authorities no longer vote in favor of the Guard flag
for relays that don't advertise directory support.
Starting in Tor 0.3.0.1-alpha, Tor clients have been avoiding using
such relays in the Guard position, leading to increasingly broken load
balancing for the 5%-or-so of Guards that don't advertise directory
support.
Fixes bug 22310; bugfix on 0.3.0.6.
Add a missing lock acquisition around access to queued_control_events
in control_free_all(). Use the reassign-and-unlock strategy as in
queued_events_flush_all(). Fixes bug 25675. Coverity found this bug,
but only after we recently added an access to
flush_queued_event_pending.
The earlier checks in this function should ensure that components is
always nonempty. But in case somebody messes with them in the
future, let's add an extra check to make sure we aren't crashing.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
Coverity found a null pointer reference in nodelist_add_microdesc().
This is almost certainly impossible assuming that the routerstatus_t
returned by router_get_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest() always
corresponds to an entry in the nodelist. Fixes bug 25629.
If we failed to connect at the TCP level to a relay, note it down and refuse
to connect again for another 60 seconds.
Fixes#24767
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This update is needed to make it consistent with the behavior of
node_awaiting_ipv6(), which doesn't believe in the addresses from
routerinfos unless it actually plans to use those routerinfos.
Fixes bug 25213; bugfix on b66b62fb75 in 0.3.3.1-alpha,
which tightened up the definition of node_awaiting_ipv6().
There was a nonfatal assertion in pathbias_should_count that would
trigger if onehop_tunnel was set, but the desired_path_length was
greater than 1. This patch fixes that. Fixes bug 24903; bugfix on
0.2.5.2-alpha.
These tests handle incoming and outgoing cells on a three-hop
circuit, and make sure that the crypto works end-to-end. They don't
yet test spec conformance, leaky-pipe, or various error cases.
Make sure we actually only report client channel to the geoip cache instead of
looking if it is a known relay. Looking if it is a known relay can be
unreliable because they come and go from the consensus.
Fixes#24904
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Because of #25306 for which we are unable to reproduce nor understand how it
is possible, this commit removes the asserts() and BUG() on the missing
descriptors instead when rotating them.
This allows us to log more data on error but also to let tor recover
gracefully instead of dying.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch adds some additional logging to circuits_handle_oom() to give
us more information about which specific compression backend that is
using a certain amount of memory.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/25372
These declarations need to exist unconditionally, but they were
trapped inside an "#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SYSLOG_H)) */" block.
Fixes a travis regression caused by 23881; bug not in any released tor.
Additionally, this change extracts the functions that created and
freed these elements.
These structures had common "forward&reverse stream&digest"
elements, but they were initialized and freed through cpath objects,
and different parts of the code depended on them. Now all that code
is extacted, and kept in relay_crypto.c
This should help us improve modularity, and should also make it
easier for people to experiment with other relay crypto strategies
down the road.
This commit is pure function movement.
This function is used upon receiving a cell, and only handles the
decrypting part. The encryption part is currently handled inside
circuit_package_relay_cell.
This should avoid most intermittent test failures on developer and CI machines,
but there could (and probably should) be a more elegant solution.
Also, this test was testing that the IP was created and its expiration time was
set to a time greater than or equal to `now+INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS+5`:
/* Time to expire MUST also be in that range. We add 5 seconds because
* there could be a gap between setting now and the time taken in
* service_intro_point_new. On ARM, it can be surprisingly slow... */
tt_u64_op(ip->time_to_expire, OP_GE,
now + INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS + 5);
However, this appears to be a typo, since, according to the comment above it,
adding five seconds was done because the IP creation can be slow on some
systems. But the five seconds is added to the *minimum* time we're comparing
against, and so it actually functions to make this test *more* likely to fail on
slower systems. (It should either subtract five seconds, or instead add it to
time_to_expire.)
* FIXES#25450: https://bugs.torproject.org/25450
These were meant to demonstrate old behavior, or old rust behavior.
One of them _should_ work in Rust, but won't because of
implementation details. We'll fix that up later.
The C code and the rust code had different separate integer overflow
bugs here. That suggests that we're better off just forbidding this
pathological case.
Also, add tests for expected behavior on receiving a bad protocol
list in a consensus.
Fixes another part of 25249.
I've refactored these to be a separate function, to avoid tricky
merge conflicts.
Some of these are disabled with "XXXX" comments; they should get
fixed moving forward.
This one can only be exploited if you can generate a correctly
signed consensus, so it's not as bad as 25074.
Fixes bug 25251; also tracked as TROVE-2018-004.
In some cases we had checked for it, but in others we had not. One
of these cases could have been used to remotely cause
denial-of-service against directory authorities while they attempted
to vote.
Fixes TROVE-2018-001.
* ADD includes for "torint.h" and "container.h" to crypto_digest.h.
* ADD includes for "crypto_digest.h" to a couple places in which
crypto_digest_t was then missing.
* FIXES part of #24658: https://bugs.torproject.org/24658#comment:30
Folks have found two in the past week or so; we may as well fix the
others.
Found with:
\#!/usr/bin/python3
import re
def findMulti(fname):
includes = set()
with open(fname) as f:
for line in f:
m = re.match(r'^\s*#\s*include\s+["<](\S+)[>"]', line)
if m:
inc = m.group(1)
if inc in includes:
print("{}: {}".format(fname, inc))
includes.add(m.group(1))
import sys
for fname in sys.argv[1:]:
findMulti(fname)
We moved the crypto_pk_obselete_* functions into crypto_rsa.[ch] because they fit
better with the RSA module.
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
since all it does is produce false positives
this commit should get merged into 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 *and* 0.3.1, even
though the code in the previous commit is already present in 0.3.1. sorry
for the mess.
[Cherry-picked]
since all it does is produce false positives
this commit should get merged into 0.2.9 and 0.3.0 *and* 0.3.1, even
though the code in the previous commit is already present in 0.3.1. sorry
for the mess.
This commit takes a piece of commit af8cadf3a9 and a piece of commit
46fe353f25, with the goal of making channel_is_client() be based on what
sort of connection handshake the other side used, rather than seeing
whether the other side ever sent a create_fast cell to us.
We moved the crypto_pk_* digest functions into crypto_rsa.[ch] because they fit
better with the RSA module.
Follows #24658.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net>
Also correct MAX_VERSIONS_TO_EXPAND to match the C.
NOTE that this patch leads to incorrect behavior: the C code allows
huge ranges; it just doesn't allow votes on them (currently). For
full compatibility, we'll need to make the rust code store ranges as
ranges natively, possibly using something like the range_map crate.
Still, this patch is smaller than a "proper" fix.
Fixes TROVE-2018-003.
Since 0.2.4, tor uses EWMA circuit policy to prioritize. The previous
algorithm, round-robin, hasn't been used since then but was still used as a
fallback.
Now that EWMA is mandatory, remove that code entirely and enforce a cmux
policy to be set.
This is part of a circuitmux cleanup to improve performance and reduce
complexity in the code. We'll be able to address future optimization with this
work.
Closes#25268
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The reason to do so is because these functions haven't been used in years so
since 0.2.4, every callsite is NOP.
In future commits, we'll remove the round robin circuit policy which is mostly
validated within those function.
This simplifies the code greatly and remove dead code for which we never had a
configure option in the first place nor an easy way to use them in production.
Part of #25268
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
It is rename to something more meaningful that explains what it does exactly
which is sets the EWMA options (currently only one exists). The new name is
cmux_ewma_set_options().
Also, remove a public function from circuitmux_ewma.h that is only used in the
C file. Make it static inline as well.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
To achieve this, a default value for the CircuitPriorityHalflife option was
needed. We still look in the options and then the consensus but in case no
value can be found, the default CircuitPriorityHalflifeMsec=30000 is used. It
it the value we've been using since 0.2.4.4-alpha.
This means that EWMA, our only policy, can not be disabled anymore fallbacking
to the round robin algorithm. Unneeded code to control that is removed in this
commit.
Part of #25268
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
We had this safeguard around dos_init() but not when the consensus changes
which can modify consensus parameters and possibly enable the DoS mitigation
even if tor wasn't a public relay.
Fixes#25223
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
